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Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against UN peacekeepers over the past decade 
prompted a “zero-tolerance” policy response from high-level UN officials. To facilitate this 
policy, the UN has initiated and implemented various preventative and responsive measures. 
Despite the raft of reforms, it is the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) which have 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over their military contingent members and the current 
framework has been criticised for failing to ensure accountability of offenders. 
In this thesis I explore alternative ways in which the United Nations can improve 
accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse committed by military contingent members 
within its peacekeeping personnel. Applying a feminist lens, I assess these options guided 
by three underlying principles; justice being seen to be done, host state ownership, and UN 
leadership. I first discuss the concepts of sexual exploitation and abuse as defined by the 
UN. Second, I explore whether TCCs could or should be sanctioned for failing to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction. Third, I investigate alternative ways to hold individual peacekeepers 
to account and fourth, I consider the role victims of sexual exploitation and abuse have to 
play and the remedies to which they may be entitled.  
I conclude that it is time for the UN to implement a different solution and remove TCCs’ 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction. I argue that a hybrid court for peacekeepers is the better 
alternative to hold individual perpetrators to account. A hybrid court would incorporate host 
state ownership and provide a clear structure for TCC cooperation and UN leadership. 
Additionally, victim inclusivity would be an important feature of such a court. Victims are 
entitled to effective remedies and I put forward recommendations for targeted and 
transformative reparations. I also recommend a re-draft of the definition of “sexual 
exploitation” to better reflect the primary targeted conduct of survival sex.   
1 
 
PART ONE: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE: ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPERS 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF HOLDING UN PEACEKEEPERS TO ACCOUNT FOR 
ACTS OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE 
In August 2015 Amnesty International reported the rape of a 12 year old girl by a United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeper (in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
the Central African Republic).1 Following these allegations, there were further reports of 
UN peacekeepers involved in the sexual abuse of several young women living in shelters in 
the Central African Republic.2 Unfortunately, sexual exploitation and abuse by UN 
peacekeepers is not an isolated or recent problem but has been present in almost every 
peacekeeping operation. A culture of sexual exploitation and abuse is contrary to the UN’s 
zero-tolerance policy and has been the subject of institutional reforms.3 Despite this, 
allegations of sexual abuse continue to emerge. The system of accountability for acts of 
sexual exploitation and abuse is complicated by the many different categories of UN 
personnel, each with their own set of standards and disciplinary measures. In relation to 
military contingents, it is the troop-contributing country (TCC) that has exclusive 
jurisdiction to investigate, discipline or initiate criminal prosecution.  
The current framework is insufficient to ensure accountability of peacekeeping personnel 
who commit sexual exploitation and abuse. Primary reasons for this gap include the total 
reliance on TCCs to enforce accountability and that victims of sexual exploitation and abuse 
                                                          
1 Amnesty International “CAR: UN Troops implicated in rape of girl and indiscriminate killings must be 
investigated” (news release, 11 August 2015).   
2 T Esslemont “EXCLUSIVE – UN Peacekeepers face new sex allegations in Central African Republic” Trust 
(11 November 2015) www.trust.org.  
3 Such reforms will be discussed below in Chapter One. 
2 
 
cannot enforce their rights as individuals at the international level. Prosecution by troop-
contributing countries rarely happen4 or are not reported on.5 Moreover, the UN is restricted 
by its international agreements with both the contributing state and the host state. As a result, 
justice is neither done nor seen to be done. 
(1) THE PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS 
The aim of this thesis is to examine various ways the United Nations can improve individual 
criminal accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse committed by its peacekeepers, 
focussing on a particular category of personnel; military contingent members. I am 
particularly interested in the perspective of victims, potential victims, and the host state 
communities when looking at these options. My focus is centred on individual criminal 
accountability and criminal justice. It has been argued that such an emphasis on criminal 
law and prosecution as “justice” and a solution to the harms being committed against 
(predominately) women neglects other concepts of “justice” that may exist.6 Victims of 
sexual exploitation and abuse, for example, may not necessarily view the criminal 
prosecution of offenders as “justice”, but rather attach “justice” to receiving restorative 
measures or remedies. Therefore, while this thesis focuses on individual criminal 
accountability, it does not do so as to exclude other measures that might be explored and 
utilised to address sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. However, in an attempt 
                                                          
4 The UN Conduct and Discipline Unit (which records statistics relating to misconduct by peacekeeping 
personnel) does not publish which TCCs are involved in allegations or the outcome of investigations, however, 
world media reports some examples of prosecution by TCCs see for example Garces R O “Uruguay: 
Peacekeepers Accused of Sexual Abuse in Haiti Jailed” Huffington Post (11 September 2011) 
www.huffingtonpost.com; AFP “Pakistan UN peacekeeping role at risk after 3 punished in Haiti sexual abuse 
case” (14 March 2012) The Express Tribune www.tribune.com.pk. 
5 Acknowledged by the Secretary-General after the 2015 allegations in the Central African Republic were 
revealed, see “Ban addresses top peacekeeping officials amid allegations of sexual abuse by UN 'blue helmets'” 
(13 August 2015) UN News Centre www.un.org.  
6 See generally, E Bernstein “Militarized humanitarianism meets Carceral Feminism” (2010) 36 SIGNS 45.  
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to mitigate this limitation, this thesis considers restorative concepts and reparations in 
Chapter Nine.  
Applying a feminist lens, I will be guided by three conceptual principles; justice being seen 
to be done, host state ownership, and UN leadership (discussed below). These principles are 
about legitimacy in responding to sexual exploitation and abuse, inclusivity of the host state 
and victims, and transparency for the international community. Overall, the purpose of this 
thesis is to make recommendations about the best steps the UN can take to improve 
individual criminal accountability, whilst complying with these three core underlying 
principles.  
(2) SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis draws on previous research, including academic, non-Governmental Organisation 
(NGO) and UN reports, which have all looked at ways to improve accountability of military 
contingent members. Military personnel will be the primary focus of this thesis. Not only 
are military personnel the most complex in regards to their legal status, they also make-up 
the majority of peacekeeping personnel contributed by member states.7 As a result, a large 
number of sexual exploitation and abuse allegations are against members of military 
contingents.8 Therefore, it is important to consider enforcement issues relevant to military 
forces.   
                                                          
7 As at June 2015 there were over 100,000 military personnel out of a total number of 123,945 UN 
Peacekeepers on mission see United Nations Peacekeeping “Peacekeeping Fact sheet” (30 June 2015) 
<www.un.org>. 
8 In comparison to other categories of personnel, such as civilian, UN police, UN officials and experts on 
mission see the figures for the year 2014 via Report of the Secretary-General Special Measures for Protection 
from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse GA A/69/779 (2015) at [19]. See also R Murphy UN Peacekeeping 
in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in Practice (Cambridge University Press, 
2007) at 23.   
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It appears that the accepted position for academics and policy-makers is to make reference 
to “sexual exploitation and abuse” or “SEA” as one complete and conjoined concept.9 For 
the purposes of this thesis, and for consistency, sexual exploitation and abuse will be used 
to refer to sexual conduct committed by UN Peacekeepers that would be categorised as 
“serious misconduct” under the relevant codes of conduct.10 However, arguably “sexual 
exploitation and abuse” can encompass so many different forms of sexual conduct that it is 
inappropriate or too simplistic to lump them both into one phrase without first making 
certain distinctions. The Secretary-General’s 2003 Bulletin on Special Measures for 
Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (S-G Bulletin) makes an important 
distinction between “sexual exploitation” and “sexual abuse” giving them different 
definitions with different elements of conduct.11 Therefore, Chapter Two will consider each 
term separately. 
Chapter Two will explore “sexual exploitation” as conceptualised under the UN’s zero-
tolerance policy, however it is important to note outright that, for the purposes of this thesis, 
“sexual exploitation” will be defined and limited to “survival sex”. Sexual exploitation, as 
defined by the UN, focuses on the differential power dynamics between peacekeepers and 
the local community, who are often dependent on aid or assistance. The definition of sexual 
exploitation itself was conceived in the early 2000s for investigations conducted by the 
                                                          
9 Some examples include Annex I “Report of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Protection 
from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises” in Report of the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services on the Investigation into Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by aid workers in West Africa GA A/57/465 
(2002);  Secretary-General A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations GA A/59/710 (2005)  prepared by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-
Hussein: [Zeid Report]; C Morris “Peacekeeping and the Sexual Exploitation of women and girls in Post-
Conflict societies: A Serious Enigma” (2010) Journal of International Peacekeeping 184; A J Millar “Legal 
aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations” (2006) Cornell 
International Law Journal 71; M Ndulo “The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Exploitation by 
Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions” (2009) 27 Berkeley Journal of International Law 127. 
10 United Nations Secretary-General’s Bulletin Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and 
Sexual Abuse, UN Secretariat SG ST/SGB/2003/13 (2003): [S-G Bulletin (2003)]; UN Conduct and Discipline 
Unit Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets <http://cdu.unlb.org>; UN Conduct and 
Discipline Unit We are United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel <http://cdu.unlb.org>. 
11 S-G Bulletin (2003), above n 10. 
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OIOS of allegations against peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers in West African 
refugee camps.12 Many of these allegations involved circumstances of survival sex; where 
sex was exchanged for assistance or aid which is already owed to the local population.13 
Arguably, survival sex was the targeted conduct of the OIOS definition which later became 
the definition of “sexual exploitation” in the S-G Bulletin.  
The S-G Bulletin’s definition has received criticism for being potentially broad enough to 
include some consensual sexual relationships between peacekeepers and local women.14 In 
particular, feminist critiques15 have drawn attention to the lack of women’s agency 
represented in the UN’s zero-tolerance policy generally, labelling sex as the problem rather 
than the context in which the exploitation occurs.16 Such context in UN peacekeeping 
operations would include poverty and displacement of the local population thereby creating  
a situation of few economic opportunities, particularly for women,17 and the performance of 
toxic masculinity associated with militaries (both peacekeeping troops and within the host 
                                                          
12 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Investigation into Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
by aid workers in West Africa, above n 9, at 1 and Annex I “Report of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises” at [8]. 
13See The Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse in the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 5 January 
2005, A/59/661 at [12]; Zeid Report, supra n 9, at [6]. 
14 See generally Otto “Making Sense of Zero-Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual Economies” in Muno 
and Stuchin (eds) Sexuality and the Law: Feminist Engagements (Routledge-Cavendish, New York, 2007); O 
Simic Regulation of Sexual Conduct in UN Peacekeeping Operations (Springer Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012). 
15 Explored further in Chapter Two, see also A Harrington Politicisation of Sexual Violence: From 
Abolitionism to Peacekeeping (Ashgate, Surrey, 2010); Jennings “Service, sex, and Security: Gendered 
Peacekeeping Economies in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (2014) 45 Security Dialogue 
313; Jennings and Nikolic-Ristanovic UN Peacekeeping Economies and Local Sex Industries: Connections 
and Implications (MICROCON Research Working Paper 17, September 2009); Kolbe “‘It’s Not a Gift When 
it Comes with Price”: A Qualitative Study of Transactional Sex between UN Peacekeepers and Haitian 
Citizens” (2015) 4 Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 1; Otto, above n 14; J McGill 
“Survival Sex in Peacekeeping Economies: Re-reading the Zero Tolerance Approach to Sexual Exploitation 
and Sexual Abuse in United Nations Peace Support Operations” (2014) 18 Journal of International 
Peacekeeping 1; Simic, above n 14.  
16 Kolbe, above n 15, at 20; Otto, above n 14, at 260-66.  
17 Patel and Tripodi “Peacekeepers, HIV and the Role of Masculinity in Military Behaviour” (2007) 14 
International Peacekeeping 584 at 588; McGill, above n 15, at 6. 
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state).18  By placing local women in a passive role and as inherently vulnerable, the UN’s 
zero-tolerance policy risks supporting cultural and social discrimination against women and 
dismisses the different levels of agency that might be operating in sexual relationships 
between peacekeepers and local women.19  
“Survival sex” may describe a spectrum of possible exchanges between peacekeepers and 
local people: from a starving young woman being forced to exchange sex for humanitarian 
aid or assistance which she is already owed (as a beneficiary of assistance) on one end,20 to 
a local woman who independently approaches peacekeepers to exchange sex for money on 
the other.21 Both circumstances, and the grey area between, are “sexual exploitation” under 
the S-G Bulletin. It is not the intention of this thesis to define where the line should be drawn 
as to what is acceptable behaviour and what is “exploitation”. Instead, I will use the most 
simple and offensive form of survival sex – that of sex being exchanged for aid or assistance 
which is already owed to the local population – as the subject of discussion. This will include 
the scenario of a local woman waiting in line for aid and being forced by a peacekeeper to 
exchange sex for such aid.  
I will not consider adult prostitution as sexual exploitation for the purposes of this thesis. 
There is no internationally agreed position on the so-called exploitative nature of sex work. 
Additionally, there are differing levels of legality across states; where in some states 
                                                          
18 See Higate “Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation” (2007) 10 Men and Masculinities 99; S 
Martin Must Boys be Boys?: Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions (Refugees 
International, October 2005) at 5. 
19 This rhetoric has been particularly embraced in literature about human trafficking for the purposes of sexual 
exploitation see S Milivojevic and S Copic “Victims of Sex Trafficking: Gender, Myths, and Consequences” 
in S G Shohan, P Knepper and M Kett (eds) International Handbook of Victimology (Taylor and Francis, 
Hoboken, 2010); see also Puechguirbal “Peacekeeping” in Shepherd (ed) Gender Matters: A Feminist 
Introduction to International Relations (Taylor and Francis, Hoboken, 2014) at 255-256. 
20 See for example, Human Rights Watch The Power These Men Have Over Us: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
by African Union Forces in Somalia (September 2014) at 22. 
21  See for example, The Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
above n 13, at [18]. 
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prostitution is legal and regulated, such as in New Zealand,22 prostitution is illegal in others, 
such as Pakistan.23 Moreover, prostitution per se has not been considered violence against 
women under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women or the related Recommendation 19 (discussed more in Chapter Two).24 Also, there 
is a notable gap in research regarding the circumstances of sex workers in peacekeeping 
economies. For these reasons, I have excluded soliciting sex from adult prostitutes from 
consideration within this thesis. 
I will be limiting my discussion of “victims” to local women and children. Although it is 
acknowledged that men and gender minorities can and have been victims of sexual 
exploitation by peacekeepers, recorded allegations demonstrate that women and children are 
disproportionately affected.25 Instead of “victims”, the terms “victim-survivor” or 
“survivor” could also be used. According to some feminist scholars,26 the language used in 
relation to such issues involving war-time or post-conflict sexual violence is important. A 
rhetoric that embraces women as vulnerable, helpless victims in need of protection can serve 
discrimination against women; keeping women tied to the notion of “femininity” as 
“vulnerability” undermines efforts to break negative social and cultural gender roles.27 I 
have chosen to frame my thesis around the term “victim” because I have defined a clear 
scope of what that term means in the context of this research (see above).  
                                                          
22 See Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (NZ). 
23 See The Punjab Suppression of Prostitution Ordinance 1961 (PK); Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (PK), section 
377. 
24 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1249 UNTS 13 (opened for 
signature 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981); Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women General Recommendation 19 (11th Session, 1992). 
25 Zeid Report, above n 9, at [12]-[13]; although it is acknowledged that continued focus on “women and 
children” as victims of sexual abuse in the discourse ignores discussion about the sexual abuse of men and 
gender minorities (such as transgendered persons), of which there is a gap in the research.  
26 See below n 27. 
27 This rhetoric has been particularly embraced in literature about human trafficking for the purposes of sexual 
exploitation see Milivojevic and Copic, above n 19; see also Puechguirbal, above n 19, at 255-256. 
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When making reference to “children” I will be referring to those aged less than 18 years. 
Eighteen is the age of maturity set by the S-G Bulletin.28 Moreover, 18 years is the age of 
maturity under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.29 The UN supports its adoption of 
18 years by making reference to the context of unequal power dynamics, the purported 
vulnerability of the local population and the seriousness of sexual exploitation and abuse 
allegations.30  However, this position does ignore the fact that the age of maturity will differ 
between states and that the host state may classify those under the age of 18 as adults for the 
purposes of local custom and law.31 It also erases the agency of young women to make 
decisions regarding their sexual relationships and their bodies. Nevertheless, 18 years is the 
age set by the S-G Bulletin which is the primary document detailing the substantive 
definitions of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation; therefore, for consistency, when I refer 
to “children,” it is to those under the age of 18.  
This thesis represents the law, policies, and academic discourse as at 1 December 2015.32 
(3) THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION OF THIS THESIS 
I aim to apply a feminist lens to the issues raised in this thesis. This lens is placed within the 
feminist theories of anti-essentialism and intersectionality.33 Anti-essentialism rejects the 
notion that there is one universal women’s voice; instead, this theory recognises the variety 
                                                          
28 S-G Bulletin (2003), above n 10, at [3.2(b)].  
29 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into 
force 2 September 1990) [CRC] art 1. 
30 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Investigation into Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
by aid workers in West Africa, above n 9, at [9].  
31 M Kanetake “Whose Zero Tolerance Counts? Reassessing the Zero Tolerance Policy against Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers” (2010) 17 International Peacekeeping 200 at 201. 
32 Since this thesis was initially submitted, there have been two important developments – an Independent 
Review Panel Report (December 2015) and Security Council Resolution 2272 (March 2016). As a result of 
corrections, the Resolution will be referred to in certain parts of this thesis where relevant but without detailed 
analysis. Additionally, the Postscript (after Part Five) will give an overview of the Independent Review Panel 
Report in so far as it is relevant to the thesis.  
33 For an overview of feminist legal theories, particularly how they have been applied in international law see 
H Charlesworth and C Chinkin The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 2000) at 23-61.  
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of experiences between groups of women.34 For example, law or policy which is based on 
the experiences of white, middle-class, heterosexual women will not necessarily be 
applicable to women of colour.35 Ignoring historic social and cultural contexts and 
differences may support further discrimination against one group of women, while another 
may significantly benefit.36 My feminist lens also attempts to reflect the intersectional nature 
of oppression.37 Intersectionality recognises that oppression may not only be based on 
gender, but also class, race, and sexual orientation and these oppressions may be operating 
at the same time and be interrelated.38 Overall, anti-essentialism and intersectionality focus 
on the context in which gender discrimination exists. This feminist lens favours bottom-up 
approaches to accountability centralising the views of victims of violence and their 
communities. Therefore, in addition to the feminist lens, there are three core principles that 
underlie my thesis; firstly, the theory of open justice – that justice should be seen to be done, 
secondly, host state ownership and thirdly, UN leadership. Ultimately, these principles are 
about legitimacy in responding to sexual exploitation and abuse, inclusivity of the host state 
and victims, and transparency to the international and local community. 
In this thesis I am focussing on the United Nations’ role in improving accountability, while 
also centralising the interests of victims, potential victims and host state communities when 
looking at options for greater accountability. Therefore, the three principles seek to guide 
                                                          
34 Charlesworth and Chinkin, above n 33, at 44-46 and 52-56; see also discussion on essentialism and anti-
essentialism by D L Brooks “A Commentary on the Essence of Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory” 
(1994) 2 Feminist Legal Studies 115. 
35 For a critique of essentialism’s impact on women of colour see A P Harri “Race and Essentialism in Feminist 
Legal Theory” (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 581.  
36 Charlesworth and Chinkin, above n 33, at 44-46 and 52-56. 
37 See further K Crenshaw “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) The University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 139; K Crenshaw “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Colour” (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241.  
38 See S N Hasse-Biber Handbook of Feminist Research: Theory and Praxis (2nd ed, SAGE, California, 2012) 
at 154ff; D Staunæ and D M Sondergaard “Intersectionality: A Theoretical Adjustment” in R Buikema, G 
Griffin and N Lykke Theories and Methodologies in Postgraduate Feminist Research: Researching Differently 
(Routledge, London, 2011) 45; Report of the Secretary-General In-Depth Study of all forms of Violence against 
Women GA A/61/122/Add.1 (2006) at 361. 
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assessment of alternative means of holding peacekeepers to account based on these 
viewpoints.  
(A) JUSTICE SEEN TO BE DONE39  
“… it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance, that 
justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen 
to be done.” 
The rhetoric of “justice being seen to be done” is a crucial element of the principle of open 
justice; the public administration of justice.40 This principle has its roots in the common law 
courts of England.41 As such, Commonwealth countries and the United States have 
embraced the principle as a central element of the common law justice system.42 “Open 
justice” is tied to the notions of democracy and accountability.43 Court proceedings, 
particularly criminal cases, should be visible and open to the public; not only should the 
public see justice being done, but also how proceedings are delivered (a check and balance 
on the functioning and role of the judiciary), and to participate (jury or judgement by 
peers).44 Although primarily a common law principle, the theory of open justice is now 
reinforced in international law under art 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (and thus is part of international standards):45 
                                                          
39 Proceeding quote from Rex v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at 259. 
40 See generally C Baylis “Justice Done and Justice Seen to be Done – the Public Administration of Justice” 
(1991) 21 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 177. 
41 For historical overview of the principle of open justice see generally G Nettheim “The Principle of Open 
Justice” (1984) University of Tasmania Law Review 25. 
42 Nettheim, above n 41, at 30-44. 
43 Baylis, above n 40, at 184. 
44 Baylis, above n 40, at 185-186 and 190-191; Hon J J Spigelman CJ “Seen to be Done: The Principle of Open 
Justice” (keynote address to the 31st Australian Legal Convention, Canberra, 9 October 1999) at 24-25 and 
26-28. 
45 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976). 
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All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination 
of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit of 
law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law … any judgement 
rendered in a criminal case shall be made public. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will be focussing on the “justice being seen to be done” 
element of the open justice principle. Under the status quo the troop-contributing state has 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction where a military contingent member commits sexual 
exploitation and abuse; therefore, prosecution (if any) is likely to occur in a foreign country. 
Although troop-contributing states are required to report on outcomes of cases to the UN, 
such reports are inconsistent.46 The United Nations is often in the dark in relation to cases, 
the host state rarely receives information, and the victim and their communities are also left 
without closure. Therefore, from the point of view of the international community, justice is 
currently not being seen to be done.   
I am taking the reasonable members of the international community here as the interested 
“public” (which should see justice being done) under this principle. Sexual exploitation and 
abuse is committed by international personnel working within a United Nations mandate 
(the UN represents its member states – essential participants of the international 
community). It is within the interests of the international community that perpetrators be 
held accountable. “Justice being seen to be done” is about transparency, fairness and 
legitimacy. Therefore, when exploring the different avenues of improving accountability of 
                                                          
46 Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned 
Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual) GA 
A/c.5/66/8 (2011) ch. 9 Memorandum of Understanding [2007 MOU] art 7 sexiens (1). Report of the Secretary-
General Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse GA A/67/766 (2013) at [15]. 
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military contingent members who commit sexual exploitation and abuse, I will be assessing 
whether such options allow for or improve “justice being seen to be done”.  
(B) HOST STATE OWNERSHIP  
In addition to improving the public administration of justice, response mechanisms should 
also foster host state ownership. In recent years, the UN has placed value in host state 
ownership and active participation of the local population in peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding.47 According to the UN, the eventual success of peacekeeping operations 
requires the cooperation, support and general inclusivity of the local population to be 
prioritised.48 It is not about outside contributors solving post-conflict situations, but about 
empowering local actors at all levels of society to exercise ownership towards sustainable 
peace.49 Specifically, the active participation of women in peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
is an essential element for the success of modern missions.50 Host state ownership is also 
part of the capacity building element of peacekeeping/peacebuilding operations and brings 
legitimacy to international projects implemented nationally.51 There seems to be much 
                                                          
47 Report of the Secretary-General The Future of the United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the 
Recommendation of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations GA A/70/375-S/2015/628 (2015) 
at [64]; Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict GA 
A/63/881-S/2009/304 (2009) at [7]-[14]; Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate 
Aftermath of Conflict GA A/64/866-S/2010/386 (2010) at [26]-[31]; Report of the Secretary-General on 
Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict GA A/67/499-S/2012/746 (2012); Report of the 
Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict GA A/69/399-S/2014/694 (2014) 
at [27]-[39]. 
48 The Future of the United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendation of the High-
Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, above n 47, at [64]; Report of the Secretary-General on 
Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict (2010), above n 47, at [26]. 
49 Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict (2010), above n 
47, at [26]. See generally, E Newman, O Richmond and R Paris New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding 
(United Nations University Press, New York, 2009).  
50 Security Council Resolution 1325 SC Res S/Res/1325 (2000); Report of the Secretary-General on 
Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict (2010), above n 47, at [32]-[32]; Report of the Secretary-
General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict (2012), above n 47, at [24]-[33]. 
51 R Machold and T Donais From Rhetoric to Practice: Operationalising National Ownership in Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding (Workshop Report, 2011) at 3. 
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debate about what national ownership means and its scope, which may differ between host 
states.52  
Host state ownership as a concept is both crucial and broad. It has been argued that the broad 
conceptualisation of ownership is necessary for its practical application; each peacekeeping 
or peacebuilding mission is different and a flexible understanding of “ownership” can realise 
the capacity of various local communities or stakeholders.53 Such ownership, for example, 
can be understood as “national ownership” (government, including opposition parties) and 
“local ownership” (residents of communities).54 Additionally, there are many different ways 
in which ownership may be realised, for example, by including local stakeholders in decision 
making, government consultation, outreach to communities and information sharing.55 In 
post-conflict settings not all of these methods of partnership may be practicable.56 However, 
the concept of host state ownership, as implemented so far by the UN, has been criticised 
for prioritising liberal principles (such as human rights and democracy) over local and 
context specific knowledge and experience.57 Advancing a “one size fits all” approach can 
undermine the legitimacy hoped to be achieved through host state ownership.58 
Notwithstanding this criticism, host state ownership is a UN strategic principle and crucial 
for sustainable peace after conflict.59 Moreover, local ownership and participation can be 
                                                          
52 At 2.  
53 Newman et al, above n 49, at 13-14. 
54  United nations Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008) at 38-39. 
55 A Hansen “Local Ownership in Peace Operations” in T Donais (ed) Local Ownership and Security Sector 
Reform (DCAF Yearly Books, 2008) at 43. 
56 See S Chesterman “Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding 
Operations” (2007) 1 Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3.  
57 See for example, O J Sending “Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sensitive to Context” 
Security in Practice (NUPI Working Paper, 2009); S B K von Billerbeck “Local Ownership and UN 
Peacekeeping: Discourse Versus Operationalization” (2015) 21 Global Governance 299. 
58 Sending, above n 57, at 7.  
59 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, above n 54, at 38-39.   
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essential for centralising the views of victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by 
peacekeepers in a legitimate way.  
The UN’s policy of host state ownership and the involvement and support of the local 
population should also be a factor when considering various ways to improve accountability 
of its peacekeepers. Sexual exploitation and abuse are committed against members of the 
local population, breaching the trust the communities place in international personnel and 
abusing the unequal power dynamics that exist. To legitimatise the UN’s continued presence 
in the host state community after its peacekeepers have violated such trust then arguably 
there should be some form of national ownership over response mechanisms. Hence my 
second underlying principle against which to assess mechanisms for holding peacekeepers 
to account will be host state ownership. 
(C) UN LEADERSHIP 
For my third underlying principle I will be considering the perspective of the United Nations, 
essentially asking what the UN can do to improve accountability mechanisms in response to 
sexual exploitation and abuse committed by military contingent members. Therefore, the 
third principle is United Nations leadership.  
The UN has the central role in any UN peacekeeping mission and it would follow that the 
organisation should take leadership in response mechanisms. Arguably, to legitimise the 
zero-tolerance policy against sexual exploitation and abuse the UN needs to take leadership 
in accountability where its own standards have been breached. Furthermore, the UN is a 
human rights promoter as specified by the UN Charter60 and has an essential role in 
monitoring human rights through its particular organs. Being unable or unwilling to take 
                                                          
60 Charter of the United Nations 1 UNTS XVI (24 October 1945). See also the United Nations Human Rights 
Initiative, available online <www.un.org>. 
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action when its peacekeepers have abused the people that the UN serve would be at the very 
least hypocritical.61 Moreover, since the early 2000s, the UN has already demonstrated 
leadership in responding to sexual exploitation and abuse, for example, through preventative 
measures and reforms.62 Such measures include a Security Council resolution authorising 
the Secretary-General to remove and replace entire contingents where there is a pattern of 
sexual exploitation and abuse, and generally calls the UN to take action and leadership in 
response to this issue.63  
Therefore to maintain and support the integrity of the UN as a human rights promoter, and 
the legitimacy of its standards against sexual exploitation and abuse64 the UN should take 
active steps in establishing or improving accountability mechanisms. Overall, the UN is best 
placed to fulfil its leadership role in the international community in improving accountability 
for sexual exploitation and abuse committed by its peacekeepers in a way that legitimate, 
transparent, and inclusive. 
(4) STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Drawing on the arguments made by others,65 suggestions for improving accountability may 
be categorised into three groups: firstly, UN enforcement against the troop-contributing 
                                                          
61 Kofi Annan “Annex. B: Draft United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims 
of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff or Related Personnel” in Comprehensive review of 
the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects Letter dated 25 May 2006 from the 
Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly GA A/60/877 (2006) at [10]: “the Charter of the 
UN reaffirms in the preamble ‘faith in fundamental HRs, in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] 
in the equal rights of men and women.’ In art 101(3) ‘the paramount consideration in the employment of staff 
and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of 
efficiency, competence, and integrity.’ UN and its staff have a particular duty of care to the people they serve.” 
62 Zeid Report, above n 9; Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (2013), 
above n 46, at 16; Ban Ki Moon Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse GA 
A/68/756 (2014).  
63 Security Council Resolution 2272 SC Res S/Res/2272 (2016). 
64 Notwithstanding the feminist critique of the zero-tolerance policy discussed in Chapter Two. 
65 These include, for example, R Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents: Moving 
Beyond the Current Status Quo and Responsibility under International Law (Leiden, Brill, 2014); E F Defeis 
“UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An end to Impunity” (2008) 7 Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 186; A Harrington “Victims of Peace: Current Abuse Allegations against UN 
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country for failure to investigate or prosecute incidences of sexual exploitation and abuse 
committed by their nationals; Secondly, alternative mechanisms to investigate and prosecute 
military contingent members should be pursued; Thirdly, the right of victims to receive 
reparations and better assistance and support from the UN. 
The thesis is structured as follows; Part One will examine the history of sexual exploitation 
and abuse by UN peacekeepers. The structural context of UN peacekeeping will be explored, 
including the current legal framework of immunity and the UN’s zero-tolerance policy on 
sexual exploitation and abuse. This Part will also discuss the concepts of “sexual abuse” and 
“sexual exploitation” as defined by the United Nations.  
Part Two will examine the first suggestion to improve accountability; sanctioning the troop-
contributing countries for failing to investigate and prosecute their nationals. This Part will 
consider whether there are obligations on states to exercise criminal jurisdiction over acts of 
sexual exploitation and abuse. Obligations may be found in international agreements (such 
as the Memorandum of Understanding, between the UN and the TCCs) or international 
human rights law. This Part will explore whether coercive measures against noncompliant 
states such as economic sanctions, withdrawal of troops from missions and blacklisting 
                                                          
Peacekeepers and the role of the Law in Preventing them in the Future” (2005) 12 ILSA Journal of International 
& Comparative Law 125; T Innes “The Accountability of Peacekeeping Operations: A Focus on Allegations 
of Sexual Abuse” (2011) 1 Warwick Student Law Review 19; V Kent “Peacekeepers as Perpetrators of Abuse” 
14 African Security Review 85; C Morris “Peacekeeping and the Sexual Exploitation of women and girls in 
Post-Conflict societies: A Serious Enigma” (2010) Journal of International Peacekeeping 184; M Ndulo “The 
United Nations Responses to the Sexual Exploitation by Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions” (2009) 
27 Berkeley Journal of International Law 127; M Odello “Tackling Criminal Acts in Peacekeeping Operations: 
The Accountability of Peacekeepers” (2010) 15 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 347; M O’Brien “Sexual 
Exploitation and Beyond: Using the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to Prosecute UN 
Peacekeepers for Gender-based Crimes” (2011) 11  International Criminal Law Review 803; Report of the 
Group of Legal Experts on Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on Mission with 
Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations GA A/60/980 (2006); Zeid report, above n 
9; G Simm “International Law as a Regulatory Framework for Sexual Crimes committed by Peacekeepers” 
(2011) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 473.  
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troop-contributing countries may be utilised as procedural tool. Non-coercive measures such 
as “naming and shaming” states will also be considered. 
Alternative ways to prosecute offenders will be considered in Part Three; these alternatives 
will include host state jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court. These options will 
be framed as desirable yet ultimately unsatisfactory. 
Part Four will consider a “hybrid” solution: the establishment of a special court for 
peacekeepers, and victim inclusivity and support. A special court for peacekeepers will be 
put forward as the most viable option for alternate prosecution. Part Four will also examine 
the position of victims under the UN’s zero-tolerance policy and victim participatory rights 
in criminal justice institutions. The status-quo for victims is quite unsatisfactory, therefore 
“transformative” reparations will be argued as the most appropriate response for victims of 
sexual exploitation and abuse. 
I will conclude in Part Five. In addition, I will provide recommendations on the best way(s) 
to improve accountability and provide justice for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse.   
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CHAPTER ONE: HISTORY OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE IN 




From its inception, United Nations Peacekeeping has been at the centre of post-conflict 
territories. Although originally conceived to assist states in peace and security without armed 
forces, UN peacekeeping has increasingly expanded its mandated support to include military 
contingents.66 The scale and diversity of modern peacekeeping can present a number of 
challenges for the international community. Currently, UN resources are stretched to cover 
16 unique UN missions across four continents.67 Without a UN “standing army”, these 
missions require significant contributions from member states (both financial and human).68  
Peacekeeping is multi-dimensional. Peacekeeping operations will have different roles 
depending on the location and mandate of the mission. Some tasks include re-building, 
establishing legal and political stability, attending to humanitarian issues and distributing 
much needed aid.69 Therefore, UN peacekeeping can be central to the recovery of a state. 
Peacekeepers also work in hostile environments and provide support and protection to poor, 
displaced and often desperate people.70 In such sensitive surroundings, peacekeepers have 
to deal with the negative consequences of post-conflict, such as increased crime.  
                                                          
66 United Nations Peacekeeping “Field Support” (2015) <http://www.un.org >. 
67 United Nations Peacekeeping “Current Peacekeeping Operations” (2015) <http://www.un.org>. 
68 “Peacekeeping Fact Sheet” above n 7. 
69 United Nations Peacekeeping “Background Note: United Nations Peacekeeping” (2015) 
<http://www.un.org>. 
70 Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support A New Partnership Agenda: 
Charting a new horizon for UN Peacekeeping (July 2009) at ii. 
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Those that are most at risk during and immediately after armed conflict are women and 
children.71 Peacekeepers are generally under a duty to ensure protection of such vulnerable 
persons.72 Unfortunately, it has been the case that the protector has become the perpetrator. 
In recent years there have been incidences where peacekeepers have been associated with 
crime, for example, trafficking of women for prostitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo.73 Most alarming has been the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and 
abuse.74  
A culture of sexual exploitation in the context of UN peacekeeping is incredibly damaging 
to the immediate victims and their communities. Moreover, the credibility of the UN and its 
relationship with the host state may be brought into question.75 Without mutual trust between 
the host state and the UN, the local community will be unwilling to let peacekeepers do their 
work.76 Moreover, adverse behaviour such as sexual abuse brings the United Nations’ 
reputation as human rights promoter into disrepute.77 Such behaviour is especially abhorrent 
when it occurs in the context of armed conflicts where the local use of sexual violence as a 
weapon of war is prevalent, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).78 The 
detrimental impact of sexual exploitation and abuse has been recognised by the UN which 
has initiated reforms to counter the problem, particularly as a result of the Zeid Report 
                                                          
71 The UN has continually acknowledged this fact in various Security Council resolutions, for example Security 
Council Resolution 1325 SC Res S/Res/1325 (2000) concerning women, peace and security; Security Council 
Resolution 1674 SC Res S/Res/1674 (2006) concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflict.  
72 See above Security Council resolutions, also note United Nations Secretary-General’s Bulletin Observance 
by UN Forces of International Humanitarian Law SG B ST/SGB/1993/3 (1993) at Section 7ff.  
73 O Simic “‘Boys will be boys’”: Human Trafficking and UN Peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo” in L 
Holmes (ed) Trafficking and Human Rights: European and Asia-Pacific Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2010) at 81-85.  
74 For example, between 2010 and 2015 there have been 398 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse made 
against peacekeeping personnel, see UN Conduct and Discipline Unit “Allegations for All Categories of 
Personnel Per Year (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse)” (30 November 2015) <www.un.org>. 
75 Morris, above n 65, at 186. 
76 S Ghosh “Are UN Peacekeepers Doing More Harm than Good?” Aljazeera (15 August 2015) 
http://www.aljazeera.com via interviewee Christos Tsatsoulis.  
77 Morris, above n 65, at 186. 
78 See for example “DR Congo mass rape in Fizi: 170 attacked” (24 June 2011) UN News Centre 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk> where DRC was described as the “rape capital of the world”. 
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published in 2005.79 However, despite the raft of seemingly positive reforms, allegations of 
sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers continue to emerge resulting in yet another official 
probing into the issue in 2015.80 
(1) EXTENT OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE IN PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS 
In 2007 a 12 year old girl, “Elizabeth”, was walking home from school on a solitary road in 
Côte d’Ivoire.81 She was alone when a United Nations peacekeeping truck pulled up 
alongside her, and she was then raped by ten peacekeeping soldiers on the side of that road. 
A year later when her story was reported by world media, she was psychologically 
traumatised and afraid to leave her home. None of her attackers were ever identified or 
punished.  
In a Human Rights Watch report, sexual exploitation by African Union Peacekeepers was 
revealed as systemic in Somalia.82 In one case, a 19 year old Somali woman was brought to 
base camp for the purposes of sex.83 Although she was afraid, she was displaced, poor and 
hungry.84 She was paid ten dollars each time she visited the base for sex.85  
In April 2015 a report leaked by an NGO86 and reported by world media revealed that French 
peacekeepers in the Central African Republic had forced local children (eight-13 year olds) 
                                                          
79 See above n 65. 
80 G Russell “EXLCUSIVE: UN sex abuse scandal: Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon announces new inquiry” 
Fox News (4 June 2015) http://www.foxnews.com. 
81 The following story comes from M Pflanz “Six-year-olds Sexually Abused by UN Peacekeepers” The Daily 
Telegraph (26 May 2008) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news (“Elizabeth” is a pseudonym).  
82 Human Rights Watch, above n 20.  
83 At 22. 
84 At 22. 
85 At 22. 
86 AIDS-Free World. 
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to perform oral sex in exchange for food.87 Prompted by the leaked report,88 it still took over 
a year before France launched its investigations into the allegations. In fact, the initial 
“whisteblower” on the sexual exploitation was disciplined by the United Nations.89  
Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel first caught media 
attention during the 1990s. Reports of such conduct had been documented in Cambodia, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.90 In 2001, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and Save 
the Children91 identified cases of sexual exploitation in West African refugee camps.92  A 
subsequent report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)93 revealed allegations 
against UN personnel (both civilian and military) and NGO employees. These cases 
involved a range of conduct, such as soliciting sex from prostitutes, rape and sexual 
relationships based upon the dependency of beneficiaries.94 Women and children were the 
majority of identified victims.95  
Although the report conceded that the particular situation of the refugees invited sexual 
abuse, OIOS could not substantiate the claim that sexual exploitation was “widespread”.96 
Furthermore, soliciting sex from adult prostitutes was distinguished from sexual 
relationships “involving persons in power or authority taking advantage of female 
                                                          
87 The following story comes from K Willsher and S Laville “France Launches Criminal Inquiry into Alleged 
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91 UK based NGO. 
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refugees”97; according to OIOS only the latter was sexual exploitation. Notwithstanding 
these remarks, several recommendations were made in order to prevent future cases of 
sexual exploitation and abuse, such as uniform codes of conduct and guidelines for reporting 
and investigating allegations.98  
The United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC)99 was next under the media spotlight for allegations of sexual exploitation and 
abuse in 2004.100 The reports were similar to those documented in West Africa in 2001. 
They included prostitution, exchanges of sex for food, paedophilia, sexual violence and 
rape.101 Again, allegations involved UN and NGO personnel against women and children 
(under the age of 18 years).102 The gravity and extent of the abuse alleged provoked a high-
level response from UN officials.103 Now UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Prince 
Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, then Personal Adviser to the UN Secretary-General, issued a report 
on the extent of sexual exploitation and abuse in the context of peacekeeping.104 Contrary to 
the findings of the OIOS, the Zeid Report confirmed a culture of sexual exploitation.105 In 
addition, the Zeid Report highlighted the “exploitative nature” of adult prostitution in 
peacekeeping and described such conduct as a “breach of trust”.106  
In order to measure the extent of the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse currently, one 
may look at statistics provided by the UN’s Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU). Although 
                                                          
97 At [43]. 
98 At [55]. 
99 Renamed United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUSCO) see Security Council Resolution 1925 SC Res S/Res/1925 (2010). 
100 Odello, above n 65, at 350. 
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Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nation Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo GA 
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Washington University Global Studies Law Review 186 at 187. 
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it has been noted by CDU that the number of allegations has decreased every year since 
2009,107 reports of sexual exploitation and abuse continue to emerge with 82 allegations 
recorded between 2014 and 2015. Moreover, official statistics do not reflect the issue of 
under-reporting, particularly by child victims.108 More recent examples of sexual 
exploitation and abuse are noted above. Other examples have occurred in the context of the 
UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).109 In 2011, there was a reported case 
involving sexual exploitation of children by a small group of Uruguayan peacekeepers110 
and in 2012 a number of Pakistani peacekeepers were repatriated following sexual abuse of 
an underage Haitian male.111 Additionally, the recent (2015) allegations involving 
peacekeepers in the Central African Republic prompted another review of UN response 
mechanisms.112 
What may be concluded from the above discussion is that sexual exploitation and abuse is 
not confined to any particular mission. Moreover, it appears that offenders are not from any 
particular national contingent. Arguably, this points to a culture of sexual exploitation and 
abuse in UN peacekeeping operations. It is also clear that before 2004 sexual exploitation 
and abuse by peacekeepers was not treated as a serious problem arguably highlighting a 
“boys will be boys” attitude of UN officials.113 The Zeid Report signified a change in 
approach and brought to attention the lack of implementation of the UN’s zero-tolerance 
                                                          
107 UN Conduct and Discipline Unit “Allegations for All Categories of Personnel Per Year (Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse)” (31 July 2015) <http://cdu.unlb.org>.  
108 See Save the Children-UK No one to turn to: the under reporting of child sexual exploitation and abuse by 
aid workers and peacekeepers (Save the Children Fund, London, 2008). 
109 Security Council Resolution 1542 SC Res S/Res/1542 (2004). 
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policy. However, recent reports during 2014 and 2015 indicate the zero-tolerance policy is 
not being adhered to and that current reforms have not been enough to overcome the culture 
of sexual exploitation.  
(2) THE UNITED NATIONS’ ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICY 
The United Nations’ policy is a prohibitionist approach on sexual exploitation and abuse, 
including soliciting sex from local adult prostitutes. Currently, any form of sexual 
exploitation and abuse is defined as “serious misconduct” under two UN codes of conduct114 
and the Secretary-General’s 2003 Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.115 Peacekeeping personnel are forbidden from buying sex 
from prostitutes or engaging in sexual conduct with persons under the age of 18 years.116 
Furthermore, sexual relationships between peacekeepers and beneficiaries are “strongly 
discouraged”.117 
Coupled with the general prohibition, a number of institutional reforms of a preventative 
nature were initiated post-2005. These include reforms that seek to regulate the behaviour 
of troops; for example, the instalment of recreation facilities within the mission site, out-of-
bounds areas and curfews.118 Additionally, there has been the introduction of “gender 
mainstreaming”; which in this context means encouraging more women to take on 
peacekeeping roles. Gender mainstreaming was originally envisioned by the Zeid Report to 
have a positive influence on the behaviour of male personnel in relation to discouraging 
                                                          
114 Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets, above n 10 and We are United Nations 
Peacekeeping Personnel, above n 10. 
115 S-G Bulletin (2003), above n 10. 
116 At [3.3(b)]-[3.3(c)]. 
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sexual exploitation and abuse.119 However, the percentage of women in peacekeeping 
remains low;120 therefore it is difficult to assess the extent to which increased female 
participation within peacekeeping has an effect on their male counterparts.121 Other reforms 
have focussed on improved education and training of peacekeeping personnel before they 
go on mission.122 
Conduct and Discipline Teams are set up in the field to raise local awareness of sexual 
exploitation and abuse and reporting mechanisms.123 Troops, particularly national 
commanders, are given detailed training in the zero-tolerance policy in both pre-deployment 
and in mission.124 Policy-makers such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee continue to 
look at ways to improve education and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse.125 
However, a 2015 report by the Office of Internal Oversight Services indicated that local 
awareness of sexual exploitation and the UN’s zero-tolerance policy remains low to non-
existent and that there is still confusion among personnel about what constitutes “sexual 
exploitation”.126 
Reforms regarding assistance and support to victims have been slow to be implemented. 
Although the United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims 
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of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Staff and Related Personnel has been in its first 
stages of implementation since 2009,127 the latest report from the Secretary-General 
indicates a failure to transfer the strategy into practice.128 Chapter Nine of this thesis will 
consider UN reforms in relation to victim assistance further. 
So far, UN reforms have focussed primarily on policy and preventative measures. Arguably, 
in order to implement the zero-tolerance effectively and uphold the rule of law in the eyes 
of the host state, it is important to ensure actual accountability of abusers.129 
(3) ACCOUNTABILITY  
Under the zero-tolerance policy, if a peacekeeper engages in activity that falls within “sexual 
exploitation and abuse” under the S-G Bulletin it is expected that disciplinary measures will 
be taken.130  There are up to five different categories of peacekeeping personnel, each with 
different levels of legal immunities which can complicate individual accountability.131 Due 
to the unpredictable and hostile environment in which peacekeepers operate, immunities 
offer important protection from the host state.132 However, they are not intended to benefit 
the particular individual.133 Article 105 of the UN Charter and the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations134 provide functional immunities to UN 
officials, civilian staff, and experts on mission. Essentially, these categories of UN personnel 
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entered into force 2 December 1948); Convention the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel 
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are immune from criminal proceedings by the host state “in respect of all words spoken or 
written or acts done by them in the course of the performance of their mission”.135 This 
“functional immunity” may be waived by the Secretary-General and does not cover any act 
which is outside the scope of official duties.136 It is generally accepted that sexual 
exploitation and abuse will unlikely fall within the scope of “official duties”.137 
Consequentially, in certain circumstances, UN officials, civilian staff, and experts on 
mission may face disciplinary action through the UN, and face the possibility of criminal 
prosecution in the host state or their contributing state. Military contingents are not included 
under the Convention but have their own set of privileges and immunities under two bilateral 
agreements: the Status-of-Forces-Agreement (SOFA) and Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU). 
The legal status of military contingents derives from a variety of sources; these can include 
the domestic laws of both the host state and the troop-contributing country, the 
administrative law of the UN and applicable norms of international law.138 There are also 
several international agreements and legal documents that apply; those of particular 
relevance include Status-of-Forces-Agreements and Memorandums of Understanding. The 
SOFA is an agreement between the UN and the host state stipulating privileges and 
immunities attributable to peacekeeping troops whilst on mission. According to the Model-
SOFA,139 although military personnel must respect local laws and customs, they are immune 
from host state jurisdiction. Moreover, unlike other categories of personnel, members of the 
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military are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the troop-contributing country.140 This is 
reiterated in the Memorandum of Understanding,141 the agreement between the UN and the 
TCC. Under the Model-MOU the contributing country assures the UN that they will exercise 
its criminal jurisdiction in respect to offending.142 Issues such as to what extent these 
documents are legally binding on the TCC will be discussed in Chapter Three. Nevertheless, 
together the SOFA and MOU provide immunities that prevent the host state from 
prosecuting the offender. Moreover, for military contingent members, it would appear that 
accountability is entirely dependent on the contributing state. 
The UN has initiated some reforms in relation to individual accountability, although none 
challenge the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of troop-contributing countries. Under UN 
policies, sexual exploitation and abuse are described as “category one” allegations; these are 
generally dealt with by OIOS, the investigative arm of the UN.143 However, in the case of 
military contingents such investigations remain the primary responsibility of the 
contributing country.144 Under the current structure, if a TCC fails to respond to a complaint 
of sexual exploitation and abuse within ten days, a preliminary fact-finding inquiry is 
undertaken by the UN.145 The investigation is then transferred to the national government 
concerned for formal investigation.146 Since May 2015, the UN has requested that states 
complete their investigations within a six-month timeline, with no additional mechanism to 
enforce TCCs to comply.147 At most, the UN may repatriate the individual where a case is 
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substantiated.148 Further enforcement measures, such as prosecution, will be determined by 
the contributing state.  
Although the Model-MOU was amended in 2007 to incorporate the UN codes of conduct, 
accountability of military contingents is still dependant on whether the TCC chooses to take 
appropriate action against the individual.149 The role of the UN is restricted by the terms of 
the SOFA.150 As the law currently stands, the exclusive jurisdiction of the troop-contributing 
country has resulted in an accountability gap, and this gap appears within the system in place 
to respond to sexual exploitation and abuse (responsive framework).  
The UN expects the troop-contributing country to report on disciplinary outcomes where a 
soldier has been repatriated home. Historically, such reporting has been notably poor; for 
example, in 2010 out of 74 requests for follow-up reports, there were only 29 responses from 
member states.151 Although reporting has improved in recent years, with 93 state responses 
out of 100 UN requests in 2015, there is no way to know what information has been 
requested from which states or what information states provide in their reports.152 As a result, 
forming a picture of typical TCC responses to repatriated troops is near impossible. This is 
exemplified by the UN Action to Counter Misconduct Factsheet issued by CDU.153 Out of 
40 substantiated cases of sexual exploitation and abuse in 2010, the factsheet lists only seven 
incidents where further action was taken against military personnel by the member state. 
There are many procedural, practical and evidential requirements that may hinder 
prosecution in the home state. Nevertheless, it appears that contributing countries are either 
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refusing (or unable) to prosecute or discipline offenders for sexual exploitation and abuse or 
are not reporting their actions (if any) to the UN.  
(4) UN ENFORCEMENT 
In regards to filling the apparent “gap” in the current responsive framework, I argue that the 
focus should be on the United Nations to take action against perpetrators of sexual 
exploitation and abuse, in cooperation with both the TCC and host states. There are both 
general and legal reasons which justify a focus on UN leadership. For the general reasons, 
the most obvious is that military contingents are identified as “UN” peacekeepers. Their 
distinctive headgear has earned them the nickname “blue helmets” or “blue beret”. 
Consequently, the local population will recognise the “blue helmets” as the UN; they 
represent the international community. Furthermore, the zero-tolerance policy is a UN 
standard and it is the only standard that applies. Therefore, it is arguable that the UN should 
retain responsibility to see that its standards are enforced.  
Legal arguments could be made on the basis of the complex control and command structure 
of peacekeeping operations.154 Peacekeeping missions are generally considered a subsidiary 
organ of the UN and often operate under a Security Council mandate.155 Although 
contributing states may have an interest in the mission, they do not strictly set the parameters 
of the mission itself.156 Although national commanders of military contingents maintain 
direct contact with the contributing state they are under an obligation to follow the 
instructions of the UN Force Commander.157 It follows that as peacekeeping operations often 
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start and end with the UN, then the UN should bear some responsibility in regards to 
accountability of its troops.  
The UN should take more of an active step to improve accountability of members of military 
contingents, but what form should such accountability mechanisms take? An international 
organisation (IO), unlike a state, does not typically have the capacity to enforce criminal 
jurisdiction over individual actors.158 Examples of measures that may be taken by an IO may 
include judicial, diplomatic, or political measures, or sanctions.159 In regards to exercising 
such enforcement, international organisations are restricted by the particular powers 
attributed to them by their member states and defined in their constituent treaty.160 
Therefore, the measures which the UN can take against states or individual peacekeepers 
will be restricted by the UN Charter161 and the particular agreements made between the UN 
and member states. 
(5) FILLING THE GAP IN THE RESPONSIVE FRAMEWORK: PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The gap in the current system of accountability has been picked up in both academic 
discourse and in official (and leaked) UN reports. The following section briefly describes 
the major contributions to the discussion on filling the gap in the responsive framework. The 
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primary focus of the discussion to date has been on increasing the role of the UN itself in 
relation to the enforcement of its zero-tolerance policy.  
(A) UN INITIATIVES 
There are a number of UN reviews that have explored the issue of accountability in 
peacekeeping. The first is the most influential and widely quoted; the Zeid Report. As noted 
above, this report has proven significant in improving the implementation of the UN’s zero-
tolerance policy. However, it should be noted that not all of Prince Zeid’s recommendations 
have been introduced. In regards to filling the gap in the responsive framework, the report 
outlined a number of suggested reforms that involve the central role of the UN.  
Following the Zeid Report, in 2005 a Group of Legal Experts was arranged to investigate 
and make suggestions regarding the criminal accountability of UN staff and experts on 
mission.162 The subsequent recommendations of the Group have been the subject of on-
going debates in the General Assembly, in particular the suggested Convention on the 
Criminal Accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission.163 Although the 
focus of the report was on non-military personnel, the Group of Legal Experts did look at 
sexual exploitation and abuse specifically and ways in which the UN could ensure criminal 
prosecution.  
Recent 2015 reports have re-ignited calls for improving the responsive mechanism for sexual 
exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers. The first was leaked by an NGO and 
highlighted the failure of previous UN reforms to fill the accountability gap.164 The second 
report was the OIOS Evaluation Report165 which also emphasised the need to take another 
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look at reforming the current responsive framework including enforcement and remedies for 
victims.  
(B) ACADEMIC CRITIQUE 
There is general consensus amongst scholars that the current framework for accountability, 
ie the complete reliance on troop-contributing countries to exercise jurisdiction over military 
contingents, is flawed. For instance, Marco Odello166 argues that the lack of prosecutions 
derives from the lack of certainty as to state obligations to investigate and prosecute for 
sexual exploitation and abuse. Other commentators, such as Alexander Harrington,167 have 
also noted this ambiguity, suggesting that perhaps the UN should take more robust steps to 
enforce its standards. Elizabeth Defeis168 goes further to suggest that the UN’s failure to 
sanction for the lack of prosecutions has contributed to the gap in the responsive framework. 
Additionally, others, such as Gabrielle Simm,169 have concluded that the current framework 
makes it difficult or impossible for individual victims to raise claims for adequate remedies 
at the international level.   
Consequently, the above commentators and others170 have suggested particular ways in 
which the UN may develop enforcement jurisdiction. These suggestions may be grouped 
into three categories which form the focus of this thesis. Firstly, UN enforcement against 
the troop-contributing country for failure to investigate or prosecute incidences of sexual 
exploitation and abuse committed by their nationals. Secondly, alternative mechanisms to 
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investigate and prosecute military contingent members should be pursued. Thirdly, the need 
for victims to receive reparations and better assistance and support from the UN. With some 
exceptions,171 the majority of these suggestions have been made without any further 
investigation as to their legal foundation or their implications for victims and their 
communities.  
Rather than being proactive, UN reforms thus far have been influenced by key events, 
particularly major media coverage of sexual exploitation and abuse, for example, 
widespread media reports of allegations in the DRC in 2004 which prompted the Zeid 
Report. Waiting for such “prompts” before taking action and merely tinkering with the 
current responsive framework has not solved the accountability problem. This thesis will 
ultimately advocate for a “hybrid” solution; a special court for peacekeepers.  
My approach in this thesis differs from the above academics in two significant ways; firstly, 
I will place less reliance on the troop-contributing country, instead I am looking at the role 
of the UN. Commentators so far have favoured the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of TCCs 
and an alternative perspective has not been considered in depth when approaching ways to 
improve accountability. Secondly, taking a feminist lens, I am interested in the perspective 
of victims and their communities. Victims are not often centralised in current UN policies 
related to sexual exploitation and abuse or literature exploring options for improving 
response mechanisms.172 Instead, the perspectives and interests of the UN and TCCs are 
centralised. Thus, I will use three conceptual principles to guide my inquiry in an attempt to 
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centralise victims’ interests; these principles are justice being seen to be done, host state 









Essentially, the underlying rationale behind the zero-tolerance policy is the purported power 
imbalance between UN peacekeepers and the local population. It has been argued by UN 
officials and academics alike1 that peacekeepers hold a position of trust in the host state 
community. Often operating in situations of post-conflict or natural disaster, UN 
peacekeepers are there to support the local population in various ways, including offering 
humanitarian, legal and similar assistance.2 Not only can the local population be dependent 
on these services, but they can also be vulnerable to exploitation based on this dependency.3 
Therefore, it is the unequal power dynamics that can arguably lead to sexual exploitation 
and abuse of local women and girls. Consequently, such deferential power is an important 
element of the S-G Bulletin’s definitions, particularly “sexual exploitation”.  
As the UN supports a zero-tolerance policy it is arguable that the context of UN 
peacekeeping itself automatically colours any sexual relationship between personnel and 
members of the local population as “exploitative”. However, notwithstanding this possible 
inference, the prohibition is not a blanket rule against sexual relationships.4 It has been noted 
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that not all sexual relationships are prohibited; instead the focus is on preventing 
“exploitative” relationships.5 It is common to find some kind of power imbalance and even 
coercion in usual everyday relationships outside the context of peacekeeping.6 Nevertheless, 
it can be unclear at which point a relationship can be described as “exploitative”. As will be 
discussed in this chapter, one of the major issues with the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on 
Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (S-G Bulletin) 
and its formal definition of “sexual exploitation” and that it arguably fails to adequately 
identify the line between an exploitative relationship and a mutually beneficial relationship 
between two consenting adults. Additionally, the spectrum of relationships that may exist 
between these is also left unclear. Therefore, the goal of this chapter is not only to examine 
the concepts of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation but also explore the difficulties 
associated with describing “exploitative” relationships.  
The first section of this chapter will look at the codes of conduct, particularly the S-G 
Bulletin which provides the substantive definitions for sexual abuse and sexual exploitation. 
Although they are essentially policy documents, these codes express the current minimum 
standards of behaviour for UN peacekeepers and provide the basis for disciplinary measures. 
The second and third sections will examine the concepts of “sexual abuse” and “sexual 
exploitation” respectively. In order to explore the meaning of sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation I will not only look at the S-G Bulletin, but also inspect other areas of 
international law to examine similar concepts or terms; including within international 
criminal law, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law. I will 
argue that the definition of “sexual abuse” is largely unambiguous and describes conduct 
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that could be classified as sexual crimes in international criminal law or clear examples of 
violence against women under human rights law, for example rape and sexual violence. 
Conversely, the S-G Bulletin’s definition of “sexual exploitation” is not only ambiguous but 
is difficult to reconcile with similar terms used elsewhere, for example human trafficking 
for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The fourth section will summarise and identify the 
forms of conduct that can be drawn from sexual abuse and sexual exploitation in those areas 
of international law explored in the previous sections. 
The fifth section will look at the critics of the zero-tolerance policy, particularly the S-G 
Bulletin’s definition of sexual exploitation. Arguably, the concept of “sexual exploitation” 
is intended to capture soliciting sex from adult prostitutes and survival-sex-type 
relationships. However, “sexual exploitation” is defined in such a way that it could include 
all kinds of sexual activity, including consensual sexual behaviour. Moreover, the definition 
fails to draw the line between a sexual relationship that is “acceptable” (more or less) and 
one that is “exploitative”. This section will therefore look more closely at the difficulties 
posed by the grey area between. Additionally, the critics of sexual exploitation expose the 
tension between two competing approaches ie the conservative “women as victims” on the 
one hand and the feminist “women as liberated decision-makers” on the other. I will argue 
that these approaches suggest that local women are either victims or survivors without 
considering the vast spectrum of circumstances that may exist between. 
(1) SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE UNDER THE CODES OF CONDUCT 
In order to facilitate the inquiry into concepts it is helpful to first consider the sources of the 
zero-tolerance policy; namely, the two UN Codes of Conduct and the S-G Bulletin. These 
sources are important when determining what type of conduct will fall under “sexual abuse” 
and “sexual exploitation” and will be referenced throughout the following discussion.  
39 
 
The Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets and We are United Nations 
Peacekeeping Personnel represent the two relevant UN Codes of Conduct.7 These codes 
describe the minimum standards of behaviour expected from UN peacekeepers and are 
binding on all categories of personnel.8 Drawing on the positive image of the United Nations 
and peacekeeping, the codes promote abstract concepts such as integrity, impartiality, 
courtesy and dignity.9 Moreover, contravening these codes will result in disciplinary 
measures.10  
The second source and the most widely quoted document is the S-G Bulletin which sets out 
the particular definitions for “sexual abuse” and “sexual exploitation”. The S-G Bulletin was 
drafted in 2003 following allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian aid 
workers in West African refugee camps in 2002 and the subsequent investigation by the 
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).11 As part of the early measures to tackle the 
problem of sexual exploitation and abuse, the Secretary-General issued the Bulletin to stand 
alongside other staff regulations and policies already in place.12 The Bulletin describes its 
scope of application to include all UN staff and troops acting under the “command and 
control” of the UN.13 Since 2007, the Bulletin applies to all peacekeeping personnel.14 
                                                          
7 UN Conduct and Discipline Unit Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets 
<http://cdu.unlb.org>; UN Conduct and Discipline Unit We are United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel 
<http://cdu.unlb.org>.  
8 Miller, above n 1, at 82; see also the Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and TCCs Annex H: 
Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned 
Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual) GA 
A/c.5/66/8 (2011) ch. 9 Memorandum of Understanding: [2007 MOU]. 
9 C Harrington Politicisation of Sexual Violence: From Abolitionism to Peacekeeping (Ashgate, Surrey, 2010) 
at 179.  
10 Millar A J “Legal aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations” 
(2006) Cornell International Law Journal 71 at 82; 2007 MOU, above n 8, art 7 ter.  
11 OIOS is the investigative arm of the UN, United Nations Secretary-General’s Bulletin Special Measures for 
Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, UN Secretariat SG ST/SGB/2003/13 (2003): [S-G 
Bulletin (2003)] at 1. 
12 Miller, above n 10, at 76. Example of other policies include the United Nations Secretary-General’s Bulletin 
Prohibition of Discrimination, Harassment, including Sexual Harassment, and Abuse of Authority SGB 
ST/SGB/2008/5 (2008).  
13 S-G Bulletin (2003), above n 11, at [2.2]. 
14 Previous to 2007 there was debate as to whether military contingents were bound by the standards of the 
Bulletin as typically troops are under the “command and control” of their contributing state. The inclusion of 
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Furthermore, the Bulletin labels the described conduct as “serious misconduct” which will 
result in disciplinary proceedings or other administrative action.15 The target audience is not 
states themselves, but rather individual UN staff and peacekeeping personnel.16  
The UN codes of conduct and the S-G Bulletin are policy documents rather than law. This 
means that although administrative or disciplinary measures will be taken against individual 
personnel for any breach, they do not, on their own, purport to obligate troop-contributing-
countries to criminalise the described conduct.  
(A) THE UN CODES17 
The UN Codes of Conduct describe minimum standards of expected behaviour and may 
form the basis of disciplinary action against those who breach them.18 Provisions governing 
interactions with the local population in the two codes do not explicitly address sexual 
exploitation and abuse but offer broad descriptions of expected conduct. The Ten Rules: 
Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets state that personnel are to refrain from 
“indulg[ing] in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation of 
the local population ... especially women and children”.19  
Similarly, the relevant section of We are United Nations Peacekeepers reads “we will never 
... commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to 
                                                          
the Bulletin in the Memorandum of Understanding in 2007 binds all categories of personnel see generally Z 
Deen-Racsmary “The Amended UN Model Memorandum of Understanding: A new Initiative for States to 
Discipline and Prosecute Military Members of National Peacekeeping Contingents?” (2011) Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 321.  
15 S-G Bulletin (2003), above n 11, at [3.2(a)] and [3.3]. 
16 At [2.1]. 
17 The English language versions of these codes were exclusively used for the purposes of the following 
interpretation. It does not preclude other interpretations that might be possible from reading the French or other 
language versions of the Codes. 
18 “may” is used here because it is the responsibility of the TCC to ensure the Codes of Conduct are adhered 
to, their incorporation in the MOU means that the TCC must make sure the Codes are binding on their national 
contingents see Defeis, above n 1, at 193-194.  
19 Ten rules, above n 7, at Rule 4. 
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members of the local population, especially women and children”.20 The code also directly 
deals with sexual relationships stating that “we will never ... become involved in sexual 
liaisons which could affect our impartiality or the wellbeing of others”.21  
When looking at sexual conduct, the UN codes draw on the idea of morality (differentiating 
“immoral” and “moral” sexual behaviour) and impartiality without defining what is meant 
by these terms. This kind of classification is unhelpful when looking to define what conduct 
constitutes sexual exploitation and abuse as it is inherently subjective.22 What is “moral” 
sexual behaviour to one person may be considered “immoral” to someone else, regardless 
of consensual sexual activity, and their interpretation can be dependent on many factors, 
including the social context of both the peacekeeper and the victim. Therefore, it is difficult 
to discern what behaviour is expected by looking solely at these codes; other than prohibiting 
“immoral” sex or sexual relationships that may or may not affect impartiality.  
The zero-tolerance policy has not always been fully appreciated by peacekeeping personnel. 
In particular there have been claims of ambiguity about what sexual relationships may be 
considered “exploitative”.23 Typically the UN codes of conduct are distributed among 
peacekeepers in card-form to be kept on their person whilst on duty.24 Although they are 
also attached to the Memorandum of Understanding,25 they are sometimes regarded by 
personnel as “just another piece of paper”.26 Indifference to the codes can be compounded 
                                                          
20 We are UN Peacekeepers, above n 7, at 3. 
21 At 3. 
22 See generally S Hayes and B Carpenter “Out of Time: The Moral Temporality of Sex, Crime and Taboo” 
(2012) 20 Critical Criminology 141.  
23 Particularly under the S-G Bulletin (2003), above n 11 at [3.3]; see also Dr T Awori, Dr C Lutz and General 
P J Thapa (leaked March 2015) Final Report: Expert Mission to Evaluate Risks to SEA Prevention Efforts in 
MINUSTAH, UNMIL, MONUSCO, and UNMISS (2013) at 14-15. 
24 Identified by the Group of Legal Experts in 2006, see Report of the Group of Legal Experts on Ensuring the 
Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on Mission with Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in 
Peacekeeping Operations GA A/60/980 (2006) [First Group of Legal Experts Report] at [17]. 
25 The UN Codes are combined into one document which is attached as an annex to the Memorandum of 
Understanding, for further discussion see Chapter Three: Agreements with the United Nations. 




by the fact that prohibited sexual conduct (that may be “serious misconduct” under the S-G 
Bulletin) sits alongside less serious wrongdoing, such as standards concerning UN 
property.27 When considering these codes together, the difficulty in identifying what conduct 
will constitute “misconduct”, “serious misconduct” or even “criminal” sexual conduct has 
led to confusion and a lack of compliance.28 It is difficult to expect peacekeepers to adhere 
to codes of conduct where such ambiguity exists. 
The UN codes are not written with the intention of establishing criminal liability although 
criminal behaviour may be included. They do not purport to obligate member states to 
criminalise the described conduct. Instead, the codes are standards of behaviour that sit 
alongside other staff regulations and policies and they apply to all peacekeeping personnel.29 
(B) STATUS OF THE S-G BULLETIN 
The Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse 
(the S-G Bulletin) provides the substantive definitions which currently form the basis of any 
subsequent UN inquiry into sexual exploitation and abuse. Therefore, it is important to 
explore the legal status of the Bulletin.  
Taking a legal positivist point of view, the S-G Bulletin is unlikely to fall under the “sources 
of international law” as provided for under the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
Article 38(1) lists three major sources of law; international conventions,30 international 
custom31 and general principles of law.32 The S-G Bulletin cannot be categorised as a treaty; 
                                                          
27 For example, see Ten Rules, above n 7, at Rule 6. 
28 First Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 24, at [17]. 
29 Will apply to military contingents through their incorporation in the MOU see generally Deen-Racsmary, 
above n 14. 
30 Statute of the International Court of Justice 1 UNTS xvi (opened for signature 26 June 1945, entered into 
force 24 October 1945) art 38(1)(a). 
31 At art 38(1)(b). 
32 At art 38(1)(c). 
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it is not concluded with other international actors (such as states or international 
organisations). The Bulletin is unlikely to establish customary international norms or general 
principles on its own. Customary international law needs evidence of substantial state 
practice and opinio juris (what states believe) relating to the fact these documents are legally 
binding on states.33 Where the Bulletin is referenced, it is in relation to policy or as collective 
code of conduct for individual personnel, rather than having a focus on states themselves 
(therefore making it difficult to argue that states believe this is a legally binding source of 
law).34 In relation to the definitions within, as will be discussed below, the definition of 
“sexual exploitation” is somewhat unique to the Bulletin itself, thereby making it difficult 
to argue that the Bulletin is a general principle of international law (it includes standards 
which are not internationally agreed, such as soliciting sex from prostitutes as being 
inherently exploitative behaviour).35 In what terms then can the Bulletin be categorised?  
It is more likely that the Bulletin simply represents policy rather than law, soft or otherwise. 
Soft law can be described as non-binding legal instruments that can either be evidence of 
existing norms or the manifestation of steps toward law-making; for example, General 
Assembly Resolutions.36 Although they are not strictly speaking legally-binding on states, 
General Assembly Resolutions may be evidence of state practice and therefore form part of 
normative development.37  The common trend, much like traditional sources of international 
                                                          
33 M Shaw International Law (6th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008) at 72-93. 
34 See for example Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group GA 
A/59/19/Rev.1 (2005) at [8] where the Bulletin is referred to as forming part of the standards and regulations 
of UN staff; General Assembly United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims 
of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel GA Res A/RES/62/214 
(2008) where the Bulletin is included under standards of conduct and regulations for personnel; General 
Assembly Summary record of the 9th Meeting GA A/C.6/66/SR.9 (2011) at [23] where a member state 
(Columbia) noted that norms described in the Bulletin would need to be adopted through another instrument 
to be legally binding on states themselves.   
35 See generally H Thirlway “The Sources of International Law” in M D Evans (ed) International Law (4th ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 91, at 104-105. 
36 See generally A Boyle “Soft Law in International Law-Making” in M Evans (ed) International Law (3rd ed) 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 122. 
37 At 134-135.  
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law, is that such “soft law” instruments engage with states or international organisations 
directly in an attempt to influence their conduct.38 In contrast, the S-G Bulletin purports to 
influence or bind the behaviour of individuals, in particular UN staff and peacekeeping 
personnel (in international law terms, non-state actors). The Bulletin, on its own,39 does not 
address conduct of states themselves. This is supported by looking at the history of the 
Bulletin itself. As noted above it was developed to sit alongside other policies and 
procedures for UN staff and contribute to the codes of conduct. It is perhaps better to 
describe the Bulletin as “internal law” of the United Nations, thus forming part of the 
administration of the Secretariat.40 As such, the codes are rules or regulations rather than 
instruments that give rise to legal obligations.  
Some academics have made reference to the S-G Bulletin “criminalising” all forms of sexual 
exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping.41 However, it is highly unlikely that the S-G 
Bulletin was drafted with the intention to create criminal law. As identified in the Group of 
Legal Experts’ Report, it was not intended that the Bulletin identify criminal sexual 
conduct.42 Instead the Bulletin focuses on defining misconduct.43 Although the definitions 
themselves include conduct that may be criminal according to the domestic laws of the host 
or contributing states, the Bulletin does not purport to obligate member states to criminalise 
                                                          
38 At 122-123. 
39 There may be an argument to suggest that through its incorporation in the MOU, the S-G Bulletin can then 
be considered to attempt to bind member states, this will be discussed further in Chapter Three. 
40 See ICRC and UCIHL Expert Meeting on Multinational Operations Report: Applicability of Humanitarian 
Law and International Human Rights Law to UN Mandated Forces (Geneva, December 2003) for the 
discussion of the legal status of the S-G Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of international 
Humanitarian Law. It was agreed that the Bulletin was better described as the internal law of the UN, at 10ff. 
This can also be applied to the S-G Bulletin on sexual exploitation and abuse. See also R Murphy United 
Nations Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2007) at 234; G Verdirame The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the 
Guardians? (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) at 207.  
41 For example, see M Ndulo “The United Nations Response to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women 
and Girls by Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions” (2009) 27 Berkeley Journal of International Law 
127 at 146.  
42 First Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 24, at [17]. 
43 At [17]. 
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sexual exploitation and abuse pursuant to the particular definitions provided. In sum, the 
Bulletin primarily acts as a code of conduct or policy and not a vehicle for criminal 
prosecution. Instead, it is through its incorporation in the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the UN and contributing states that obligations on states to prosecute 
criminal conduct may arise (an issue that will be discussed further in Chapter Three below). 
In summary, the above documents represent the main sources of the UN’s zero-tolerance 
policy; they are the vehicle through which sexual exploitation and abuse are prohibited. 
Contravening these codes will result in administrative measures; they prescribe standards of 
conduct of individuals but do not impose legal obligations on states. As the UN codes and 
the S-G Bulletin, by themselves, cannot be said to have been drafted with the intention of 
creating criminal offences, it is helpful to look at different areas of international law for 
similar terms/definitions to explore further the concepts of sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation.  
(2) SEXUAL ABUSE 
Although the S-G Bulletin is unlikely to be a source of law, it does provide substantive 
definitions of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation upon which serious misconduct may be 
investigated. Therefore, the Bulletin will be the starting point for the following two sections. 
I will begin this section by unpicking the particular definition of sexual abuse provided by 
the Bulletin. I will then look at other international instruments or areas of law for similar 
terms in order to explore how “sexual abuse” has been used in other contexts.  
Arguably, it is somewhat easier to identify the concept of “sexual abuse” and what kind of 
conduct would be classified as sexual abuse than “sexual exploitation”. Overall, I will argue 
that sexual abuse is largely unambiguous and describes conduct that could be classified as 
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sexual crimes in international (or domestic) criminal law or clear examples of violence 
against women under human rights law, for example rape and sexual violence.  
(A) S-G BULLETIN DEFINITION 
According to the S-G Bulletin, sexual abuse means “the actual or threatened physical 
intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.”44  
It is arguable that rape and other forms of sexual violence would fall under this definition 
from the words “physical intrusion of a sexual nature” and the reference to coercion and 
force. This can be supported by similar definitions of “rape” used by the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals ie the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).  
For the purposes of prosecuting rape as part of the international crimes of genocide and 
crimes against humanity, including torture, inhuman treatment and enslavement, the ad-hoc 
tribunals have developed an applicable definition. The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda defined rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive”.45 Like “sexual abuse”, the ICTR definition takes a 
coercive context into consideration. “Circumstances which are coercive” has been held to 
include threats or intimidation and duress drawing on circumstances of desperation.46 These 
explanations can be associated with the “unequal conditions” aspect of sexual abuse. As 
discussed above, one of the fundamental elements of sexual exploitation and abuse is the 
unequal power dynamics between peacekeepers and the local population. Similar concepts 
                                                          
44 S-G Bulletin (2003), above n 11, at 1. 
45 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR Trial Chamber ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998 at 
[688]. 
46 D Cohen “Prosecuting Sexual Violence from Tokyo to the ICC” in M Bergsmo et al. (eds) Understanding 
and Providing International Sex Crimes (Beijing, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2012) at 26. 
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of abuse of power underlie the ICTR’s definition of rape.47 Furthermore, the words “physical 
invasion of a sexual nature” used by the ICTR have similar connotations to “physical 
intrusions of a sexual nature” as defined under the S-G Bulletin.48  In light of its similarity, 
it will be assumed that “sexual abuse” as defined by the S-G Bulletin would include acts of 
rape. 
A related issue that springs from the similarity between the ICTR’s definition of rape and 
the S-G Bulletin’s definition of “sexual abuse” is the absence of consent. In many common 
law jurisdictions consent is often a central element when prosecuting domestic crimes of 
rape.49 Of course, this will only become an issue when the situation of criminal prosecution 
arises. Nevertheless, reference to force or coercion envisions circumstances in which there 
is a lack of consent (either altogether or genuine) which would also support rape falling 
under “sexual abuse”.50 Other jurisdictions require evidence of force or the threat of force 
which can be reflected in the definition by the words “the actual or threatened physical 
intrusion of a sexual nature”.51  
Similarly, sexual violence has been given a definition for the purposes of international 
criminal law.52 The definition has been largely borrowed from the 1998 UN report 
Contemporary Forms of Slavery regarding the sexual exploitation of women during armed 
conflict.53 Sexual violence is defined as:54 
                                                          
47 Amnesty International Rape and Sexual Violence: Human Rights Law and Standards in the International 
Criminal Court (Amnesty International publications, London, 2011) at 26. 
48 Both phrases envision sexual penetration, but could also include other forms of “sexual intrusions” or 
“invasions” short of penetration see Cohen, above n 46, at 25.  
49 Prosecutor v Furundzija (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998 at [180]. 
50 Cohen, above n 46, at 29.  
51 At 26. 
52 Leading definition of “sexual violence” for the purposes of international crimes can be found in Prosecutor 
v Furundzijia, above n 49, at [186]. 
53 Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed 
Conflict Final Report, submitted by G J McDougall, Special Rapporteur E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (1998). 
54 At [21].  
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... any violence, physical or psychological, carried out through sexual means 
or by targeting sexuality. Sexual violence covers both physical and 
psychological attacks directed at a person’s sexual characteristics, such as 
forcing a person to strip naked in public, humiliating a person’s genitals, or 
slicing off a woman’s breasts. 
Sexual violence therefore includes the use of physical force or psychological coercion, 
which certainly falls within the meaning of “sexual abuse”. Therefore, it will be assumed 
that sexual abuse in the S-G Bulletin intends to include acts of sexual violence. 
(B) OTHER DEFINITIONS OF “SEXUAL ABUSE” 
When looking at the specific term “sexual abuse” it should be noted that although it can be 
found elsewhere in international law, it is seldom defined. Security Council Resolution 
132555 concerning the protection of women and children in armed conflict refers to “sexual 
abuse”. Paragraph 10 of the resolution “calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special 
measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other 
forms of sexual abuse ...” It is important to note that here rape is considered a form of “sexual 
abuse” thus supporting the above discussion.  
Sexual abuse has also been referenced in some human rights treaties, particularly those 
concerning sexual activity with children. As a significant number of allegations of sexual 
abuse involve children such instruments are relevant.56 Moreover, the Convention on the 
                                                          
55 Security Council Resolution 1325 SC Res S/Res/1325 (2000). 
56 In his 2012 report on sexual exploitation and abuse, the Secretary-General noted that 30% of allegations 
involved children see Secretary-General Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
Abuse GA A/66/699 (2012) at [12]. 
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Rights of the Child (CRC)57 proved to be particularly influential in the development of the 
Bulletin’s definitions.58 The CRC art 34 requires state parties to: 
... undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and 
sexual abuse. For those purposes, State Parties shall in particular take all 
appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent: 
(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual 
activity; 
(b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual 
practices; 
(c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and 
materials.  
From looking at art 34 CRC, it is likely that sex with minors (including transactional sex) 
would also fall within the meaning of “sexual abuse”, particularly with the reference to 
inducement or coercion in sub-paragraph (a).59  
Similar provisions can be found in regional human rights treaties. The Council of Europe 
Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse 
obligates member states to criminalise particular sexual behaviour regarding children and 
specifically defines the conduct that would fall under “sexual abuse”.60 Similar to the CRC, 
                                                          
57 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into 
force 2 September 1990). 
58 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Investigation into Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
by aid workers in West Africa GA A/57/465 (2002) at [9]. 
59 See also Report of the World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, Stockholm, 
Sweden, 27-31 August 1996, Part I and II (Stockholm, 1996); see generally V Muntarbhorn A commentary on 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 34 Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse of 
Children (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2007). 
60 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse 
CETS No: 201 (opened for signature 25 October 2007, entered into force 1 July 2010) arts 18-23.  
50 
 
art 19(b) of the Convention makes reference to coercion of a child to engage in sexual 
activity. The contents of art 34 of the CRC are also found in the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child.61  
From the above discussion it is possible to determine that rape and sexual violence would 
most certainly fall within the meaning of “sexual abuse” under the S-G Bulletin. Moreover, 
sexual activity with minors (including transactional sex with children) would also fall under 
“sexual abuse”. Consequently, any attempt to commit any of these acts will also breach the 
S-G Bulletin’s definition. Rape and sexual violence have been considered crimes under 
international criminal law and international humanitarian law.62Although it is unclear 
whether rape and sexual violence on their own are violations of human rights,63 they have 
been considered forms of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and are clear examples 
of violence against women.64  
In sum, the S-G Bulletin’s definition of “sexual abuse” can be closely compared with the 
ICTR’s definition of “rape” under international criminal law. Moreover, descriptions of 
“sexual violence” could also align with sexual abuse. Although the term “sexual abuse” has 
not been widely defined elsewhere in international law, there is an argument to suggest that 
                                                          
61 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child OAU CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force 29 
November 1999) art 27(1)-(c).  
62 Rape and Sexual Violence have been said to constitute war crimes under international humanitarian law see 
The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, above n 45; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 
UNTS 3 (opened for signature 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) [Rome Statute] art 8(b).  
63 The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women 
(opened for signature 6 September 1994, entered into force 3 May 1995) is the only major human rights treaty 
to explicitly refer to rape and sexual violence as a breach of human rights. See D S Mitchell “The Prohibition 
of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a norm of jus cogens; clarifying the Doctrine” (2004-2005) 15 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 219 at 245; also specifically noted as a breach of human 
rights in the World Conference on Women: Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their 
Contribution to Development and Peace E/CONF.66.34 (1975) at [28].  
64 Rape and sexual violence were specifically referred to in the definition of “violence against women” in the 
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women GA Res A/RES/48/104 (1994) art 
2; See also A Edwards “Everyday Rape: International Human Rights Law and Violence against Women in 
Peacetime” in C McGlynn and V E Munro (eds) Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative 
Perspectives (Routledge, New York, 2010) 92 at 100. I will discuss the concept of violence against women in 
more detail below. 
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the S-G Bulletin’s definition represents sexual crimes or clear examples of violence against 
women. Sexual abuse envisions violence, force and coercion; it has an identifiable character 
to its definition. In contrast, “sexual exploitation” is more ambiguous.  
(3) SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
The concept of sexual exploitation is closely linked to the idea of vulnerability and abuse of 
power. The UN, when first responding to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, was 
mostly concerned with peacekeeping personnel exploiting the vulnerability of the local 
population and abusing their authority or power for sexual purposes.65 Of particular concern 
were instances where personnel would exchange sex for services, food or money which is 
already due to the local population.66 This so-called “survival sex” situation would 
sometimes result in an on-going relationship or perhaps evolve from one already in 
existence.67 Although survival sex is arguably targeted by the S-G Bulletin’s definition of 
“sexual exploitation”, the definition is ambiguous enough to catch other types of 
relationships, including those that fall in the grey area between exploitation and a mutually 
beneficial relationship between two consenting adults. This line is not easily drawn and the 
question as to what constitutes an exploitative relationship and what does not has arguably 
been left open by the Bulletin.68  
Using the S-G Bulletin as the guide once more, this section will begin by unravelling the 
Bulletin’s definition of “sexual exploitation”. To achieve this it is necessary to break down 
the definition and explore particular elements; these include the “position of vulnerability or 
deferential power” and the required “exchange”. The latter will be further broken down into 
                                                          
65 Zeid Report, above n 1, at [6]. 
66 At [6].  
67 At [6]. 
68 And consequentially has been the subject of much criticism from feminist scholars, discussed more below. 
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two circumstances of such exchanges; firstly, adult prostitution and secondly, survival sex.  
Again, I will also look at other instruments or areas of law for similar terms in order to 
explore how the concept of “sexual exploitation” has been used in other contexts. Following 
this, I will take a step back and consider whether sexual exploitation could be interpreted as 
violence against women under international human rights law. 
Arguably, “sexual exploitation” is a mixed bag: its definition could be comparable to 
international crimes such as sexual slavery or forced prostitution. At the same time, the 
definition prohibits the act of buying sex from adult prostitutes which is generally not a 
violation of any human right (and may or may not be a crime in domestic law). However, it 
is at least arguable that sexual exploitation as “survival sex” could be considered violence 
against women under international human rights law; therefore states may have certain 
international obligations resulting from that.  
(A) S-G BULLETIN DEFINITION 
The Bulletin defines sexual exploitation as “actual or attempted abuse of a position of 
vulnerability, deferential power or trust for sexual purposes including, but not limited to, 
profiting from monetarily, socially, or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.”69 
At first glance, the S-G Bulletin’s definition appears to be clear. The definition requires an 
exchange to be made, similar to the concept of prostitution as transactional sex. Common 
examples of an exchange would be money, food or assistance. In addition to the exchange, 
there needs to be an abuse of position – of vulnerability and/or of trust. It is this latter 
requirement that can create difficulties when trying to understand what sexual conduct is 
prohibited.  
                                                          
69 S-G Bulletin (2003), above n 11, at 1.  
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(I) POSITION OF VULNERABILITY OR DEFERENTIAL POWER 
The requirement for abuse of a position of vulnerability or trust is based on the purported 
power imbalance between UN peacekeepers and the local population. The S-G Bulletin 
makes this clear in section 3.2(d): 
Sexual relationships between United Nations staff and beneficiaries of 
assistance, since they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics, 
undermine the credibility and integrity of the work of the United Nations and 
are strongly discouraged. 
As noted in the introduction, “inherent unequal power dynamics” is drawn from the notion 
that beneficiaries of assistance and peacekeepers sit opposite each other in the host state 
community.70 The Zeid Report noted that the UN is often present in post-conflict states with 
the mandate to offer humanitarian, legal and other assistance to the local population.71 
Consequently, this places peacekeepers in a position of power; they are the hand of the UN 
in distribution of such help. At the same time, peacekeepers are in a position of trust; the 
host state and its population trust that representatives of the UN will not exploit the 
vulnerability arising in situations of post-conflict.72 According to the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA Task 
Force), “the foundations of sexual exploitation and abuse are embedded in [such] unequal 
power relationships”.73 Additionally, unequal power can also be signalled by a financial or 
material imbalance. Peacekeepers receive regular income for their work and can be 
                                                          
70 The Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse in the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 5 January 2005, 
A/59/661 at [23]. 
71 Zeid Report, above n 1, at [6].  
72 At [6]. 
73 Annex I “Report of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Protection from Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises” in Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the 
Investigation into Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by aid workers in West Africa GA A/57/465 (2002) at [2].  
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contrasted with the pressing problem of local poverty.74 Such power imbalances can also be 
based on gender; these can be pre-existing in the particular culture of the host state,75 and 
also be brought with members of the contributing country.76 This contextual problem will 
be further explored below.77 
Section 3.2(d) of the Bulletin makes the additional point that sexual relationships between 
UN personnel and “beneficiaries of assistance” are strongly discouraged. The expression 
“beneficiaries of assistance” does not always refer to the local population generally; it is 
dependent on the mandate of the Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) which will specify a 
particular group that receives assistance and which the UN serves. In some instances the 
subjects of mission assistance will be the local population generally, including refugees.78 
Although this particular term has been used, it has been stressed that the focus should not be 
on whether the individual is a “beneficiary of assistance” but whether the relationship is one 
that exploits a position of trust or deferential power.79  
Although high-level UN officials and policy-makers have accepted the idea that a power 
imbalance exists between peacekeepers and the local population, the zero-tolerance policy 
is not a blanket rule against sexual relationships between individuals from these respective 
groups; instead, only exploitative relationships are prohibited. Under the zero-tolerance 
policy, the relationship or sexual conduct may be considered exploitative regardless of 
consent or individual agency. The S-G Bulletin makes no reference to consent (or lack of) 
                                                          
74 Ndulo, above n 41, at 145; see also Awori et al, above n 23, at 6. 
75 Pre-existing power-imbalances based on gender can also be seen as “normal” by visiting peacekeepers. 
Therefore it can be tempting for contingent members to engage in such behaviour, for example prostitution 
and sexual activities with girls under the age of 18 years; see Zeid Report, above n 1, at [2]. 
76 “Report of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse in Humanitarian Crises”, above n 73, at [9(c)]; see also Awori et al, above n 23, at 6-7. 
77 Discussion: Feminism & “Sexual Exploitation.” 
78 See UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo Frequently Asked Questions and Answers Question 2.2 
available online <http://www.unmikonline.org>.   
79 PSEA FAQ, above n 78, at Question 19.  
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or even force or coercion leading to the natural conclusion that consensual or voluntary 
sexual relationships may be caught under this definition, if such activity is “exploitative”. It 
is the nature of the relationship that is the focus of the Bulletin.80   
(II) AN EXCHANGE: ADULT PROSTITUTION 
Although sexual exploitation is based on inherent deferential power between personnel and 
the local population, an additional element to the definition is an exchange. Prostitution can 
be described as an exchange of (often) money for sexual purposes. Furthermore, buying sex 
from prostitutes is also prohibited specifically under section 3.2(c).81 Peacekeeping missions 
tend to correspond with an increase in the sex trade in mission areas.82 The opportunity to 
pay for sex whilst temporarily deployed in a foreign country has, in some cases, formed part 
of the masculine culture of the military.83  Hence, it is not uncommon to see an increase of 
brothels, cafes, clubs and bars in and around areas in which there are long-term military 
deployments.84 Associated risks can include trafficking in women and girls for the purposes 
of prostitution and organised crime.85  
The UN’s tough stance on soliciting sex from prostitutes in peacekeeping areas stems from 
evidence regarding human trafficking in the Bosnia and Kosovo missions.86 The UN itself 
has noted that it was “extremely difficult to differentiate between trafficking victims and 
                                                          
80 At Question 15.  
81 Section [3.2(c)] “Exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex ...” S-G Bulletin (2003), above 
n 11. 
82 For example, a 2004 list of off-limit areas for troops in the UN Mission in Kosovo showed brothels were 
situated around UN mission bases. See S E Mendelson Barracks and Brothels: Peacekeepers and Human 
Trafficking in the Balkans (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Wellington, 2005), at 11; see also K 
M Jennings and V Nikolic-Ristanovic UN Peacekeeping Economies and Local Sex Industries: Connections 
and Implications (MICROCON Research Working Paper 17, Brighton, 2009) at 3. 
83 See generally Higate P “Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation” (2007) 10 Men and 
Masculinities 99; S Martin Must Boys be Boys?: Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping 
Missions (Refugees International, 2005). 
84 Mendelson, above n 82, at 11.  
85 See generally Amnesty International “So does that mean I have rights?” Protecting the Human Rights of 
Women and Girls Trafficked for Forced Prostitution in Kosovo (London, 2004) at 41ff.  
86 See generally Mendelson, above n 82 and Amnesty International, above n 85.  
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local prostitution” in Bosnia.87 Not only did the demand for prostitutes create a market for 
trafficking, but there was also evidence that peacekeepers themselves were participating in 
trafficking.88 Therefore, buying sex from prostitutes was prohibited to help eradicate the 
demand (and the complicity in) human trafficking.89 As the official training FAQ on sexual 
exploitation explains, buying sex from prostitutes is prohibited because:90 
… prostitution in war-ravaged societies, developing countries and in 
countries hosting a peacekeeping mission frequently involves vulnerable 
women and children, including persons who have been trafficked for sexual 
exploitation. The vast majority of women in prostitution don’t want to be 
there. Few seek it out or choose it, and most are desperate to leave it … it 
comes from a lack of choice. The only person with choice is the exploiter. 
Therefore, the UN views all prostitution in the peacekeeping context as “de-humanising”91, 
“profoundly disturbing” and enabling a life of dependency and exploitation.92 Again, it is 
also linked to the position of trust and power that peacekeepers have in the host state; it is 
the context that turns transactional sex into exploitation. However, it is difficult to find an 
example elsewhere in international law where prostitution is similarly treated.  
According to sources of international human rights law, buying sex from prostitutes is not 
strictly speaking a breach of human rights. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) details under art 6 that “states parties shall take 
                                                          
87 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Human Trafficking and United Nations 
Peacekeeping (Policy Paper, 2004) at [12].  
88 See generally O Simic “Boys will be Boys: Human Trafficking and UN Peacekeeping in Bosnia and 
Kosovo” in L Holmes (ed) Trafficking and Human Rights: European and Asia-Pacfic Perspectives (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, 2010).  
89 Trafficking for sex work itself is not covered by the definition of “sexual exploitation”.  
90 PSEA FAQ above n 78, at Question 22. 
91 At question 23.  
92 Zeid Report, above n 1, at [6].  
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all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and 
exploitation of prostitution of women.” The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women’s General Recommendation 19 pointed out that prostitutes 
are often driven into such work due to economic hardship.93 Consequentially, it is their 
marginalised status that makes them susceptible to violence.94 Essentially, art 6 is about 
providing prostitutes with protection from human rights violations, such as rape and other 
violent crimes, not necessarily from the engagement in prostitution itself. However, the act 
of trafficking young women and girls in order to exploit them for prostitution is recognised 
as a breach of human rights.95  
(III) AN EXCHANGE: SURVIVAL SEX 
Arguably, the primary focus of “sexual exploitation” under the S-G Bulletin is to address 
the situation of survival sex. The majority of allegations received by the Conduct and 
Discipline Unit each year concern survival sex situations and prostitution.96 Survival sex is 
a term associated with (predominately) young women and children who engage in sexual 
relationships with peacekeepers for an (sometimes promised) exchange of nominal material 
goods or assistance. Examples of typical items exchanged are small amounts of money, 
biscuits, water and greater access to aid that is already due to them.97 The goods or assistance 
exchanged are linked with basics necessary for survival. An example of such a case can be 
drawn from the OIOS investigations of the 2004 allegations against a number of 
                                                          
93 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women General Recommendation 19 (11th 
Session, 1992). 
94 Above n 93. 
95 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1249 UNTS 13 (opened for 
signatures 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) art 6; see also the Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, above n 63, art 2(b).  
96 See Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (2012), above n 56, at [12] 
where it was noted that situations of survival sex and prostitution made up 58% of all allegations of sexual 
exploitation. 




peacekeepers from the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC):98 
Case A 
The girl, identified by OIOS as V046A, was 14 years old and lived with her 
family. Owing to a lack of finds she did not attend school ... she had had 
sexual relations with a MONUC soldier who was known to her (PK1). Each 
time this soldier gave her $1 or $2 or eggs in return. 
The Zeid report described this conduct as creating a relationship of dependency.99 Local 
women and children often do not have the power to negotiate and risk receiving nothing in 
exchange at all.100 Moreover, Prince Zeid expressed concern that items may be given after 
the fact to “disguise rape as prostitution”.101  
The concept of survival sex is not easily reflected in existing international norms or 
instruments. Nevertheless, it may be argued that the international crimes of sexual slavery 
and forced prostitution may apply. These crimes refer to situations where a woman or girl is 
forced to exchange sex for their own safety or survival.102 In reality, these women may not 
be regarded as prostitutes; however, due to the context, where the man has the “dominant 
position of power” and access to the safety that the woman is dependent on she may be 
deemed a sexual slave.103 Such a description can easily be compared with survival sex in 
                                                          
98 The Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse in the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, above n 70, at 
[12].  
99 Zeid Report, above n 1, at [6]. 
100 P Patel and P Tripodi “Peacekeepers, HIV and the Role of Masculinity in Military Behaviour” (2007) 14 
International Peacekeeping 584 at 588. 
101 Zeid Report, above n 1, at [6].  
102 N Quenivet “The Dissonance between the United Nations Zero Tolerance Policy and the Criminalisation 
of Sexual Offences on the International Level” (2007) 7 International Criminal Law Review 657 at 671.  
103 See Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice in the International Criminal Court Recommendations and 
Commentary Preparatory Committee (December, 1997) PART III, at WC.5.6. 
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peacekeeping missions. As was noted above, peacekeepers are in a position of trust and have 
access to assistance and material goods that the local population does not. Moreover, 
survival sex creates a cycle of dependency.104 Sexual slavery and forced prostitution are 
international crimes (forming part of the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes) and are limited to the context of armed conflict (which is unlikely to apply to 
UN peacekeeping missions as peacekeepers are unlikely to be considered “party” to an 
armed conflict).105 Although crimes against humanity may also apply during peacetime, 
there are additional requirements that must be met, for example, the conduct in question 
(sexual slavery or forced prostitution) must be systematic and form part of a widespread 
policy to attack or dehumanise the local population.106 Such a high threshold is unlikely to 
apply to survival sex which is more likely to be committed for personal reasons and be 
opportunistic in nature.  As the scope of this thesis does not consider international 
humanitarian law directly, the applicability of sexual slavery and forced prostitution to 
peacekeepers will not be explored any further. However, survival sex may be considered 
generally as violence against women (discussed further below). 
(B) OTHER DEFINITIONS OF “SEXUAL EXPLOITATION” 
When looking for the term “sexual exploitation” (or similar) elsewhere in international law 
it becomes apparent that it is more likely to be found in the context of anti-trafficking law 
(for the purposes of prostitution) or in relation to the exploitation of children. Like “sexual 
abuse”, sexual exploitation is rarely defined.  
The most recent example of the use of “sexual exploitation” can be found in the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
                                                          
104 Zeid Report, above n 1, at [6] 
105 Quenivet, above n 102, at 671. 
106 Rome Statute, above n 62, art 7.  
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supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). Article 
3(a) describes exploitation as the following:107 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution 
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. 
Although “sexual exploitation” is not defined in the Convention, the Annotated Guide to the 
Complete Trafficking Protocol provided the following model definition for state parties 
wishing to use it in their domestic legislation:108 
Sexual exploitation means the participation by a person in prostitution, sexual 
servitude, or the production of pornographic materials as a result of being 
subjected to a threat, coercion, abduction, and force abuse of authority, debt 
bondage or fraud.  
Neither art 3(a) of the Convention nor the Annotated Guide describe circumstances that the 
S-G Bulletin’s concept of “sexual exploitation” can be easily compared with. Both 
correspond with the concept of forced or coerced prostitution which is more likely to 
compare with the definition of “sexual abuse”. However, neither seem to indicate that adult 
prostitution itself is exploitative in nature. The primary focus of the Convention is to 
criminalise trafficking of women and children for the purposes of prostitution. It does not 
quite fit the definition of sexual exploitation used in the S-G Bulletin, particularly survival 
sex situations.  
                                                          
107 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2237 UNTS 319 (opened for 
signature 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 December 2003) art 3(a). See also D Otto “Making Sense 
of Zero-Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual Economies” in V Muno and C Stuchin (eds) Sexuality and 
the Law: Feminist Engagements (Routledge-Cavendish, New York, 2007) at 269. 
108 A D Jordon Annotated Guide to the Complete UN Trafficking Protocol (Washington DC, Global Rights, 
2002) at 5. 
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Article 34 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (reproduced above) also uses the 
term “sexual exploitation”. As previously noted art 34 resonates with the concept of “sexual 
abuse”. Generally the use of sexual exploitation in the CRC (and other international 
instruments governing the rights of children)109 focuses on the act of exploiting children for 
the purposes of prostitution. It has also been noted that “sexual exploitation” as used in art 
34 includes child prostitution.110 Child prostitution arguably consists of both an exchange 
and an abuse of power. Such an abuse of power is not only due to the inherent power 
imbalance as between peacekeepers and beneficiaries of assistance, but there also exists 
unequal conditions between an adult and a child. Therefore, the use of “sexual exploitation” 
in this context is more aligned with the definition used in the S-G Bulletin. However, this 
only covers one scenario of sexual exploitation. 
In sum, arguably the S-G Bulletin’s definition is meant to include buying sex from adult 
prostitutes and survival-sex-type relationships. However, the UN’s strict approach towards 
buying sex from adult prostitutes is difficult to reconcile with the general approach taken by 
human rights law ie that buying sex per se it is not a violation of human rights. Moreover, 
“survival sex” is largely an unfamiliar concept; although it may be comparable to the 
international crimes of sexual slavery and forced prostitution. Additionally, “sexual 
exploitation” has not been used elsewhere in international instruments in the same way as 
the S-G Bulletin. Therefore, it is perhaps helpful to take a broader view of “sexual 
exploitation”; for example, exploring whether sexual exploitation can be interpreted as 
violence against women in human rights law. 
                                                          
109 For example, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, above n 74, at art 27(1)(a)-(c) and 
the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, 
above n 60.  
110 See Report of the World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, above n 59; see 
also Muntarbhorn, above n 59, at 2. 
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(C) SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AS VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
In the pursuit of gender equality and the realisation of women’s human rights, it was 
acknowledged by many women’s organisations around the world that violence perpetrated 
against women was not only a form of discrimination but also a barrier to the enjoyment of 
such equality and human rights.111 However, violence against women, also known as 
gender-based violence, represents more than just discrimination. According to the Beijing 
Platform for Action 1995, violence against women is “the manifestation of the historically 
unequal power relations between men and women”.112 Therefore, gendered violence is often 
rooted in social and cultural structures; such violence can be an expression of (or coincide 
with) historic subordination of women, cultural justifications for harmful practices against 
women, economic inequalities and continued denial of women’s human rights generally.113 
Consequentially, violence against women has been understood to be more than a private 
issue as between individuals but also a public issue requiring certain steps to be taken by the 
state.114  
Violence against women has been defined in a number of international instruments. It has 
also been subject to different interpretations depending on the instrument; for example, 
multilateral documents, such as the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women,115 do not recognise violence against women as a breach of human rights but see 
such violence as a barrier to the full enjoyment of women’s human rights.116 However, some 
                                                          
111 Report of the Secretary-General In-Depth Study of all forms of Violence against Women GA 
A/61/122/Add.1 (2006) at [1]-[3]. 
112 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995) 
[Platform for Action] at [118]. 
113 In-Depth Study on all forms of Violence against Women, above n 111, at [65]-[92]. 
114 H Charlesworth and C Chinkin The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 2000) at 235.  
115 Above n 64.  
116 A Edwards Violence against Women under International Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2011) at 22. 
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regional treaties, such as the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women, have recognised a separate right for women to be 
free from violence.117  
The leading definition can be found in the UN Declaration. Although the declaration is non-
binding (in the sense that it does not create obligations on member states), the definition has 
been reproduced in the Beijing Platform for Action 1995118 and the General Assembly 
Resolution on Violence against Women 2006.119 Article 1 of the Declaration defines violence 
against women as the following:120 
Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, 
physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, including 
threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether 
occurring in public or in the private life. 
The definition is to be understood as non-exhaustive.121 Violence against women is thus 
broadly defined to capture all forms of violence such as physical, sexual or psychological 
violence. As noted above, rape and sexual violence have been considered clear examples of 
violence against women.122 Other examples of violence against women would include 
femicide, female genital mutilation, psychological or emotional pressure by intimate 
partners and sexual harassment.123  
                                                          
117 See Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against 
Women, above n 63, art 3 “Every woman has a right to be free from violence in both the public and private 
spheres”.  
118 Platform for Action, above n 112, at [113].  
119 General Assembly Resolution on Violence against Women GA Res A/RES/61/143 (2006) at [3]. 
120 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, above n 64, art 1. 
121 At art 1. 
122 In-Depth Study on all forms of Violence against Women, above n 111. 
123 See In-Depth Study on all forms of Violence against Women, above n 111 and Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women General Recommendation 19, above n 93, at [11]. 
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The Declaration’s definition also puts the social, cultural and economic inequalities or the 
systematic power imbalance between men and women at the centre of the problem.124 This 
would seem to suggest that sexual exploitation in the context of peacekeeping could be 
considered violence against women. The Platform for Action noted that women living in 
poverty are especially vulnerable to such violence and this would tend to align with the 
context of survival sex.125 Moreover, the Platform for Action also recognised that women 
and girls are particularly vulnerable to this kind of violence perpetrated by those in authority, 
such as security forces, in conflict and post-conflict states.126 However, it has been noted 
that violence against women has been limited to inequalities based on gender.127 Power 
imbalance based on positions of trust rather than gender may not fit within this particular 
definition of violence against women.  
Taking a regional example, such as the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women,128 there is a slightly different definition of violence 
against women which may include sexual exploitation. Article 1(j) of the African Protocol 
describes violence against women as: 
All acts perpetrated against women which cause or could cause them 
physical, sexual, psychological, and economic harm, including the threat to 
take such acts; or to undertake the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or 
deprivation of fundamental freedoms in private or public life in peace time 
and during situations of armed conflict or of war. 
                                                          
124 D Otto “Violence against Women: Something Other than a Human Rights Violation?” (1993) 1 Australian 
Feminist Law Journal 159 at 161. 
125 Beijing Platform for Action 1995, above n 112, at [116]. 
126 At [121].  
127 This is due to the word “gender” not being given a separate definition see Edwards Violence against Women, 
above n 116, at 21.  
128 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women (opened for 
signature 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 November 2005): [African Protocol]. 
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Unlike the Declaration, the African Protocol does not limit violence against women to 
physical acts of violence, but covers “all acts perpetrated against women”.129 Such a wide 
qualification would enable sexual exploitation to fall within this definition of violence 
against women. However, as the Protocol is a regional document, its application would 
depend on whether the host or contributing state were a party.  
Violence against women is conceptually part of a broader social context of subordination 
and gender inequalities. Thus, it is perhaps better to argue sexual exploitation as violence 
against women under the related concept of intersectionality. The Secretary-General has 
explained intersectionality as the following:130   
The intersection of male dominance with race, ethnicity, age, caste, religion, 
culture, language, sexual orientation, migrant and refugee status and 
disability frequently termed “intersectionality” ... [can] make some women 
more likely to be targeted for certain forms of violence because they have 
less social status than other women.   
There are many different forms of discrimination and inequalities that can be at play between 
peacekeepers and the local population. Keeping in mind that in any one mission there will 
be many national contingents made up of different ethnicities, language, cultural 
backgrounds and differing levels or concepts of male dominance.131 All these aspects can 
influence gender-specific discrimination, particularly in the context of militaries.132 Field 
research has exposed that some military contingents embrace a very masculine culture where 
                                                          
129 Edwards Violence against women, above n 116, at 22.  
130 In-Depth Study of all forms of Violence against Women, above n 111, at 361.  
131 And these all may be quite different to the ethnicity, language, culture and religion of the host state 
population see M O’Brien National and International Criminal Jurisdiction over United Nations Peacekeeping 
Personnel for Gender-Based Crimes against Women (PhD, University of Nottingham, 2010) at 32. 
132 C Duncanson “Forces for Good? Narratives of Military Masculinity in Peacekeeping Operations” (2009) 
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soldiers focus on certain symbols of masculinity; such as the “warrior”, “heterosexuality” 
and domination over the “feminine” can contribute to the objectification and de-
humanisation of local women.133 An example of inequality has already been discussed at 
length – that of differential power based on the fact that they are “UN peacekeepers”.134  
Economic and social or political inequalities that are pre-existing in the host state may also 
contribute to local women and girls being marginalised.135 Peacekeepers are often deployed 
to post-conflict states where political, legal, and economic structures are substantially 
deficient. Women and children are more vulnerable during and post-conflict because they 
are more likely to be displaced, and male relatives are likely to have left for military or 
employment purposes.136 Moreover, any gender inequalities that had existed before conflict 
can be exacerbated by war.137 A local woman without any long-term economic opportunities 
carrying the burden of family obligations can be contrasted to a UN peacekeeper who has 
shelter, income, and aid that is desperately needed by the host state community.138 Coupled 
with the concept of differential power, these factors can place local women in a marginalised 
position.  
It can be argued that sexual exploitation is the manifestation of the above inequalities and 
forms of discrimination that exist the context of peacekeeping.139 Local prostitutes and those 
                                                          
133 Patel and Tripodi, above n 100, at 589; A Kronsell Gender, Sex, and the Postnational Defense: Militarism 
and Peacekeeping (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 95-99; A Kronsell “Sexed Bodies and Military 
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139 O’Brien National and International Criminal Jurisdiction over United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel for 
Gender-Based Crimes against Women, above n 131, at 30-34. 
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engaged in survival-sex-type relationships are arguably marginalised (and therefore rendered 
vulnerable to violence/exploitation) and reinforce the subordination of women. Prostitution 
and survival sex treat women’s sexuality as a commodity rather than embracing a right of 
sexual autonomy,140 such women are unlikely to have any power of negotiation141 and are 
less likely to make a complaint to local authorities.142 At least, this is the argument taken up 
by the UN within the zero-tolerance policy and has its critics (I will illustrate this below).  
Therefore, I contend that it is at least arguable that sexual exploitation could be considered 
violence against women. I will further clarify below that sexual exploitation should be 
considered survival sex only.   
(4) SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE: SUMMARY OF IDENTIFIED CONDUCT 
UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS’ DEFINITIONS 
Having unpacked the S-G Bulletin’s definitions of “sexual abuse” and “sexual exploitation” 
and also looked to other areas of the law for guidance as to their likely meaning, it is useful 
to identify the particular sexual conduct that the zero-tolerance policy has targeted. 
Therefore, this section will summarise the conduct identified and point out the particular 
international norms that are likely to cover such conduct. 
Rape, sexual violence and sexual activity with children represent the identified conduct of 
“sexual abuse”. The term and its definition have been used consistently elsewhere in 
international law; it has an identifiable character and is unambiguous. However, it is arguably 
more difficult to identify conduct under the S-G Bulletin’s definition of “sexual 
exploitation”.  
                                                          
140 At 33. 
141 Discussed more below.  
142 Vojdik, above n 135, at 161. 
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Although human trafficking conventions have used the phrase “sexual exploitation” I noted 
that it has not been used in the same way as the S-G Bulletin. The Bulletin’s definition 
prohibits buying sex from prostitutes and survival-sex-type relationships with local women. 
Conversely, the use of “sexual exploitation” in the human trafficking context focuses on the 
movement of people for the purposes of exploiting them for prostitution. Therefore, I will 
not be looking at human trafficking for the purposes of this paper since it does not offer an 
adequate comparison. Instead, I will look at sexual exploitation as violence against women. 
I will further qualify what I mean as “sexual exploitation” when I take a feminist analysis 
below. 
Notwithstanding the conduct identified here, I noted above that “sexual exploitation” is an 
ambiguous term. This ambiguity has been picked up by academics, particularly feminist 
scholars. Consequently, sexual exploitation, and the zero-tolerance policy generally, has 
been the subject of much criticism. In order to gain a more thorough understanding of sexual 
exploitation it is necessary to explore the term’s conceptual development and the feminists’ 
critique in more detail.  
(5) DISCUSSION: FEMINISM & “SEXUAL EXPLOITATION” 
Arguably, from its inception in the 2002 OIOS investigations of allegations in West Africa, 
“sexual exploitation” was defined in order to target the exploitation of a particular vulnerable 
group, those local women or girls engaged or tempted to engage in survival-sex-type 
relationships with peacekeeping personnel. Specifically, exchanging sex for assistance 
peacekeepers have access to or which are otherwise owed to the local population. It is about 
the differential power in these circumstances and the abuse of that power. However, the S-
G Bulletin’s definition can be interpreted to capture a much wider group than that, from 
those involved in mutually beneficial and consensual adult relationships to those that are 
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coerced in some way into survival-sex-type relationships. Even within “survival sex” there 
can be various levels of agency and negotiation operating. Consequently, it is unclear at 
what point in the vast spectrum of relationships that exist which relationship can be deemed 
“exploitative”. 
The ambiguous nature of “sexual exploitation” as defined has been the subject of much 
criticism, particularly from feminist scholars. In fact, the definition, and the zero-tolerance 
policy generally, exposes the tension between two competing approaches. On the one hand, 
there is the conservative “women as victims” approach. This is reflected in the position taken 
by the UN under the zero-tolerance policy.143 This is the view that women of the host state 
are inherently vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel because of 
their position as beneficiaries of assistance, their reliance on peacekeepers to distribute such 
assistance and the consequential power and trust bestowed on peacekeepers.144 In this view 
transactional sex of any kind is also exploitative (from adult prostitution to survival sex). On 
the other hand, there is the “women as liberated decision-makers” approach. This is the view 
that women in the host state are not “victims” but “survivors” who may choose to engage in 
sexual relationships with peacekeepers for many different reasons including inter alia a 
means of employment, love and attraction, adventure and sometimes marriage.145  
These feminist approaches, of the conservative “women as victims” on one side and “women 
as liberated decision-makers” on the other, do little to solve the ambiguous nature of “sexual 
exploitation”. This is due to the extreme nature of the positions taken. As will be discussed 
in this section, to take either of these approaches on their own, with women being regarded 
                                                          
143 For example, Quenivet, above n 162, at 668; see also Spencer at 138. 
144 Noted in Quenivet, above n 102, at 668. 
145 See generally Simic Regulation of Sexual Conduct in UN Peacekeeping Operations, above n 6; see also 
Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Investigation into Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by 
aid workers in West Africa, above n 58, at [11].  
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as either victims or liberated decision-makers, means there is little consideration given to 
the spectrum of different relationships that can exist between peacekeepers and individual 
local women or the intersection of oppression that may exist. However, the critics do offer 
some notable points about the (in)action of the UN to combat the arguable driving forces 
behind sexual exploitation, however conceived, particularly the context of poverty and 
harmful masculinities.  
In order to explore the criticisms of “sexual exploitation” and relevant feminist approaches 
it is necessary to first briefly consider the conceptual foundations of the S-G Bulletin’s 
definition. Subsequently, this section will then analyse the major critics and their arguments.  
In the end, it is the “women as victims” approach that has been taken by the UN and is 
reflected in the S-G Bulletin’s definition. Thus, the concept and definition used under the 
zero-tolerance policy presents particular issues for possible avenues for accountability at the 
outset.    
(A) CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION  
The concept of sexual exploitation had its beginnings in terms of the UN’s response to 
undesirable conduct by peacekeepers with the first major investigation by the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services into allegations against West African aid workers in 2002. From 
there, a definition was posed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for the Protection 
from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA Task Force).146 This specific definition later 
turned up in the S-G Bulletin.  
During the 2002 investigation of West African aid workers, the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services developed a working definition of “sexual exploitation” to facilitate its inquiry. The 
                                                          
146 “Report of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse in Humanitarian Crises”, above n 73, at [8].  
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definition detailed the particular circumstances that many of the allegations brought to 
light:147 
... situations in which an international NGO, humanitarian or aid worker, in 
a position of power, uses that power to request sexual favours or benefits by 
trading food or services that refugees are entitled to receive free of charge. 
The above arguably describes the situation of survival sex. The definition used by the OIOS 
was picked up by the PSEA Task Force in a Plan of Action148 (later transferred into the S-G 
Bulletin). From the inception of the definition I argue that the primary scenario “sexual 
exploitation” seeks to protect is that of survival sex. This situation of “survival sex” can be 
understood as the exchange of sex for services, money or assistance to which peacekeepers 
have access and to which locals are already entitled.149 As will be seen below, the wider 
definition eventually adopted under the S-G Bulletin is broad enough to capture many forms 
of transactional sex. Moreover, the S-G Bulletin’s definition has brought about confusion 
regarding the concept of exploitative relationships. The fact that the definition does not 
differentiate between coercive and voluntary sexual behaviour has drawn some criticism 
from feminist scholars. 
(B) THE FEMINISTS’ CRITIQUE 
The S-G Bulletin’s definitions of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation have seldom been the 
subject of in-depth analysis in academic discourse; however, there are a growing number of 
                                                          
147 Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
in the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, above n 70, at 1. 
148 “Report of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse in Humanitarian Crises”, above n 73, at [8].  
149 As evidenced by the detailed discussion on the context of exploitation by the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee describing conduct of greatest concern which aligned significantly with the idea of survival sex, 
see “Report of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse in Humanitarian Crises”, above n 73, at [5]-[6]. See also the Zeid Report, above n 1, at [6].  
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feminist scholars that have tackled the interpretation of the zero-tolerance policy on which 
the S-G Bulletin is based. Few scholars will deny that local women and children need to be 
protected from coercive or violent sexual conduct, such as rape. As a result, the prohibition 
of “sexual abuse” under the zero-tolerance policy is generally supported. Differences in 
opinion arise however in regard to the concept of sexual exploitation, specifically the issue 
of consensual sexual relationships potentially being caught under the definition and the 
prohibition of all kinds of transactional sex.  
Scholars advocating the “women as liberated decision-makers” point of view150 are strong 
critics of the UN’s zero-tolerance policy and specifically the S-G Bulletin’s definition of 
“sexual exploitation”. There are three major criticisms. Firstly, that the zero-tolerance policy 
removes the possibility of mutual and consensual sexual relationships and does not take into 
consideration the point of view of the so-called “victim”. Secondly, the Bulletin does not 
consider the legitimacy of the survival aspect of transactional sex and, more broadly, the 
legitimacy of sex work. Thirdly, the policy incorrectly labels sex as the problem and ignores 
the context in which the sex occurs, particularly poverty, pre-existing inequalities, and 
harmful masculinities within military contingents. 
Taking the first of these criticisms and exploring it in more depth, as noted above, sexual 
exploitation under the S-G Bulletin has the capacity to include entirely voluntary and 
consensual relationships between peacekeepers and local women. Effectively, as the UN has 
identified an inherent power imbalance between peacekeepers and beneficiaries of 
assistance, all local women and girls have arguably been labelled as potential “victims” 
                                                          
150 For example, Otto “Making Sense of Zero-Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual Economies”, above 
n 107; Harrington (2010), above n 9; K M Jennings “Service, sex, and Security: Gendered Peacekeeping 
Economies in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (2014) 45 Security Dialogue 313; Jennings 
and Nikolic-Ristanovic, above n 95; A R Kolbe “It’s Not a Gift When it Comes with Price”: A Qualitative 
Study of Transactional Sex between UN Peacekeepers and Haitian Citizens” (2015) 4 Stability: International 
Journal of Security & Development 1; McGill, above n 133; O Simic Regulation of Sexual Conduct in UN 
Peacekeeping Operations, above n 6. 
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before any such relationship has been entered into. However, some feminist scholars suggest 
that the zero-tolerance policy wrongly denies women’s agency in such sexual 
relationships.151 Additionally, the definition of sexual exploitation does not make a 
distinction between coerced/forced and voluntary sex.152  
There are notable gaps in research regarding local women’s perspectives on the zero-
tolerance policy, specifically the notion of sexual exploitation. As an attempt to fill this gap, 
Olivera Simic undertook empirical research in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which she 
questioned three subject groups about their views on the zero-tolerance policy.153 The most 
relevant group was made up of local Bosnian women who were engaged in sexual 
relationships with peacekeepers throughout the duration of the UN mission.154 Simic 
questioned these women about the themes presented by the zero-tolerance policy, including 
questions relating to positions of power, both within their relationships and the overall 
concept of “inherent unequal power” between peacekeepers and beneficiaries of assistance. 
The intended outcome of the research was to expose the difference between coerced and 
voluntary sexual relationships.155  
Simic hypothesised that women had legitimate reasons to enter into relationships with 
peacekeepers and that not all women believed they were being “exploited” for sexual 
purposes.156 The relevant group of women interviewed had different types of relationships 
with peacekeepers (both military and civilian contingent members); ie some had married or 
had long-term plans, others had short-term or less serious relationships.157 Purported reasons 
                                                          
151 For example, Otto “Making Sense of Zero-Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual Economies”, above 
n 107, at 267-270; see also O Simic “Rethinking Sexual Exploitation in UN Peacekeeping Operations” (2009) 
32 Women’s Studies International Forum 288 at 291.  
152 Otto “Making Sense of Zero-Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual Economies”, above n 107, at 26. 
153 Simic Regulation of Sexual Conduct in UN Peacekeeping Operations, above n 6. 
154 See generally Security Council Resolution 1035 SC Res S/Res/1035 (1995).  
155 Simic Regulation of Sexual Conduct in UN Peacekeeping Operations, above n 6, at 90. 
156 At 90. 
157 At 110. 
74 
 
for entering into these relationships did not refer to financial or material benefits, but instead 
for “love, attraction and friendship”.158  
When asked about the “inherent unequal power” between peacekeepers and local women, 
the majority of those interviewed believed that there was a power imbalance; but suggested 
that this was based on the legal immunities peacekeepers enjoyed rather than trust within 
their personal relationships.159 Thus, where interviewees suggested there was unequal power 
dynamics it was not based on money or gender, but rather described in legal terms.160 
Differences in power dynamics were also described in other ways, such as education and 
age,161 which are arguably present in many adult relationships, not just those between 
peacekeepers and local women. Nevertheless, the interviewees did not believe that these 
power imbalances flowed through to their sexual interactions.162 Therefore, Simic’s research 
exposes that relationships between peacekeepers and beneficiaries of assistance are not 
always about the “vulnerable” local woman or girl being exploited for sexual purposes, 
although gifts may be exchanged and a power imbalance may be present.  
All of Simic’s interviewees were over the age of 18 years, all had “good jobs” and were 
“happy with their salaries”, ruling out any financial motivations for their relationships.163 As 
previously argued, the zero-tolerance policy, particularly sexual exploitation, is intended to 
address a particular group of local people – those engaged or tempted to engage in survival 
sex. Women more likely to engage in survival sex are those living below the poverty line, 
without long-term economic opportunities, or who are dependent on receiving aid from UN 
                                                          
158 At 111 and 113.  
159 At 114.  
160 At 118. 
161 At 114. 
162 At 119. 
163 At 110.  
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and related humanitarian agencies.164 Women who are internally displaced are also more 
likely to engage in survival-sex-type relationships.165 Moreover, a vast majority of reported 
allegations of survival sex concern girls under the age of 18, typically between the ages of 
13 and 17 years old.166 Arguably, to engage with these women and girls and question them 
about what they believe is “sexually exploitative” conduct would be more valuable as an 
insight into the applicability of the S-G Bulletin’s definition of sexual exploitation as they 
are the group which the S-G Bulletin’s definition targets. Simic’s research did not take these 
women and girls into account. However, similar qualitative research commissioned by the 
Office of Internal Oversight Services in Haiti does engage with such women. 
The 2014 study interviewed over 200 Haitians (mostly women) who engaged in 
transactional sex with UN peacekeepers about their relationships.167 The study revealed a 
range of transactional interactions including single exchanges, continuing relationships and 
relationships described by some as “dating”.168 Interviewees who were deemed “very 
poor”169 and/or lived in rural areas cited money, food, medication or other kinds of assistance 
that peacekeepers had access to as the most valued items in exchange for sex.170 Whereas 
those who attended school and/or were from urban or suburban areas noted they received 
“gifts” in exchange for sex (such as payment of school fees, school books, and cell phones) 
                                                          
164 Awori et al, above n 23, at 6; Human Rights Watch “The Power These Men Have Over Us” Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia (2014) at 21-24; Vojdik, above n 135, at 162.  
165 A Harrington “Prostituting Peace: The Impact of Sending State’s Legal Regimes on UN Peacekeeper 
Behaviour and Suggestions to Protect the Populations Peacekeepers Guard” (2007-2008) 17 Transnational 
Law and Policy 217 at 225. 
166 See Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (2012), above n 56, at 
[12]; also the two OIOS investigations reports Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the 
Investigation into Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by aid workers in West Africa, above n 58 and Investigation 
by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United 
Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, above n 70.  
167 Kolbe, above n 150, at 4, although the majority of individuals interviewed were women, some men and 
transgendered individuals were included in the study, see at 8. 
168 Kolbe, Above n 150, at 8. 
169 An interviewee was deemed “very poor” under the study if their household generated an income of less 
than $800 (US), see Kolbe, above n 150, at 7. 
170 Kolbe, above n 150, at 9-11.  
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and were more likely to describe these exchanges within the concept of “dating” (but 
distinguished from romantic relationships).171 In both categories the transactional sex was 
linked to tangible goods or services related to survival, but with differing levels of 
negotiating power and consent. Where some interviewees expressed desperation for money 
or assistance as a “triggering” driving force, others believed they could call the exchange off 
whenever they pleased.172 None of these individuals were asked whether they thought these 
exchanges or relationships were exploitative. When asked about the zero-tolerance policy 
(in the very few cases where sexual abuse had occurred), many did not know about the policy 
or how to make a complaint.173 
Under the zero-tolerance policy all these relationships would be considered sexual 
exploitation because of their transactional nature. Therefore, the broad definition of sexual 
exploitation utilised by the UN codes of conduct and the Bulletin have the potential to 
prohibit many kinds of relationships ie consensual and mutually beneficial adult 
relationships. Moreover, the blanket inclusion of transactional sex disregards the varied 
types of sex work/relationships that may exist, and the motivations behind them. 
It has been acknowledged by UN officials174 that local women and girls have different 
reasons for entering into relationships with peacekeepers that are not always related to 
survival. In its original report concerning West African aid workers in 2002, the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services observed the following:175 
                                                          
171 At 9, 12 and 14. 
172 At 9-11; similar findings were made in a study located in Liberia see B Beber, M J Gilligan, J Guardado 
and S Karim Peacekeeping, International Norms, and Transactional Sex in Monrovia, Liberia (New York 
University, 2012) available online <www.nyu.edu>. See also Jennings “Service, sex, and Security: Gendered 
Peacekeeping Economies in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, above n 150, at 319. 
173 Kolbe, above n 150, at 17-18. 
174 See Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Investigation into Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by aid workers in West Africa, above n 58, at [11].  
175 [emphasis added] Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Investigation into Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse by aid workers in West Africa, above n 58, at [11].  
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Such relationships are entered into for a variety of reasons, including the 
situation where a female refugee does so in the expectation or hope that she 
may be rewarded with additional goods and services beyond what she would 
normally be entitled to receive. This is not to suggest that a number of these 
relationships are not genuine and may result in marriages. 
Here the OIOS was careful not to colour all sexual relationships as survival-sex-type 
situations or prostitution. Nevertheless, the fact that this was recognised in a final sentence 
of a paragraph (and investigation) that focussed on survival sex gives the impression that 
the majority of relationships are entered into for financial or material purposes. In turn, the 
majority of peacekeepers are assumed to exploit these circumstances for sexual purposes.  
As sexual exploitation arguably labels all women and girls as potential victims, a related 
criticism alluded to above is that women are denied agency in sexual matters, particularly 
the ability to negotiate terms of an exchange. Feminist legal theorists such as Dianne Otto 
and Jena McGill argue that the zero-tolerance policy fails to consider the legitimacy of 
survival sex.176 Although it is not the intention of this paper to explore whether prostitution 
is prima facie exploitative,177 it is important to note the particular arguments put forward in 
respect of survival sex as legitimate sex work. Survival sex is “legitimate” in this context 
due to the socio-economic pressures that exist in conflict and post-conflict states which lead 
women and girls to look for pecuniary opportunities.   
                                                          
176 See Otto “Making Sense of Zero-Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual Economies”, above n 107; 
McGill, above n 133; see also Harrington (2010), above n 9; Jennings “Service, sex, and Security: Gendered 
Peacekeeping Economies in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, above n 150.  
177 For examples of this debate see D Leidholt “Prostitution: A Violation of Women’s Human Rights” (1993-
1994) 1 Cardozo Women’s Law Journal 133; K Green “Prostitution, Exploitation and Taboo” (1989) 64 
Philosophy 525.  
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Otto describes survival sex as “a form of livelihood for the “vulnerable” participant and, 
often, through a web of obligations, for members of their extended family as well”.178 
Therefore, young women are more likely to seek out these kinds of relationships to generate 
small amounts of money or food for themselves and/or their family. Often in post-conflict 
states there are few economic opportunities, especially for women.179 As a result, male 
relatives will relocate for work or military purposes. Thus, family survival will often depend 
on the women finding work, collecting aid packages and so on.180 Accordingly, these women 
are not “victims”, but survivors, making calculated decisions based on their cultural or social 
role in the family/community and the surrounding situation of poverty.181 Such decision-
making and strategies are thus weakened severely by the Bulletin’s definition of sexual 
exploitation.182  
Although there have been some examples of women and girls turning down sex when it is 
clear they will receive nothing in exchange,183 I assert that arguments such as Otto’s 
overestimate the ability of some local women to negotiate terms of an exchange or exercise 
true agency. It has been noted that some women do not have the power to negotiate when 
entering into survival-sex-type relationships, or feel they have no choice.184 Moreover, when 
taking the post-conflict context into consideration it is difficult to argue that all women have 
the legitimate freedom of choice. Arguably, where peacekeepers take advantage of this 
context of desperation for sexual purposes, by withholding assistance owed for example, 
                                                          
178 Otto “Making Sense of Zero-Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual Economies”, above n 107, at 260. 
179 Patel and Tripodi, above n 100, at 588; McGill, above n 133, at 6. 
180 McGill, above n 133, at 7. 
181 Otto “Making Sense of Zero-Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual Economies”, above n 107, at 266; 
McGill, above n 133, at 30. 
182 Otto “Making Sense of Zero-Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual Economies”, above n 107, at 273. 
183 For example, see Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
above n 70, at [14] Case B; see also Kolbe, above n 150, at 9.  
184 K M Jennings “Unintended Consequences of Intimacy: Political Economies of Peacekeeping and Sex 
Tourism” (2010) 17 International Peacekeeping 229 at 234; Kolbe, above n 150, at 11. 
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then it is rightly classified as exploitation.185 Moreover, Otto’s assumption that these women 
are exercising agency in their “choice” to engage in transactional sex oversimplifies the 
reality of such relationships (just as the “women-as-victims” rhetoric oversimplifies them). 
It’s not about agency, it’s about survival. 
Generally, there will inevitably be a vast spectrum of relationships that exist between 
mutually beneficial adult relationships on the one hand and coercive, exploitative 
relationships on the other. Some survival-sex-type relationships may exist in the grey area 
between. The 2014 qualitative study in Haiti explored above illustrates this spectrum. As 
noted above, interviewees who were very poor and/or living in rural areas entered into 
survival-sex-type relationships for money or items of assistance to which peacekeepers had 
access and felt they had little choice.186 Conversely, others had creative methods to 
demonstrate their power of negotiation and agency, for example one interviewee stole and 
held onto a peacekeeper’s identity badge until she was given what he had promised her.187 
Other respondents felt like they “owed sex” to peacekeepers who provided them with 
material goods.188 One interviewee noted:189 
If you say no to a man like that, with power, a foreigner, he will just take it 
anyway. You don’t have the right to say no. I can’t say it was rape. It wasn’t 
rape. 
The differential power between peacekeepers (as foreigners with access to money and 
assistance) was a barrier to the exercise of agency for some women. Furthermore, traditional 
gender roles also play a part in such interactions. The social or cultural inequalities between 
                                                          
185 Spencer, above n 138, at 171. 
186 Kolbe, above n 150, at 6-7. 
187 At 10. 
188 At 11. 
189 At 11. 
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men and women that exist (both in the host state and within military units) are elements that 
form the broader context of the transactional sex, to which the zero-tolerance policy has 
failed to draw attention. Sex is labelled as harmful and women as inherently vulnerable to 
its harm, rather than the context in which the sex occurs.190 
Part of that context is the gendered nature of peacekeeping operations, the economies it 
creates and harmful masculinities associated with militaries. Despite gender mainstreaming 
programmes, UN peacekeeping personnel are overwhelmingly male.191 Additionally, 
peacekeeping economies (the economies that inevitably spring up in the areas in which 
peacekeepers work) involve work primarily associated with women, such as food services 
and sex work.192  Straightaway there is a gender divide. Traditional gender roles tend to 
follow, along with any negative gendered stereotypes that previously existed within the host 
state, but also the cultural/social backgrounds of foreign personnel.193 The added presence 
of a hyper-masculine community (especially those that favour harmful performance of 
masculinity characterised by antagonism, heterosexual norms, and dominance over the 
“feminine”) within the military can compound discrimination against women.194 Women are 
thus more likely to be de-humanised, hyper-sexualised, and the subject of male 
aggression.195 A culture favouring harmful kinds of masculinities can also foster a “boys 
will be boys” attitude and a reluctance to report sexual misconduct or enforce standards.196 
Overall, the social and cultural structures (within peacekeeping and the host state) that foster 
                                                          
190 At 20. 
191 Current statistics on gender diversity in peacekeeping can be found online <www.un.org> (however, the 
official stats only portray numbers for male and female, other genders are not represented).  
192 Jennings “Service, sex, and Security: Gendered Peacekeeping Economies in Liberia and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo”, above n 150, at 315.  
193 Awori et al., above n 23, at 6-7; Puechguirbal “Peacekeeping” in Shepherd (ed) Gender Matters: A Feminist 
Introduction to International Relations (Taylor and Francis, Hoboken, 2014) at 256. 
194 McGill, above n 133, at 24; Kronsell, Gender, Sex, and the Postnational Defense, above n 133, at 55. 
195 Awori et al., above n 23, at 6-7; McGill, above n 133, at 24. 
196 Martin, above n 83, at 5; Awori et al., above n 23, at 7. 
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discrimination against women, and thus a driving force for transactional sex and sexual 
abuse, have not been dealt with by the UN’s zero-tolerance policy.  
Another contextual element that may exist behind transactional or survival sex is extreme 
poverty. Scholars like Otto and McGill argue that the underlying socio-economic context 
that can lead young women into survival-sex-type relationships has not been dealt with by 
the zero-tolerance policy. Due to conflict or disaster, host states may have very limited 
employment opportunities, particularly for women who may suffer from gender, race or 
class-based inequalities.197  Therefore, transactional or survival sex are among the very few 
options available for some women to provide for their livelihood. The UN has yet to tackle 
the context of poverty, or racial and gender inequalities underlining that poverty, that might 
be a driving force for transactional sex or sexual abuse. Consequently, the UN has been 
accused of looking out for the interests of itself as an institution and its reputation rather 
than demonstrate any real concern for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse in the 
peacekeeping context.198  
Some UN reports have acknowledged the pressing socio-economic problems underlying 
peacekeeping mission areas. The OIOS 2002 investigation report observed that many 
reasons young women and girls in West African refugee camps entered into such 
relationships were connected with poverty and lack of real employment opportunities for 
women:199 
                                                          
197 McGill, above n 133, at 26; Secretary-General Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation 
and Sexual Abuse GA A/68/756 (2014) at [37]; See also E G Ferris “Abuse of Power: Sexual Exploitation of 
Refugee Women and Girls” (2007) 32 SIGNS 584. 
198 M Lipson “Peacekeeping: Organised Hypocrisy?” (2007) 13 European Journal of International Relations 
5, at 17-18; McGill, above n 133, at 33. 
199 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Investigation into Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
by aid workers in West Africa, above n 58, at [12].  
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The Investigation Team discovered that many female refugees engage in 
relationships because of abject poverty pervading the refugee camps in which 
they live. In the absence of skills training and employment, many are 
compelled to enter into prostitution or other forms of exploitative 
relationships to augment the inadequate aid provided for their basic needs of 
food, clothing and shelter. 
Again, the UN expert report leaked in 2015 clearly linked transactional sex to the context of 
poverty, highlighting that for some women sex work may be the only means of obtaining 
food or money.200 Similarly in 2015, the OIOS noted once again that poverty was a driving 
force of survival-sex-type relationships and prostitution.201 However, despite subsequent 
recognition of factors that can lead women and girls into survival-sex-type relationships with 
peacekeepers, the zero-tolerance policy itself takes no account of this context.   
As the feminist legal theorists have correctly suggested,202 the zero-tolerance policy colours 
all local women as victims. Arguably, this may be based on the concept of the western or 
imperial peacekeeper with disposable income taking advantage of vulnerable local 
women.203 Another interpretation is the developed state versus developing state scenario; ie 
peacekeepers representing the developed states that can take advantage of the vulnerability 
of developing nations.204 However, the reality of modern peacekeeping runs counter to this 
assumption; for example, the top ten contributing countries are all developing states.205 
                                                          
200 Awori et al, above n 23, at 6. 
201 Office of Internal Oversight Services Evaluation Report: Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial 
Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the United Nations and Related Personnel in 
Peacekeeping Operations (May 2015) at [47]. 
202 Simic “Rethinking Sexual Exploitation in UN Peacekeeping Operations”, above n 151; Otto “Making Sense 
of Zero-Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual Economies”, above n 107; Harrington (2010), above n 9. 
203 See generally R Kapur “The Tragedy of Victimisation Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in 
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics” (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1 at 11-12. 
204 C Schellhaas and A Seegers “Peacebuilding: Imperialism’s New Disguise?” (2009) 18 African Security 
Review 1 at 6-7. 
205 The top ten TCCs of military and police contingent members are the following; Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Nepal, Jordan, Egypt and Ghana see Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
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Moreover, some host states have not been developing countries, for example, Bosnia. The 
rhetoric of women as inherently vulnerable or victimised can also support further 
discrimination against women. Particularly, this rhetoric panders to negative gendered 
stereotypes that women are passive, helpless and in need of protection.206 Arguably, the 
zero-tolerance policy is patronising and runs counter to the UN’s wider policy on women’s 
active role in peacebuilding.207 
The UN’s zero-tolerance policy is clearly based on the conservative “women as victims” 
approach. This is represented in the S-G Bulletin’s broad definition of “sexual exploitation”. 
However, there are genuine consensual relationships that do exist and may be unfairly 
caught under the definition. Moreover, the policy does not consider the spectrum of 
transactional sex and relationships that may exist between locals and peacekeepers which 
may have differing levels of agency exercised or power of negotiation. The local population 
should not be classified generally as inherently vulnerable.  
Conversely, there is a similar danger with fully embracing a “women as liberated decision-
makers” approach. As was seen above, it is perhaps the context of social and cultural 
inequalities, and poverty that lead to transactional sex. It is difficult to argue that on the one 
hand women in such circumstances are acting with their agency and negotiating terms of an 
exchange for sex with peacekeepers then argue on the other hand that these women are 
driven into survival sex because of abject poverty.  In reality some women may have very 
little choice or power to negotiate. The approach also fails to consider whether when 
accepting the exchange in these circumstances peacekeepers are exploiting the desperation 
                                                          
“Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations” (August, 2015) available online 
<https://www.un.org >. 
206 See discussion on this rhetoric above, see also S Milivojevic and S Copic “Victims of Sex Trafficking: 
Gender, Myths, and Consequences” in S G Shohan, P Knepper and M Kett (eds) International Handbook of 
Victimology (Taylor and Francis, Hoboken, 2010); Puechguirbal, above n 193. 
207 McGill, above n 133, at 32; see also UN Security Council Resolution 1325, above n 55. 
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of these women or not.  Moreover, the situation where sex is exchanged for money, food, 
medicine or other kinds of assistance that peacekeepers have access to and locals are owed 
is arguably the targeted conduct of “sexual exploitation” and is rarely engaged with in the 
literature itself. 
In summary, the tension between the competing approaches of “women as victims” on one 
side and “women as liberated decision-makers” on the other expose the lack of attention 
paid to the wide spectrum of relationships that exist between coerced and voluntary sexual 
relationships. Both approaches attempt to essentialise women’s experience. The UN’s 
blanket prohibition on transactional sex disregards any engagement with the contextual 
factors that lead locals to sex work generally. The differing levels of agency or power of 
negotiation are also ignored. Sexual exploitation is about the differential power imbalance 
between peacekeepers and locals, and the abuse of that power. The line between a 
consensual relationship or exchange and an exploitative one is not drawn by the definition, 
and is in fact difficult to draw. The UN has chosen a strong position with a definition of 
“sexual exploitation” that drives the assumption that all local women are potentially victims. 
By taking such an extreme position the UN shuts down any engagement with the myriad of 
reasons behind an individual’s decision to participate in transactional sex or survival sex 
with UN peacekeepers.  The definition is much broader than the conduct it intended to target 
originally; survival sex scenarios.  
Both approaches (of “women as victims” on one side and “women as liberated decision-
makers” on the other) can be compared with the feminist lens that I apply to this thesis. 
Feminist theories of anti-essentialism and intersectionality, in which my feminist lens is 
placed, challenges the dichotomy of “victims” versus “agency” because they both ignore or 
do not adequately address women’s experiences within patterns of systematic power and 
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oppression.208 As a starting point, I argue that women should have the ability to exercise 
their active agency in making decisions relating to their sexual relationships and their bodies. 
To support a blanket rule against all kinds of transactional sex and label all sex between 
peacekeepers and local women as inherently harmful may support further discrimination 
against women. This view places women in a passive role and enforces the continuation of 
negative gendered stereotypes. Nevertheless, differential power between peacekeepers and 
locals does exist and cannot be ignored. The unequal power dynamics stem from the context 
in which peacekeepers operate; typically in post-conflict zones, to provide assistance and 
stability, protection of civilians and aid for local people. They have access to money, food, 
and medicine needed for survival where the local population may not. The host state and 
locals place their trust in peacekeepers to do their job and supply such aid. Moreover, 
additional power dynamics swing in peacekeepers’ favour as they have legal immunity from 
host state jurisdiction.209 It is argued therefore that the official definition of “sexual 
exploitation” under the S-G Bulletin needs to be redrafted or reconceptualised in order to 
better reflect women’s agency, the power to negotiate, and contextual issues, and reflect the 
targeted conduct more clearly. 
As stated in the Introduction, for the purposes of this thesis I am re-conceptualising the 
definition of “sexual exploitation” to mean survival sex specifically. Although there is a 
spectrum of possible exchanges between peacekeepers and local people within “survival 
sex”, I am using the most offensive form as the subject of discussion for the remainder of 
this thesis – where sex is exchanged for aid or assistance to which peacekeepers have access 
                                                          
208 M A Fineman and R Mykitick The Public Nature of Private Violence: The Discovery of Domestic Violence 
(Routlegde, New York, 1994) at 64; see generally, B Hooks Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (2nd 
ed, Pluto Press, London, 2000); E Schneider “Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and 
Agency” (1993) 38 New York Law School Review 387.  
209 Noted by Simic’s interviewees as part of the inherent differential power between peacekeepers and the local 
population, see Simic Regulation of Sexual Conduct in UN Peacekeeping Operations, above n 6, at 114. 
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or which is already owed to the local population. This will include the scenario of a local 
woman waiting in line for aid and being forced by a peacekeeper to exchange sex for such 
aid. This will exclude adult prostitution.  
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have argued that essentially, “sexual abuse” and “sexual exploitation”, as 
defined in the S-G Bulletin, are quite different. “Sexual abuse” is unambiguous; it covers 
conduct that may be considered international crimes or clear examples of violence against 
women under international human rights law, such as rape and sexual violence.  Sexual 
abuse has an identifiable character and is largely supported by academics. However, “sexual 
exploitation” is more complicated. 
Sexual exploitation as currently defined in the S-G Bulletin captures instances of survival 
sex and prostitution. The UN has prohibited these relationships as exploitative based on the 
inherent power imbalance between peacekeepers and beneficiaries of assistance. However, 
the resulting definition in the S-G Bulletin is arguably broad enough to catch other kinds of 
relationships, such as consensual relationships. The difference between coerced and 
voluntary sexual relationships can be important because many international instruments 
make such distinctions; for example, forced prostitution is an international crime and 
voluntary adult prostitution is not. For these reasons, the concept of sexual exploitation has 
been subject of much criticism. 
The critics of sexual exploitation expose the tension between two competing approaches ie 
the conservative “women as victims” on the one hand and the “women as liberated decision-
makers” on the other. The critics of sexual exploitation point out that prostitution and 
survival sex are part of broader contextual issues such as poverty and harmful masculinities 
that have failed to be dealt with by the UN. Additionally, the zero-tolerance policy disregards 
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the agency of local women who engage in transactional sex. However, these approaches do 
little to solve the ambiguous nature of sexual exploitation as neither address the vast 
spectrum of relationships that exist between coerced/forced and voluntary sexual 
relationships. Instead, they attempt to essentialise women’s experience.  
Although the concept of sexual abuse is rather uncomplicated, sexual exploitation is 
ambiguous, leaving open the possibility of many different kinds of relationships being 
caught within the S-G Bulletin’s definition. The major critics of sexual exploitation and 
zero-tolerance policies point out that prostitution and survival sex are manifestations of a 
much wider socio-economic problem that the UN has failed to address. This wider context 
includes poverty within the host state and harmful masculinities associated with militaries 
and a “boys will be boys” attitude; these foster a culture of sexual exploitation and a tradition 
of silence.  Overall, the S-G Bulletin definition of sexual exploitation is conceptually flawed 
and ambiguous 
For the purposes of this thesis, the following sexual conduct has been identified; sexual 
abuse will be assumed to include rape and sexual violence, and sexual activity with children. 
Sexual exploitation will be considered survival sex – specifically where sex is exchanged 
for assistance that peacekeepers have access to or are already owed to the local population. 
I will not consider adult prostitution as sexual exploitation.   
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PART TWO:  SANCTIONS AGAINST TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES 
 
INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 
Part Two will examine the first substantive category of suggested options for increased 
accountability; sanctions against the troop-contributing country. Despite the raft of 
institutional reforms undertaken by the UN there remains a general impression that troop-
contributing countries are not prosecuting members of national contingents for sexual 
exploitation and abuse.1 As a result, some academics have argued the UN should sanction 
TCCs that fail to exercise their criminal jurisdiction. 2 Such measures against contributing 
states would “validate the rights of the victims”3 and better enforce compliance with UN 
standards.4 It would also help legitimise the UN’s zero-tolerance policy towards sexual 
exploitation and abuse. 
This Part will analyse the following proposition; as troop-contributing states have exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction then the UN should have the corresponding responsibility to ensure 
states exercise such jurisdiction. For example, in the event that there are prima facie grounds 
indicating serious misconduct and the TCC fails to hand over the case to the appropriate 
national authorities for investigation, or further discipline or prosecute an individual 
                                                          
1 See for instance, Office of Internal Oversight Services Evaluation Report: Evaluation of the Enforcement 
and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the United Nations and Related 
Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations (May 2015) at [25]-[31]; C Ferstman Special Report: Criminalising 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers (United States Institute of Peace , Washington, 2013) at 3. 
2 Including, Z Deen-Racsmary “The Amended UN Model Memorandum of Understanding: A new Initiative 
for States to Discipline and Prosecute Military Members of National Peacekeeping Contingents?” (2011) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 321; Defeis, above n 12; A Harrington “Victims of Peace: Current Abuse 
Allegations against UN Peacekeepers and the role of the Law in Preventing them in the Future” (2005) 12 
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 125; V Kent “Peacekeepers as Perpetrators of Abuse” 14 
African Security Review 85; R Murphy UN  Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and 
Legal Issues in Practice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007). 
3 Harrington, above n 2, at 148.  
4 Murphy, above n 2, at 303.  
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peacekeeper for sexual exploitation and abuse the UN should sanction the TCC. For the 
purposes of this chapter the term “sanctions” is used to convey coercive means of 
enforcement.5 Additionally, “sanctions” will be used to include those measures that may be 
considered non-coercive as well (ie those based on political or moral persuasion). Academic 
commentators advocating the above proposition6 have referred to various measures the UN 
should use in order to compel contributing states to hold their contingent members to account 
for sexual exploitation and abuse. Such suggested sanctions include making public the 
names of states which do not exercise criminal jurisdiction to the full extent of their national 
law,7 withdrawing national contingents,8 blacklisting states so they may no longer contribute 
troops,9 and even economic sanctions in the most serious cases.10  
Outside of academic discourse, strong responses to continued impunity caused by 
contributing states’ failure to ensure accountability have been suggested by UN officials and 
reports.11 Roberto Ricci, former Head of the Human Rights Section of UN Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC),12 argued that contributing states 
should be “held accountable when they don’t prosecute people who have been sent home.” 
                                                          
5 The term “sanctions” is typically used in academic discourse to refer to coercive means of enforcement see 
A Cassese International Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) at ch 15; see also M Noorthman 
Enforcing International Law: From Self-help to Self-contained Regimes (Ashgate, Burlington, 2005) at 33-35. 
6 See above n 2.  
7 Kent, above n 2, at 90; Murphy, above n 2, at 303. 
8 Harrington, above n 2, at 148. 
9 Deen-Racsmany, above n 2, at 342; Defeis, above n 2, at 209; Harrington, above n 2, at 148; Murphy, above 
n 2, at 303; Ferstman, above n 2, at 12. 
10 Defeis, above n 12, at 214; Harrington, above n 17, at 148. 
11 See for example Report of the Group of Legal Experts on Making the Standards contained in the Secretary-
General’s Bulletin binding on Contingent Members and Standardising the Norms of Conduct so That They Are 
Applicable to All Categories of Peacekeeping Personnel GA A/61/645 (2006): [Second Group of Legal 
Experts Report].  
12 Now known as the “UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo” 
(MONUSCO) see Security Council Resolution 1925 SC S/RES/1925 (2010).  
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Furthermore, he suggested a system should be implemented where the UN would actively 
oversee such prosecutions.13  
Annual reports released by the Secretary-General on Special Measures for the Protection 
from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse since 2009 reveal that the SG has become 
increasingly frustrated with issues relating to accountability and transparency by TCCs. In 
his 2012 report, the SG used strong language to suggest coercive measures may be necessary 
in response to contributing states, and their national contingent commanders, that allow 
continued impunity. The Secretary-General noted that the UN “… will not hesitate to 
repatriate an entire military or police contingent where it is determined that serious 
misconduct, particularly sexual exploitation and abuse, has occurred owing to failure by the 
chain of command”.14 This was reiterated in 2015 where Ban Ki-moon noted “strong 
sanctions” would be employed against states which continued to allow abuse.15 Moreover, 
the Secretary-General further expressed that he would repatriate contingents where there 
was a “demonstrated pattern of abuse or non-response to allegations of misconduct.”16 
Additionally, he noted that he would consider termination of deployment of contingents 
from particular TCCs where abuse is ignored.17 Moreover, in March 2016, the Security 
Council authorised the Secretary-General to remove entire contingents where there were 
patterns of sexual exploitation and abuse.18 
                                                          
13 S K Miller “Accountability for Conduct of UN-Mandated Missions under International Human Rights Law: 
A Case Study concerning the Sexual Abuse of Women in the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (MONUC)” in R Arnold and GA Knoops (eds) Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support 
Operations under International Law (Transnational Publishers, New York, 2006) 261 at 281, footnote 87 and 
accompanying text. 
14 Report of the Secretary-General Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
GA A/66/699 (2012) at [36]. This was re-emphasised in the 2013 Report, Secretary-General Special Measures 
for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse GA A/67/766 (2013) at [35]. 
15 Report of the Secretary-General The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations GA A/70/357-S/2015/628 
(2015) at [120]. 
16 At [120]. 
17 At [120]. 
18 Security Council Resolution 2272 SC Res S/Res/2272 (2016). 
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In 2013 the Secretary-General  revealed plans to extend the information to be provided in 
his annual reports to increase transparency, including country-specific data relating to 
allegations being investigated by contributing states and what sanctions (if any) those states 
imposed on offenders.19 Statistics provided by the annual reports are derived from those 
collected by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support.20 
Thus far, official statistics have not named those contributing states connected with 
allegations. However, in an unprecedented move, the Office of Internal Oversight Services 
released an evaluation report (2015) which did name states which had received allegations 
over the period of 2010-2013.21  
In both 2014 and 2015 the Secretary-General warned that he would name and shame non-
compliant states.22 It remains to be seen whether the Secretary-General will take this next 
step and name the states in his report or continue to leave them anonymous. Either way, this 
will be an important step for greater transparency. Further non-coercive measures were 
suggested in order to strengthen enforcement. Such measures included human rights related 
pre-screening of personnel on pre-deployment, increasing investigative capabilities in the 
field and better information sharing between national governments and the investigative arm 
of the UN, currently the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).23 The goal of these 
proposed changes is to increase TCCs’ technical capabilities to hold offenders to account. 
These developments illustrate a clear intention to introduce mechanisms to aid state 
compliance.  
                                                          
19 Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (2013), above n 14 at [25]. 
20 At [13] footnote 5.  
21 Evaluation Report: Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse by the United Nations and Related Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations, above n 1, at 14.  
22 Report of the Secretary-General Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
GA A/68/756 (2014) at [33]; The Future of United Nations Peace Operations, above n 15, at [122(f)]. 
23 Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (2013), above n 14, at [30], [32]-
[34]; The Future of United Nations Peace Operations, above n 15, at [124(j)] and [126(k)]. 
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There appears to be inconsistency of opinion in the literature as to when measures, coercive 
or otherwise, should be imposed on contributing countries. On the one hand, both Elizabeth 
Defeis and Alexander Harrington argue that coercive measures should be imposed on TCCs 
that do not “prosecute the abusers to the fullest extent allowed under their legal systems”.24 
Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany mentions blacklisting states as a response to TCCs which are 
“systematically unwilling or unable to prosecute or cooperate in any relevant way”.25 This 
aligns with the Zeid Report and the recent reports from the Secretary-General.26  
To implement measures against a state there should be evidence of international 
responsibility through a breach of an obligation. Legal obligations can arise from a number 
of sources; such as international agreements, treaties or customary international law. There 
is currently a lack of certainty regarding what obligations exist for troop-contributing 
countries to criminalise, investigate and prosecute sexual exploitation and abuse, and where 
such obligations would arise. 
The overall goal of Part Two is to examine the option of these enforcement measures, 
analyse possible legal foundations, and assess options in light of the three principles I 
highlighted in Part One; justice being seen to be done, host state ownership and UN 
leadership. Thus, it is necessary to consider when such sanctions should be used and on what 
legal basis. As noted by Frederic Dopagne, “a sanction presupposes a previous wrongful 
act”.27 Furthermore, for academics and official UN reports to suggest or recommend 
sanctions assumes that certain obligations to investigate and prosecute for sexual 
exploitation and abuse exist. For a state to be held responsible for its international wrongful 
                                                          
24 Harrington, above n 2, at 148; Defeis, above n 2, at 209. 
25 Deen-Racsmany, above n 2, at 342. 
26 Secretary-General A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations GA A/59/710 (2005)  prepared by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein: [Zeid 
Report] at [82]; The Future of United Nations Peace Operations, above n 15, at [120]. 
27 F Dopagne “Sanctions and Countermeasures by International Organisations” in R Collins and N White (eds) 
International Organisations and the Idea of Autonomy (Routledge, New York, 2011) 178 at 180.  
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acts the principles of state responsibility dictate that there must first be a violation of an 
obligation owed by the state in question.28 This is particularly true for coercive measures, 
such as economic sanctions.  
In this Part I will examine different sources of international law for state obligations to 
criminalise, investigate, prosecute and punish acts of sexual exploitation and abuse 
committed by military contingent personnel. The primary sources I will look at include the 
agreements with the UN, particularly the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the 
agreement between the UN and the TCC, and question whether treaty law applies. In 
addition, I will examine principles of international human rights law for obligations that may 
arise independently from the MOU. Having explored the substantive rights and obligations 
that may apply, I will consider the measures which the UN might employ to enforce those 
obligations and discuss which organ of the UN has the power to impose such measures. 
I address these issues across chapters three, four and five. In Chapter Three I will examine 
the agreements concluded with the UN; the Status-of-Forces Agreement29 (between the UN 
and the host state) and the Memorandum of Understanding (between the UN and the TCC).  
These two documents are important because they reflect the terms which states have agreed 
in regard to criminal jurisdiction and immunities and also explore what the UN expects from 
states, in particular the TCCs. There are significant grey areas that will be addressed, 
primarily issues relating to legal status and lack of clarity regarding the rights and duties of 
states to investigate and prosecute for sexual exploitation and abuse. 
Chapter Four will consider relevant international human rights law to support the idea of 
sanctioning the TCC. It will examine such norms for evidence of duties on states to 
                                                          
28 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts GA Res A/Res/56/83 (2001) art 2. 




criminalise, investigate, prosecute and punish offences that could be considered “sexual 
abuse” or “sexual exploitation”. Examples of relevant positive duties may be found in human 
rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women.30  
The fifth chapter will consider the use of sanctions (withdrawing troops, blacklisting states, 
naming and shaming states) as a means to deliver or enforce the rights and obligations 
discussed in chapters three and four. I will also discuss which organ of the UN would most 
likely implement such measures. Additionally, I will be assessing the coercive and non-
coercive enforcement measures in light of my three underlying principles of justice being 
seen to be done, host state ownership and UN leadership.  
These chapters will be followed by the conclusions to Part Two which will pull together the 
main arguments.  
  
                                                          
301249 UNTS 13 (opened for signatures 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981): [CEDAW].  
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The two primary instruments that contribute to the legal framework of peacekeeping 
operations are the Status-of-Forces Agreements (between the UN and the host state) and the 
Memorandum of Understanding (between the UN and the TCC). They both govern the 
jurisdiction of states and immunity of UN personnel. The current version of the UN-Model 
Memorandum of Understanding provides the most detailed provisions governing 
investigation and accountability requirements on behalf of TCCs and is therefore the most 
relevant. The first issue to consider is the legal status of the MOU.  If the MOU is considered 
a bilateral treaty, then aspects of treaty law may apply. There are particular consequences 
that attach to breaching treaty obligations independent from the rules of state responsibility, 
such as the termination of the treaty. Terminating the MOU would naturally result in the 
withdrawal of troops. Additionally, if the MOU is a treaty then its provisions regarding the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction may have cogent normative value. The MOU may also be 
legally binding without being a treaty and thus certain sanctions may flow from breach 
outside of the particulars of treaty law. As a general rule however, it has been understood by 
some legal academics that MOUs are not legally binding instruments under international 
law.31 Commentary on the UN-TCC MOU in particular has been conflicting on this issue.32  
                                                          
31 For example, A Aust Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007). 
32 See discussion below, (B) Legal Status. 
96 
 
There appears to be further difficulties associated with the implementation of the UN codes 
of conduct33 and the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from 
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.34 Although it was originally recommended in a 
number of official reports that the MOU should have all these documents annexed,35 only 
one document made it to the final draft (an amalgamation of the two UN Codes).36 
Moreover, it is unclear what legal status the annexes have in relation to the MOU. 
Nevertheless, the zero-tolerance policy may have been incorporated in other ways, for 
example, there are many references to the terms “serious misconduct”, “sexual exploitation” 
and “sexual abuse”. The definitions of these terms are also annexed to the agreement.  
Determining the status of the MOU leads to the next issue of what terms TCCs have agreed 
to be bound by and whether these involve obligations to exercise criminal jurisdiction? 
There are several stages to the “exercise of criminal jurisdiction” by troop-contributing states 
in response to serious misconduct (including sexual exploitation and abuse) by members of 
their military forces. Investigation and accountability for serious misconduct are covered at 
length by the MOU as amended in 2007.37 When an allegation of sexual exploitation and 
abuse is made, the UN (through the OIOS) may undertake a preliminary investigation where 
it has prima facie grounds suggesting that serious misconduct has taken place.38 This is 
                                                          
33 UN Conduct and Discipline Unit Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets 
<http://cdu.unlb.org> and UN Conduct and Discipline Unit We are United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel 
<http://cdu.unlb.org>.   
34 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
Abuse, UN Secretariat ST/SGB/2003/13 (9 October 2003): [S-G Bulletin 2003]. 
35 Zeid Report, above n 26, at [25]; Second Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 11, at [6]; see also a copy 
of the previous draft Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding between United Nations and 
[participating state] Contributing Resources to [the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation] GA A/61/494 
(2006).  
36 2007 MOU, below n 37, Annex H We are United Nations Peacekeepers.  
37 Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned 
Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual) GA 
A/c.5/66/8 (2011) ch. 9 Memorandum of Understanding: [2007 MOU]. 
38 The UN also must notify the national government immediately see 2007 MOU, above n 37, art 7 quater 
[7.11]. The national government has the responsibility to undertake its own investigation where it has prima 
facie grounds indicating serious misconduct see art 7 quater [7.11].  
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limited to an administrative investigation, the gathering and holding of information about 
the complaint (this is a by-the-papers investigation that does not include the interviewing of 
witnesses).39 The responsibility of a formal criminal investigation is then handed over to the 
relevant national government.40 The Office of Internal Oversight Services has no capacity 
to undertake criminal investigations. Upon the outcome of an investigation it is expected 
that the TCC will hand the case over to the appropriate national authorities for a decision as 
to whether or not the accused will be disciplined and/or prosecuted.41 Additionally, the 
troop-contributing country is expected to report back to the UN regarding the outcome of 
the case.42 
The above outlines a clearly delineated process for investigating serious misconduct 
allegations made against members of military personnel. In reality however there may be 
more of a combined effort between the investigative arm of the UN and the national 
government.43 The process of cooperative investigation will be further explored in Chapter 
Eight: A Special Court for Peacekeepers. However, for the purposes of this chapter, the 
above outline serves as a useful yardstick by which to examine particular issues related to 
the TCC’s exercise of its criminal jurisdiction.   The expected cooperation between the UN 
and the TCC at the investigative stage adds a layer of complexity to the question of UN 
enforcement measures against the contributing country. A particular issue relevant to this 
chapter’s subject matter is whether an “assurance” that the TCC will exercise jurisdiction 
assumes that all these steps be taken. It may be that sanctioning for an omission at certain 
stages may have more of a legal basis or at least have more of a legitimate footing than 
others. For example, a sanction for failure to initiate a formal investigation may have more 
                                                          
39 Above n 37 Annex F at [30] meaning of “Preliminary fact-finding inquiry” and at art 7 quater [7.12].  
40 2007 MOU, above n 37, at art 7 quater [7.12].  
41 At art sexiens [7.24].  
42 At art sexiens [7.24].   
43 In particular see 2007 MOU, above n 37, arts 7 quarter, 7 sexiens and 7 quinquiens.  
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credibility than sanctioning upon a failure to prosecute. This comes down to the issue of 
state sovereignty – it may be the case that the UN simply cannot compel contributing states 
to prosecute via an agreement as that decision is clearly one of sovereignty and prosecutorial 
discretion.44 However, omitting to execute other stages, such as submitting the case to the 
relevant national authorities, could be a breach of the MOU and therefore such sanctions 
could be at least arguable on that basis.45 The UN however has placed more emphasis on the 
reporting requirements and these will also be discussed. 
It is important to note at the outset that there are minimal references to the host state in the 
Model MOU. Moreover, there is absolute silence on the role of victims, their rights, or the 
impact of sexual exploitation and abuse on victims themselves, their communities or the 
host state. This chapter will argue that the MOU should be interpreted as a treaty and will 
explore its provisions in detail, particularly those which may obligate TCCs to positively 
respond to sexual exploitation and abuse by military contingent members. This chapter will 
highlight that the MOU does not allow for host state ownership, or any kind of inclusivity, 
and that there is little room for the UN to take leadership.  
(1) JURISDICTION  
From the inception of the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)46 in 1956 
(established to help end to the Suez Crisis), troop-contributing countries have received the 
benefit of exclusive criminal jurisdiction over members of their national military contingents 
in UN peacekeeping operations.47 The purpose of this policy was to encourage member 
states to contribute troops from their military forces without the fear of being subjected to 
                                                          
44 Zeid Report, above n 26, at [80].  
45 Based on the arguable case that the MOU is meant to be a treaty.  
46 General Assembly Resolution GA Res A/Res/998 (ES-I) (1956); General Assembly Resolution GA Res 
A/Res/1000 (ES-I) (1956); General Assembly Resolution GA Res A/Res/1001 (ES-I) (1956).  
47 M Odello “Tackling Criminal Acts in Peacekeeping Operations: The Accountability of Peacekeepers” 
(2010) 15 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 347 at 366. 
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foreign jurisdiction for crimes committed while on mission. Specifically, there was concern 
that TCC’s military personnel may be tried in a possibly defective legal system, perhaps 
without procedural safeguards in relation to evidence collection or relevant civil rights.48 
Immunity from host state jurisdiction provides important protection for foreign military 
forces so they can perform their official functions without interference.49 Additionally, 
granting exclusive criminal jurisdiction to the contributing country supports the practice of 
sovereign immunity.50 The discipline or criminal punishment of members of military forces 
in particular is often considered a special matter of sovereignty for the sending state.51  
Generally, customary international law dictates that states are not permitted to proscribe or 
exercise their jurisdiction unless it can be supported by certain jurisdictional principles.52 
Jurisdiction over criminal conduct is primarily based on the “territoriality principle” where 
a state establishes jurisdiction on the basis that the crime has been committed within the 
state’s own territory.53 In the peacekeeping context, this would mean that the host state 
would usually have jurisdiction over criminal offences committed by peacekeeping 
personnel based on the territoriality principle. However, under the Status-of-Forces 
agreement (SOFA) between the host state and the United Nations, the host state essentially 
                                                          
48 Such as a right to lawyer or a fair trial see Odello, above n 47, at 366; Dag Hammarskjold Summary Study 
of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General 
GA A/3943 XIII (1958) at [136]. 
49 D Fleck “Introduction” in D Fleck (ed) The Handbook of The Law of Visiting States (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2001) at 5.  
50 See generally D Fleck “Securing Status and Protection of Peacekeepers” in R Arnold and G A Knoops (eds) 
Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations under International Law (Transnational 
Publishers, New York, 2006) 141.  See also F Akada “The Enforcement of Military Justice and Discipline in 
External Military Operations: Exploring the Fault Lines” (2008) 47 Military Law and the Law of War Review 
253 at 262; G Simm “International Law as a Regulatory Framework for Sexual Crimes committed by 
Peacekeepers” (2012) 16 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 473 at 501; Odello, above n 47, at 376.  
51 Zeid Report, above n 26, at [80].  
52 C Ryngaert Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 21. 
53 G Simm Sex in Peace Operations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) at 56. 
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waives their jurisdiction in regards to military contingent members, confirming their 
immunity.54  
For sending/troop contributing state criminal law to apply abroad, extraterritorial 
jurisdiction must first be prescribed in a state’s domestic laws. For the troop-contributing 
country, jurisdiction over crimes committed extraterritorially may be prescribed on the basis 
of other principles of jurisdiction; the most relevant principle is that of “active personality”. 
States may prescribe jurisdiction over offences committed outside their territory on the basis 
that the offender is a national.55 It is not enough to proscribe extraterritorial jurisdiction, the 
state must also make the necessary changes to domestic law to allow for law enforcement 
jurisdiction or adjudication through national courts.56  
Immunity from host state jurisdiction is not an excuse for impunity; therefore, it is expected 
that the TCC exercise their jurisdiction.57 As the Secretary-General (SG) noted in his report 
on the operation of UNEF I:58 
It was important that this waiving of jurisdiction by the host state should not 
result in a jurisdictional vacuum, in which a given offence might be subject 
to prosecution by neither the host state nor the participating state.  
The Secretary-General acknowledged the risk that troop-contributing countries may not 
seriously consider allegations and investigate their members of national contingents or 
                                                          
54 The agreement between the UN and the host state, see Model SOFA, above n 29. 
55 Ryngaert, above n 52, at 88.  
56 For the most part, the ability to enforce the jurisdiction is implied by its proscription over particular conduct 
see N Boister An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law (OUP Oxford, Oxford, 2012) at 136.  
57 Defeis, above n 2, at 208. 
58 Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of 
the Secretary-General, above n 48, at [136].  
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ultimately punish offenders.59 This risk is meant to be offset by obtaining a formal assurance 
from the TCC that they will exercise criminal jurisdiction:60  
The military contingent immunity from host state jurisdiction ... is based on 
the understanding that the troop-contributing country would exercise such 
jurisdiction as might be necessary with respect to crimes or offences 
committed in the host state. Therefore, assurances were sought from the 
troop-contributing country for this reason. 
The assurance that the contributing state will exercise its criminal jurisdiction is dependent 
on whether the conduct in question (for the purposes of this thesis; sexual exploitation and 
abuse) is firstly criminalised under their national law and secondly, whether extraterritorial 
jurisdiction has been prescribed, and the necessary changes have been made to allow for law 
enforcement.  
(2) STATUS-OF-FORCES-AGREEMENTS  
Status-of-Forces Agreements (between the UN and the host state) set out the privileges and 
immunities to be enjoyed by UN personnel when they enter the host state and execute their 
operational duties as mandated by the UN Security Council. The agreements also govern 
other concerns, such as liabilities for civil claims,61 use of uniforms and arms,62 
transportation,63 and the settlement of disputes.64 The relevant provision in terms of criminal 
jurisdiction over military contingent members is art 47(b): 
                                                          
59 At [136]. 
60 At [136].  
61 Model SOFA, above n 29, art 49. 
62 At art 37. 
63 At arts 12-14. 
64 See part VII.  
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Military members of the military component of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operation shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their 
respective participating states in respect of any criminal offences which may 
be committed by them in [host country]. 
This provision reinforces the doctrine of sovereign immunity; it also makes clear that the 
host state waives its criminal jurisdiction over such personnel.65 The host state is however 
relying heavily on the troop-contributing country to exercise its criminal jurisdiction. The 
provisions go on to state in art 48 that:66 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations will obtain assurances from the 
Government of participating States that they will be prepared to exercise 
jurisdiction with respect to crimes or offences which may be committed by 
members of their national contingents serving with the peacekeeping 
operation.  
Additionally, the footnote to art 48 states:67 
Upon conclusion of a specific agreement, the provision in question could 
instead be inserted in a memorandum of understanding where further 
clarifications on the terms of an agreement are usually provided. 
There are a couple of points that may be deduced from the two provisions and footnote. 
Firstly, troop-contributing countries retain exclusive criminal jurisdiction on the 
understanding they will indeed exercise it. The SOFA dictates that the Secretary-General is 
                                                          
65 Compare to the practice under NATO status-of-forces agreements where the host state still retains secondary 
jurisdiction should the TCC fail to exercise criminal jurisdiction (further discussed in Chapter Six: Host State 
Jurisdiction) see R Opie “Human Rights Violations by Peacekeepers: Finding a Framework for Attribution of 
Responsibility” (2006) New Zealand Law Review 1 at 24. 
66 Model SOFA, above n 29, art 48. 
67 At art 48 footnote h.  
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to ensure this by obtaining formal assurances from each TCC to this end – this is required 
(as opposed to being merely optional) by art 48. Secondly, the footnote of art 48 suggests 
that assurances could be inserted in the Memorandum of Understanding as part of the usual 
terms of that agreement.  
Status-of-Forces Agreements have been concluded in one way or another since United 
Nations Emergency Force in 1956.68 The UN Model SOFA was drafted in 1991 to facilitate 
negotiation of such agreements based on past state practice.69 Where a SOFA has not been 
concluded before the commencement of a particular mission, the Security Council has on 
such occasions stated that the Model SOFA will apply in the interim.70 This continued state 
practice has brought about much scholarship on the legal status of the Model SOFA. Some 
academics71 have debated the extent to which the Model SOFA now represents customary 
international law. If it were the case that the Model SOFA represents custom, then the 
requirement of a formal assurance is more cogent. As will be seen below, between 1997 and 
2007 the Model MOU did not contain a provision on assurances and there had also been a 
lack of state practice in providing them. Whether during that time the TCC or the UN were 
breaching a requirement of custom falls outside the scope of this thesis, however, for current 
purposes it is sufficient to note that the SOFA and its legal status has received a lot of 
scholarly attention. Interestingly, there is a gap in the literature on the Model MOU and its 
precise legal status which is unexpected since it is the partner agreement to the Model 
SOFA.72  
                                                          
68 See Deen-Racsmany, above n 2, at 329. 
69 For example see Security Council Resolution 1528 SC Res S/Res/1528 (2004) at [9]; Security Council 
Resolution 1542  SC Res S/Res/1542 (2004) at [11]. 
70 Deen-Racsmany, above n 2, at 326. 
71 For example D Fleck and M Saalfeld “Combining Efforts to Improve the Legal Status of UN Peacekeeping 
Forces and their Effective Protection” (1994) International Peacekeeping 82. 
72 For example, as noted in the Model SOFA, above n 29, art 48 footnote h – “further clarifications” on the 




(3) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
Unlike the Status-of-Forces agreements, there is not much commentary concerning the 
Memorandum of Understanding or the previous “Troop Contribution Agreements” (TCAs). 
When attempting to determine the existence of obligations concerning accountability of 
military personnel, the relevant terms to which TCCs have agreed should be the first point 
of call. Although Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany considers73 the provisions of the Model MOU 
as amended in 2007, she omits to consider the legal status or corresponding responsibility 
from the amended terms of the Model MOU. Instead, it is assumed that the MOU is binding 
in international law without describing it as a treaty. Thus, the aspects of treaty-law that may 
be applicable here have not been previously discussed in academic literature. Therefore, I 
will attempt to consider both the legal status of the MOU and the likely consequences if it 
is a treaty.  
(A) HISTORY 
 
Since UNEF I, agreements were concluded or exchanged between the UN and troop-
contributing countries governing financial administration and logistics of providing 
personnel and equipment to peacekeeping operations.74 The agreement also serves to 
supplement the terms relating to immunity and privileges attributed to personnel under the 
Status-of-Forces Agreement.75 In 1991 a Model Troop Contribution Agreement was drafted 
based upon previous state practice and use of exchange of letters to serve as a basis of 
negotiation between contributing countries and the UN.76 This model agreement was subject 
                                                          
73 See above n 2. 
74 This was typically done through an exchange of letters see for example Exchange of Letters constituting an 
agreement concerning the service with the United Nations Emergency Force of the National Contingent 
provided by the Government of Finland 271 UNTS 135 (1957). 
75 Deen-Racsmany, above n 2, at 329; Odello above n 47, at 366.  
76 Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment 
to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations GA A/46/1991 (1991): [1991 TCA]. 
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to important amendments in 1997 and 2007. The 1997 amendment changed the TCA to a 
“Memorandum of Understanding”77 and its terms were arguably stripped down to the most 
basic provisions. The MOU was again amended in 2007 which is the current version the UN 
and states will work with. 
The 2007 amended MOU is one of the most positive developments that came through the 
UN’s many reforms post-2005. The amendments followed several recommendations made 
by official UN reports and academic commentary.78 Both the Zeid Report and the first 
Report of the Group of Legal Experts identified the need for clearly stated provisions 
governing accountability of personnel, particularly military contingent members.79 The 
second Group of Legal Experts Report focussed particularly on the need to include the UN 
codes of conduct and the Secretary-General’s Bulletin concerning sexual exploitation and 
abuse. Before 2007 the UN Codes were not standardised across all categories of UN 
personnel.80  
The 2007 amendments saw the introduction of several detailed provisions pertaining to the 
application of the UN standards of conduct,81 discipline,82 investigations,83 exercise of 
jurisdiction and accountability.84 Furthermore, the amendments changed the purpose 
                                                          
77Reform of the Procedures for Determining Reimbursement to Member States for Contingent-Owned 
Equipment GA A/51/967 (1997) Annex. It has also been noted that the 1997 version was never adopted by the 
General Assembly, therefore the 1997 MOU was never technically a basis for negotiation unlike the 1991 
version and the subsequent 2007 MOU see Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and 
its Working Group GA A/59/19/Rev. 1 (2005). 
78 Zeid Report, above n 26, at [25]; Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its 
Working Group, above n 77, at [39]; Report of the Group of Legal Experts on Ensuring the Accountability of 
United Nations Staff and Experts on Mission with Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping 
Operations GA A/60/980 (2006) [First Group of Legal Experts Report] at [64(c)]. 
79 Zeid Report, above n 26, at [38]-[46]; First Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 78.  
80 See generally the Second Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 11.  
81 2007 MOU, art 7 bis.  
82 At art 7 ter.  
83 At art 7 quater.  
84 At arts 7 quinquiens and 7 sexiens.  
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provision, adding the words: “to specify United Nations standards of conduct for 
peacekeeping personnel provided by the Government”.85  
Before looking more closely at the terms of the MOU, it is necessary to investigate what 
legal status these agreements have. Whether or not the MOU is a treaty will affect the legal 
consequences that flow from a possible breach and the enforcement strategies that may be 
employed. It will also affect the interpretation of the terms themselves. Moreover, if there 
are obligations on TCCs to exercise criminal jurisdiction, then the normative value of those 
obligations is more cogent.  
(B) LEGAL STATUS 
A common designation used among scholars to describe the UN-TCC Memorandum of 
Understanding is an “international agreement” between the UN and contributing states.86 
However, the term “bilateral treaty” has seldom been used.87 This is despite the fact that 
there appears to be some consensus that the MOU places obligations on TCCs. Although a 
treaty need not explicitly be designated as such, the absence of such designation does raise 
the issue of legal status. International instruments can be legally binding without being a 
treaty, for example Security Council resolutions. There has been some argument to suggest 
that the term “international agreement” is different to “treaty”, even under the Vienna 
Conventions.88 Michael Brandon argues that “international agreement” is more generic than 
“treaty”.89 Thus, “international agreements” would include treaties and other instruments 
that would not necessarily fall within the meaning of “treaty” in the relevant Vienna 
                                                          
85 At art 3. 
86 See for example Opie, above n 65. 
87 But see Simm, above n 50, at 501.  
88 For example see M Brandon “Analysis of the terms “treaty” and “international agreement” for the Purposes 
of Registration under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter” (1953) The American Journal of International 
Law 49.  
89 Brandon, above n 88, at 51. 
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Conventions.90 Therefore, being designated as an “international agreement” by academics 
and policy-makers does not necessarily mean that the said authors are suggesting that the 
MOU is (or is not) in fact a treaty.  
Moreover, comments made by academics are conflicting on the issue of legal status. One 
academic has described the MOU as an instrument “adopted by the UN” and compared this 
with an “international convention”.91 It is unclear whether the author has meant to instead 
compare the bilateral nature of the MOU with multilateral treaties. Another commentator 
has gone even further to suggest that neither the SOFA nor MOU have been “adopted in 
treaty form” referring to the UN Model versions of these agreements.92 Again it is unclear 
whether the author means to imply that concluded/negotiated agreements based on the UN 
Models are not adopted as treaties or that his comments are limited to the Models alone. 
Furthermore, some other scholars do not list the Memorandum of Understanding under 
“legal sources” or within the “legal framework” of peacekeeping operations.93 Nevertheless, 
as will be explored below, there is an arguable case to suggest that the MOU is a treaty. 
Despite the evidence, there appears to be nothing in the literature that discusses the 
applicability of treaty law. I will argue that this is a highly relevant area of law that needs 
more scholarly attention, particularly when considering the accountability issues for sexual 
exploitation and abuse.  
                                                          
90 D Door and K Schmalenbach Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Springer, Berlin, 2011) at 30. 
Vienna Conventions include the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for 
signature 1969, entered into force 1980)  [1969 Vienna Convention] and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organisations or Between International Organisations 1986 
(opened for signature 21 March 1986, not yet in force) [1986 Vienna Convention]. 
91 Deen-Racsmany, above n 2, at 350-355. 
92 Fleck “Securing Status and Protection of Peacekeepers”, above n 50, at 150.  




The starting point when determining the status of a Memorandum of Understanding is the 
presumption that it is a non-binding, informal agreement.94 Nevertheless, there has been 
some extensive debate about legal status of MOUs. Whereas Jan Klabbers95 argues that all 
MOUs are in fact treaties, Anthony Aust96 casts doubt on such a proposition. According to 
Aust, determining the status of MOUs requires looking for evidence of an intention to 
conclude a treaty.97 Even after such evidence has been obtained, the MOU may still not in 
fact be a treaty.98 Determination may depend on state practice. For the purposes of the 
current context, it is helpful to compare the benefits of an MOU to a formalised treaty. This 
is an important consideration given the fact that the previous “Contribution Agreements” 
were deliberately renamed as “Memoranda of Understanding” in 1997.  
There are many practical reasons why states or international organisations may choose to 
use a Memorandum of Understanding as opposed to a formal treaty. MOUs are not typically 
subject to same technical process of ratification.99 In fact, this seems to be one of the 
principal reasons behind the formal change from “Troop Contribution Agreements” to 
“Memoranda of Understanding”.100 The Secretary-General followed the recommendation of 
the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions which noted at 
paragraph 7 of its report that:101 
                                                          
94 Aust, above n 31, at 20.  
95 J Klabbers  The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer Law International, Boston, 1996). 
96 See above n 31. 
97 Aust, above n 31, at 33; Klabbers Concept of Treaty in International Law also stresses the importance of 
determining an intention to conclude a treaty, above n 95, at 68.  See also C Chinkin “A Mirage in the Sand? 
Distinguishing Binding and Non-Binding Relations Between States” in S Davidson The Law of Treaties 
(Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004) 223. 
98 Aust, above n 31, at 33. 
99 C Lipson “Why are some International Agreements Informal?” (1991) 45 International Organization 495 at 
514. 
100 See 1997 MOU, above n 77 note by the Secretary-General; see also Report of the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions GA A/61/646 (1996) at [7]. 
101 Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions see above n 100, at [7]. 
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The term “Contribution Agreement” might cause some difficulty as it would 
require legislative approval at the national level. This could entail clearance 
of the agreement through an act in Parliament. Such action would result in 
undue delays in deployment.  
This implies that a TCA did require legislative changes at the domestic level and MOUs do 
not. Simply on this basis it could be argued that the MOU cannot be a treaty. However, 
despite the name change it is still generally expected (from the point of view of the UN) that 
some legislative changes need to be made in order to incorporate the requirements of the 
MOU.102 Although the use of a Memorandum of Understanding may avoid the technicalities 
associated with formal ratification, it seems that the UN still expects its terms to be 
implemented through domestic law.103 However, this is not the case for all states. In some 
(monist) states international agreements or treaties will directly apply as domestic law after 
ratification or accession, or approval of the legislature.104 In other (dualist) states, 
international agreements may only need legislative expression, thus needing extra steps 
taken by the legislature.105 Therefore, there may be no practical difference between the 
processes of implementing a TCA as opposed to an MOU despite the intention outlined 
above.  
The change from TCAs to MOUs may have been influenced by state practice at the time, 
particularly agreements concerning the protection and status of military forces. The practice 
                                                          
102 This has been particularly relevant when considering the incorporation of the UN Codes of Conduct and 
the S-G Bulletin on the protection from sexual exploitation and abuse see Report of the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group, above n 77, at [40(b)], and was one of the tasks set for the 
Second Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 11.  
103 See Second Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 11, at [38(a)-(b)].  
104 This is typical of civil law jurisdictions such as Brazil, Egypt, France, Japan, Mexico, Namibia, the 
Netherlands, Russia see discussion A Byrnes and C Renshaw “Within the State” in D Moeckli, S Shah and S 
Sivakumaran (eds) International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 458 at 461. 
105 This is typical of common law systems such as the Commonwealth countries of Australia, New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom see Byrnes and Renshaw, above n 104, at 464. 
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of the United States during the late 1980s and early 1990s was to conclude Memorandums 
of Understanding to govern matters of defence.106 Interestingly, from the perspective of the 
US these MOUs were always meant to be legally binding international instruments.107 
However, some of its partners to these agreements were traditionally of the view that they 
were not, particularly Commonwealth countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada.108 
It is unclear to what extent the US’s view of MOUs as binding agreements had on the 
decision to change from TCAs or whether the Commonwealth view had greater influence.  
Arguably, the form of a Memorandum of Understanding suits the unpredictable nature of 
the peacekeeping operations. In missions where circumstances are likely to change rapidly 
or evolve unexpectedly, states must be able to change their agreement with the UN quickly 
and efficiently.109 Likewise, the UN may also want to renegotiate the terms of the MOU and 
effect changes in a timely manner. The decision to establish a mission in the first place and 
have enough troops contributed in time may also have a bearing on the form of the agreement 
needed. A formal treaty, even the bilateral kind, can be a lengthy and costly process and 
their amendments even more so.110 Moreover, peacekeeping missions concern issues that 
are highly political.111 Therefore, the practical benefits of a not-so-formalised instrument 
can have a positive impact on the efficient functioning of peacekeeping operations.  
Evidence of an intention to conclude a treaty may be found in the content of the 
Memorandum. When looking at the particular form of the Model Memorandum of 
Understanding it arguably “looks” like a treaty. According to Anthony Aust, there are 
particular key indicators that can support a claim that a memorandum of understanding is in 
                                                          
106 J McNeill “International Agreements: Recent US-UK Practice Concerning the Memorandum of 
Understanding” (1994) The American Journal of International Law 821. 
107 McNeill, above n 106, at 821-822. 
108 At 822. 
109 Fleck “Securing status and protection of peacekeepers”, above n 50, at 150. 
110 Lipson, above n 99, at 514.  
111 At 514.  
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fact a treaty;112 firstly, the use of mandatory and treaty-like language. The MOU uses 
obligatory language throughout its provisions, such as “shall” instead of discretionary terms 
such as “may”.113 The MOU also refers to “articles” rather than the less formal term 
“sections”.  This seems to be a deliberate change from the previous 1991 model TCA which 
referred to numbered sections only. Additionally, the preamble concludes with the phrase 
“[the parties] agree as follows”.114 These terms are more likely associated with treaties rather 
than informal documents which typically state that the parties “understand” or “decide”.115 
Secondly, there are certain provisions that are typically found in treaties. The MOU has 
provisions governing the amendment of the MOU,116 the settlement of disputes117 and 
termination.118 Such provisions can however also be found in non-binding MOUs so their 
presence on their own cannot be determinative.119 Moreover, the MOU has an “entry into 
force” article.120 Thirdly, the MOU is effective upon the signature of representatives of the 
Government and the UN. The act of signing such an instrument can be evidence of consent 
to be bound by the terms therein.121 
Although these attributes are not determinative as to status on their own, together they 
provide good evidence that the Memorandum of Understanding may have been drafted with 
                                                          
112 See Aust, above n 31, at 33-36.  Anthony Aust is one of the leading authorities on contemporary treaty 
conception in international law.  
113 Mandatory language had been used in the previous versions of these agreements.  
114 2007 MOU, preamble.  
115 Aust, above n 31, at 427. 
116 2007 MOU, art 12. 
117 At art 13. 
118 At art 15. 
119 Aust, above n 31, at 46. 
120 2007 MOU, art 14. This was also a change from the 1991 Model TCA which did not have such a clause. 
The move to add the provision when changing the form of the agreement to an MOU may indicate an intention 
to conclude a treaty. See also, Klabbers Concept of Treaty in International Law, above n 95, at 75. 
121 Aust, above n 45, at 96; see also 1986 Vienna Convention, above n 90, arts 11-12; However the Model-




the intention that it be a treaty. Other indicators may come from the subsequent behaviour 
of both parties.  
(I) SUBSEQUENT BEHAVIOUR - IS THE MOU A TREATY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE 
OF THE UN? 
There is evidence to suggest that the United Nations itself treats the MOU as a treaty rather 
than a non-binding agreement. Some of the concluded Memorandums of Understanding are 
registered with the Secretariat of the UN and published in the United Nations Treaty 
Series.122 When it is the Secretariat that registers an instrument there will be a determination 
made as to whether that document is in fact a treaty.123 Therefore, the registration may 
provide good evidence that the MOUs are in fact treaties, at least from the perspective of the 
UN. However, this practice has been inconsistent with peacekeeping-related MOUs. 
Moreover, registration alone cannot be said to be determinative.124 As Aust points out, many 
instruments have been wrongly registered in the past.125  Nevertheless, the fact that they are 
then published in the United Nations Treaty Series (and thus available to all member states) 
may mean that TCCs failing to object to the MOU’s “treaty” status may preclude later denial 
to its status.126 This would be more cogent if the matter ever arose before the International 
Court of Justice, which has not yet happened. Additionally, in another relevant publication, 
                                                          
122 See for example Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Government of 
Romania contributing resources to the United Nations Special Police Unit in Kosovo 2421 UNTS 293 (opened 
for signature 11 February 2001, entered into force 20 February 2002); Memorandum of understanding between 
the United Nations and the Government of New Zealand contributing resources to the United Nations in East 
Timor (DPKO/UNTAET/NZ/04) 2152 UNTS 3  (opened for signature 27 April 2001, entered into force with 
retroactive effect 21 February 2000); Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the 
People's Republic of Bangladesh contributing resources to the United Nations Mission for the referendum in 
Western Sahara (MINURSO) 2716 UNTS 139 (opened for signature 10 December 2010, entered into force 
with retroactive effect 1 November 2010). 
123 D N Hutchinson “The Significance of the Registration of an International Agreement in Determining 
whether or not it is a Treaty” in S Davidson The Law of Treaties (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004) 133 at 139. See 
also Klabbers Concept of Treaty in International Law, above n 95, at 79-84.  
124 Klabbers Concept of Treaty in International Law, above n 95, at 142.  
125 Aust, above n 31, at 36. Although, this is usually a problem when states register an instrument as the same 
checks on its legality are often not met see Hutchinson, above n 123 . 
126 Hutchinson, above n 123, at 272-273.  
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the UN Treaty Handbook, the peacekeeping MOUs are used as an example of where MOUs 
can be legally binding.127  
Other indications that the MOU may be a treaty have come from various statements made 
in UN reports or by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General noted in 1997 that the 
MOU “entails legally binding rights and obligations and, once concluded, is legally binding 
on the parties”.128 Likewise, Prince Zeid referred to the MOU giving rise to certain 
obligations on states and indicated the binding nature of the document.129 Moreover, the 
same reports noted that certain legislative changes were required to implement the MOU. 
However, the need to undertake legislative changes to incorporate the terms of an MOU (or 
Treaty) will depend on the constitutional framework of each individual state.130 As such, 
these statements may be unnecessarily expansive. As stated previously, before the 2007 
amendments the UN Codes of Conduct and the S-G Bulletin were not considered binding 
on all categories of personnel, specifically military contingents.131 This was particularly 
concerning to Prince Zeid who recommended their implementation in the MOU for the very 
purpose that TCCs would then be bound to incorporate the standards into their own military 
codes of conduct.132 The fact that the MOU was seen to have such an effect supports the 
argument that it is a treaty. 
 
                                                          
127 “Glossary” UN Treaty Handbook (Prepared by the Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, UN 
Publications, 2006) at 61. 
128 Reform of the Procedures for Determining Reimbursement to Member States for Contingent Owned 
Equipment, above n 77, at [2].  
129 See for example Zeid Report, above n 26, at [80].  
130 See above notes 104 and 105 and corresponding explanations of the differences between monist and dualist 
states. 
131 Zeid Report, above n 26, at [20]; Second Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 11, at [37]. 
132 See generally Second Group of Legal Experts report, above n 11; see also Zeid Report, above n 26, at [25].  
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(II) SUBSEQUENT BEHAVIOUR - IS THE MOU A TREATY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE 
OF STATES? 
The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations met in 2006 and 2007 to discuss re-
drafting the Model Memorandum of Understanding.133  The Committee included 
representatives from prominent troop-contributing countries such as Bangladesh, India and 
Pakistan,134 as well as representatives from top financing states such as France, Japan and 
the United States.135 These sessions of the Special Committee were closed to the public.136 
With no information on the Committee’s deliberations and in the absence of statements from 
troop-contributing countries, it is difficult to ascertain how states view the MOU’s legal 
status. 
Arguably, the lack of outcome reports to the UN (as seen below, this is an obligation under 
the MOU) could be evidence of state behaving as if the MOU is not legally binding, or a 
treaty.137 However, this may indicate a simple breach of treaty obligations.  
(III) DEFINITION OF “TREATY” IN THE 1986 VIENNA CONVENTION 
Traditionally, states have been the primary subjects of international law and so have the 
necessary legal personality for concluding treaties between each other. However, it is 
equally well established that international organisations (IOs) may have similar treaty-
                                                          
133 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group GA A/61/19/Rev.1 
(2007) at [14] and Annex “Composition of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations at its 2007 
session”.  
134Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group, above n 133; 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations “Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations” 
(August 2015) <https://www.un.org >. 
135 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group, above n 133; United 
Nations Peacekeeping “Financing Peacekeeping” (August 2015) <https://www.un.org>.  
136 An Official Information Act (OIA) application was made by the author to the  New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs & Trade in 2014 in order to obtain information from the Special Committee’s meetings on the 
draft MOU where New Zealand was included (in 2006 and 2007). However most of that information has been 
rendered classified. 
137 Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (2013), above n 14, at [15]. 
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making powers resulting from their requisite constituent treaty and international legal 
personality.138 The United Nations in particular has the necessary legal personality to make 
agreements with states, even though that power is not explicitly provided for in the UN 
Charter.139 The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organisations or Between International Organisations was intended to govern 
such treaties concluded with IOs.  
The 1986 Vienna Convention is the partner of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties between States. The 1969 Convention was drafted by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) and regulates the application and interpretation of treaties. It has been 
generally accepted that its provisions have customary law status.140 However, its application 
was limited to treaties between states.141 The ILC effectively transferred those rules from 
the 1969 Convention to the 1986 Convention thus making them applicable to treaties with 
IOs.142 Unlike its 1969 counterpart, the 1986 Convention is currently not in force. 
Nevertheless, as its provisions closely follow those in the 1969 Convention they may also 
represent custom.143 Moreover, the similarities are perhaps the reason for the difference in 
the number of signatories.144 Therefore, the 1986 Convention is directly relevant to the 
                                                          
138 As the General Assembly noted in the introduction of the 1986 Vienna Convention “international 
organisations possess the capacity to conclude treaties which is necessary for the exercise of their functions 
and the fulfilment of their purposes.” Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties Between States and 
International Organisations or Between International Organisations GA A/CONF.129/15 (1986). 
139 See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ 
Rep 174.  
140 See for instance Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16 
at [94].  
141 1969 Vienna Convention, above n 90, art 1.  
142 G Gaja “A “New” Vienna Convention on Treaties Between States and International Organisations or 
Between International Organisations: A Critical Commentary” (1987) 58 British Yearbook of International 
Law 253.  
143 Aust, above n 31, at 400; J Klabbers International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) at 
42. 
144 Aust, above n 31, at 400: Klabbers International Law, above n 143, at 42. 
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question of legal status of the MOU. Moreover, due to their similarities, jurisprudence and 
commentary on the 1969 Convention and its principles are also relevant.  
Article 2 of the 1986 Convention defines “treaty” as the following: 
(a) “treaty” means an international agreement governed by international law 
and concluded in written form: 
 (i) between one or more states and one or more international organization.  
Article 3 goes on to describe the scope of the 1986 Vienna Convention: 
 The fact that the present Convention does not apply: 
(i) to international agreements to which one or more states, one or more 
international organizations and one or more subjects of international law other 
than states or organizations are parties. 
(ii) to international agreements which one or more international organization 
and one or more subjects of international law other than states are a party 
(iii) to international agreements not in written form ... 
(iv) to international agreements between subjects of international law other 
than states or international organizations.  
Upon examination of these provisions it would seem that the MOU would fall within the 
scope of the Convention, assuming that it is at least arguable that the Memorandum is an 
“international agreement governed by international law”. The MOU is in written form and 
is between a state and an international organisation. Therefore, the 1986 Vienna 
Convention’s provisions governing interpretation and breach may be applicable.  
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(IV) THE ANNEXED DOCUMENTS – THE EXTENT TO WHICH SEXUAL 
EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE ARE INCORPORATED 
There are three documents relevant to sexual exploitation and abuse that collectively form 
part of the policies and codes of conduct; these include two UN Codes of Conduct (We are 
United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel and Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue 
Helmets)145 and the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from 
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.146 Although it was recommended in the Zeid Report 
that the all three documents should be attached to the MOU, only one of these documents 
has made it to the final amendment.147 Annex H includes all the terms from We are United 
Nations Peacekeeping Personnel but neglects to add the entirety of the Ten Rules and the S-
G Bulletin. However, some aspects of the S-G Bulletin have nevertheless been introduced 
into the body of the MOU. 
Annex H came out of recommendations made by the Group of Legal Experts Report Making 
the Standards Contained in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin binding on Contingent 
Members.148 In order to standardise the UN Codes and the S-G Bulletin across all categories 
of personnel the Group of Legal Experts edited both the Ten Rules and We are United 
Nations Peacekeepers to incorporate the spirit of the S-G Bulletin.149 It was then suggested 
by the Group of Legal Experts both documents be annexed to the Memorandum of 
Understanding. As noted above however, only one of these documents made the final 
                                                          
145 See above n 33. 
146 See above n 34. 
147 2007 MOU, Annex H.  
148 Above n 11. 
149 Second Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 11, at [55]-[59], Annex III and Annex VI. Interestingly, 
the Ten Rules document was also entirely reworded in order to be “less ambiguous”, at [57].  
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draft.150 Annex H contains the contents of We are United Nations Peacekeepers and the 
following additions:151 
 We will always ... report all acts involving sexual exploitation and abuse 
We will never ... commit any act involving sexual exploitation and abuse, 
sexual activity with children under 18, or exchange of money, employment, 
goods or services for sex. 
We realise that the consequences of failure to act within these guidelines may 
... result in administrative, disciplinary or criminal action.  
Arguably, the additions do contain the spirit of the S-G Bulletin.152 The Annex covers the 
key aspects of the zero-tolerance policy; it makes reference to “sexual exploitation and 
abuse” which is further defined in another annexed document (see below). Additionally, it 
covers the prohibition of sexual activity with minors. It also makes clear that there will be 
enforcement action taken against those that contravene the codes. 
There are a couple of notable omissions, such as the exchange (of sex) for “other forms of 
humiliating, degrading or exploitative behaviour” and “assistance that is due to beneficiaries 
of assistance”.153 These are more associated with survival-sex-type relationships and there is 
no direct reference to this in Annex H.154 This is arguably not covered by the vague and 
broader requirement of “we will never ... become involved in sexual liaisons that could affect 
our impartiality or the well-being of others”.155  
                                                          
150 There is no information as to the reasons why only one document was included in the final draft. 
151 See 2007 MOU, Annex H; Second Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 11, Annex III. 
152 See for example S-G Bulletin (2003), above n 34, at [3.2(a), (b) and (e)].  
153 At [3.2(c)].  
154 However, it is arguable that the terms “exchange of ... goods or services for sex” may cover survival sex.  
155 2007 MOU, Annex H.  
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The main body of the Memorandum of Understanding also makes reference to the standards. 
Article 7 bis states that: 
The Government shall ensure that all members of the Government’s national 
contingent are required to comply with the United Nations standards of 
conduct set out in annex H to the present memorandum of understanding. 
This provision points to those standards in Annex H only; there is no mention of the other 
two documents. Article 7 ter governs the requirements of TCCs to ensure good discipline of 
their national contingent members. The article refers to the general phrase “... ensure 
compliance with the United Nations standards of conduct”. This must be read together with 
art 7 bis which is titled “United Nations standards of conduct”, thus limiting the phrase to 
those standards in Annex H.  
Interestingly, there are references made to “misconduct” and “serious misconduct” in other 
provisions including art 7 quater (investigations), art 7 quinquiens (exercise of jurisdiction 
by the Government) and art 7 sexiens (accountability). The interpretation of these sections 
will be discussed further below, but it is sufficient for current purposes to point out that they 
arguably imply the inclusion of sexual exploitation and abuse.  This is due to the definition 
of “serious misconduct” which is provided for in Annex F as the following: “... Sexual 
exploitation and abuse constitute serious misconduct.” Both “sexual abuse” and “sexual 
exploitation” are further defined in Annex F as having the exact same meaning as in the S-
G Bulletin.156 Therefore, the meaning of “sexual exploitation” given in Annex F would cover 
survival-sex-type relationships, thus filling any gap provided by the standards in Annex H. 
                                                          
156 “Sexual abuse means the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or 
under unequal or coercive conditions. Sexual exploitation means any actual or attempted abuse of a position 
of vulnerability, differential power or trust for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting 
monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another” see 2007 MOU, Annex F 
“Definitions”; see also S-G Bulletin (2003), above n 34, at [1]. 
120 
 
As sexual exploitation and abuse related standards are mostly incorporated through annexes, 
it is now necessary to turn to the issue of legal status of the annexed documents.  
It has been asserted that not all documents annexed to the MOU are legally binding.157 In 
the Zeid Report, it was noted that mission-specific Guidelines to Troop-Contributing 
Countries were not binding although they are subsequently attached to the MOU.158 These 
“guidelines” were contrasted with “rules” where it was explained that the latter was of 
greater legal status than mere guidelines.159 This reasoning would suggest that whether or 
not those documents attached to the MOU are legally binding depends on the legal status of 
the individual documents. As argued in Chapter Two, the UN Codes of Conduct are more 
likely to represent policy documents rather than having any binding force. Therefore, it 
would seem on the above reasoning that although We are United Nations Peacekeepers is 
attached to the MOU it is not legally binding in the same way as the MOU itself. Moreover, 
the “Definitions” section in Annex F would similarly not be legally binding, as alone it is a 
mere glossary of terms.   
According to Anthony Aust, unless there is a provision stating that the annexes are “integral” 
to the treaty/instrument the presumption is that they are not binding.160 Article 2 of the MOU 
states “this document, including all of its annexes, constitutes the entire memorandum of 
understanding”. This is a strong indication that the annexes, including the definitions in 
Annex F, form part of the MOU – therefore part of the “treaty”.  However, the statements 
about the non-binding nature of the Guidelines to Troop-Contributing Countries are not 
easily reconciled with a conclusion that the annexes are binding. It may be that only the 
                                                          
157 See Zeid Report, above n 26, at [20]; Deen-Racsmany, above n 2, at 331. 
158 See for example 2007 MOU, Annex G.  
159 Zeid Report, above n 26, at [20]. 
160 Aust, above n 31, at 436-437.  
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Guidelines specifically are not binding. The Zeid Report and subsequent academics161 have 
not mentioned the status of the other annexed documents, of which there are currently 
seven.162 Moreover, as stated above, annexing the UN standards of conduct to the MOU was 
recommended on the basis that they would bind TCCs and their contingent members. 
Previously, UN standards were annexed to the Guidelines (not legally binding). In any case, 
Annexes H and F may be important for the purposes of interpretation. 
In sum, sexual exploitation related standards are arguably incorporated in the MOU in their 
entirety; however, this has been primarily achieved through the use of annexes. Assuming 
that Annexes H and F form part of the content of the Memorandum (and that the MOU is a 
treaty) then troop-contributing countries are arguably bound by them. This would mean that 
the standards may also be distinguished from mere policy documents, rather they are 
instruments giving rise to certain legal obligations. One of those “obligations” would be to 
ensure relevant pre-deployment training in the standards and incorporate them into national 
military codes, as provided in art 7 bis.163 The reference in Annex H to accountability for 
contravention of standards, including sexual exploitation and abuse, may provide further 
obligations – particularly when read together with other provisions of the MOU, such as art 
7 quinquiens.  
(C) PROVISIONS OF THE 2007 MODEL-MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING  
Proceeding on the assumption that the Memorandum of Understanding is in fact a treaty, it 
is necessary then to examine the terms of the MOU and consider whether there are binding 
obligations on TCCs to exercise their criminal jurisdiction in response to sexual exploitation 
and abuse committed by military personnel. There are three provisions of the current Model 
                                                          
161 Deen-Racsmany, above n 2. 
162 See 2007 MOU, art 2.  
163 This also may be implied from the purpose section of the 2007 MOU, see art 3 “... and to specify United 
Nations standards of conduct for personnel provided by the Government”.  
122 
 
MOU that directly apply to this inquiry; arts 7 quinquiens (exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Government), 7 quater (investigations), and 7 sexiens (accountability). Read together these 
provisions indicate that TCCs are required to take certain steps to “exercise their criminal 
jurisdiction” (such as handing over a case to the appropriate national authorities) but are not 
necessarily obligated to take other steps (for example, prosecute offenders).  
(I) ARTICLE 7 QUINQUIENS 
The first article to examine concerns the issue of formal assurances obtained from TCCs that 
they will exercise their criminal jurisdiction. Article 7 quinquiens reads: 164 
Military members and any civilian members subject to national military law 
of the national contingent provided by the Government are subject to the 
Government’s exclusive jurisdiction in respect of any crimes or offences that 
might be committed by them while they are assigned to the military 
component of [UNPKO]. The Government assures the UN that it shall 
exercise such jurisdiction with respect to such crimes or offences. 
The Government further assures the UN that it shall exercise such disciplinary 
jurisdiction as might be necessary with respect to all other acts of misconduct 
committed by any members of the Government’s national contingent while 
they are assigned to the military component of [UNPKO] that do not amount 
to crimes or offences. 
An assurance that the TCC will exercise their criminal jurisdiction is not an assurance of 
prosecution. The decision as to whether or not to prosecute is a matter of state sovereignty 
                                                          
164 2007 MOU, at art 7 quinquiens [7.22]-[7.23]. 
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which has not been interfered with by the provision of such assurances.165 So what does the 
formal assurance mean? The assurance is firstly directed at the UN itself; the TCC does not 
“assure” the host state or victims that they will provide justice. This is consistent with the 
complete silence of the MOU regarding victims and a lack of consideration of the host state. 
Secondly, the provision is one-sided; the TCC assures the UN that they will exercise their 
jurisdiction but the provision does not explicitly authorise the UN to enforce this. Therefore, 
art 7 quinquiens, if it can be construed as an obligation to exercise criminal jurisdiction, does 
not satisfy the principle of host state ownership. Furthermore, there can be no guarantee that 
justice will be seen to be done. There is no explicit authority for the UN to take leadership 
within this provision either.  
Before the amendments in 2007, some scholars166 and authors of UN reports167 lamented the 
absence of these assurances in practice. Although the early Troop Contribution Agreements 
made similar provision for assurances, the 1997 redrafting dropped this requirement. The 
withdrawal of the assurance clause represented practice at the time, where formal assurances 
were not actively sought from TCCs despite the fact that they were still required by the 
Status-of-Forces Agreement.168 It was argued that a re-introduction of the provision would 
place more pressure on contributing states to hold their military forces to account.169 
Whether or not this translates into a binding obligation is unclear.  
The principles of treaty interpretation may be helpful for the purposes of this inquiry. Article 
31 of the 1986 Vienna Convention states the general rule of treaty interpretation which is 
                                                          
165 Zeid Report, above n 26, at [80]. An assurance that the state will exercise criminal jurisdiction assumes that 
the state would have asserted or prescribed extraterritorial jurisdiction over the act in question.  
166 For example, A Miller “Legal Aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations” (2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 71; M Nuldo “The United Nations Responses to the 
Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women and Girls by Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions” (2009) 
27 Berkeley Journal of International Law 127. 
167 For example, Zeid Report, above n 26. 
168 Deen-Racsmany, above n 2, at 329. 
169 Zeid Report, above n 26.  
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simply to interpret the text in good faith according to the ordinary meaning of the words in 
their context and “in light of its object and purpose”.170  
Starting with the ordinary meaning of the words alone; is an “assurance” an agreement to be 
bound to exercise criminal jurisdiction? Or is it a mere expectation? The 1991 TCA did not 
make reference to an assurance but rather that the national government “agrees” to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction.171 Nevertheless, the 1991 TCA does seem to be strongly worded in 
comparison to the art 7 quinquiens of the 2007 MOU.  Arguably, to agree to exercise 
jurisdiction seems to indicate the involvement of both parties in reaching that decision in 
drafting the TCA; that the UN expects the TCC to exercise their jurisdiction and that the 
state has agreed to do so. When the similar provision was put back into the Model MOU the 
word used is not “agree” but that the TCC “assures” that it will exercise jurisdiction – is this 
signifying something less than an “agreement” or is it an equivalent term? The absence of 
“assures” from the Definitions (Annex F) suggests that it does not have any “special 
meaning”.172 
A provision such as art 7 quinquiens was supported by both the Zeid Report173 and the Group 
of Legal Experts Report.174 In fact, the Group of Legal Experts recommended that 
contribution should only be made on the basis that formal assurances will be made, and this 
should be required under the MOU.175 However, it has been argued that the wording that 
eventually made the amendment is not such a key provision; for example, Deen-Racsmany 
labels the article a “watered down” version of the 1991 Contribution Agreement.176 
                                                          
170 It has been established that these principles reflect customary international law, see Case Concerning 
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia) (Merits) [2002]  ICJ Rep 625 at 23-
24. 
171 1991 TCA, above n 76, at VIII [25].  
172 1986 Vienna Convention, above n 90, art 31(4).  
173 Zeid Report, above n 26, at [80]. 
174 Second Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 11, at [18(i)].  
175 At [18(i)].  
176 Deen-Racsmany, above n 2, at 339. 
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Although it should be remembered that despite the strong wording in 1991 formal assurances 
were not often sought therefore the provision was not reflected in practice.  
The principles of treaty interpretation dictate that the ordinary meaning must be read in light 
of the context and the object and purpose of the treaty itself. The object and purpose may be 
inferred from the text of the treaty (such as the preamble and even its annexes) and by 
reading the treaty as a whole.177 The TCA and the 1991 MOU were created undoubtedly for 
the purpose of supplying troops and equipment to UN peacekeeping missions.  However, 
the amended MOU has the additional articles detailing the accountability of troops. These 
additions are detailed and considered; the majority of the model agreement is now taken up 
with accountability provisions. Such a change must have an impact on the object and 
purpose of the MOU.  
Conveniently, the 2007 MOU does have a purpose section, which includes: “to specify 
United Nations standards of conduct for personnel provided by the Government”.178 This 
phrase represents a change from a previous draft which was much more specific and clearer 
that improved accountability of peacekeeping personnel was a central issue.179 The purpose 
is now limited to the UN standards of conduct. However, Deen-Racsmany notes that this 
should not alter the general impression of the previous wording as when read within the 
context of the other changes made it is clear accountability is still part of the purpose of the 
MOU.180 I generally agree with this proposition, especially when taking Annex H into the 
                                                          
177 F Jacobs “Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: with Special Reference to the Draft Convention 
on the Law of Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference” in S Davidson (ed) The Law of Treaties 
(Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004) 297 at 298 also termed the “teleogical approach”.  
178 2007 MOU, art 2.  
179 “... and to provide for the maintenance of discipline and good order among such personnel and the 
investigation of, and accountability for, violations” Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding, 
above n 35, at 4.  
180 Deen-Racsmany, above n 2, at 335, footnote 76.  
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consideration.181 It is noted in Annex H that criminal accountability is expected from TCCs 
where their national contingents breach the standards which translate into crimes in their 
domestic law.182  
Arguably, the additional provisions183 all have a similar theme; as noted above, the reasoning 
behind the 2007 amendments was to improve accountability of peacekeeping personnel (but 
not to improve the accountability of states themselves). Additionally, these 
recommendations were made specifically with sexual exploitation and abuse in mind. They 
are also the most detailed provisions. Together with the purpose and Annex H, this could 
suggest that the object and purpose includes holding contingent members to account for their 
criminal acts. On the above reasoning, the requirement that TCCs “assures” the UN that the 
Government will exercise criminal jurisdiction can be interpreted as an obligation to do so. 
In some circumstances the intention of the parties can shed light on the interpretation of 
certain provisions.184 In order to determine the intentions of the parties it is helpful to look 
to the preparatory work of the 2007 MOU.185 As part of the preparatory work on the amended 
MOU, the Secretary-General issued a commentary on the new provisions.186 Commenting 
on art 7 quinquiens the Secretary-General noted simply that the provision gives effect to the 
requirement under art 48 of the Model Status-of-Forces Agreement (that the TCC should 
provide an assurance they will exercise criminal jurisdiction).187 However, the draft art 7 
quinquiens the Secretary-General commented on is different to the version that was finally 
                                                          
181 As noted above, Annex H could either form part of the content of the MOU (thus legally binding) or serve 
as a useful tool for interpretation.  
182 2007 MOU, Annex H.  
183 Namely arts 7 bis,7  ter, 7 quater, 7 quinquiens and 7 sexiens.  
184 See Aust, above n 31, at 244. 
185 Article 32 1986 Vienna Convention, these are supplementary means of interpretation.  
186 Above n 35. 
187 Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding, above n 35, at 12.  
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accepted. Arguably, the original version had much stronger (and contained obligatory) 
wording:188 
It is ... understood that this exclusive jurisdiction is based on the 
understanding that the Government will exercise such jurisdiction as might 
be necessary with respect to crimes or offences committed by members of the 
Government’s national contingent while they are so assigned. 
Arguably, the above paragraph is quite clear about what is expected from the contributing 
state. It also aligns with the reasoning of assurances when first adopted after UNEF I.189  
Nevertheless; this additional language was dropped in the final version. It is difficult to 
assess whether the omission means that the current version has been “watered down” in its 
effect as the reasoning behind the change has not been publically released.190 It could be 
equally arguable that these words would not have added anything material to the requirement 
under the provision.  
Overall, the meaning of art 7 quinquiens is unclear because there is limited information 
about the intention of both parties. Information that is available comes from the pre-drafting 
stages such as the official recommendations. There is enough evidence to suggest that the 
UN expects that the TCC will exercise criminal jurisdiction and they may be obligated by 
art 7 quinquiens. However, there is further evidence to counter this proposition as seen by 
comparing the previous draft of the provision and the similar yet stronger worded provision 
under the 1991 TCA. Nevertheless, reading the MOU as a whole it would seem that the 
ordinary meaning of art 7 quinquiens, taking into consideration the additional and detailed 
provisions made in 2007, suggests that an “assurance” is likely an obligation on the TCC to 
                                                          
188 At 56.  
189 See above n 57 and accompanying text.  
190 Thus, there is no record of various states’ opinion on the draft. 
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exercise their criminal jurisdiction. But this still leaves the question of what amounts to the 
“exercise of criminal jurisdiction”? Other provisions of the MOU help shed some light on 
this issue.  
(II) OTHER “OBLIGATIONS”? 
Article 7 quater is a particularly lengthy provision governing the investigation of contingent 
members for misconduct and serious misconduct.191 Although it is reiterated several times 
that the contributing state has the exclusive jurisdiction with such investigations,192 the 
provision attempts to split up investigative duties between the TCC and the UN in certain 
circumstances. For instance, where the national Government fails to initiate a preliminary 
investigation when it has received a complaint, the UN’s investigative arm (the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services) will take over this task.193 Although it is specified that in such 
cases the Government will be considered to be “unwilling or unable” to conduct such 
investigations, the UN will be limited to an administrative investigation.194 This is where 
information is gathered (for example, contact details of witnesses) and is held by OIOS until 
a formal investigation can be undertaken by the relevant TCC’s national investigation 
teams.195 It is still up to the TCC to make a decision whether to investigate or not.196  
                                                          
191 Misconduct means “any act or omission that is a violation of United Nations standards of conduct, mission 
specific rules and regulations or the obligations towards national and local laws and regulations in accordance 
with the status-of-forces agreement where the impact is outside the national contingents.” Serious misconduct 
“is misconduct, including criminal acts, that results in or is likely to result in, serious loss, damages or injury 
to an individual or to a mission. Sexual exploitation and abuse constitute serious misconduct.” See 2007 MOU, 
Annex F.  
192 2007 MOU, art 7quater at [7.10] and [7.20]. 
193 2007 MOU, art 7 quater at [7.13].  
194 This will not include the interviewing of witnesses for example, see 2007 MOU, Annex F at [30].  
195 2007 MOU, art 7 quater at [7.16, 7.17] and Annex F [33]; see also T A Shockley “The Investigation 
Procedures of the United Nations Office of International Oversight Services and the Rights of the United 
Nations Staff Member: An Analysis of the United Nations Judicial Tribunals’ Judgments on Disciplinary Cases 
in the United Nations” (2015) 27 Pace International Law Review 468 at 485. 
196 2007 MOU, art 7 quater at [7.15].  
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If requested by the Government, the UN has agreed to assist the national investigation 
officers in several different ways.197 The Office of Internal Oversight Services will attempt 
to work with members of the national investigative team as much as possible to this end.  
Nevertheless, art 7 quater emphasises several times that it is the representatives of the TCC 
that are in charge of investigations.198 The UN provides support only. The provision also 
draws attention to the sovereign right of the TCC to investigate their national contingent 
members.199 Since May 2015, the UN has encouraged a sixth-month time limit to conduct 
formal investigations, without any additional enforcement mechanism in place to make sure 
TCCs adhere to the time limit or otherwise exercise their criminal jurisdiction outside the 
MOU.200  
There appears to be no indication of an obligation to investigate per se within art 7 quater, 
at least on the TCC. The provision instead seems to focus more on the role of the UN and 
its own obligations, particularly in relation to the information it collects in its administrative 
investigations. Such information must return to the contributing state. This is important for 
the contributing state to adhere to the requirements under arts 7 ter (discipline) and 7 
quinquiens (exercise of criminal jurisdiction).201 Moreover, any support the UN gives is 
subject to the decisions of the national investigative teams.202 However, in turn the 
Government is required to make sure contingent commanders cooperate with any UN 
investigation.203  
                                                          
197 At art 7 quater at [7.17, 7.18].  
198 At art 7 quater at [7.10, 7.20].  
199 At art 7 quater at [7.21].  
200 UN Conduct and Discipline Unit “Fact Sheet on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse” (3 September 2015) 
<http://cdu.unlb.org>. 
201 See Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding, above n 35, at 10.  
202 2007 MOU, arts 7 quater at [7.10,] and [7.20]. 
203 At art 7 quarter at [7.14]; Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding, above n 35, at 10. 
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The only obligatory language used in art 7 quater relates to the TCC concerns informing the 
UN of prima facie cases received by them and the act of forwarding the case to the 
appropriate national authorities:204  
In the event that the Government has prima facie grounds indicating that any 
member of its national contingent has committed an act of serious misconduct 
it shall without delay inform the United Nations and forward the case to its 
appropriate national authorities for the purposes of investigation. 
Prince Zeid noted that the provisions, when read together, “obliged” the TCC to submit the 
case to the appropriate national authorities.205  
Submitting a case to the appropriate national authorities seems to be the first step in the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction under art 7 quinquiens.206 This can be supported by the 
inclusion of similar provisions made in art 7 sexiens. If the outcome of a UN investigation 
or that of the Government reveal that the allegations were well founded then the case must 
be “forwarded to [the TCCs] appropriate authorities for due action”.207 Such action would 
include initiating formal investigation (if the allegation is “well-founded” under a UN 
administrative investigation) or a decision whether or not to prosecute.208 Therefore, this 
step seems to be an obligation under the MOU. However, the provisions governing what the 
TCC is expected to do after this step is taken seem to defer to the sovereign right of the TCC 
to make such decisions. For instance, it appears from the language of art 7 quarter that 
formal investigation of allegations is considered a matter of sovereignty; it is up to the 
prosecutorial discretion of that TCC.  This is similar to the approach taken under art 7 
                                                          
204 2007 MOU, art 7 quater at [7.11].  
205 Zeid Report, above n 26, at [80]. 
206 Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding, above n 35, at 13.  
207 2007 MOU, art 7 sexiens at [7.24]. 
208 Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding, above n 35, at 15. 
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quinquiens where it is generally accepted that the UN cannot obligate the contributing state 
to prosecute as this is also a matter of sovereignty. Again, there is no guarantee that justice 
will be seen to be done because the TCCs are not obligated to investigate and prosecute, 
rather only to forward the case to the appropriate national authorities. The UN has some 
leadership within these provisions to initiate administrative investigations where the TCC 
has failed to do so, although this does not amount to formal criminal investigation (needed 
to bring forward prosecution and punishment for sexual exploitation and abuse).  
(III) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
Although not strictly attached to the “exercise of criminal jurisdiction”, the UN has added 
the requirement of reporting back on outcomes of cases in arts 7 quater and 7 sexiens. The 
UN has put much emphasis on the reporting requirements under the Memorandum. 
Reporting of outcomes is incredibly important for transparency to victims, their 
communities and the host state itself. Although there has been a recent improvement, the 
Secretary-General has in his annual reports noted with disappointment the continued lack of 
reporting back to the UN on the outcomes of cases.209 Article 7 sexiens requires that “the 
Government agrees to notify the Secretary-General of progress on a regular basis, including 
the outcome of the case”.210 Moreover, the Zeid Report suggested that certain consequences 
should attach to the failure to comply with “reporting obligations”.211  
 
                                                          
209 See for example Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (2013), above n 
14, at [21]; Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (2014), above n 22, at 
[27]-[28]; Report of the Secretary-General Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse GA A/69/779 (2015) at [28]-[29]. 
210 2007 MOU, art 7 sexiens at [7.24]. The provision notes that the reports “include” outcomes of cases, this 
would seem to indicate that the reporting requirements are not limited to this.  
211 Zeid Report, above n 26, at [82].  
132 
 
(IV) THE MOU AS A TREATY 
There are several consequences that flow from the MOU being interpreted as a treaty. As 
MOUs are signed between the UN and each troop-contributing country, its provisions may 
have cogent normative value; for example, the binding agreement detailing obligations on 
TCCs to exercise criminal jurisdiction by forwarding a case to the national authorities carries 
more normative weight if the MOU is considered a treaty. And the normative value of these 
obligations is important if the UN wants to use coercive measures against TCCs for failing 
to discharge them. Additionally, if it is at least arguable that the above observations are 
correct (that contributing countries are obligated under the terms of the MOU to submit a 
case to the appropriate national authorities and are also obligated to regularly report 
outcomes to the UN) then the principle of pacta sunt servanda will apply.212 Article 26 of 
the 1986 Vienna Convention states that “every treaty in force is binding on the parties and 
must be performed by them in good faith”. Therefore, if there was evidence to suggest that 
the TCC was not submitting cases to their national authorities to either investigate or make 
a decision whether to prosecute then this may amount to a breach of the Memorandum of 
Understanding.  
(D) A BREACH OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
Pending a breach of a treaty there can be various consequences that flow from this. Among 
these can be unilateral termination of the treaty or countermeasures.213 A treaty may be 
terminated or its operation suspended by one party in certain circumstances; these include a 
                                                          
212 This principle is a well-established customary norm see Nuclear Test cases (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ 
Rep 253; (New Zealand v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 475.  
213 Countermeasures will be covered in Chapter Five: State Responsibility.  
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fundamental change in circumstances,214 impossibility of performance215 and material 
breach.216  Of the most relevant applicable circumstance is material breach.217  
A “material breach” is defined under art 60(3) of the 1986 Vienna Convention as: 
 (a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or 
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object 
and purpose of the treaty. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has used much stronger language in relation to this 
section stating that for a breach to be considered “material” it must be “of a deliberate and 
persistent violation of obligations which destroys the very object and purpose of that 
relationship.”218 Article 60(3) seems to set a deceivingly high threshold as noted by the lack 
of successful claims before the ICJ.219 As argued above the object and purpose may include 
holding contingent members to account for their criminal acts. I argue that failing to at least 
forward a case to the appropriate national authorities could qualify as a material breach. It 
would directly hinder the process of accountability of contingent members. However, failure 
to report back to the UN on outcomes may not be a material breach. The reporting 
requirements are not strictly attached to the obligation to exercise criminal jurisdiction. It is 
an added requirement for information (that is not limited to the outcome of cases).  
If it is arguable that failing to hand a case over to national authorities is a material breach, 
then there are certain procedures that both parties must go through before a treaty can be 
                                                          
214 1986 Vienna Convention, above n 90, art 62. 
215 At art 61.  
216 At art 60. 
217 Impossibility of performance relates directly to the object of the treaty, in Peacekeeping this would be the 
Operation itself.  
218 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, above n 140, at 47. 
219 G Triggs International Law Contemporary Principles and Practices (2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Chatswood, 2011) at 133.  
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terminated. Articles 65-67 of the 1986 Vienna Convention cover such procedures. The 
troop-contributing country should first be notified of the proposed breach and given a period 
of time to object. The Vienna Conventions prioritise peaceful means to resolve such issues, 
such as negotiations between the parties and arbitration. Thus, the dispute resolution 
mechanism in the MOU itself should be initiated first.  
The Model Memorandum of Understanding has its own dispute resolution mechanism that 
should be the first point of call. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly examine art 13. There 
are three-levels of dispute resolution envisioned by the Model-MOU, the first two consisting 
of negotiation between the parties and the third by way of binding arbitration before the 
ICJ.220 Either party may initiate the mechanism, thus it would be available for the UN if it 
was considered that TCCs were not adhering to the requisite obligations. Deen-Racsmany 
points out that this would be a highly costly avenue for the UN if they were to confront a 
contributing state on each and every case of non-compliance.221 This is perhaps the reason 
that the arbitration mechanism has never been used. Furthermore, it may also be unlikely to 
achieve the necessary results (ie enforce the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) as it arguably 
relies on the will of each state to cooperate with the mechanism.222  
Should termination of the treaty be determined as the best course of action (or the peaceful 
means of dispute resolution fail) then which organ of the UN has the power to implement 
termination? Under art 67(2) Vienna Convention where there is an act declaring termination, 
if signed by a representative of an organisation, they may be called upon to produce “full 
powers”.  “Full Powers” refers to individuals with the authority to sign treaties on behalf of 
                                                          
220 See 2007 MOU, art 13 at 13.1-13.2.  
221 Deen-Racsmnay, above n 2, at 342. 
222 2007 MOU, art 13 states that both parties must agree on an arbitrator. An un-willing state may not agree 
and thus be limited to continued negotiations between the UN and the TCC.  
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Heads of States or International Organisations.223 Although there is less significance 
associated with full powers in modern treaty making law, the signature or termination of 
treaties should be undertaken by those with particular authority to do so.224 The General 
Assembly has only the power to give recommendations.225 Perhaps only the Security 
Council has such power to terminate the MOU. The Security Council is the only body within 
the UN that can initiate a UN Peacekeeping Operation.226 Therefore, by that reasoning the 
Council should be the only body to end the contribution to one. However, it is the Secretary-
General that has in the past removed contingents from peacekeeping.  
In 2005, members of the Ukrainian engineering and demining contingent operating in the 
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were implicated in serious financial misconduct 
concerning significant theft of fuel.227 As a response, the Secretary-General asked the 
Ukrainian government to withdraw this contingent which was subsequently replaced with 
troops from China.228 It is not clear on what grounds this request was made ie whether it was 
based on a provision in the MOU. Additionally, the Secretary-General himself has made 
statements to suggest that he has the authority to remove contingents, seemingly without the 
consent of the troop-contributing country:229 
                                                          
223 I Sinclair The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984) 
at 30. 
224 At 30-31.  
225 D Akande “International Organisations” in M D Evans International Law (4th ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2014) 248 at 275. 
226 As it’s connected to the Security Council’s role in maintaining peace and security see Akande, above n 225, 
at 275. 
227 Murphy, above n 2, at 303; Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services GA A/60/364 (2005) at [25]-[26]; “Scandal hits Ukrainian UN Troops” BBC News (3 
September 2005) http://news.bbc.co.uk. 
228 Secretary-General Kofi Annan Letter dated 13 April 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council S/2006/245 (2006).  
229 “Secretary-General Remarks at Meeting with Permanent Representatives of Troop and Police Contributing 




I will not hesitate to repatriate entire contingents or terminate deployments 
where there are failures in command and control, evidence of widespread or 
systematic violations, or when Member States fail repeatedly to respond to 
requests for investigations or to investigate promptly. 
Contributing troops to any peacekeeping operations is a voluntary act230 associated with 
states’ membership with the United Nations. Therefore, the removal of contingents would 
also be connected with membership, and within the authority of the Secretary-General. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the above example indicates the Secretary-General would also 
need to inform the Security Council, and possibly consult. Moreover, Security Council 
Resolution 2272 authorised the Secretary-General to remove contingents where there is a 
pattern of sexual exploitation and abuse.231 This resolution supports the argument that the 
Security Council is the appropriate organ of the UN either to terminate MOUs or be 
consulted if the Secretary-General terminates.  
In regards to my three underlying principles, a removal of troops as a result of the 
termination an MOU is somewhat unsatisfactory. Although removing contingents sent by 
states which have failed to exercise criminal jurisdiction over acts of sexual abuse within 
their ranks will remove any offenders from the host state, the international community may 
still not see justice being done. The removal of troops is not a guarantee or an indication that 
the TCC will then go on to exercise jurisdiction over perpetrators. The termination does not 
involve the host state, so the principle of host state ownership is not engaged with. However, 
if the United Nations terminates the MOU in response to a failure to exercise jurisdiction, 
this does send a strong signal of leadership. A withdrawal of troops would be the default 
                                                          
230 R Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents: Moving Beyond the Current Status 
Quo and Responsibility under International Law (Leiden, Brill, 2014) at 264. 
231 Security Council Resolution 2272 SC Res S/Res/2272 (2016).  
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eventuality of termination of the MOU; however other measures may also be available, 
including political strategies. These will be discussed further in Chapter Five: State 
Responsibility.  
 CONCLUSION  
A strong argument can be made that the Memorandum of Understanding is in fact a treaty. 
Evidence of an intention to conclude a treaty may be found by looking at the form of MOU; 
it uses treaty-like and obligatory language, it represents what the parties “agree”232 rather 
than merely “decide”, and its provisions reflect those commonly found in treaties, such as 
an “entry into force” article. The fact that an MOU has been chosen over a formal treaty 
structure may be due to the practical benefits of avoiding costly ratification procedures. 
Furthermore, subsequent behaviour and statements by UN officials suggest that, at least 
from the perspective of the UN, the MOU is a treaty. It is unclear how states themselves 
view the MOU. 
Incorporation of the standards relating to sexual exploitation and abuse has been primarily 
achieved through the use of documents annexed to the MOU. There is a grey area associated 
with the legal status of the annexed materials. However, Annexes H (We are United Nations 
Peacekeepers) and F (Definitions) form part of the content of the MOU because if they were 
not binding then it be inconsistent with the reasons behind the Group of Legal Experts’ 
recommendations to attach the standards to the MOU rather than the Guidelines to Troop-
Contributing Countries.  
It is similarly unclear whether art 7 quinquiens can be interpreted as an obligation on 
contributing states to exercise criminal jurisdiction. Reading the requirements of the 
                                                          
232 2007 MOU, Preamble.  
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“exercise of criminal jurisdiction” under the following articles of the MOU indicates that 
there may be obligations on TCCs to undertake certain steps but not others; TCCs may only 
have obligations to hand over a prima facie case to the appropriate national authorities and 
report back to the UN on outcomes (art 7 sexiens). These are important for increased 
transparency, but there is no guarantee that justice will be seen to be done as the UN cannot 
compel the TCC to prosecute. There is little room for UN leadership within the provisions 
of the MOU. It is unlikely that there are obligations on the TCC to investigate per se because 
if they fail to do so the UN has the ability to initiate an administrative investigation in their 
place under art 7 quater. It also appears that initiating a formal investigation, like the 
decision to prosecute, is considered a matter of sovereignty (at least under the MOU).  
If it were assumed that art 7 quinquiens gave rise to a legal obligation on the contributing 
country to exercise criminal jurisdiction and they failed to do so, then this may be a “material 
breach” for the purposes of termination of the treaty/MOU. Termination would most 
definitely achieve the withdrawal of troops. Failure to report on outcomes would unlikely 
amount to a material breach.  
This conclusion is rather unsatisfactory if the aim is to attach sanctions to states which fail 
to hold their national contingent members to account for sexual exploitation and abuse. It 
may be the case that allegations and investigations are indeed handed over to the national 
authorities but it is from there that nothing ever eventuates. Under the Memorandum of 
Understanding there appears to be a reluctance to interfere with sovereign rights to decide 
whether to prosecute (or even to initiate a formal investigation). Moreover, to get to the point 
of termination requires going through dispute resolution processes which are costly both in 
money and time. Additionally, the process relies on the will of states to engage with the 
dispute resolution mechanism or the Secretary-General (or the Security Council) to 
ultimately terminate the treaty. Although a removal of troops satisfies the principle of UN 
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leadership in responding to sexual exploitation and abuse, it does not mean that justice will 








In this chapter I will be revisiting many of the human rights treaties that were considered in the 
previous part of this thesis. While in Chapter Two I limited my discussion to the concepts of 
sexual abuse and sexual exploitation as defined under the UN’s zero-tolerance policy, in this 
section I will discuss state obligations in relation to treaties and norms found in international 
human rights law.  As identified in Chapter Two, the relevant conduct for sexual exploitation 
and abuse has been defined as the following: “sexual abuse” as rape and sexual violence and 
sexual activity with children; “sexual exploitation” as survival sex, specifically where sex is 
exchanged for assistance that peacekeepers have access to or that the local population is already 
entitled to. For the purposes of this section, sexual exploitation and abuse will be considered 
under human rights heads of conduct that were also identified in the previous part as having 
the most similarity with the concepts under the SG Bulletin on sexual exploitation and abuse. 
Such conduct includes, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, prohibited 
sexual activities with children, and violence against women.  
State obligations in which I am especially interested in relate to the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction; positive obligations on states to criminalise, investigate, prosecute and punish 
under their domestic criminal law or codes. If the existence of independent positive obligations 
can be identified, then it is likely that aspects of state responsibility will arise if troop-
contributing countries fail to take active steps to legislate, investigate and/or prosecute sexual 
exploitation and abuse (thus supporting UN sanctions or measures against TCCs).  
141 
 
Under human rights law there are general obligations on states to respect and ensure rights.1 In 
order to implement human rights protections a state must first “respect” those rights; this 
translates into a negative obligation on states and their agents to refrain from taking measures 
that would violate those rights. A state must also “protect” individuals from violations by a 
third party; this includes a positive duty to put particular measures in place, legislative or 
otherwise,2 in order to enshrine those rights in the domestic legal framework. A state must also 
“fulfil” or “ensure” its obligations under the relevant treaty to which they are a party; this is a 
positive duty on a state to implement relevant legislation and create a particular environment 
where rights are enforced.3 This will include the obligation for the state to have in place 
mechanisms in which victims can apply for remedies where their rights have been violated.4  
Thus positive duties to create a legal (criminal) framework that punishes those who violate 
certain rights fall under the general obligation for states to protect and ensure rights.5 For 
example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held in the Velasquez Rodriguez decision 
that “to ensure” placed positive obligations on states to not only prevent human rights 
violations but also investigate and prosecute violators.6 Additionally, the standard of “due 
diligence” may also be relevant, especially when examining state obligations associated with 
                                                          
1 The following explanation can be referenced to R McCorquodale “Impact on State Responsibility” in M T 
Kamminga and M Scheinin (eds) The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 246-247.  
2 It is important to note here that some states (such as Haiti) adopt a monist approach in relation to the applicability 
of international treaties to their domestic legal framework; international conventions are deemed to be 
incorporated as domestic law upon their ratification and are “superior” where domestic laws are inconsistent see 
B Bookey “Enforcing the Right to be Free from Sexual Violence and the Role of Lawyers in Post-Earthquake 
Haiti” (2011) CUNY Law Review 271 at 276; see also M Shaw International Law (6th ed, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2008) at 131-133.  
3 B G Ramcharan The Fundamentals of International Human Rights Treaty Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Boston, 2011) 
at 17.  
4 At 18.  
5 T Buergenthal “To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations” in L Henkin (ed) The 
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Cambridge University Press, New York, 
1981) at 77; A Seibert-Fohr Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2009) at 264. 




violence against women. The due diligence standard refers to the steps states should take to 
fulfil their responsibility to respond to acts to violence against women including to investigate 
and prosecute such violence.7  
(A) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
The question as to whether human rights norms apply to peacekeepers and what obligations 
arise for states as a consequence is an important and growing area of academic interest.8 It has 
been asserted that, for policy reasons, human rights obligations of states should devolve to all 
peacekeeping personnel, particularly military contingent members.9 This can be supported by 
inspecting the Security Council mandates that create or extend peacekeeping operations; for 
example, in many instances the Council has signified the importance of protecting civilians 
against abuses of human rights and violations of humanitarian law “including all forms of 
sexual and gender-based violence”.10 Moreover, military personnel should be considered 
employees or agents of the state.  
In regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction, a state may well be responsible at international law for 
alleged human rights violations vis a vis the actions of their military personnel. What I am 
interested in is the related question of whether a state is required to assert jurisdiction over 
sexual exploitation and abuse that are considered “crimes” committed by military members 
acting abroad. As a matter of principle states are permitted to assert jurisdiction over offences 
                                                          
7 Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women General Recommendation 19 
CEDAW/C/GC/19 (1992) at [9]; Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women 
General Recommendation 28 CEDAW/C/GC/28 (2010) at [19]. 
8 See for example K M Larsen The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2012).   
9 Primarily because military contingent members can be considered “state actors” or “agents” see Larsen, above 
n 8, at 5, 11 and 13.  
10 See Security Council Resolution 2098 extending the mandate of MONUSCO SC S/Res/2098 (2013) at [12(iii)]; 
see also Security Council Resolution 2100 establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) SC S/Res/2100 (2013) at [24] and [34]; Security Council Resolution 
2113 extending the mission mandate for African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur SC 
S/Res/2113 (2013) at [17]-[18].  
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committed outside their territory on the basis that the offender is a national.11 Whether states 
are required to do so under human rights law will be investigated. For the opportunity of 
transparency and for victims to see justice being done, such extraterritorial jurisdiction should 
be asserted.  
(B) INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
I will focus on international human rights law in this chapter. The human rights framework 
applies in both peacetime and during conflict.12 This is advantageous because although 
peacekeepers may at times be operating during armed conflict, it is unlikely they will be 
considered combatants continually for the application of humanitarian law (which may also 
provide state obligations to respond to crimes committed by their troops during armed 
conflict).13 Additionally, individuals are rights-holders under the international human rights 
framework which mean states have an obligation to protect and respond to rights violations 
committed by both state and non-state actors.14 This is beneficial to apply in the context of 
peacekeeping because of the opportunistic nature of survival sex, which is unlikely fall within 
the scope of official state actions.15 Nevertheless, states may still be obligated to respond to 
abuse under human rights law. Therefore, the human rights framework is a useful tool to 
articulate state obligations to respond to survival sex committed by peacekeepers. 
                                                          
11 C Ryngaert Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 88.  
12 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 226 at [25]; Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
2004, 178 at [106]. 
13 The question of whether and when international humanitarian law applies to UN peacekeepers has been 
discussed elsewhere see for example, R Murphy “United Nations Military Operations and International 
Humanitarian Law: What Rules to Apply to Peacekeepers?” (2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum 153; Saura “Lawful 
Peacekeeping: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” 
(2006-2007) 58 Hastings Law Journal 479; Shraga “UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage” (2000) 94 The American Journal of 
International Law 406; see also United Nations Secretary-General’s Bulletin Observance by UN Forces of 
International Humanitarian Law SG B ST/SGB/1999/13 (2006).  
14 Alston and Goodman International Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 58-59. 
15 R Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents: Moving Beyond the Current Status Quo 
and Responsibility under International Law (Leiden, Brill, 2014) at 331. 
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This chapter will explore state obligations relating to particular conduct under human rights 
law which correspond to sexual abuse and sexual exploitation; these include torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (sexual abuse); sexual activity with children (sexual 
abuse); and violence against women (sexual exploitation). To achieve this, various 
international human rights instruments will be examined. Additionally, this chapter addresses 
whether states are expected to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to these categories.  
(1) TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT 
Rape and sexual violence have been treated as torture and/or inhuman treatment by a number 
of international human rights mechanisms, such as the Committee for the Convention against 
Torture (CAT),16 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,17 and the European Court 
of Human Rights.18 Furthermore, positive duties have been identified by such bodies which 
include the obligation on states to conduct effective investigations into acts of torture.19  
For this heading it is useful to take developments under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) as an opening example.20 The ICCPR is one of nine United 
Nations human rights instruments and its implementation by states parties is reviewed every 
                                                          
16 Based on article 1, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1465 UNTS 85 (opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987): [CAT];  
Committee against Torture V L v Switzerland Commission No. 262/2005, CAT/37/D/262/2005 (2007). See also 
Concluding Observations by the Committee which has addressed rape and sexual violence generally as violence 
against women under the Convention’s definitions of torture (art 1) and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
(art 16) examples: Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic 
reports of Peru, adopted by the Committee at its forty-ninth session CAT/C/PER/CO/5-6 (2013) at [14]; 
Committee against Torture Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Ghana 
CAT/C/GHA/CO/1 (2011) at [22].  
17 Based on the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against 
Women [Convention of Belém do Pará] (opened for signature 9 June 1994, entered into force 5 March 1995).  
18 Based on article 3, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ETS 
3 (opened for signature 14 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953); see also Aydin v Turkey (1998) 
25 EHRR 251 (ECHR). 
19 MC v Bulgaria (2005) 40 EHRR 20 (ECHR) at [149]-[153].  
20 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976): [ICCPR].  
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four years by the Human Rights Committee (HRC).21 As such, the HRC not only monitors 
implementation but also interprets the provisions of the ICCPR.  
The HRC has interpreted obligations under art 2 so as to include a duty on states to bring those 
responsible for human rights violations “to justice”.22 However, these words do not strictly 
refer to punishment in criminal law. Instead the interpretation of “justice” changes depending 
on the nature of the right violated.23 Generally, how violators are brought to justice is left to 
the discretion of states parties.24 However, the HRC has noted that only criminal punishment 
may suffice in certain circumstances, for example, for acts of torture.25 To “make remedies 
effective” in terms of art 2, the Human Rights Committee has signified the importance of 
investigation.26 This line of reasoning has been applied to all forms of “serious human rights 
violations”, which again includes torture.27  
However, as will be seen below, recent observations by the HRC suggest that serious sexual 
harm caused to women will also require states to investigate in order to bring violators “to 
justice” in terms of art 2. The HRC has called on states to investigate serious forms of sexual 
exploitation against women, which would satisfy the definitions of both “sexual abuse” and 
“sexual exploitation” under the SG Bulletin.28  
                                                          
21 ICCPR, arts 28 and 40-42. 
22 Human Rights Committee Minanga v Zaire Communication No. 366/1989, CCPR/C/49/D/366/1989 (1993) at 
[7].  
23 Seibert-Fohr, above n 5, at 13.  
24 At 13. 
25 Human Rights Committee General Comment No 31: The nature of the general legal obligation imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004): [HRC General Comment No 31] at [16] and 
[18]. 
26 Seibert-Fohr, above n 5, at 35; Human Rights Committee General Comment No 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of 
Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) Adopted at the Forty-fourth Session 
(1992): [HRC General Comment No 20] at [11]-[12].  
27 HRC General Comment No 20, above n 26, at [11]-[12]. 
28 See for example Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations on the third periodic report of Paraguay, 
adopted by the Committee at its 107th session CCPR/C/PRY/CO/3 (2013) at [12].  
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According to the HRC, upon a positive outcome of investigation adequate punishment is 
required which may imply a duty to prosecute.29 Moreover, the Committee has indicated in its 
General Comments and in various Concluding Observations that prosecution and punishment 
(following a conviction) is indeed expected in cases of torture.30 In sum, for states to fulfil their 
obligations under arts 2 and 7 (torture) of the ICCPR states must criminalise, investigate, 
prosecute and punish acts of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Similar findings have 
been made under regional instruments such as the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights31 and the European Convention on Human Rights.32 The Committee against Torture 
considered domestic prosecution of the acts described in arts 1 and 1633 under the Convention 
against Torture as essential for protection.34 Asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction over torture 
crimes is also expected where military members operate abroad.35 
According to the Committee against Torture’s General Comment No 2, a failure by the state to 
exercise due diligence to investigate, prosecute and punish acts of torture committed by state 
                                                          
29 Seibert-Fohr, above n 5, at 46.  
30 Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations on the initial Report of Indonesia CCPR/C/IDN/CO/1 
(2013) at [14]; Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations Kuwait CCPR/C/KWT/CO/2 (2011) at [16]; 
HRC General Comment No 20, above n 26, at [14].  
31 Based on art 5(2): American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica" OAS (opened for 
signature 22 January 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978).  
32 Torture is considered a serious violation of human rights and fundamental values under the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, above n 17, and as such will require 
criminalisation and enforcement of the criminal law: see HR and Mohammed Momani v The Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (admissibility) (1999) Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina Case No. CH/98/946 
at [112] and[146]-[147]; Oneryildiz v Turkey (judgment) (2002) no. 48939/99 (ECHR) at [109]; Seibert-Fohr, 
above n 5, at 113-115.  
33 CAT, art 1 is included in-text below and art 16(1) reads: “Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any 
territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not 
amount to torture as defined in article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. In particular, the 
obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of 
references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
34 Based on CAT, arts 1, 2, 12 and 16 see for example, Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on 
the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Guatemala adopted by the Committee at its fiftieth session 
CAT/C/GTM/CO/5-6 (2013) at [13(b)]; Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on the second 
periodic report of the Plurinational State of Bolivia as approved by the Committee at its fiftieth session 
CAT/C/BOL/CO/2 (2013) at [15a)]; , Committee against Torture Concluding Observations of the Committee 
against Torture: Sri Lanka CAT/C/LKA/CO/3-4 (2011) at [22].  
35 See CAT, art 7(1); HRC General Comment No 31, above n 25, at [80]; Seibert-Fohr, above n 5, at 159.  
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or private actors will be a breach of their obligations under CAT and the state will bear 
consequential responsibility.36 It is important to be aware, however, that there are specific 
requirements for the definition of “torture” which may not be met in all instances of sexual 
exploitation and abuse in the peacekeeping context.  
Article 1 of CAT defines torture as the following: 
… “torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or 
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed or intimidating 
or coercing him or a third person or for any other reason based on discrimination 
of any kind, when such pain or suffering  is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity. 
The requirement of “severe pain or suffering” is a high threshold.37 However, rape has been 
held to meet this requirement in circumstances where women were systematically and 
repeatedly raped by military forces.38 Often it is dependent on the circumstances such as the 
duration of the act/s, the effects both mentally and physically, and the individual victim.39 A 
second requirement is that the infliction is for one of the prohibited purposes listed in art 1. 
Additionally, if rape or sexual violence is used to “punish, intimidate and humiliate” or is 
otherwise directed towards a woman because she is a woman (discrimination) then these will 
                                                          
36 Committee against Torture General Comment No 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties CAT/C/GC/2 
(2008) at [18].  
37 K Fortin “Rape as Torture: An Evaluation of the Committee against Torture’s attitude to Sexual Violence” 
(2008) 4 Utrecht Law Review 145 at 149. 
38 V L v Switzerland, above n 16.  
39 Moldovan v Romania [2003] ECHR 485, at [100] regarding article 3 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights.  
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be considered “prohibited purposes” under the Convention.40 The third relevant requirement is 
that the acts are committed by a public official or with consent or acquiescence of the public 
official.  
Members of military contingents can be considered “state actors”.41 Moreover, military forces 
have been considered public officials for the purposes of CAT.42 Rape and sexual violence will 
meet the required severity threshold.43 It is uncertain whether all forms of sexual exploitation 
would also meet the threshold. In cases where rape has been considered “severe pain or 
suffering” the circumstances involved systematic or multiple rapes of women detained by the 
state.44 However, these cases have been used by academics to support the general proposition 
that single acts of sexual violence or rape will nevertheless be “torture” where the other 
requirements are met.45 Moreover, if sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers is not found 
to meet the threshold of severity under art 1 but the other requirements are present, then such 
conduct may be considered cruel or other degrading treatment under art 16. In these cases the 
obligations on states to investigate and prosecute will still apply.46 It is also interesting to note 
that in its Concluding Observations the Committee against Torture does not only address rape 
and sexual violence as acts that would fulfil the definitions of torture (or cruel, inhuman or 
                                                          
40 N S Rodley Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to any form of Detention or Imprisonment, 
in particular: Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment E/CN.4/1994/31 (1994) 
at [431]; Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo (Judgment) ICTY Trial 
Chamber  IT-96-21-T, 16  November 1998 at [493].  
41 See Larsen, above n 8, at 5, 11 and 13.  
42 See Raquel Marti de Meja v Peru (1996) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report 5/96, Case 10. 
970. 
43 See Raquel Marti de Meja v Peru, above n 24. 
44 See discussion Fortin, above n 37, at 149-150. 
45 See for example, Fortin, above n 37; J Marshall “Positive Obligations and Gender-based Violence: Judicial 
Developments” (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 143 at 146;  D S Mitchell “The Prohibition of 
Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of jus cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine” (2004-2005) 15 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 219 at 251-256; N Ousman Contribution of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone to the Development of International Humanitarian Law (Duncker & Humlot, Berlin, 2013) at 117-
118. 
46 See CAT, art 16.  
149 
 
degrading treatment), but addresses violence against women generally.47 This approach would 
seem to support the assertion that forms of sexual exploitation may be considered torture/cruel, 
inhuman treatment.  
In sum, it is likely that some forms of sexual exploitation and abuse will fall within the 
definition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, provided the particular 
requirements are met in an individual case; ie where sexual exploitation and abuse is used by 
military contingent members to humiliate the victim or is otherwise used against the victim 
because she is a woman (discrimination). It is unlikely that opportunistic acts of sexual 
exploitation will strictly fulfil the “prohibited purpose” requirement. However, it will depend 
on the circumstances and indeed it is arguable that in some cases such opportunistic acts of 
sexual abuse may nevertheless be committed with a prohibited purpose. In these circumstances 
the obligation on troop-contributing countries under the ICCPR, CAT or relevant regional 
treaty to investigate and prosecute will apply.  
(2) SEXUAL ACTIVITY WITH CHILDREN 
Sexual activity with children (including child prostitution) is “sexual abuse”.48 This category 
is important because 35% of substantiated cases of sexual abuse involve victims under 18 years 
old, which the SG Bulletin has defined as “children”.49 As such, this section explores 
obligations on states to investigate and prosecute for such activity.   
                                                          
47 See for example, Concluding observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Guatemala, above 
n 34, at [13]; Concluding observations on the second periodic report of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, above 
n 34, at [15]. 
48 As concluded in Chapter Two: What is Sexual Abuse and Sexual Exploitation? 
49 The Secretary-General noted that although in 2014 thrifty-five percent of sexual abuse allegations involved 
minors, that category made up fifty percent of allegations from 2010-2013: Secretary-General Special Measures 
for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse GA at A/69/779 (2015) at [20]. See also Secretary 
General Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse GA A/66/699 (2012); 
Secretary-General Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse GA A/68/756 (2014); 
Secretary-General Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse GA A/67/766 (2013); 
United Nations Secretary-General’s Bulletin Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and 
Sexual Abuse SG B ST/SGB/2003/13 (2003) [S-G Bulletin (2003)] at [3.2(b)].  
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The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), one of the UN’s core human rights treaties, 
is specifically relevant here.50 The CRC primarily focuses on preventative measures rather than 
punishment. A relevant example of this preventative approach is seen in art 34.51 The provision 
places a duty on states to implement preventative measures to guard against the sexual 
exploitation of children through prostitution. Explicit obligations involving state enforcement 
against rights-abusers are limited to art 32 which concerns exploitation of children in 
employment. The wording of art 32 is similar to art 10(3) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) with references made to protection from 
exploitative work that may negatively interfere with the “child’s health or physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral or social development”.52 It is arguable that such phrasing could include child 
prostitution or sex work; one example would be that child prostitution exposes children to the 
increased possibility of contracting HIV which is a major health risk.53 Moreover, art 10 of 
ICESCR has been interpreted widely as comprising violence against children, including sexual 
abuse or exploitation.54 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
reveal a similar interpretation of the CRC, implying a duty on states parties to protect children 
from all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse.55  
                                                          
50 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into 
force 2 September 1990): [CRC].  
51 See CRC art 2(2) “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against 
all forms of discrimination or punishment...” 
52 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 18 
December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981): [ICESCR].  
53 See for example B M Willis and B S Levy “Child Prostitution: Global Health Burden, Research Needs, and 
Interventions” (2002) 359 The Lancet: Public Health 1417. 
54 See for example, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Concluding Observations on the 
combined third and fourth periodic reports of Jamaica adopted by the Committee at its fiftieth session 
E/C.12/JAM/CO/3-4 (2013) at [20]; Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights Concluding 
Observations on the initial to third reports of the United Republic of Tanzania adopted by the Committee at its 
forty-ninth session E/C.12/TZA/CO/1-3 (2012) at [13].  
55 See for example, Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations: Guinea-Bissau 
CRC/C/GNB/CO/2-4 (2013) at [38]-[39]; Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations: 
Afghanistan CRC/C/AFG/CO/1 (2011) at [71(e)]; Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding 
Observations: Montenegro CRC/C/MNE/CO/1 (2010) at [67].  
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The obligations for states parties under the CRC’s art 32 provides that: 
2. States Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social and educational 
measures to ensure the implementation of the present article. ... States Parties 
shall in particular: 
... 
(c) Provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the effective 
enforcement of the present article. 
The provision requires states to make the necessary changes to their national law to incorporate 
penalties for the exploitation of children in employment. The article does not explicitly provide 
for states to investigate and prosecute offenders. However, according to the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, states are nevertheless expected to actively respond to sexual exploitation 
and abuse of children that occur within their territory.56 Positive steps expected from states 
parties will include exercising their criminal jurisdiction over violators.57 In sum, buying sex 
from child prostitutes in the peacekeeping context would seem to require positive action from 
the troop-contributing country, such as investigation and prosecution under art 32 of the CRC. 
Arguably, states that do not react to such abuse in the prescribed ways will breach the spirit of 
the CRC. 
                                                          
56 See for example, Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations: Rwanda CRC/C/RWA/CO/3-
4 (2013) at [30]; Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations: Slovenia CRC/C/SVN/CO/3-4 
(2013) at [42].  
57 Such as to “prohibit all violence against children” and “take measures to prosecute perpetrators of sexual 
exploitation of children” see examples Concluding Observations: Rwanda, above n 56, at [30(a)]; Concluding 




Additionally, the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child Pornography (OP-SC)58 seeks to expand the duties under a number of the CRC’s 
provisions in certain areas, including arts 32 and 34. The OP-SC focuses on the criminalisation 
and enforcement of certain offences. As this OP is specific to child prostitution it is relevant to 
examine for obligations on states to investigate and prosecute.  
The sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography are offences under the Optional 
Protocol, bringing the relevant rights under the CRC into the realm of transnational criminal 
law.59 The definition of child prostitution is most relevant; art 2 states that “child prostitution 
means the use of a child in sexual activities for remuneration or any other form of 
consideration”. Article 3 develops the definition further by requiring states to make the 
following an offence under their domestic criminal law in relation to child prostitution: “the 
offering, obtaining, procuring or providing a child for child prostitution as defined in article 
2”.60 In fulfilment of their obligations under the OP-SC, states are expected to assert 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over these offences.61  
The Protocol itself does tend to focus on the movement of children for the stated purposes rather 
than on those who buy sex from child prostitutes, being primarily influenced by state 
obligations to prevent the transnational trafficking of children and child pornography.62 The 
requirement to criminalise certain conduct implies that states parties should also actively 
                                                          
58 Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography 2171 UNTS 
227 (opened for signature May 25 2000, entered into force January 18 2002): [OP-SC].  
59 See OP-SC, arts 2-3. 
60 At art 3(1)(b).  
61 Committee on the Rights of the Child Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 12. 
Paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Children on the Sale of Children, 
child prostitution and child pornography, Concluding Observations: Argentina CRC/C/OPSC/ARG/CO/1 (2010) 
at [32]; Committee on the Rights of the Child Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 
12. Paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Children on the Sale of Children, 
child prostitution and child pornography, Concluding Observations: Colombia CRC/C/OPSC/COL/CO/1 (2010) 
at [25].  
62 See generally United Nations Children's Fund  Handbook on the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, 
Child Prostitution and Child pornography (Innocenti Research Centre, Florence, 2009).  
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investigate and prosecute/penalise offenders.63  Additionally, the Third World Congress against 
Sexual Exploitation of Children and Adolescents in 2008 noted that in order to implement the 
Optional Protocol states were urged to address the issue of demand by criminalising the buying 
of sex from children.64 Being “urged” is perhaps the strongest language that can be used without 
a legally binding consequence. The act of buying sex from children is of most concern under 
the SG Bulletin’s prohibitions, rather than who is supplying the children. Thus, the above seems 
to suggest positive action is required from TCCs to criminalise buying sex from child prostitutes 
(and by implication extend their jurisdiction in order to cover their peacekeeping personnel 
acting abroad).  
However, upon examining the work of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, it seems that 
addressing demand in criminal law is not generally expected from states parties.65 Instead, 
emphasis has been placed on education and research in identifying the causes of child 
prostitution and trafficking.66 Moreover, the Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children has 
urged states to address demand by implementing awareness-raising measures, rather than 
through criminalisation.67 In sum, there seems to be no general or explicit duty stemming from 
the OP-SC for states to criminalise, investigate and/or prosecute the purchase of sex from child 
prostitutes. Nevertheless, child prostitution (as well as other forms of sexual activity with 
                                                          
63 This was also supported by several statements to this effect in the Third World Congress against Sexual 
Exploitation of Children and Adolescents The Rio de Janeiro Declaration and Call for Action to Prevent and Stop 
Sexual Exploitation of Children and Adolescents (2008) at Preamble [4] and [A13].  
64 At [C14].  
65 See for example, Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations on the initial report of 
Paraguay submitted under article 12 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, adopted by the Committee at its sixty-fourth session 
CRC/C/OPSC/PRY/CO/1 (2013) at [23(b)]; Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations on 
the initial report of Burkina Faso submitted under article 12 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, adopted by the Committee 
at its sixty-second session CRC/C/OPSC/BFA/CO/1 (2013) at [25].  
66 Concluding Observations on the initial report of Paraguay, above n 65, at [23]; Concluding Observations on 
the initial report of Burkina Faso, above n 66, at [25]. 
67 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, Najat 
Maalla M’Jid A/HRC/22/54 (2012) at [95(b)]; see also the General Assembly Resolution which urges states to 
address the demand for child prostitution and trafficking without explicitly referring to criminal measures: 
General Assembly Resolution on the Rights of the Child GA Res A/RES/66/141 (2012) at [20].  
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children) does fall into the general category of sexual exploitation and abuse as defined by the 
Committee under the CRC itself.68 
Like the ICCPR, the CRC has a “respect and ensure” provision.69 As such, it is arguable that in 
order to ensure those relevant rights under the CRC (notably arts 32 and 34) states would need 
to address the demand side of child prostitution and pursue individuals that sexually exploit 
children. One of the steps states could take to respect and ensure these rights is to criminalise, 
investigate and ultimately punish those activities. Furthermore, this is supported by several 
statements made by the Commission, detailing the need to criminalise violence against children, 
which includes all forms of sexual abuse and exploitation.70 
Although there may be an obligation on states to enact legislation and enforce certain offences 
in their domestic criminal law regarding sexual activity with children, there may still be issues 
addressing these obligations across troop-contributing countries in the context of peacekeeping. 
While the CRC is almost universally ratified, there are a significant number of reservations. 
Many states parties also have wide discretion in relation to the age of legal maturity, as seen in 
art 1 of the CRC therefore undermining the SG Bulletin’s definition of maturity at 18 years 
old.71 However, a counterargument could be that many of the provisions of the CRC are 
considered customary international law. Being customary the view would be that the CRC’s 
provisions/obligations will nevertheless apply across all TCCs. Nonetheless, as noted above, 
there are a number of reservations to this treaty, and so those states that are “persistent 
                                                          
68 See for example, Commission on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations on the combined third and 
fourth periodic report of Canada adopted by the Committee at its sixty-first session CRC/C/CAN/CO/3-4 (2012) 
at [49(b)]; Concluding Observations: Montenegro, above n 55, at [38(a)]. 
69 See CRC, art 2(1).  
70 See above n 55 and accompanying text.  
71 “For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years 
unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier” [emphasis added] CRC, art 1. 
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objectors” would not be bound by those provisions in which they have a reservation in place. 
Thus, the CRC’s customary status cannot be fully relied upon to bind all TCCs to its provisions.  
Unlike the OP-SC, the CRC itself is silent on the issue of asserting jurisdiction over crimes 
such as violence against children or sex offences committed abroad. Such an interpretation is 
deplorable when considering the perspective of victims and their communities, as host state 
jurisdiction has been waved under the SOFA there is total reliance on TCCs to respond to 
sexual abuse of children committed by their military personnel. If TCCs do not assert 
jurisdiction and are not required to do so under the CRC then this is an unacceptable gap. 
However, arguably, in order to adhere to the obligation to “respect and ensure” rights under 
the Convention it would be necessary for states to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts 
of violence against children. The lack of extraterritorial jurisdiction for child sexual 
exploitation and abuse is perhaps the current situation for many TCCs and this could in fact be 
a breach of the CRC respect and ensure provision.  
(3) VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
The concept of violence against women can encompass both “sexual abuse” and “sexual 
exploitation”. Violence against women includes rape and sexual violence, and sexual 
exploitation of women generally. Violence against women is addressed in several specific 
international instruments, such as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women’s General Recommendation 19,72 based on art 1 of the Convention on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).73 In addition, both the Human Rights Committee 
and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have included violence against 
women generally in their Observations on the respective Covenants. Duties on states to actively 
                                                          
72Above n 7. 
73 Convention on All forms of Elimination of Discrimination against Women 1249 UNTS 13 (opened for signature 
18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981): [CEDAW]. 
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address violence against women have been connected to rights under art 10 of ICESCR 
(protection of women and children)74 and art 7 of ICCPR (torture and inhuman treatment).75 In 
order to fulfil obligations under these articles, coupled with art 2 of both Covenants, states are 
required to criminalise certain aspects of violence against women (primarily rape, marital rape 
and domestic violence), to investigate all complaints of violence and prosecute and punish 
offenders.76  
Article 4(c) of the General Assembly’s 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women77 provides that states should “exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate 
and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether 
those acts are perpetrated by the state or by private persons”. Subparagraph (d) goes on to say 
that states should “develop penal, civil, labour and administrative sanctions in domestic 
legislation to punish and redress the wrongs caused to women who are subjected to violence”. 
Importantly, neither provision explicitly requires the development of legislation to pursue 
perpetrators of violence against women exclusively in criminal law. The Declaration defers to 
existing domestic arrangements of states. In subparagraph (d) states are given a range of options 
to punish perpetrators, of which punishment in criminal law is only one. This seems to go to 
the status of the Declaration as a non-binding instrument – it cannot strictly require states to do 
anything. Nonetheless, the Declaration is currently one of the only official UN instruments that 
refer to state obligations related to violence against women explicitly.  
                                                          
74 See for example, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Concluding Observations on the third 
periodic report of Azerbaijan, adopted by the Committee at its fiftieth session E/C.12/AZE/CO/3 (2013) at [18]; 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Concluding Observations of the Committee on the third 
report of Ecuador as approved by the Committee at its forty-ninth session E/C.12/ECU/CO/3 (2012) at [21].  
75 See for example, Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Cape 
Verde CCPR/C/CPV/CO/1 (2012) at [9]; Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee: Dominican Republic CCPR/C/DOM/CO/5 (2012) at [11].  
76 For example see, Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations on the fifth periodic review of Peru, 
adopted at its 107th Session CCPR/C/PER/CO/5 (2013) at [10]; Concluding Observations on the initial to third 
reports of the United Republic of Tanzania, above n 55, at [13].  
77 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women GA Res A/RES/48/104 (1993). 
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In terms of other non-binding instruments under this heading, the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action are also relevant.78 These documents emerged from the UN’s Fourth World 
Conference on Women in 1995, which looked at inter alia steps governments could take to 
eliminate violence against women. Although the Platform for Action was adopted by the 
General Assembly, it is not regarded as a legally binding document. Rather, the Platform is of 
political importance only. As part of the measures that should be taken by governments to 
eliminate violence against women, paragraph 124 of the Platform details that states should:79 
... exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national 
legislation, punish acts of violence against women ... 
Enact and/or reinforce penal, civil, labour and administrative sanctions in 
domestic legislation to punish and redress the wrongs done to women and girls 
who are subjected to any form of violence. 
As the Platform represents the collective consensus of many states, it defers to state discretion 
as to how violence against women is sanctioned and redressed, reflecting the compromise made 
to gain consensus across many different governments.  
The General Assembly’s special session to review the implementation of these political 
documents strongly supports the development of legislation or other laws to make violence 
against women and girls punishable under domestic criminal law.80  The special session refers 
specifically to gendered violence as a criminal offence representing a shift away from the 
                                                          
78 Fourth World Conference on Women Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and 
A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995): [Platform for Action]. 
79 Platform for Action, above n 78, at 124(b)-(c).  
80 See at General Assembly Resolution Further actions and initiatives to implement the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action GA Res A/RES/S-23/3 (2000) [66(c)]-[66(d)].  
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language of the Platform itself, which deferred to state discretion. However, like the Platform, 
this later document is still of political influence rather than law.   
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s General 
Recommendation 19 provides that violence against women is a form of discrimination under 
art 1 of CEDAW.81 As such, art 2 provides that states must inter alia “adopt appropriate 
legislative and other measures including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all 
discrimination against women”.82 Moreover, General Recommendation 28 expands on state 
obligations under the Convention and notes that “[s]tates parties have a due diligence obligation 
to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish such acts of gender based violence”.83 These 
duties are also reflected in the jurisprudence of the Committee and many of its Concluding 
Observations.84 The Committee has however only required criminalisation of certain acts of 
violence, such as rape, and domestic violence (a similar approach as is taken under the ICCPR 
and ICESCR).85 States thus have discretion on the type of sanction to attach to other forms of 
                                                          
81 General Recommendation 19, above n 7, at [6]. 
82 CDEAW, art 2(b) see also art 2(e). 
83 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core 
Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2 (2010) at [19].  
84 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Angela González Carreňo v Spain 
CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012 Communication No 47/2012 (2014) at [9.7] and [11(b)(ii); Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women Banu Akbak, Gülen Khan and Melissa Őzdemir v Austria 
CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 Communication No 6/2005 (2007) at [12.1.2] and [12.3(a)]; Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women Hakan Goekce, Handan Goekce and Guelue Goekce v Austria 
CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 Communication No 5/2005 (2007) at [12.3(a)]; Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women S V P v Bulgaria CEDAW/C/53/D/31/2011 Communication No 31/2011 (2012) 
at [9.3]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women V K v Bulgaria 
CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008 Communication No 20/2008 (2011) at [9.3]; Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women Concluding Observations on the Combined initial and second periodic reports of 
Afghanistan CEDAW/C/AFG/CO/1-2 (2013) at [23(a)]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Israel 
CEDAW/C/ISR/CO/5 (2011) at [23(a)]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: South Africa 
CEDAW/C/ZAF/CO/4 (2011) at [31(c)].  
85 See for example, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Concluding Observations of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Côte d’Ivoire CEDAW/C/CIV/CO/1-3 
(2011) at [30]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Concluding Observations of the 




violence against women, such as administrative sanctions.  However, when states have 
criminalised violence against women generally, the Committee has treated this favourably.86  
In its Concluding Observations on Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, the Committee explicitly referred to 
the context of peacekeeping.87 At that time there were a number of suspected cases of sexual 
exploitation and abuse committed by members of the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire (UNOCI).88 Allegations included the sexual abuse of children.89 The CEDAW 
Committee requested that the UN ensure the return of those suspected of sexual exploitation 
and abuse to their respective troop-contributing countries “with the request to initiate domestic 
investigations and prosecutions”.90 This statement suggests that those acts of sexual 
exploitation and abuse (violence against women) committed by those military members were 
(or should have been) within the criminal jurisdiction of the TCC. Moreover, that criminal 
sanction in particular was expected. As such, this strengthens the argument that violence 
against women in the form of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping ought to be 
criminalised. Whether criminalisation of sexual exploitation and abuse is actually an obligation 
under the provisions of CEDAW is not so clear.  
As noted above, specific mention of a duty to criminalise has been reserved for forms of 
violence against women the Committee considers “serious”, such as rape. In the peacekeeping 
context this would cover “sexual abuse” but not necessarily “sexual exploitation”. A similar 
conclusion can be found in the approach taken by regional treaties, such as the Inter-American 
                                                          
86 See for example, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women: South Africa, above n 84, at [25].  
87 Concluding Observations of the Committee of the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Côte d’Ivoire, 
above n 85. 
88 At [29(b)]. 
89 See for example, “Cote d’Ivoire: UN Responding to Allegations of Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers” (1 
September 2011) UN News Centre www.un.org.  
90 Concluding Observations of the Committee of the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Côte d’Ivoire, 
above n 85, at [29(b)]. 
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Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women,91 the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa,92 and The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and combating violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence.93 
(A) DUE DILIGENCE  
As discussed above, there are many treaties and instruments that refer to the “due diligence” 
standard. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights noted in Velasquez Rodriguez that: “The 
state has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the 
means at its disposal to carry out serious investigations ... to identify those responsible, to 
impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation”.94 
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has further reiterated the due 
diligence standard noting that states have an obligation to conduct good faith investigations 
into acts of violence against women (the standard also requires investigations to be prompt, 
impartial and exhaustive).95  
                                                          
91 See Convention of Belém do Pará, art 7(b): “The States Parties condemn all forms of violence against women 
and agree to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, policies to prevent, punish and eradicate such 
violence and undertake to: ... apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for violence against 
women”. See also art 7(c).  
92  See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women (opened for 
signature 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 November 2005) art 4(b) which requires stats parties to “adopt such 
other legislative, administrative, social and economic measures as may be necessary to ensure the prevention, 
punishment and eradication of all forms of violence against women”. See also See African Commission on Human 
and People’s Rights Social and Economic Rights Action (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria Communication 155/96 
(2001). 
93 See Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and combating violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence CETS No: 210 (entered into force 11 May 2011) art 1(1)(a) see also art 5 with reference to due diligence 
and art 49(2) general obligations. See also arts 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40. 
94 Velasquez Rodriguez, above n 6, at [172].  
95 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States of American (2011) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Case 
12.626, Report 80/11; see for discussion A J Sennett “Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States of America: Defining 
Due Diligence?” (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal 538; da Penha Maia Fernandes v Brazil (2001) 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Case 12.051, Report 54/01; see for discussion R M Celorio “The 
Rights of Women in the Inter-American System of Human Rights: Current Opportunities and Challenges in 
Standards-Setting” (2001) 65 University of Miami Law Review 819. 
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The UN’s Special Rapporteur on violence against women has noted that:96 
... the due diligence responsibility comprises the obligation of states to: (a) prevent 
acts of violence against women; (b) investigate and punish all acts of violence 
against women; (c) protect women against acts of violence, and (d) provide 
remedy and reparation to victims of violence against women. 
Although the above is well accepted by the Rapporteurs (past and present), there is still 
considerable debate about the specific scope and content of the due diligence standard in 
regards to violence against women.97 Moreover, state assertion that “due diligence” is unclear 
leaves open the possibility of side-stepping their obligations.98 As such, the current Rapporteur 
Rashida Manjoo has proposed a specific international legally binding instrument that clarifies 
state obligations regarding violence against women.99 In the absence of such an instrument, 
there are two broad ways to interpret the due diligence standard. 
If applying an expansive interpretation of “due diligence”, there seems to be an inherent duty 
to prosecute. Indeed, jurisprudence of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women indicates that where acts of violence against women are criminalised in 
domestic law, effective investigation and prosecution is required.100 Moreover, investigations 
                                                          
96 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences GA A/66/215 
(2011) at [50].  
97 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences: Integration of the 
Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence against women: The Due Diligence Standard as 
a Tool for the Elimination of Violence against Women ESC E/CN.4/2006/61 (2006) at [14]; Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences GA A/HRC/29/27 (2015) at [63]. 
98 Sennett, above n 95, at 547; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes 
and Consequences (2015), above n 97, at [63]. 
99 Manjoo has also proposed a specific monitoring body to oversee the implementation of state obligations in 
relation to violence against women see Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes 
and Consequences (2015), above n 97, at [63]; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights “UN 
Expert urges States to agree to Specific Legal Obligations to Fight Violence against Women and Girls” (media 
release, 22 June 2015).  
100 Hakan Goekce, Handan Goekce and Guelue Goekce v Austria, above n 84, at [12.1.2]; Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women R P B v The Philippines CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011 
Communication No 34/2011 (2014) at [8.3]; See also Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Côte d’Ivoire, above n 85, at [31(c)]-[31(d)]; Committee on the 
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must be prompt, impartial and conducted in good faith.101 A failure to investigate and prosecute 
would therefore be a breach of the due diligence standard. Therefore, it would appear that the 
due diligence standard goes beyond what is expected under the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the UN and contributing state in terms of exercising criminal jurisdiction. In Chapter 
Three I argued that under the Model Memorandum of Understanding prosecution by the troop-
contributing country was not required. However, prosecution and punishment following any 
conviction is necessary in order for states to meet the due diligence standard under international 
human rights law, particularly in relation to violence against women.  Moreover, the context in 
which violence against women occurs has proved important for the application of the due 
diligence standard. Where a state continuously fails to seriously investigate and prosecute 
violence against women, this pattern of non-action has been evidence of failing to act with due 
diligence to protect, investigate and punish violence against women.102 Thus, where a troop-
contributing country has demonstrated a pattern of non-action (investigation/prosecution) 
against allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse this could be interpreted as condoning the 
behaviour (of violence against women).103 A continuing failure to prosecute could therefore be 
a failure to act with due diligence and breach obligations under human rights law in regards to 
violence against women. 
                                                          
Elimination of Discrimination against Women Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women: Kuwait, above n 100, at [31(b)]; Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women Concluding Observations of the Committee of Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women: Bangladesh CEDAW/C/BGD/CO/7 (2011) at [20(b)]; As the relevant monitoring body for 
CEDAW, the Committee’s interpretation of its provisions as a duty to prosecute could be construed as an 
“authoritative interpretation” see Scharf M “The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal 
Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights” (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 41 at 48-50.  
101 See above n 99. 
102 Case of Gonzales et al (“Cotton Field”) v Mexico (2009) Inter-American Court of Human Rights(Ser C) No 
205 at 258; see discussion V Waiseman “Human Trafficking: State Obligations to Protect Victims’ Rights, the 
Current Framework and a New Due Diligence Standard” (2010) Hastings International and Comparative Law 
Review 385 at 411-412. 
103 Waiseman, above n 102, at 419. 
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However, although the due diligence standard appears to step over the line of state sovereignty, 
some scholars argue that in practical terms (and state practice) it is unlikely to remove the 
state’s ability to direct the investigation and punishment of offenders within their borders 
(including prosecutorial discretion). “Due diligence” is therefore read within the context of its 
limitations. Some scholars argue that there is only a narrow set of circumstances under 
international law where a duty to prosecute (or hand over the case to another state for the 
purposes of prosecution) is formally required.104 Such circumstances include international 
humanitarian law under the Geneva Conventions. For example, a duty to prosecute is attached 
to “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions during armed conflict, such as wilful killing 
and torture (in connection to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide).105 Outside of 
these contexts, the discretion of the state to prosecute is maintained. Moreover, obligations to 
prosecute may be limited by the state practice of providing amnesties, derogation or the 
existence of statutes of limitation.106 Therefore, although the expansive interpretation of the 
due diligence, which would imply a duty on states to prosecute, would align with the 
jurisprudence of treaty bodies and human rights institutions, this may be limited by the reality 
of state practice.  
Due diligence is also based on reasonableness ie states should take steps that are reasonable 
according to their legal framework and resources available to them in order to address violence 
against women.107 The problem with the reasonableness standard is that states can invariably 
point to lack of resources as the reason for substandard attempts at implementation. Moreover, 
                                                          
104 See generally Scharf, above n 100. 
105 At 43-48 and 52-59. 
106 M M Jackson “The Customary International Law Duty to Prosecute Crimes against Humanity: A New 
Framework” (2007) 16 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 117 at 123 and 134; see also N 
Roht-Arriaza “Special Problems of a Duty to Prosecute: Derogation, Amnesties, States of Limitation, and Superior 
Orders” in N Roht-Arriaza (ed) Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1995) 57. 
107 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences GA A/HRC/23/49 
(2013) at [72]; Sennett, above n 95, at 543.  
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it is difficult to apply the same level of due diligence across all states, as it depends upon the 
individual state’s resources and legal system.  
The due diligence standard may also be used to argue that states should extend criminal 
jurisdiction over nationals abroad, particularly in the case of violence against women. Many 
treaties are silent as to whether states are required to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. In the 
absence of such extraterritorial jurisdiction over the relevant sexual crimes TCCs will not be 
obligated to pursue their nationals operating abroad in domestic criminal law. Where 
jurisdiction is mentioned, treaties only require states to protect rights or react to violators 
“within the territory” of that state or simply “within that state’s jurisdiction”.108 As a matter of 
principle states are permitted to assert jurisdiction over crimes that are committed by their 
nationals abroad and some treaties reflect this.109 In the case of violence against women, the 
Special Rapporteur has noted that the due diligence standard obligates states to protect 
individuals within their jurisdiction.110 Moreover, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women has suggested that states will be responsible for all their human 
rights violations, even if they are committed against persons outside that state’s territory.111 
Although not expressly required under any convention, it is arguable that for states to meet 
their obligations in relation to violence against women, in particular to comply with the due 
diligence standard, it is necessary to assert jurisdiction over their military contingents acting 
overseas. This conclusion is supported by the CEDAW Committee’s comments in their 
                                                          
108 ICCPR, art 2(1); CRC, art 2(1); CAT, art 10; Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, art 1(1). 
109 For example, CAT, art 5(b); Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence, art 44(b).  
110 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences (2013) above n 
107, at [12].  
111 CEDAW General Recommendation 28, above n 7, at [12].  
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Observations on Côte d’Ivoire where TCCs were assumed to have jurisdiction over sexual 
exploitation and abuse committed by their military contingents.112  
In sum, the exact scope and content of the due diligence standard has been questioned by states, 
debated among scholars and is in need of further development. Thus, while the due diligence 
standard can be given an expansive interpretation so as to include an obligation on TCCs 
prosecute peacekeepers, it may in fact be limited by state sovereignty and state practice. Any 
due diligence obligation related to violence against women may in reality be a similar 
obligation to that under the MOU – to submit the case to the appropriate national authorities.  
(B) CRIMINALISING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
The due diligence standard clearly requires states to criminalise violence against women in 
their domestic law. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women and the Secretary 
General in his in-depth study on violence against women suggest that all forms of gendered 
violence should be criminalised.113 However, as noted above, treaty bodies for the requisite 
instruments (ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW) focus instead on the criminalisation of only certain 
forms of violence, notably rape, and domestic violence. Arguably, this seems to reflect the fact 
that many states have not yet fully implemented the rights under the relevant treaties, and so 
treaty bodies focus on the most serious forms of violence rather than all forms of violence 
against women. The most serious forms would cover conduct described as “sexual abuse” but 
not “sexual exploitation”.  
                                                          
112 Concluding Observations of the Committee of the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Côte d’Ivoire, 
above n 85.  
113 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its causes and consequences (2011), above n 
96, at [17]; Report of the Secretary General In-Depth Study on all forms of Violence against Women GA 
A/61/122/Add.1 (2006) at 86. 
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Therefore, whether states are required to criminalise all forms of violence against women, 
including all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse in criminal law, is unclear.  It is at least 
arguable that the development of the “due diligence” standard in regard to violence against 
women seems to indicate that states are to work towards the criminalisation of all forms of 
violence against women. If a particular form of violence against women is criminalised then 
investigation, prosecution and punishment (following conviction) is expected. For troop-
contributing countries that do have forms of sexual exploitation and abuse described as sexual 
crimes under their domestic criminal law and have asserted jurisdiction over their nationals 
abroad then the due diligence standard would require investigation and prosecution. Whether 
TCCs are required to criminalise all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse at the outset is not 
clear. At the most, the above discussion would lend itself to the argument that TCCs may be 
obligated to criminalise conduct falling under “sexual abuse”. Again, Concluding Observations 
from the HRC and the CEDAW Committee indicate that many states are falling short of this 
requirement. This summary would therefore indicate that survival sex (sexual exploitation) is 
not required to be criminalised.  
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter is to establish that there are human rights obligations on states to 
positively respond to sexual exploitation and abuse committed by their military contingent 
members. The table (below) summarises the information about the treaties (state obligations) 
discussed in this section. As shown in the table, a number of provisions in human rights treaties 
require states to criminalise or at least create a legal framework to address conduct which would 
be considered sexual exploitation and abuse.  
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against 
Torture, acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment have been interpreted 
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as including rape and other sexual violence against women. Although there are specific 
additional requirements, such as a prohibited purpose, there may be circumstances (however 
unlikely) where sexual abuse by peacekeepers would fulfil the definition of either torture or 
inhuman treatment. Moreover, in order to realise these obligations it would be necessary for 
states to assert criminal jurisdiction over their military members operating abroad. If such 
circumstances exist, a troop-contributing country’s failure to investigate and prosecute would 
potentially give rise to state responsibility. 
Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child there is an obligation on states to actively 
address violence against children (sexual exploitation and abuse). However, there appears to 
be no explicit obligation to criminalise. This may be because criminalising violence against 
children is simply assumed by the treaty, due to the egregious nature of the violation. States 
have discretion to address violations with administrative sanctions or penal sanctions. States 
are also required to investigate violations. Additionally, states have a wide discretion as to the 
age of maturity and there is therefore a possibility that persons under the age of 18 years will 
not be considered “children” in the domestic law of the TCC. Again, in order to fulfil the 
obligation to respect and ensure the rights under the CRC it may be necessary for states to 
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of violence against children. A contributing state’s 
failure to investigate acts of sexual activity with children would give rise to state responsibility.  
According to treaty bodies, “serious” forms of violence against women, such as rape, are 
currently required to be criminalised in domestic law. This perhaps suggests that current 
international understanding is that only conduct which is more likely to be considered “sexual 
abuse” is required to be criminalised. This leaves a gap concerning “sexual exploitation” 
(survival sex). The due diligence standard would suggest that if a particular form of violence 
against women is criminalised in domestic law then it must be investigated, the violator 
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prosecuted and if convicted punished. On an expansive interpretation the due diligence 
standard goes beyond what is expected in the Memorandum of Understanding between the UN 
and TCCs by requiring prosecution. In theory, where a TCC has criminalised a form of violence 
against women that fits within the concept of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, 
then a failure to investigate and prosecute would give rise to state responsibility. However, this 
interpretation may be limited; in reality the national authorities must still retain prosecutorial 
discretion, whether to investigate or initiate prosecution. As a result, the due diligence standard 
may only require submission of the case to the appropriate national authorities on all cases of 
sexual abuse (required to be criminalised) and cases of sexual exploitation that happen to be 
criminalised under domestic law. Nevertheless, in order to fulfil the due diligence standard 
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is required over those forms of violence against women 
that are criminalised under a troop-contributing country’s domestic law.  
This conclusion is quite unsatisfactory. Violence against women clearly encompasses “sexual 
exploitation”. However, under the international human rights treaties, only the more serious 
forms of violence against women are required to be criminalised by states; thus leaving out 
survival-sex-type relationships. For victims of sexual exploitation (mostly young women) this 
gap in international human rights law may mean it is less likely the perpetrator will be punished, 
and justice will not be done. Considering the seriousness of sexual exploitation in the context 
of peacekeeping, and assuming its continued spotlight in international media reflects concern 
at this behaviour,114 this gap is unacceptable.  
                                                          
114 See for example, Amnesty International “CAR: UN Troops implicated in rape of girl and indiscriminate killings 
must be investigated” (news release, 11 August 2015); Esslemont T “EXCLUSIVE – UN Peacekeepers face new 
sex allegations in Central African Republic” Trust (11 November 2015) www.trust.org; Ghosh S “Are UN 
Peacekeepers Doing More Harm than Good?” Aljazeera (15 August 2015) http://www.aljazeera.com; K Willsher 
and S Laville “France Launches Criminal Inquiry into Alleged Sex Abuse by Peacekeepers” The Guardian (7 
May 2015) http://www.theguardian.com/world.  
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The exclusion of survival-sex-type relationships (in the peacekeeping context) from the human 
rights discourse on violence against women should be addressed by one of the treaty bodies 
mentioned in this chapter; most relevant would be the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women. A CEDAW General Recommendation, for instance, might 
clarify state obligations in responding to survival sex (and sexual exploitation and abuse by 
peacekeepers more widely). There is room for more research here. As noted in Chapter Two, 
survival sex is one of the most common forms of sexual exploitation committed by 
peacekeepers. As these acts are not strictly required under current human rights law to be 
criminalised in domestic law, if a troop-contributing country has not done so and thus failed to 
take action against their contingent members then there will be no consequential state 
responsibility. State responsibility would therefore depend on the existence of domestic laws.  
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Due diligence Applicable to SEA by 
military contingents? 
ICCPR, arts 2, 7 Torture Yes Yes Yes Arguable in the 
prescribed circumstances 
Arts 2, 7 Cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment 
Yes Yes Yes Arguable in the 
prescribed circumstances 
Arts 2, 7 Violence against 
Women 
Certain acts of violence 
against women 
Yes Yes Yes 
ICESCR, art 10 Violence against 
Children 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CRC, arts 2(1), 32 Violence against 
Children  
No (however, assumed 
“yes”) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Arts 2(1), 32 Sexual exploitation 
and abuse of children 
No (however, assumed 
“yes”) 
Yes Yes Yes 
CEDAW, art 1 Violence against 
women 
Certain acts of violence 
against women 
Yes Yes Yes 
CAT, arts 1, 2 Torture Yes Yes Yes Arguable in the 
prescribed circumstances 
Art 16 Cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment 
Yes Yes Yes Arguable in the 
prescribed circumstances 
CRC-OPSC, arts 2, 3 Child Prostitution Yes (limited to the sale 
of children not the 
buying of sex) 
Yes(limited to the 
sale of children not 
the buying of sex) 
NA No 
Convention of Belém 
do Pará art 7 
Violence against 
Women 
Certain acts of violence 
against women 
Yes Yes Yes 
ACHPR-OP, art 4(b) Violence against 
Women 
Certain acts of violence 
against women 
Yes Yes Yes 








 From the previous chapters it has been concluded that troop-contributing countries have 
certain positive obligations in relation to sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers that 
arise out of several sources of international law. Firstly, the Model Memorandum of 
Understanding (between the UN and the troop-contributing country) requires contributing 
countries to exercise criminal jurisdiction over serious misconduct which is considered 
criminal under domestic law. “Exercise of criminal jurisdiction” under the MOU merely 
obligates the contributing state to submit cases to the appropriate national authorities. As 
this thesis argues that the MOU is a treaty, a failure to exercise jurisdiction will be a breach 
of an international obligation. Not only should there be consequences under treaty law (as 
discussed in Chapter Three) but there may also be wider consequences of state responsibility 
which may support the UN issuing coercive or non-coercive measures against non-
compliant states. Here, the UN may take leadership in responding to sexual exploitation and 
abuse. It should be noted at the outset that sanctioning non-compliant states does not in and 
of itself guarantee that justice will be done; it does, however, draw attention to a general 
failure of states to respond to violence against (predominately) women. For the UN to 
sanction states in this way signifies the seriousness of sexual exploitation and abuse and 
perhaps make victims more visible to the international community (and perhaps encourage 
accountability).  
Secondly, there are other obligations that arise under human rights law. Where a TCC is 
party to the relevant international treaty, there are positive duties on states in relation to 
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sexual conduct that falls within the definition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment; sexual exploitation of children; and violence against women. Those obligations 
linked to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction involve the criminalisation of torture (or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment), sexual exploitation of children, and some “serious” forms 
of violence against women. States are additionally obligated to investigate, and if possible 
prosecute, and if convicted, punish violators. Potentially, if TCCs fail to take any one of 
these steps they will be in breach of their international obligation to take positive action.  
This chapter explores circumstances under which sanctions can be implemented, by the UN 
using the principles of state responsibility to support such sanctions.1 The relevant 
instrument to work with for this purpose is the International Law Commission’s Articles on 
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).2 It is important to 
note that the legal status of the ARSIWA is not yet fixed; while they have been noted by the 
UN General Assembly, the Articles are not an independent source of law.3 However, when 
drafted the Commission sought to cover all forms of state responsibility that reflect, or are 
influential upon, state practice.4 Moreover, international judicial institutions have 
periodically referred to the Articles when considering state responsibility.5 Therefore, they 
                                                          
1 See for example, Z Deen-Racsmary “The Amended UN Model Memorandum of Understanding: A New 
Incentive for States to Discipline and Prosecute Military Members of National Peacekeeping Contingents?” 
(2011) 16 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 32; E F Defeis  “UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and 
Exploitation: An end to Impunity” (2008) 7 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 186; A 
Harrington “Victims of Peace: Current Abuse Allegations against UN Peacekeepers and the role of the Law in 
Preventing them in the Future” (2005) 12 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 125; V Kent 
“Peacekeepers as Perpetrators of Abuse” 14 African Security Review 85; R Murphy UN Peacekeeping in 
Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in Practice (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007); M Odello “Tackling Criminal Acts in Peacekeeping Operations: The Accountability of 
Peacekeepers” (2010) 15 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 347. 
2 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts GA Res A/Res/56/83 (2001): [ARSIWA]. 
3 J Crawford and S Olleson “The Character and Forms of International Responsibility” in M Evans (ed) (4th 
ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 443 at 444. 
4 At 447-448. 
5 See Report of the Secretary-General Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful acts: Compilation 
of decisions of international courts, tribunals and other bodies GA A/62/62 (2007); Report of the Secretary-
General Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful acts: Compilation of decisions of international 
courts, tribunals and other bodies GA A/65/76 (2010); Report of the Secretary-General Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful acts: Compilation of decisions of international courts, tribunals and other bodies 
GA A/68/72 (2013). 
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can be said to represent the current consensus on state responsibility, and so form the 
framework, thus they will be relied upon for the purposes of this section. Additionally, the 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO) will be considered.6 
The ARIO was modelled on the ARSIWA and largely mirrors its provisions.7  It has 
similarly been noted by the General Assembly.8 However, states have pointed out that in 
certain areas the ARIO represents law which is currently unclear; this is particularly true of 
article 17 (involving the responsibility of member states for the internationally wrongful acts 
of IOs).9 The law on the responsibility of IOs is still developing, with the Articles being a 
guide as to its direction.10 
For state responsibility to arise there must first be an internationally wrongful act; thus, 
conduct or an omission of the state that is considered a breach of an international obligation 
owed by that state.11 The sources of obligations identified above to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over sexual exploitation and abuse represent primary rules of international law. 
A breach of an obligation of such primary rules will be an “internationally wrongful act” for 
the purposes of the ARSIWA.12 Additionally, the internationally wrongful act must be 
attributable to the state.13 As the failure to exercise criminal jurisdiction is firmly attached 
to the state itself, it can be asserted that the breach is attributable to the state.  
This chapter will explore the consequences of state responsibility, however, it will not 
strictly apply the principles of state responsibility or the responsibility of international 
                                                          
6 Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations GA Res A/66/10 (2011): [ARIO]. 
7 D Akande “International Organizations” in M D Evans (ed) International Law (4th ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2014) 248, at 265. 
8 General Assembly Resolution Responsibility of International Organizations GA Res A/Res/69/126 (2014). 
9 See for example, General Assembly Summary Record of the 18th Meeting A/C.6/69/SR.18 (2015) at [47]-
[80] 
10 Summary Record of the 18th Meeting, above n 9, at [69]. 
11 ARSIWA, art 2.  
12 ARSIWA, art 2(b).  
13 ARSIWA, art 2(a). 
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organisations. To apply ARIO/ARSIWA strictly requires determining whether the UN is an 
“injured” or “non-injured” party.14 Such a discussion is not useful or particularly relevant 
here, because the failure of states to discharge their obligations to respond to sexual 
exploitation and abuse causes harm to individuals, who do not see justice being done. 
Instead, the UN may point to the principles of state responsibility and the responsibility of 
IOs to support the use of coercive or non-coercive measures; ARIO/ARSIWA are useful 
tools to guide the use of such sanctions against non-compliant states. I will also assess the 
sanctions in light of the three underlying principles I identified in Part One; justice being 
seen to be done, host state ownership and UN leadership. Additionally, the issue of which 
organ of the UN is best suited to authorise such sanctions will be discussed.  
The chapter will conclude that while withdrawing troops and blacklisting states may be 
considered too “punitive” to be lawful countermeasures under the principles of state 
responsibility or the responsibility of IOs, they may still be employed as part of a political 
strategy against the TCC. Moreover, naming and shaming states appears to be the direction 
the UN is currently taking. Withdrawing troops or blacklisting states achieves the immediate 
removal of perpetrators from the host state community, but does not guarantee that the 
offender will ever be brought to justice. Additionally, it is not perceived that the host state 
has any ownership in such decisions. Nevertheless, the removal of troops, blacklisting of 
states and naming and shaming TCCs which fail to exercise criminal jurisdiction is a show 
of strong UN leadership in responding to sexual exploitation and abuse. 
 (1) CONSEQUENCES – SANCTIONS AGAINST THE STATE 
Sanctions that have been suggested by academics are primarily of a coercive nature. Of the 
most coercive are economic sanctions, which I will deal with below. The more popular 
                                                          
14 ARSIWA, arts 49(1); ARIO, arts 51(1). 
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options are withdrawing contingents and prohibiting states from contributing to 
peacekeeping.15 Such measures could be considered coercive as they interfere with the 
voluntary right under the UN Charter of member states to contribute.16 Moreover, an 
immediate removal of troops from peacekeeping operations could have a detrimental impact 
on the mission itself with fewer personnel on the ground for a period while the UN sources 
troops from other states. Additionally, they appear to be punitive in nature – as a response 
to failing to exercise criminal jurisdiction. This can be compared to non-coercive measures 
that seek to put states on notice such as naming and shaming non-compliant states.  
Withdrawal and blacklisting measures have been suggested by academics and there has been 
growing official support for these options, particularly from the UN Secretariat. The Group 
of Legal Experts recognised that the UN maintains the “ultimate sanction”17 of refusing to 
accept or seek troops from particular member states (without going into detail about which 
organ of the UN is officially capable to “refuse” such troops). Although this does not 
translate directly into “blacklisting states”, it does indicate that there is some official support 
for this.  The Secretary-General has made recent statements supporting the forced removal 
of contingents that exhibit a “pattern of non-compliance”.18 However, scholars have cast 
doubt on whether such a course of action is wise given the difficulties in persuading enough 
countries to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations.19 Nevertheless, the Security 
                                                          
15 See for example Deen-Racsmany, above n 1, at 342; Defeis, above n 1, at 209; Harrington, above n 1, at 
148. 
16 Charter of the United Nations, art 2(2). 
17 Report of the Group of Legal Experts on Making the Standards contained in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin 
binding on Contingent Members and Standardising the Norms of Conduct so that they are applicable to all 
Categories of Peacekeeping Personnel GA A/61/645 (2006) [Second Group of Legal Experts Report] at [10].  
18 Report of the Secretary-General The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations GA A/70/357-S/2015/682 
(2015) at [120]. 




Council issued Resolution 2272 in March 2016 which endorsed and authorised the removal 
of entire contingents is there was a pattern of sexual exploitation and abuse.20 
A non-coercive measure that has been suggested is to publically name states that fail to hold 
offenders to account or report back to the UN on outcomes of exercise of jurisdiction.21 This 
suggestion has support at the official UN level. Naming and shaming contributing countries 
was supported by the Zeid Report where it was noted that such action should be undertaken 
by the Secretary-General in his annual reports where states fail to report outcomes of cases 
to the UN.22 Prince Zeid was reluctant to attach such a response to other failures that may 
be made by TCCs, such as the failure to prosecute or even submit the case to the appropriate 
national authorities.23 Additionally, since his 2013 annual report on sexual exploitation and 
abuse the Secretary-General has suggested he will include country-specific data on non-
compliant troop-contributing countries.24  
Under the principles of state responsibility, there are multiple steps that are required from 
the state in breach and the state or IO invoking that responsibility. Using these principles as 
a guide to how the UN may respond to non-complaint states, the first option that will be 
briefly discussed will be economic sanctions. The second will be cessation, reparation and 
promises of non-repetition. The third option is that of countermeasures; this is where the 
majority of coercive measures suggested by academics would lie.  
                                                          
20 Security Council Resolution 2272 SC Res S/Res/2272 (2016).  
21 For example Kent, above n 1, at 90; C Leck “International Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Command and Control Arrangements and the Attribution of Conduct” (2009) Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 346 at 356. 
22 General Assembly United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel GA Res A/RES/62/214 (2008) 
[Zeid Report] at [82]. 
23 At [80]. 
24 Report of the Secretary-General Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse GA 
A/67/766 (2013) at [25]; Report of the Secretary-General Special Measures for Protection from Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse GA A/68/756 (2014) at [33]. 
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(A) ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
Some authors25 have suggested the more serious measure of trade or other economic 
sanctions. Scholars such as Alexander Harrington argue that the threat of sanctions would 
be difficult for TCCs to ignore and help compel states to prosecute those responsible for 
sexual exploitation and abuse to the full extent of their domestic criminal law.26 The General 
Assembly may recommend economic sanctions, and it is also within the power of the 
Security Council to impose them.27 It is certainly not within the powers of the Secretary-
General.28 Furthermore, such measures are typically only implemented as a response to a 
breach or threat to international peace and security.29  While the interpretation of whether 
an act (or omission) is a breach or threat to international peace and security has been broadly 
defined, it is unlikely that sexual exploitation or abuse by peacekeepers would qualify. 
Additionally, economic sanctions may have detrimental consequences for the TCCs, many 
of which are developing states. Moreover, there is no previous practice to suggest that the 
Security Council would impose sanctions for non-compliance by states. Therefore, I argue 
that imposing economic sanctions on troop-contributing countries for failing to exercise 
their criminal jurisdiction in relation for sexual exploitation and abuse is an unlikely option. 
(B) CESSATION, REPARATION, ASSURANCES AND GUARANTEES OF NON-
REPETITION 
According to the principles of state responsibility and the responsibility of IOs, one response 
to a state’s wrongful act would be for the UN to demand cessation and non-repetition.30 
                                                          
25 For example see Defeis, above n 1 and Harrington, above n 1.  
26 Harrington, above n 1, at 147-148.  
27 See Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII. 
28  Or the Under Secretary-General which officially heads UN Peacekeeping Operations see Charter of the 
United Nations, arts 97-101. 
29 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII. 
30 ARSIWA, art 28-31; ARIO, arts 29-31. 
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Cessation implies that a state is doing something in breach of its international obligations 
rather than omitting to fulfil its obligations. Therefore, requiring the TCC to stop failing to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction will not suffice. On the other hand, states are also under an 
obligation to provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. Here it is arguable that 
states would need to assure that they will in future exercise criminal jurisdiction.  
Additionally, the troop-contributing country would be under an obligation to make 
reparations. Reparations cannot be used to punish the state for the wrongful act; rather it is 
for mitigating or mending the damage done by the wrongful act (whether physical or moral 
damage).31 There are three forms of reparations;32 firstly, restitution requires states to “re-
establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act”; secondly, compensation for 
the damage caused by the wrongful act which is not covered by restitution; thirdly, 
satisfaction. 
 The most relevant form of reparation for an omission such as the failure to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over peacekeepers who had committed sexual exploitation or abuse would be 
that of satisfaction. Restoring the situation before the wrongful act (restitution) would not 
address the issue of failure to exercise criminal jurisdiction. Moreover, compensation is for 
damage caused that is financially assessable. As the damage caused to the host state, or even 
the UN, is one of purely moral or political reputation, it is not necessarily financially 
assessable. Satisfaction is about acknowledging the breach and expressing regret, and this 
may be achieved through an apology.33 Therefore, satisfaction would be the best option of 
reparation; the TCC would be required to acknowledge the breach and issue a formal 
apology.34 In light of the three principles that underlie this thesis, acknowledgement of the 
                                                          
31 J Klabbers International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) at 131.  
32 See ARSIWA, art 34-37; ARIO, arts 34-37.  
33 ARSIWA, art 37(2). 
34 Reparations to individual victims and their communities will be discussed in Chapter Nine.  
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breach and a formal apology may not result in “justice being seen to be done”. However, 
these acts may have some element of engagement with the host state, as it would arguably 
receive an apology for failing to exercise criminal jurisdiction over sexual exploitation and 
abuse committed against a national. By directing this outcome, the United Nations would be 
illustrating strong leadership in responding to sexual exploitation and abuse.  
The above options fall short of the more ambitious measures contemplated by academics 
and found in official UN reports. However, it is still possible that sanctions may be used “to 
enforce cessation of the breach and reparation of the beneficiaries of the obligation”.35 
Naming and shaming the TCC may be an example here.  
(C) COUNTERMEASURES 
Under the principles of state responsibility and the responsibility of IOs, countermeasures 
are restricted to “lawful measures”.36 They must be used in order to induce the state to 
provide reparation for injury caused by the internally wrongful act (cessation, reparation, or 
non-repetition).37 Furthermore, countermeasures must be proportionate to the gravity of the 
internationally wrongful act.38  According to ARSIWA/ARIO there are certain steps that 
must be taken before countermeasures may be taken; for example, the state or IO must:39 
(a) call on the responsible state, in accordance with article 43, to fulfil its 
obligations under part two; 
(b) notify the responsible state of any decision to take countermeasures and 
offer to negotiate with that state. 
                                                          
35 ARIO, art 57. 
36 ARSIWA, art 54; ARIO, art 57. 
37 ARSIWA, art 49. 
38 ARSIWA, art 51. 
39 ARSIWA, art 53(1)(a) and(b).  
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Countermeasures will not be available if the dispute is pending before a “tribunal which has 
the authority to make decisions binding on the parties”.40 This would apply if the dispute 
resolution mechanism under the Memorandum of Understanding was initiated or pending.41 
If countermeasures are taken without fulfilling the above requirements then they themselves 
will be an internationally wrongful act.42 
The tougher measures suggested by academics must be used to induce compliance rather 
than punish the state for non-compliance. The coercive nature of blacklisting states and 
removing contingents could be argued to be punitive. Countermeasures must also be 
proportionate, which might also be problematic in terms of some of the measures suggested. 
For example, a withdrawal of an entire contingent in response to the TCC’s failure to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over one of its members may be seen as not proportionate. 
This could arguably be the same for blacklisting TCCs. However, evidence of continued 
lack of prosecution of a number of members of a contingent may then change the nature of 
the breach enough to make the countermeasure “proportionate”.  
Nevertheless, the appropriate measures to be taken by the UN may depend on the particular 
circumstances surrounding the TCC’s failure to exercise criminal jurisdiction over sexual 
exploitation and abuse by its contingent members. For example, the withdrawal of an entire 
contingent as a countermeasure to a single occasion where the TCC does not refer the case 
to the appropriate national authority may not be “proportionate”. In such instances, perhaps 
“naming and shaming” would be a more proportionate measure. Perhaps, the withdrawal of 
troops and blacklisting options are more appropriate for the continuous failure to exercise 
                                                          
40 ARSIWA, art 53(3)(b).  
41 Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned 
Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual) GA 
A/c.5/66/8 (2011) ch. 9 Memorandum of Understanding  [2007 MOU] art 13.  
42 N White and A Abass “Countermeasures and Sanctions” in M Evans (ed) International Law (4th ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) 531 at 534. 
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criminal jurisdiction. Determination of such a “magic number” may in itself be problematic, 
as to a single victim of sexual exploitation who has yet to see justice been done waiting until 
there is a pattern of TCC failure to hold offenders to account before coercive UN action in 
terms of countermeasures would seem superfluous. Although withdrawing troops or 
blacklisting states achieves the removal of perpetrators from the host state community, there 
is no guarantee that the individual offender will be brought to justice. Additionally, host 
states are unlikely to have any ownership in such decisions. Again, the only principle that is 
fulfilled here is UN leadership. In regards to naming and shaming states, this would again 
only fulfil the third principle of UN leadership, however if the naming and shaming led to 
future improvement in investigation and prosecution of offenders by TCCs, then eventually 
justice will be seen to be done. However, for individual victims, again, such a “waiting 
game” may seem superfluous and perhaps be psychologically and emotionally harmful. 
(D) POLITICAL STRATEGIES 
As withdrawing contingents and blacklisting states are arguably too punitive for 
countermeasures, they may instead be employed as part of political strategies. This exposes 
the weakness of the law on state responsibility and the responsibility of international 
organisations. Although state obligations are arguably breached, the potential measures that 
are most embraced by academics and UN officials (withdrawal and blacklisting states)43 
would not fall within the legal boundaries. Moreover, if framed as “political strategies” these 
measures could be undertaken without strict evidence that an obligation has been breached. 
As the law on state responsibility and the responsibility of IOs is still evolving (particularly 
regarding evoking responsibility and countermeasures), it is unclear whether the imposition 
of such measures would be legally sanctioned or within the power of the UN and its organs 
                                                          




to implement without state responsibility ever coming into question. Due to this legal 
ambiguity, in practice state responsibility may not be needed at all as long as it is generally 
accepted (perhaps even only politically) that it is within the power of the UN to implement 
such measures.  
(E) “WHO” WILL ENFORCE SUCH MEASURES AGAINST CONTRIBUTING 
COUNTRIES? 
The issue as to “who” in the United Nations would implement measures against troop-
contributing countries highlights the difference between what is legally possible and the 
political reality. Although it is arguable that it is within the powers of the Secretary-General 
to order the withdrawal of contingents from peacekeeping missions, depending on the 
circumstances it would perhaps be more appropriate for the Security Council to do so. 
However, in terms of “naming and shaming” it appears from the 2013 report that the 
Secretary-General believes it is within their general powers to do so.44 Moreover, recent 
statements made by the Secretary-General reveal that he believes it is also within his powers 
to withdraw entire contingents.45 As noted in Chapter Three, the Secretary-General did 
remove an entire contingent in 2005, not for sexual exploitation, but for serious financial 
misconduct.46 It is unclear whether the UN requested the troop-contributing country in that 
instance to withdraw troops or whether withdrawal was ordered. It should be noted that the 
sources are contradictory on this issue.47 
                                                          
44 Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (2013), above n 24, at [25]. 
45 The Future of Peace Operations, above n 17 at [120]. 
46 In 2005 the Secretary-General had a contingent from Ukraine removed from  UNIFIL for serious financial 
misconduct see Murphy, above n 1, at 303; Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services GA A/60/364 (2005) at [25]-[26]; “Scandal hits Ukrainian UN Troops” BBC News 
(3 September 2005) http://news.bbc.co.uk; see also Secretary-General Kofi Annan Letter dated 13 April 2006 
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2006/245 (2006). 
47 The Secretary-General’s letter was silent on whether withdrawal was ordered or requested, see Letter dated 
13 April 2006 above n 46; Murphy simply states that the UN “announced” the replacement of troops, see 
183 
 
In terms of the Memorandum of Understanding, it is signed by the Under Secretary-General 
in the Department of Field Support for Peacekeeping Operations.48 This seems to suggest 
that the signing of individual agreements between TCCs and the UN for particular missions 
is delegated to the Under Secretary-General as part of an administrative procedure. As such, 
it would be within the powers of the Under Secretary-General, or the Secretary-General 
proper, to terminate the MOU or otherwise order the withdrawal of the relevant contingent. 
However, if withdrawal of contingents would mean the removal of a greater part of the entire 
peacekeeping force in the mission itself it would be difficult to argue that the Secretary-
General could independently order the withdrawal without Security Council approval. The 
removal of a great number of peacekeeping personnel may have a detrimental impact on the 
mission itself signifying a political crisis as well as an administrative one. It would be 
difficult to imagine the Security Council not intervening in such decisions. Therefore, the 
Security Council would possibly be the organ of the UN to implement the more coercive 
measures against non-compliant troop-contributing countries or at least be formally 
consulted on such matters. 
Security Council Resolution 2272, which authorises the Secretary-General to remove entire 
contingents where there is a pattern of sexual exploitation and abuse, does not attach these 
measures to a failure to discharge any specific obligation under international law. Instead, 
the Resolution links these measures to “the primary responsibility of troop-contributing 
countries to investigate allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by their personnel and 
of troop- and police-contributing countries to hold accountable, including through 
prosecution, where appropriate, their personnel for acts of sexual exploitation and 
                                                          
Murphy, above n 1, at 303; the media item however says that the UN “told” the Ukrainian government to 
withdraw their troops, see “Scandal hits Ukrainian UN Troops” above n 46. 
48 See 2007 MOU, last page. 
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abuse…”49  Firstly, the Resolution supports the argument that the Security Council is the 
organ of the UN which should endorse and authorise coercive measures against non-
compliant states. Secondly, the provisions themselves are broad enough to interpret a single 
omission to respond to sexual exploitation and abuse as enough to authorise the Secretary-
General to remove entire contingents. If this interpretation is correct, then the effect of this 
Resolution is to recognise the gravity of harm caused to a single victim and this is significant 
for the overall recognition of the seriousness of violence against women on the international 
stage. It remains to be seen whether the Resolution will be utilised in such a way. 
CONCLUSION 
The sanctions suggested by academics include economic sanctions, withdrawal of troops, 
blacklisting TCCs, and naming and shaming non-compliant states. Economic sanctions are 
unlikely to be implemented. While withdrawing troops and blacklisting states may be 
considered too “punitive” to be lawful countermeasures, they may still be used as part of a 
political strategy against troop-contributing countries. The Secretary-General appears to be 
favouring naming and shaming non-complying TCCs. The Security Council has favoured 
coercive measures. In light of the three underlying principles of this thesis, this conclusion 
is unsatisfactory. Although withdrawing troops and blacklisting states achieves the 
immediate removal of perpetrators from the host state community, there is no assurance that 
the offender will be brought to justice. Additionally, it is unlikely that the host state would 
have any ownership in such decisions. Nevertheless, the removal of troops, blacklisting of 
states and naming and shaming TCCs which fail to exercise criminal jurisdiction is a show 
of strong UN leadership in responding to sexual exploitation and abuse. 
                                                          
49 Security Council Resolution 2272 SC Res S/Res/2272 (2016). 
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CONCLUSION TO PART TWO   
Troop-contributing countries have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
members of their military contingents. Under the Model Memorandum of Understanding 
between the United Nations and TCCs these states make assurances that they will “exercise 
criminal jurisdiction”. In the event that contributing countries do not fulfil these assurances 
in relation to acts of sexual exploitation and abuse some academics have suggested that the 
UN should sanction those TCCs.50 Suggested sanctions include coercive measures, such as 
economic sanctions, removing contingents and blacklisting non-compliant states, and non-
coercive measures such as “naming and shaming”. Part Two has explored whether there are 
obligations on TCCs to criminalise, investigate, prosecute and punish sexual exploitation 
and abuse. The following summarises the primary conclusions that can be drawn from this 
Part. 
(A) FAILURE TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE APPROPRIATE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES 
UNDER THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING  
As this thesis has taken the position that the Memorandum of Understanding is a treaty and 
that its provisions are binding on troop-contributing states, states are therefore obligated 
under the MOU to “exercise criminal jurisdiction” over crimes committed by members of 
their national contingents. However, the “exercise of criminal jurisdiction” requires the 
troop-contributing country to merely submit the case to the appropriate national authorities.  
If the appropriate national authorities fail to investigate or prosecute then this will not be a 
breach of the MOU. 
                                                          
50 See Deen-Racsmary above n 1; Defeis above n 1; Harrington above n 1; Kent above n 1; Murphy, above n 
1; Odello, above n 1. 
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A failure to at least submit a case to the appropriate national authorities will however be a 
“material breach” of the MOU. There are certain consequences for such a breach under 
treaty law. For instance, the TCC and the UN would have to engage with a dispute resolution 
process. If a resolution is not found then the UN may be entitled to terminate the treaty. Both 
processes rely on the will of TCCs to actively engage with the dispute resolution process. In 
regards to the underlying principles of this thesis, a termination of the treaty would result in 
the removal of contingents and although such a move would signify UN leadership, it does 
not follow that justice will be seen to be done, and the host state is not involved. 
(B) FAILURE TO CRIMINALISE, INVESTIGATE, PROSECUTE AND PUNISH TORTURE, 
OR CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT, SEXUAL ACTIVITY WITH 
CHILDREN AND “SERIOUS” FORMS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
The “due diligence” standard under international human rights law goes further than what 
is required under the Memorandum of Understanding, at least conceptually. Potentially, 
troop-contributing countries are obligated under certain treaties (for example ICCPR, 
ICESCR, CRC, and CEDAW) to not only hand the case over to the appropriate authorities 
but to investigate, prosecute and punish violators. This is the case for certain forms of sexual 
abuse and exploitation; including torture, or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, sexual 
activity with children, rape, and sexual violence. Moreover, states are required to have these 
particular acts criminalised. If a state fails to exercise criminal jurisdiction at any one of 
these stages – criminalisation, investigation, prosecution, punishment – then the troop-
contributing country would be in breach. However, the due diligence standard is still unclear 
in its meaning and scope, and possibility limited by state sovereignty and state practice (such 
as prosecutorial discretion). Hence, the obligation on states may be limited to submitting the 
case to relevant national authorities and if investigated, then this would be regarded as acting 
in good faith. A breach of this obligation would be considered an internationally wrongful 
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act and thus the principles of state responsibility will apply. As a result, the UN may be 
entitled to use countermeasures. There will also be consequences for states under the 
relevant human rights treaty.  
(C) IDENTIFIABLE GAP: THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF SURVIVAL SEX  
Under the international human rights treaties, there are certain forms of violence against 
women that do not require criminal sanction, at least not in domestic criminal law. Rape, 
sexual violence and similarly “serious” forms of sexual abuse do require criminalisation 
under various human rights treaties. However, the most relevant forms of violence against 
women in the peacekeeping context, notably “survival sex”, are seemingly not considered 
“serious” enough to warrant the same treatment. In sum, there are no obligations under 
human rights law on troop-contributing countries to criminalise, investigate or prosecute 
these “lesser” forms of sexual exploitation. Therefore, sanctions for failing to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over this kind of conduct would have to rely on a breach of the 
Memorandum of Understanding alone. Unfortunately, if no investigation or prosecution 
eventuates after that step has been taken then there will be no “internationally wrongful act” 
upon which sanctions could be based. 
(D) COERCIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY ARE 
UNLIKELY 
Economic sanctions are unlikely to be implemented because sexual exploitation committed 
by peacekeepers is unlikely to be considered a threat to international peace and security, and 
sanctions themselves would have detrimental consequences for TCCs, many of which are 
developing states. Removing contingents and preventing states from contributing are fairly 
coercive steps that interfere with the voluntary rights of member states to contribute to 
peacekeeping operations. Therefore, according to the law of state responsibility and the 
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responsibility of international organisations, governing the use of countermeasures, such 
coercive measures may not be considered “proportional” to a single occasion of a failure to 
investigate or prosecute. Moreover, they may also be regarded as punitive in nature.  
(E) POLITICAL STRATEGIES TO EMPLOY – ONLY SERVE A PARTIAL RESPONSE 
Although states are obligated under various areas of international law to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction, the coercive measures suggested by academics and UN officials (withdrawing 
troops and blacklisting states) fall outside legally endorsed activities (within 
countermeasures). Such measures may instead be framed as “political strategies” and may 
be the most likely direction that the UN takes in response to continued failures by troop-
contributing states to exercise criminal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Security Council has 
endorsed and authorised the use of coercive measures in Resolution 2272. 
The UN could also “name and shame” non-compliant states. Such a list of non-compliant 
states could be included in the Secretary-General’s annual report on sexual exploitation and 
abuse in peacekeeping. Indeed, this is what the Secretary-General himself has proposed. 
However, these political strategies only serve as a partial response to the problem. The top-
down approach of measures against troop-contributing states does not reflect the three 
conceptual principles outlined at the beginning of this thesis; they do not achieve justice 
being seen to be done and do not involve host state ownership. Victims are not mentioned 
in the Model MOUS, highlighting the silence of those perspectives, and there is an 
identifiable gap in state obligations regarding survival sex. 
Therefore, other avenues of responding to sexual exploitation by military contingent 
members need to be explored. Part Three continues this exploration by examining other 
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avenues for prosecuting offenders, namely host state jurisdiction and the International 
Criminal Court.  
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PART THREE: ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO PROSECUTE: DESIRABLE YET 
UNSATISFACTORY OPTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE 
The overall purpose of this thesis to explore different ways the United Nations can improve 
accountability in response to military contingent members who commit sexual exploitation and 
abuse. Part Three explores the second broad category of suggestions to improve accountability; 
alternative ways to investigate and prosecute offenders.  
Part Three looks at two desirable options for improving accountability - host state jurisdiction 
and the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, for different reasons these options are 
also unsatisfactory. Chapter Six considers host state jurisdiction, a venue for accountability 
which reflects the key principles I identified in Part One (justice being seen to be done, host 
state ownership, and UN leadership). Nevertheless, there are certain limitations that will be 
discussed which make host state jurisdiction unsatisfactory. 
Chapter Seven will examine the International Criminal Court. Despite some pragmatic 
advantages, I also conclude that the ICC is unsatisfactory. The jurisdiction of the Court is 
hindered by its scope (limited to international crimes), the complementarity principle and the 
Prosecutor’s discretion. Moreover, prosecution by the ICC does not fulfil any of the three 
principles underlying this thesis.  
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CHAPTER SIX: HOST STATE JURISDICTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the troop-contributing country (TCC) has arguably led to 
an accountability gap, alternative ways to hold military contingent members who commit 
sexual exploitation and abuse to account should be explored. One such alternative is host state 
jurisdiction.  In this chapter I will first briefly summarise how jurisdiction is approached under 
the current system. Secondly, I will explore the different ways in which host state jurisdiction 
may be achieved, for example, the Group of Legal Experts’ proposed convention-based system. 
This chapter will summarise the reasons why some commentators have proposed host state 
jurisdiction as an alternative accountability mechanism, and also explore the possible 
disadvantages of such jurisdiction.  
In light of the three principles identified in Part One of this thesis, host state jurisdiction clearly 
fulfils two of these. If trials are held within the victim’s community, justice is seen to be done, 
and the host state has some ownership over that process. If host state jurisdiction is achieved 
through processes that foster cooperation between host states, troop-contributing countries and 
the UN, then the UN will have some leadership in responding to sexual exploitation and abuse 
as well. If the goal is to improve accountability mechanisms, being guided by these three 
principles, then host state jurisdiction is desirable. However, I will conclude that although host 
state jurisdiction and cooperation between the UN, host states and troop-contributing states 
may be achieved through agreements or a treaty guaranteeing some form of host state 
jurisdiction, it may be more beneficial to explore alternative structural measures, such as 




(1) JURISDICTION – STATUS QUO 
Under the Model Sates-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA), the troop-contributing country has 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over their national military personnel.1  Therefore, although 
members of national contingents are expected to respect local laws and customs, the host state 
waives its territorial jurisdiction under the SOFA.2 In regard to other categories of personnel, 
such as UN officials and experts on mission, functional immunity is granted under various 
international instruments.3 Such immunities are limited to acts committed during official 
duties; criminal offences (including acts of sexual exploitation and abuse) committed outside 
official capacity would potentially be subject to host state jurisdiction.4 However, if the host 
state judicial system is unstable (for example, due to ongoing conflict, physical destruction or 
corruption) it may not be appropriate for the host state to exercise such jurisdiction and 
therefore it will likely still be waived under the SOFA.5 
(2) HOST STATE JURISDICTION 
In light of the mass reports of sexual exploitation and abuse allegations during the early 2000s, 
the UN commissioned a Group of Legal Experts to explore options for increased accountability 
of its staff and experts on mission (as well as other personnel).6 The Group argued that host 
state jurisdiction should be prioritised when responding to crimes committed by peacekeeping 
                                                          
1 The agreement between the UN and the host state Model Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations 
and Host Countries GA A/45/594 (1990)  [Model SOFA] at art 47(b). 
2 Model SOFA, above n 1, at art 6. A more detailed discussion of the Model SOFA and exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction is included in Chapter Three of this thesis.  
3 Charter of the United Nations, art 105; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1 
UNTS 15 (Opened for signature13 February 1946, entered into force 17 September 1946) art VI (22)(b). 
4 Report of the Group of Legal Experts on Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on 
Mission with Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations GA A/60/980 (2006) [Group of 
Legal Experts Report] at [21]. 
5 At [22]. 
6 Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 4; See also Secretary-General A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate 
Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations GA A/59/710 (2005). 
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personnel within host state territory.7 To prioritise host state jurisdiction was to acknowledge 
the principle of territorial jurisdiction,8 to follow through with the obligation on peacekeeping 
personnel to respect local laws and customs and to make sure victims would see justice being 
done.9  
Host state jurisdiction realises two of the principles underlying this thesis. With trials being 
held within the victim’s community, justice is seen to be done, and the host state may have 
ownership over that process. If host state jurisdiction can be achieved through intervention of 
the UN, by implementing a system of cooperation between the host state, TCC and the UN, 
then the organisation will have proven leadership in responding to sexual exploitation and 
abuse. If the goal is to improve accountability mechanisms, using these three principles as a 
guide, then host state jurisdiction is desirable. However, as will be seen below, host state 
jurisdiction may not always be possible.  
The Group of Legal Experts in 2006 drafted a preliminary convention as a starting point for 
discussion among member states (the draft is still being considered by member states, and is 
yet to be adopted).10 The Draft Convention on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission (Draft Convention) does not consider the accountability of 
military contingent members.11 However, it is useful to examine in regard to jurisdictional 
issues and how the Group of Legal Experts envisioned a combined effort between the host state 
and troop-contributing countries to hold offenders to account. Article 4 of the Draft Convention 
covers the establishment of jurisdiction. Establishing jurisdiction based on territory (crime 
                                                          
7 Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 4, at [27]. 
8 Where the crime takes place within the territory then that state has jurisdiction over that criminal act. 
9 Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 4, at [27(a)]-[27(d)]. 
10 At [47]; Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission GA Res A/Res/69/114 
(2014).  
11 “Draft Convention on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission” Report 
of the Group of Legal Experts on Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on Mission 




committed within state territory) and nationality (offender as a national of that state) is 
mandatory under art 4(1). Article 4(2) provides that states may also establish jurisdiction based 
on passive personality (victim is a national) or over a stateless person within their territory. 
Article 4 would make concurrent jurisdiction possible; two states having jurisdiction operating 
at the same time over a particular offence. The Draft Convention does not attempt to resolve 
concurrent jurisdiction by prescribing primary or secondary jurisdiction, however it does 
include an “extradite or prosecute” provision. 
Article 4(4) of the Draft Convention provides that: 
Each State party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the crimes set out in article 3 in cases where the 
alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite such person 
pursuant to article 8 to any of the States parties which have established their 
jurisdiction in accordance with paragraphs 1 or 2 of the present article. 
Together with art 7, this provision requires states parties to either exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over the accused or extradite that person to a state which also has jurisdiction to do so. It also 
provides universal jurisdiction if states parties chose to establish such jurisdiction over crimes 
included in the Draft Convention.12 Articles 10 and 16 envision mutual legal assistance 
between states parties during the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. There is no obligation to 
prosecute unless double criminality exists (where the conduct is deemed a crime in both the 
host state and TCC domestic criminal law).13  
                                                          
12 Such crimes include conduct related to sexual exploitation and abuse, see Draft Convention, above n 11, art 3; 
see also M O’Brien “Issues of the Draft Convention on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials 
and Experts on Mission” in N Quenivet and S Shah-Davis (eds) International Law and Armed Conflict: 
Challenges in the 21st Century (YMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2010) 57, at 72. 
13 Draft Convention, above n 11, art 9; R S Clark “Peacekeeping Forces, Jurisdiction and Immunity: A Tribute to 
George Barton” (2012) 43 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 77 at 95. 
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The Draft Convention seems to encourage states to modify their criminal law to incorporate 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the prescribed crimes.14 Moreover, the Draft Convention 
supports the mutual cooperation between states to hold perpetrators to account in terms of 
whichever state exercises their criminal jurisdiction. This mutual cooperation between states 
has been highlighted many times by state representatives during General Assembly discussions 
on the Draft itself.15 Overall, the Draft Convention is the Group of Legal Experts’ attempt at 
prioritising host state jurisdiction and promoting cooperation among states parties. If the Draft 
is adopted at some point in the future, it could prove a useful alternative to TCC exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction (if military contingent members were also included within its scope, which 
has not been suggested so far). However, arguably the Draft does not provide an adequate 
structure to incorporate host state jurisdiction as much of its application is dependent on 
whether sexual exploitation and abuse is a crime in either or both of the host state and the TCC 
and whether extradition treaties exist between such states. Therefore, there will likely be a gap 
where sexual exploitation is concerned, as survival sex is unlikely to be deemed a crime. 
Moreover, where concurrent jurisdiction exists, the Draft Convention does not address whether 
the host state will have primary or secondary jurisdiction. Such concurrent jurisdictional 
agreements have been embraced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) under their 
SOFAs. 
Outside the context of UN peacekeeping, concurrent jurisdiction agreements (where 
jurisdiction is shared between the sending and receiving states) are common for foreign military 
forces operating abroad.16 Although something to be negotiated between parties, the default in 
                                                          
14 Clark, above n 13, at 96.  
15 See for example, General Assembly Summary record of the 6th Meeting GA/C.6/62/SR.6 (2007); General 
Assembly Summary Record of the 5th Meeting GA A/C.6/63/SR.5 (2008); General Assembly, Summary Record 
of the 7th Meeting GA A/C.6/64/SR.7 (2009). 
16 P J Conderman “Jurisdiction” in D Fleck (ed) The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2001) 99; A P V Rogers “Operational Context” in D Fleck (ed) The Handbook of the Law of 
Visiting Forces (Oxford University Press, New York, 2001) 533.  
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such agreements is to prioritise the primary jurisdiction of the host state (where offences are 
committed outside the performance of official duties).17 Such offences would include crimes 
of a sexual nature. Concurrent jurisdiction agreements are used to reconcile the two principles 
of jurisdiction that operate at the same time; the host/receiving state has territorial jurisdiction 
(as the crime is committed within their territory) and the sending state has the right to exercise 
jurisdiction over their own national personnel.18 Such concurrent jurisdiction agreements have 
been suggested19 as an alternative arrangement for including the host state in responding to 
crimes committed by military contingent members in the context of UN peacekeeping 
operations. 
The NATO-SOFA recognises the primary jurisdiction of the host state in certain circumstances 
and incorporates concurrent jurisdiction.20 Article VII of the NATO-SOFA provides that where 
an offence is committed outside the performance of official duties, and/or is committed against 
a national, and is covered by the laws of both sending and receiving states, the receiving state 
has primary jurisdiction.21 The sending state has secondary jurisdiction which will operate 
where the host state has waived its jurisdiction or has been unwilling or unable to exercise it.22 
Members of both parties are expected to cooperate with each other on the arrest and 
investigation of military personnel.23 Moreover, if trial can be brought by the host/receiving 
state then the rights of the accused for a fair trial must be substantively guaranteed.24 
                                                          
17 Rogers, above n 16, at 550.  
18 Conderman, above n 16, at 103.  
19 See for example, M Du Plessis and S Pete “Who Guards the Guards?” (2010) 13 African Security Review 4 at 
6. 
20 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the 
Status of Their Forces (entered into force 19 June 1951): [NATO-SOFA]. See generally E G Schuck “Concurrent 
Jurisdiction under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement” 57 Columbia Law Review 355; J H Rouse and G B 
Baldwin “The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement” (1957) The 
American Journal of International Law 29. 
21 NATO-SOFA, art VII (3)(b). 
22 At art VII (3)(c).  
23 At art VII (6). 
24 At art VII (9).  
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Despite the NATO-SOFA, supplementary agreements are often sought by NATO members to 
waive the primary jurisdiction of the receiving state and/or establish exclusive jurisdiction of 
the sending state.25 The United States is an example of a NATO member which regularly seeks 
such agreements.26 Moreover, in modern practice, NATO has opted for exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction for sending states in SOFAs, but maintains mutual investigatory assistance 
clauses.27 Therefore, the NATO agreements do not often follow through on the host state 
jurisdiction provisions.  
The NATO-SOFA and its concurrent jurisdiction arrangements can also be distinguished from 
UN peacekeeping operations. NATO-SOFAs are reciprocal agreements, governing the 
permanent stationing of allied forces, thus the receiving state will often be granted similar 
immunities.28 This is quite different to UN peacekeeping military contingent members who 
operate independently from host state forces on a temporary basis and often on rotation.29 
Therefore, it may not be appropriate to directly compare the two status-of-forces agreements 
as they serve slightly different purposes. However, the NATO-SOFA does illustrate that 
prioritising host state jurisdiction in regard to responding to criminal activity can be achieved 
via international agreements.  
After the Group of Legal Experts’ Report, academics discussed whether the host state should 
have primary or secondary jurisdiction over foreign military troops in the context of UN 
                                                          
25 The United States policy is to require such agreements before military forces are sent see Conderman, above n 
16, at 112. 
26 See International Security Advisory Board Report on Status of Forces Agreements (United States Department 
of States, 2015) at 16-19. 
27 Particularly where governance on the host/receiving state is in question see for example North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisations and the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan on the Status of NATO-led activities in Afghanistan (entered into force 30 September 2014) at art 11. 
Such arrangements are often criticised by human rights NGOs see for example Amnesty International 
“Afghanistan: No Justice for Thousands of Civilians Killed in US/NATO Operations” (news release, 11 August 
2014). 
28 R Burke “Status of Forces Deployed on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Jurisdictional Immunity” (2011) 16 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law 63 at 77. 
29 At 77-78. 
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peacekeeping.30 Some academics consider host state jurisdiction advantageous for practical 
reasons, such as the proximity to the victim/s and witnesses, and evidence, and the principled 
reason that victims will see justice being done.31 However, there are certain challenges 
associated with host state jurisdiction. An example of a particular challenge is securing custody 
of peacekeeping personnel who may have been redeployed or otherwise outside the host state 
territory.32  Additionally, host states may not be in a position to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
due to ongoing conflict or post-conflict, for example, the legal infrastructure may be weakened 
by political corruption or physically destroyed.33 Moreover, any legal system still functioning 
may well not have the human rights guarantees and procedures in place to deliver due process.34  
The Group of Legal Experts noted that “jurisdiction is not an indivisible concept”.35 To exercise 
criminal jurisdiction involved different components, such as arrest, investigation, prosecution, 
and sentence.36 Therefore, the host state may well be able to carry out some of these steps 
regardless of a weakened judicial infrastructure. The importance of mutual legal assistance and 
cooperation between the host state, UN and TCC investigatory teams was highlighted as a way 
to bridge the gap caused by a compromised criminal justice system.37  
Additionally, a 2009 Stimson Center Report, Improving Criminal Accountability in United 
Nations Peace Operations, argued that host state (secondary) jurisdiction should be supported 
                                                          
30 See for example K J Allred “Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for 
Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It” (2006) 33 Armed Forces & Society 5; Clark above n13; A J 
Miller “Legal Aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations” (2006) 39 
Cornell International Law Journal 71; M Ndulo “The United Nations Response to the Sexual Abuse and 
Exploitation of Women and Girls by Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions” (2009) 27 Berkeley Journal 
of International Law 127; M Odello “Tackling Criminal Acts in Peacekeeping Operations: The Accountability of 
Peacekeepers” (2010) 15 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 347.  
31 Ndulo, above n 30, at 153; Odello, above n 30, at 374.  
32 Ndulo, above n 30, at 153.  
33 At 155. 
34 Allred, above n 30, at 18; Miller, above n 30, at 92; Ndulo, above n 30, at 155.  
35 Group of Legal Experts, above n 4, at [40].  
36 At [41]-[42] see also Clark, above n 13, at 93-96. 
37 Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 4, at [40]. 
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by the UN.38 In response to criminal conduct committed by UN peacekeepers, the Stimson 
Center Report made recommendations aimed at improving accountability. Similar to the Group 
of Legal Experts, the Stimson Center Report limited its research to non-military personnel.39 
Additionally, the Report recommended that primary jurisdiction should remain with troop-
contributing countries and the host state having secondary jurisdiction in circumstances where 
the TCC does not have extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crime in question (unable to 
investigate or prosecute) or does not agree to prosecute (unwilling).40 However, unlike the 
Group of Legal Experts, the Stimson Center Report recommended that host state jurisdiction 
should be assisted by a UN organ specifically created to support host state judicial systems 
(“Justice Support Division”).41 Such logistical support would be in addition to a roster of 
international expertise available to fill any gaps in the host state system.42 A support mechanism 
centralised in the UN would help in circumstances where the host state’s domestic judicial 
infrastructure is weakened due to ongoing conflict or post-conflict, and provide clear UN 
leadership. Nevertheless, the Stimson Center Report’s proposals are dependent on whether 
sexual exploitation and abuse are crimes in the domestic law of either the TCC or the host state. 
Moreover, unlike the Draft Convention, it has yet to be to be tabled or discussed at the UN.  
The Group of Legal Experts’ Draft Convention suggest a system of cooperation between the 
UN, host state and TCC whilst prioritising host state jurisdiction, but it does not offer a formal 
structure.43 Instead, ad hoc arrangements are recommended.44 The Stimson Center Report goes 
                                                          
38 W J Durch, K N Andrews, M L England and M C Weed Improving Criminal Accountability in United Nations 
Peace Operations (STIMSON Center Report, Washington, 2009): [Stimson Center Report]. The Stimson Center 
is a non-profit organisation based in the United States which periodically publishes reports aimed at improving 
international peace and security. 
39 At xi. 
40 At xiii. 
41 At xvi.  
42 At xvi.  
43 Although hybrid courts are mentioned and recommended to be “considered” without further developing this 
idea see Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 4, at [33]-[37] and [44c]. 
44 At [44b]; See also generally Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission (2014), 
above n 10.  
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a step further and suggests host state jurisdiction supported by a centralised UN organ 
especially created for the purpose of filling gaps in expertise and logistical assistance to the 
host state’s juridical system.45 However, I argue that a formal judicial structure may be more 
advantageous if the goal is to achieve accountability while also incorporating the jurisdiction 
of the host state and TCC (thus, I argue for a special court for peacekeepers in Chapter Eight). 
Moreover, host state jurisdiction relies on the host state’s criminal laws to cover sexual 
exploitation and abuse. It is unlikely that aspects of sexual exploitation, particularly survival 
sex, would be covered adequately in domestic criminal law of host states.  
CONCLUSION 
Although host state jurisdiction is desirable (and reflects the key principles that guide this 
thesis, particularly justice being seen to be done and host state ownership), it is not satisfactory 
without structural measures in place to facilitate it. Purely relying on host state jurisdiction may 
not be possible in practice; the host state’s legal infrastructure may be weakened or 
compromised due to conflict or post-conflict. The Group of Legal Experts’ Draft Convention, 
the NATO-SOFA and the Stimson Center Report illustrate ways in which host state jurisdiction 
can be incorporated into international agreements or supported, and as such may be achieved 
in the UN Peacekeeping context through amending both the UN Model-SOFA and the 
Memorandum of Understanding or simply adopting a version of the Draft Convention. These 
are possible alternative ways to exercise criminal jurisdiction over military contingent members 
who commit sexual exploitation and abuse. However, I argue that these options do not go far 
enough in offering a structural system in which to support cooperation between the UN, host 
states and TCCs while also incorporating host state ownership and, in some circumstances, 
host state jurisdiction. Arguably, a judicial tribunal of some kind should provide such a 
                                                          
45 Stimson Center Report, above n 38, at xvi-xv. 
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structure; for example, the International Criminal Court (discussed in Chapter Seven) or a new 




CHAPTER SEVEN: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been discussed by many commentators as a 
legitimate option for increasing the accountability of peacekeepers, particularly for crimes 
of a sexual nature.1 It has been argued that where the troop-contributing country is unwilling 
or unable to prosecute their nationals for sexual exploitation and abuse, the ICC should be 
considered.2 It has been equally argued that extending the jurisdiction of crimes currently 
listed is unlikely and that perhaps it is better to amend the Rome Statute in order to 
incorporate the prosecution of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers.3 Such a 
considerable call within the academic literature therefore requires serious consideration. In 
this chapter I will discuss these theories and put forward the major limitations to ICC 
jurisdiction. I argue that the International Criminal Court in its current form is unsuitable for 
the prosecution of peacekeepers for sexual exploitation and abuse.   
Although there are pragmatic advantages to the ICC having jurisdiction, such as the 
existence of a judicial infrastructure and agreed standards of investigation and trial, there 
                                                          
1 R Burke “UN Military Peacekeeper Complicity in Sexual Abuse: The ICC or a Tri-Hybrid Court” in M 
Bergsmo (ed) Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes (Torkel Opsahl, Beijing, 2012) 317; M Du 
Plessis and S Pete “Who Guards the Guards? The ICC and Serious Crimes Committed by United Nations 
Peacekeepers in Africa” (2004) 12 African Security Review 5;  M O’Brien “Sexual Exploitation and Beyond: 
Using the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to Prosecute UN Peacekeepers for Gender-based 
Crimes” (2011)11  International Criminal Law Review 803; N Quenivet “The Role of the International 
Criminal Court in the Prosecution on Peacekeepers for Sexual Offences” in R Arnold (ed) Law Enforcement 
within the Framework of Peace Support Operations (Konihklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008) 399; R A Vezina 
“Combating Impunity in Haiti: Why the ICC Should Prosecute Sexual Abuse by UN Peacekeepers” (2012) 1 
Ave Maria International Law Journal 431. 
2 O’Brien “Sexual Exploitation and Beyond”, above n 1, at 808; Burke, above n 1, at 320; Vezina, above n 1, 
at 447.  
3 On the problems with ICC jurisdiction see A Harrington “Victims of Peace: Current Abuse Allegations 
against UN Peacekeepers and the Role of Law in Preventing them in the Future” (2005) 12 ILSA Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 125, 140-143; see also O’Brien “Sexual Exploitation and Beyond”, above 
n 1, 826; Quenivet, above n 1, at 411. 
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are three major barriers complicit with ICC current jurisdiction and procedure that would 
mean it is unlikely the Court would prosecute peacekeepers for sexual exploitation and 
abuse. The first possible limitation is that ICC jurisdiction is currently restricted to 
international crimes. Although some authors have argued that the Rome Statute should be 
amended to include sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers,4  this is unlikely given 
the drafting history of the Rome Statute (the ICC’s constituent document). A second hurdle 
to prosecution by the ICC is the complementarity principle which portends that the Court 
shall only intervene in cases where member states are unable or unwilling to prosecute. 
Thirdly, the discretion of the ICC Prosecutor which potentially operates to limit 
admissibility based on the ranking of personnel involved and the gravity of the crime(s) 
committed will also be a major limitation to the application of the Court in cases of sexual 
exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers.  
Additionally, assessing the International Criminal Court option in light of the three 
principles identified in Part One means the ICC is unsatisfactory. It is important to note at 
the outset that the ICC does not give the UN an opportunity to show leadership. The UN has 
very little control over the work of the Court itself. Moreover, the host state is unlikely to 
have ownership over the process as the ICC is physically located in The Hague. 
Additionally, unless an effective outreach programme is employed, victims may not hear 
about cases or see justice being done. Overall, although a desirable option to improve 
accountability of military contingent members who commit sexual exploitation and abuse, 
the ICC is unlikely to actually improve accountability at all.  
 
                                                          




(1) THE CRIMES WITHIN ICC JURISDICTION   
The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is set out under Part II of the Rome 
Statute.5 The listed crimes are limited to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
the crime of aggression.6 As has been discussed in Chapter Two, gender-based crimes have 
been included under genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and these are 
described in arts 6 to 8 under the Statute.7 The inclusion of gender-based crimes is an 
important aspect of the International Criminal Court, as stated by the UN Secretary-General 
in 2005 “sexual-based violence which may have occurred before, during and after conflict 
can seriously jeopardise peacebuilding efforts during this early phase”.8 Sexual exploitation 
by UN peacekeepers can fall into this general concern. However, the ICC has been 
constructed with a narrowly defined jurisdiction that will exclude sexual exploitation by 
peacekeeping personnel.  
It was noted eariler that many forms of sexual exploitation and abuse are committed in the 
context of opportunistic situations. Although it is possible, it is nevertheless unlikely that 
sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers would fulfil the requirements of rape or 
sexual violence under the international crimes described above.9 These requirements include 
that the sexual exploitation committed be “directed towards a civilian population as a 
whole”, a “widespread and systematic attack” and/or have evidence that the abuse was part 
of an overall policy.10  However, some authors11 have argued that sexual abuse and sexual 
                                                          
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 17 July 1998, entered 
into Force 1 July 2002): [Rome Statute]. 
6 Rome Statute, art 6 (genocide), art 7 (crimes against humanity), art 8 (war crimes), art 8 bis (definition of 
crime of aggression adopted in 2010).  
7 Rome Statute arts 6(b) and (c),7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(c)(vi). 
8 United Nations World Summit Outcome GA Res A/Res/60/1 (2005).  
9 But see Burke, above n 1; Du Plessis and Pete, above n 1; O’Brien “Sexual Exploitation and Beyond”, above 
n 1. 
10 Rome Statute, art 7. 
11 O’Brien, “Sexual Exploitation and Beyond”, above n 1, 826; Quenivet, above n 1, at 411. 
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exploitation should be included in the Rome Statute, if not interpreted as crimes against 
humanity or war crimes specifically then be included as separate crimes.  
(2) A NEW CRIME OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION BY PEACEKEEPERS? 
Looking at the drafting history of the Rome Statute reveals that tightly defined crimes were 
preferred in order to gain widespread agreement across many states. Although at the 
negotiation stage some states preferred a broad range of crimes, it became apparent that in 
order to reach consensus the listed crimes would need to be clearly and narrowly defined.12 
Additionally, the agreed list represented the most serious international crimes of universal 
concern or so-called “core” crimes.13 Such a narrow window in which to introduce new 
crimes will hinder sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers being adopted into the 
Rome Statute. Nevertheless, it is possible for the Rome Statute to be amended in order to 
extend its jurisdiction or add new crimes.  
A mechanism on hand to make such changes is by agreement of the Assembly of State 
Parties (ASP) at a Review Conference on the Rome Statute, the first of which was held in 
2010.14 The ASP acts as the legislative body to the Rome Statute. Therefore, any new crime 
would need the support of these states. Proposals for new crimes are considered by the 
Working Group on Amendments (WGA).15 There have been several such proposals, 
including for terrorism and drug trafficking, but to date, none have been successful.16  
                                                          
12 B Broomhall International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule 
of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) at 76; Rome Statute, art 5.  
13 T Otto “The Object of Review Mechanisms: Statutes’ Provisions, elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence” in R Bellelli (ed) International Criminal Justice: Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to 
its Review (Ashgate, Surrey, 2010) 355 at 370. 
14 Rome Statute, art 121. 
15 Official Record of the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
ICC-ASP/8/Res.6 (2011).  
16 Proposal for the inclusion of the Crime of Terrorism in the Rome Statute ICC-ASP/10/32 Annex III (2011); 
Trinidad and Tobago and Belize ICC-ASP/10/32 Annex IV (2011) (on drug trafficking).  
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The Working Group considers new crimes with certain principles in mind in order to 
appropriately justify their inclusion in the Rome Statute alongside genocide and crimes 
against humanity.  Additional crimes proposed by states should attract universal 
condemnation.17 For example, the drug trafficking proposal has been described by some 
states as traditionally a domestic law issue.18 Although its transnational nature means that 
trafficking of narcotic drugs affects more than one state, it is not generally considered to 
have universal impact.19 This may have implications for “sexual exploitation” by 
peacekeepers as defined by the UN, which currently includes survival sex.20 Transactional 
sex may be considered a purely domestic issue.  
The “universal” aspect of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers could be supported 
by the very fact that UN peacekeepers represent the international community. The context 
in which sexual abuse occurs may also have an impact on the truly international character 
of such conduct. The position of trust and differential power present in the peacekeeper-
beneficiary of assistance dynamic adds to a potentially coercive situation of post-conflict 
territories.21 When sexual exploitation and abuse occurs, it can harm the relationship 
between the United Nations and the host state. Beyond this, sexual abuse can undermine the 
reputation of the UN in the eyes of the international community. However, the context still 
does not align with the unique characteristic associated with the current crimes listed; that 
the conduct be committed as part of a wider policy or is widespread and systematic.22 As 
Harrington argues, the primary focus of the ICC when it was created was to prosecute 
                                                          
17 Resolutions and Recommendations adopted by the Assembly of State Parties ICC-ASP/11/20 Annex II 
(2012) at [9] “In the case of a proposal for a new crime, the WGA particularly considers whether the crime 
can be characterised as one of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole 
an whether the crime is based on an existing prohibition under international law.” 
18 Report on the Working Group on Amendments ICC-ASP/10/32 (2011) at [19]. 
19 At [19].  
20 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
Abuse, UN Secretariat ST/SGB/2003/13 (9 October 2003) [S-G Bulletin (2003)] at 1. 
21 O’Brien “Sexual Exploitation and Beyond”, above n 1 at 826.  
22 Harrington, above n 3, at 143.  
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persons for political or military atrocities committed as part of a widespread and/or 
systematic attack on civilians or towards a particular group of civilians.23 Generally, it was 
not envisioned that prosecutions of crimes committed outside this context would be tried by 
the ICC.24 The current critique of the proposals for terrorism and drug trafficking supports 
this conclusion.25  
A new provision in the Rome Statute may be justified by pointing to the increased 
international attention paid to the protection of human rights during and after armed conflict. 
The importance of human rights is pointed out in the Rome Statute itself and in all 
resolutions adopted by the Assembly of State Parties.26 At the time of state negotiations the 
inclusion of gender-based crimes was evidence of progressive drafting.27 However, the 
definitions themselves had already been thoroughly discussed in both ad-hoc international 
tribunals; International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)28 and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).29 Therefore, there was sufficient legal 
support for their inclusion. The same cannot be said for sexual exploitation and abuse by 
peacekeepers. As discussed previously, not all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse are 
reflected in human rights treaties. There is no universally agreed definition.  
Any definition of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers proposed may be 
problematic. In the case of the terrorism proposal to the Working Group on Amendments, it 
was an important factor that there was no universally agreed definition of “terrorism”.30 It 
                                                          
23 At 143. 
24 At 143. 
25 Report on the Working Group on Amendments, above n 18, at [16] and [21]. 
26 Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of State Parties ICC-ASP/11/Res.8 (2012) 
at 45; Rome Statute, arts 21(3), 36(3)(b)(ii) and 69(7).  
27 S Ratner, J Abrams and J Bischoff Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond 
the Nuremberg Legacy (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) at 234. 
28 Prosecutor v Furundzija (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998. 
29 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR Trial Chamber ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998. 
30 Report on the Working Group on Amendments, above n 18, at [14].  
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has been argued by O’Brien and Quenivet that a “criminal” definition of sexual exploitation 
and abuse could be developed from the UN Secretary-General’s Special Measures for 
Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (S-G Bulletin).31 As argued in 
Chapter Two, the definition of sexual exploitation in particular under the Bulletin is 
ambiguous and highly criticised in feminist scholarship. Survival sex as a discrete notion is 
not found anywhere else in international law. This would have a dramatic impact on any 
proposed universal definition. Additionally, the S-G Bulletin is not drafted with the intention 
of being a basis for criminal prosecution but is instead a creature of policy. Again, there is 
no universally agreed definition in which to draw an international crime.  
Overall, the truly international character of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers 
may only be argued on the basis of the context in which the abuse arises. However, from 
reviewing the past assessment of proposed crimes by the WGA, sexual exploitation may be 
criticised by the Working Group as to the opportunistic nature of its occurrence. Moreover, 
the definition of sexual exploitation in its current form (in the S-G Bulletin) is problematic 
if one wanted to pull a new provision from what is already available. The lack of universal 
agreement on the definition or even criminalisation of some forms of sexual exploitation, 
such as survival sex, also poses a challenge to a new provision. If in the unlikely 
circumstance a new provision governing sexual exploitation by peacekeepers was accepted 
into the Rome Statute, ICC prosecution would nevertheless be hindered by other aspects of 
the Court’s procedure.  
 
 
                                                          
31 O’Brien “Sexual Exploitation and Beyond”, above n 1, at 826; Quenivet, above n 1, at 411. 
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(3) COMPLEMENTARITY PRINCIPLE 
The principle of complementarity is considered fundamental to the International Criminal 
Court.32 This principle deals with the ICC’s relationship with national courts. Essentially the 
Court cannot investigate or prosecute a case unless a state which has jurisdiction over it is 
unable or unwilling to do so.33 Even then the ICC Prosecutor must notify states which have 
jurisdiction of his/her intention to prosecute.34 Additionally, an offender cannot be tried in 
the ICC if the case has already been heard in a national court.35 The complementarity 
principle is specified in art 17 of the Rome Statute which also details in what circumstances 
a state is considered “unwilling” or “unable” to investigate and prosecute. A state is deemed 
“unwilling” to investigate or prosecute if the alleged offender is being shielded by that state, 
if there is unjustified delay in bringing an investigation or prosecution or if proceedings are 
impartial.36 A total collapse of legal or administrative institutions would render a state 
“unable” under the Rome Statute.37 Overall, the International Criminal Court is meant to be 
a Court of “last resort”.38  
The complementarity principle aligns with the current situation for sexual crimes committed 
by military contingent members ie that the troop-contributing state has primary jurisdiction. 
However, the principle also signifies that the Court has secondary jurisdiction over the 
limited set of crimes, something that TCC “exclusive jurisdiction” described in the various 
agreements with the UN does not take into account. If a new provision were to be adopted 
into the Rome Statute, then these agreements would need to be re-drafted/negotiated. 
                                                          
32 Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Complementarily “Taking Stock of the Principle of Complementarity: 
Bridging the Gap” ICC-ASP/8/20/Add.1 (2010) at [3].  
33 Rome Statute, art 17(1)(a). 
34 Rome Statute, art 18(1). 
35 Rome Statute, arts 17(1)(c) and 17(1)(d). 
36 Rome Statute, art 17(2)(a)-(c). 
37 T H McCormack and S Robertson “Jurisdictional Aspects of the Rome Statute for the New International 
Criminal Court” (1999) Melbourne University Law Review 635 at 645. 
38 Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Complementarity, above n 32, at [3].  
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Applying the complementarity principle to sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers 
would be beneficial as TCC inaction would be remedied with the Court’s secondary 
jurisdiction.  A contributing state would also need to ensure the new crime is considered a 
“crime” under their domestic criminal law in order to avoid being deemed “unable” to 
prosecute and thereby possibly triggering ICC jurisdiction.39 Moreover, it is important to 
note that the International Criminal Court also has the advantage of an established judicial 
system, with agreed standards of investigations and trials.40 Judges, registrars and other 
related personnel are already sourced and a budget already in place. This can be contrasted 
to establishing a new court or tribunal to deal with peacekeeping crimes (discussed in 
Chapter Eight).  
In order to ascertain whether a state is unwilling to unable to investigate or prosecute there 
would need to be evidence or monitoring in place.41 Evidence could be attained through 
contributing states reports to the UN as required by the Memorandum of Understanding.42 
Therefore, some commentators argue that the knowledge that the ICC may investigate an 
allegation may at least encourage contributing states to comply with reporting obligations 
under the Memorandum of Understanding.43 Moreover, the Rome Statute goes further than 
the MOU in relation to where such information can be obtained. The ICC Prosecutor for 
example may gather information from states themselves, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), inter-governmental organisations and “other reliable sources”.44 Additionally, it 
can be presumed that if contributing states continued to be unwilling to prosecute then the 
                                                          
39 McCormack and Robertson, above n 37, at 645.  
40 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr. 1 Part II.A (New York, 2002). 
41 Du Plessis and Pete, above n 1, at 13. Rome Statute, art 14(2). 
42Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned 
Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual) GA 
A/c.5/66/8 (2011) ch. 9 Memorandum of Understanding [2007 MOU]  art sexiens [7.24]. 
43 Burke, above n 1, at 363; Du Plessis and Pete, above n 1, at 13.  
44 Rome Statute, art 15; see also McCormack and Robertson, above n 37, at 642. 
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ICC would have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction of the Court is unlikely to be welcomed by 
many TCCs and so will encourage such states to genuinely investigate and prosecute cases 
of sexual exploitation and abuse.  
However, the evidence and monitoring required in order to prove that a TCC is “unwilling” 
or “unable” to investigate or prosecute is a disadvantage flowing from the complementarity 
principle. As had been argued in previous chapters, contributing states have been lax in their 
reporting duties and the level of detail provided may vary state to state. As a result, reporting 
may not be a wholly reliable source of information. There may have to be further 
investigation into the reasons behind non-accountability. Such intrusive steps are likely to 
be rejected by TCCs, particularly when concerning the conduct of military contingent 
members. Moreover, the delay that will inevitably occur between the case being transferred 
to the TCC and the determination that the state has failed to investigate or prosecute in order 
to trigger ICC jurisdiction can lead to a number of issues. Such issues include the likelihood 
that the alleged offender, witnesses and even the victim have relocated or are otherwise 
difficult to locate in order to properly investigate the case. As a result, justice may never be 
seen to be done. For these reasons, the complementarity principle may mean that ICC 
jurisdiction does not in fact fill the accountability gap. A new court with the reversal of a 
complementarity system will be discussed in Chapter Eight. 
(4) PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
As O’Brien rightly points out, prosecutorial discretion may be the most limiting factor on 
ICC prosecution of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers.45 In order to safeguard 
the independence of the ICC Prosecutor considerable discretion has been granted under the 
                                                          
45 M O’Brien “Prosecutorial Discretion as an Obstacle to Prosecution of United Nations Peacekeepers by the 
International Criminal Court: The Big Fish/Small Fish Debate and the Gravity Threshold” (2012) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 525.  
212 
 
Rome Statute.46 The Prosecutor may choose which cases or situations to investigate.47 The 
crime(s) must be of sufficient gravity to warrant the exercise of ICC jurisdiction.48 As part 
of prosecutorial discretion, the Prosecutor may consider a number of factors in order to 
assess the gravity of the crime(s) alleged.49  
The gravity threshold described by the preamble of the Rome Statute dictates that the Court 
shall prosecute “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole” and such “grave” crimes that threaten international peace and security.50 According 
to the ICC Prosecutor, the gravity of the crime/s is central for admissibility.51 The 
importance of gravity is reiterated several times throughout the Rome Statute.52 Overall, the 
policy favoured by the ICC Prosecutor is to focus on “representative rather than 
comprehensive” cases.53 This means that not all cases that come within the jurisdiction of 
the Court will be investigated and/or prosecuted. 
The ICC Prosecutor will favour prosecution of the most senior leaders rather than lower 
ranking officials or soldiers. The general policy of the Prosecutor is to focus on individuals 
who “bear the most responsibility”.54 This generally equates to higher-ranking officials.55 
Additionally, this recognises the reality that the “Court will never be able to prosecute all 
those responsible for crimes under its jurisdiction in a given situation.”56 This limitation also 
acknowledges the restricted resources and budget allocated to the Court itself.57 Although it 
                                                          
46 At 527. 
47 Rome Statute, art 15. 
48 Rome Statute, arts 17(1)(d), 53(1)(b) and 53(2)(b). 
49 O’Brien “Prosecutorial Discretion as an Obstacle to Prosecution of United Nations Peacekeepers by the 
International Criminal Court”, above n 45, at 534-536. 
50 Rome Statute, Preamble. 
51 Paper on some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor ICC-OPT (2003) at 7. 
52 Rome Statute, Preamble, arts 17, 53, 59, 77, 78, 84, 85, 90 and 93.  
53 B Schiff Building the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008) at 118.  
54 Paper on some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor ICC-OPT (2003) at 3 and 7. 
55 O’Brien “Prosecutorial Discretion as an Obstacle to Prosecution of United Nations Peacekeepers by the 
International Criminal Court”, above n 45, at 528. 
56 Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Complementarity above n 32, at [12].  
57 At [15].  
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is unclear from statistics provided by the UN Secretary-General in his annual reports on 
sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping, it can be assumed that not all allegations are 
directed towards high-ranking personnel.58 A single act of rape by a low-ranking 
peacekeeper may not reach the required threshold. This general restriction in the assessment 
of gravity may severely limit ICC jurisdiction over peacekeepers. 
The practice of the ICC Prosecutor indicates that the number of victims is a highly valued 
factor when assessing gravity.59 As noted by both Burke and O’Brien, this may considerably 
limit the admissibility of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers.60 The number of 
victims per allegation is unlikely to be high. Moreover, in dismissing a potential case the 
Prosecutor has pointed out the number of victims of current cases before the Court to be in 
the hundreds or thousands. Waiting for such a “magic number” of victims is particularly 
unsatisfactory as it is not the number of victims of sexual exploitation and abuse that is 
concerning, it is the fact that these abuses happen at all. In circumstances where the local 
population is meant to be protected by peacekeepers, acts of sexual exploitation and abuse 
committed by these “protectors” is the most alarming aspect of such violations. One victim 
should be enough to be a valued factor when assessing gravity. For sexual exploitation and 
abuse to be considered then a different approach would need to be taken by the Prosecutor 
in assessment of gravity, such as the nature of the crimes themselves or the impact on the 
victim and their communities or the violation of trust in the peacekeeping mandate.61  
                                                          
58 O’Brien, “Prosecutorial Discretion as an Obstacle to Prosecution of United Nations Peacekeepers by the 
International Criminal Court”, above n 45, at 531.  
59 At 531. 
60 Burke, above n 1,  at 348-350;  
61 O’Brien, “Prosecutorial Discretion as an Obstacle to Prosecution of United Nations Peacekeepers by the 
International Criminal Court”, above n 45, at 535. 
214 
 
Burke and O’Brien’s counterargument to the barrier prosecutorial discretion presents is an 
interesting one and deserves discussion.62 Peacekeepers are potentially given special status 
under the Rome Statute via art 8(2)(e)(iii): 
Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, units or vehicles 
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the 
protection to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the 
international law of armed conflict. 
This provision has been used once in connection to a case against two rebel leaders of a 
movement (JEL-CL) in Sudan which allegedly carried out an attack killing twelve 
peacekeepers.63 The number of victims in this case was few. However, as the victims in this 
case were peacekeepers they were looked at as having a special status and thus had an impact 
on the Prosecutor’s assessment of gravity. O’Brien argues that because peacekeepers have 
special status as victims, thereby having a bearing on the assessment of “gravity”, then the 
same should apply to peacekeepers as offenders.64 However, this provision does not apply 
to all peacekeepers. Where the mandate of the mission requires peacekeepers to take the role 
of “combatants” or allows for self-defence they will be considered part of the conflict and 
will not be afforded special protection.65 Consequently, Burke and O’Brien’s 
counterargument would result in unequal distribution of justice as this “special status” may 
apply to one group of peacekeepers, but not to others. This is unsatisfactory. This “special 
                                                          
62 Burke, above n 1, at 357; O’Brien “Prosecutorial Discretion as an Obstacle to Prosecution of United Nations 
Peacekeepers by the International Criminal Court”, above n 45, at 532-533. 
63 M Bangura “Prosecuting the Crime of Attack on Peacekeepers: A Prosecutor’s Challenge” (2010) 23 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 165 at 174. 
64 O’Brien “Prosecutorial Discretion as an Obstacle to Prosecution of United Nations Peacekeepers by the 
International Criminal Court”, above n 45, at 533. 
65 Bangura, above n 63, at 168. 
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status” would need to apply to peacekeepers as a group, regardless of whether they are party 
to armed conflict or not. 
(5) OTHER LIMITING FACTORS 
Purely international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court also have other 
disadvantages. The ICC is unlikely to have any link to the victim or their community in 
terms of personnel or location.66 The legitimacy of the Court’s decisions may therefore be 
brought into question with justice not being seen to be done.67   Moreover, the Court will 
have similar disadvantages to exclusive TCC jurisdiction, such as practical difficulties 
associated with investigating and gathering evidence in a foreign state. However, unlike 
TCCs, the International Criminal Court specialises and has extensive experience in the 
investigation of cases in foreign countries.68 Furthermore, the reason behind the limitation 
in admissibility is partly to do with limited resources (financial, administrative, and human) 
at the ICC’s disposal. Unfortunately, the Court can simply not hear all deserving cases. This 
reality will also hinder an argument for peacekeepers to be prosecuted for sexual exploitation 
and abuse at the ICC. The International Criminal Court is unsatisfactory when assessing its 
jurisdiction in light of the three principles identified in Part One. Unless an effective 
outreach programme is employed, victims may not hear about cases or see justice being 
done. Moreover, the host state and the UN would not have an active role in the operations 
of the ICC and its trials. 
 
                                                          
66 R Lipscomb “Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: A Search for a Permanent 
Solution in Sudan” (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review 182 at 193. 
67 At 196. 




Having discussed the relevant theories on the potential for the International Criminal Court 
to deal with sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, I argued that it is unlikely the 
ICC can provide a legitimate avenue for filling the accountability gap. It is doubtful that 
sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers will fit within the narrowly defined crimes 
currently listed in the Rome Statute. Furthermore, to attempt to introduce a new provision 
into the Statute would be challenging given the lack of universality attached to the crimes 
and agreed definition. The complementarity principle means that the ICC may have 
secondary jurisdiction, however the required evidence to prove that a TCC is “unable” or 
“unwilling” to prosecute their nationals would mean long delays and possibly intrusive 
monitoring. Finally, prosecutorial discretion favours high-ranking officials and a higher 
number of victims in the assessment of “gravity”. For these reasons, ICC jurisdiction is 




CONCLUSION TO PART THREE 
This Part has demonstrated that two potential options for improving accountability, ie host 
state jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court are unsatisfactory for different 
reasons.  Chapter Six illustrated the challenges associated with trying to fit sexual 
exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers into the boxes of international crimes or the Rome 
Statute generally in order to come under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Moreover, Chapter 
Seven established that an alternative system which incorporates host state jurisdiction is 
conceptually beneficial; victims and their communities will see justice being done and host 
state ownership may be facilitated. However, host state jurisdiction may not always be 
practically possible. Therefore, a structural system which supports cooperation between the 
UN, host states and TCCs while also incorporating host state ownership and, in some 





PART FOUR:  TOWARDS A HYBRID SOLUTION? A SPECIAL COURT FOR 
PEACEKEEPERS AND THE ROLE OF VICTIMS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION TO PART FOUR 
Part Four continues with the second broad category of suggestions for improving 
accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse (alternative ways to prosecute military 
contingent members) by exploring a special court for peacekeepers. Additionally, Part Four 
considers the third broad category of suggested avenues for improving accountability; 
support and assistance for victims. Chapters Eight and Nine argue for a two-pronged system, 
of prosecution and victim reparations.  
This Part will not only argue for a hybrid tribunal for peacekeepers, a measure that has been 
seldom considered, but also for a court with jurisdiction over military contingent members 
in the first instance, thereby avoiding the current exclusive criminal jurisdiction of TCCs. In 
Chapter Eight I will explore past and present examples of hybrid tribunals and how a similar 
structure will best serve the three underlying principles of justice being seen to be done, host 
state ownership, and UN leadership. I will also consider three potential hurdles, including 
the material jurisdiction of such a tribunal, political will and financial considerations.  
As I am particularly interested in the perspective of victims, their communities, and the host 
state when exploring avenues for improving accountability, in Chapter Nine I will examine 
the situation of the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. I will argue that in addition to 
a hybrid tribunal for peacekeepers, victims of sexual exploitation and abuse should also have 
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a participatory role. Moreover, that a reparations scheme should be implemented which aims 
to dismantle the structural inequalities that foster gendered violence.  
The aim of Part Four is to illustrate that in order to fill the gap in the current framework for 
dealing with sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, where past UN reforms have 
seemingly failed, it is perhaps time for states to have uncomfortable conversations about 
TCC exclusive criminal jurisdiction over their troops. This requires consideration of 
alternative mechanisms, such as a hybrid court, and serious responses to victims of sexual 
exploitation and abuse that involve comprehensive support, assistance, and, where 
appropriate, transformative reparations. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: A SPECIAL COURT FOR PEACEKEEPERS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I will continue to look at alternative avenues for investigation and prosecution 
of military contingent members for sexual exploitation and abuse; specifically, hybrid or tri-
hybrid tribunal models. I will use the three principles identified in Part One which should 
underlie an alternative model for prosecution of military contingents for sexual exploitation 
and abuse; justice being seen to be done, host state ownership, and UN leadership. I argue 
that these principles are best served by a tribunal following a hybrid model. The arguments 
for a special tribunal for peacekeepers will be briefly noted in section (2) and the principles 
themselves are discussed in section (3).  
In section (4) I look closely at hybrid tribunals. I will consider past and present examples of 
such tribunals (Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia) and compare common 
attributes to determine whether they are applicable to the peacekeeping context. I will further 
develop the model by looking at the tri-hybrid tribunal (cooperation between the UN, troop-
contributing countries and the host state) in section (5).  
One of the major differences between my suggested model and those that have been argued 
in previous scholarship is removal of the troop-contributing country’s exclusive (or primary) 
criminal jurisdiction. Instead of a court of “last resort” I will argue for a court of first instance 
in Section (6). Moreover, I will discuss possible structure in terms of legal basis and 
jurisdiction. This will include a discussion on three potential barriers to a new court for 
peacekeepers; firstly, the material jurisdiction and possible offences within sexual 
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exploitation and abuse; secondly, the political will of states ie how will states sign up to a 
special court for peacekeepers; and thirdly, resourcing a special court for peacekeepers.  
(1) INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE – LIMITATIONS 
Before exploring the proposal of a special court for peacekeepers, it is necessary to address 
the perceived limitations of international criminal justice in delivering “justice” to victims 
of sexual exploitation and abuse. Criminal institutions and courts have been criticised for re-
traumatising victims of crimes of a sexual nature through the trial process.1 Moreover, 
traditional criminal justice theory favours retribution and so places the prosecution of the 
offender at the centre of importance (discussed further in Chapter Nine).2 Therefore, it has 
been argued that an emphasis on prosecution and incarceration as “justice” neglects other 
concepts of “justice” that may exist.3 For some victims, “justice” may mean the prosecution 
of perpetrators, for others it may mean compensation for harm caused or the opportunity to 
have their stories heard and reported in a public setting.4 These latter interpretations of 
“justice” align with restorative theories of criminal justice. As stated in Part One, it is not 
the intention of this thesis to propose a special court of peacekeepers as the only method of 
tackling sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. The individual criminal 
accountability of military contingent members is simply the focus of this particular thesis. 
However, in an attempt to mitigate the limitations of international criminal justice, and 
centralise victims, Chapter Nine will explore restorative measures and how they may fit into 
                                                          
1 F Marsh and N Wager “Restorative Justice in Cases of Sexual Violence: Exploring the Views of the Public 
and Survivors” (2015) 62 Probation Journal 336 at 338; A Kasparian “Justice Beyond Bars: Exploring the 
Restorative Justice Alternative for Victims of Rape and Sexual Assault” (2014) 37 Suffolk Transnational Law 
Review 1.  
2 Marsh and Wager, above n 1, at 338.  
3 See generally, E Bernstein “Militarized humanitarianism meets Carceral Feminism” (2010) 36 SIGNS 45; E 
Bernstein “Carceral Politics as Gender Justice? The “Traffic in Women” and Neoliberal Circuits of Crime, 
Sex, and Rights” (2012) 41 Theor Soc 233.   




a special court for peacekeepers. As the introduction of this Part explained, Chapters Eight 
and Nine are argued as a two-pronged system of both prosecution and reparations.  
(2) THE ARGUMENT FOR A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL 
After the release of the influential Zeid Report on sexual exploitation and abuse in 2005, the 
Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations called upon a Group of Legal Experts to 
compile a list of recommendations to improve accountability of peacekeepers.5 The 
subsequent report entitled: Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts 
on mission with Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations was 
released in 2006.6 The Group of Legal Experts discussed many different options for 
accountability, among them were hybrid tribunals.7 However, the Group’s terms of 
reference limited the focus of their report to the accountability of experts on mission and 
UN officials only; such personnel include UN staff and volunteers, UN police, military 
observers and advisers, military liaison officers, and consultants.8 Therefore, the 
accountability of military contingents was not specifically examined, because of the then 
existing exclusive jurisdiction of the troop-contributing country.9 However, the report is still 
useful for this current discussion and is the one of the few UN documents so far that seriously 
explores alternative ways to prosecute peacekeepers other than by the contributing state.  
The Group of Legal Experts argued that “a new international judiciary with jurisdiction to 
deal with serious crimes by peacekeepers” could fill the accountability gap.10 Moreover, in 
                                                          
5 UN Secretary-General, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations GA A/59/710, (24 March 2005)  prepared by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid 
Al-Hussein [Zeid Report] at [80]. 
6 Report of the Group of Legal Experts on Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on 
Mission with Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations GA A/60/980 (2006): [Group 
of Legal Experts Report].  
7 At [33]-[39]. 
8 At [7]. 
9 At 8 footnote 5, and 9 footnote 8. 
10 The Group of Legal Experts Report ultimately dismissed the option due to the perceived limitations that will 
be discussed below see Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 6, at [76]. 
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2015 Radhika Coomaraswamy, lead author of the global study on the implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 1325,11 included among her recommendations related to 
Resolution 1325 the “establishment of a UN tribunal for sexual exploitation and abuse” for 
peacekeepers.12 Coomaraswamy did not include any more information about her 
recommendation. So far, Roisin Burke has been one of the few academics to seriously tackle 
alternative trial mechanisms in the context of peacekeeping, specifically military contingent 
members.13 Although only briefly mentioned by a few other scholars,14 Burke has broadly 
explored the possibility of a hybrid or tri-hybrid tribunal to govern crimes committed by 
peacekeepers.15 Burke has examined a mechanism with equal input from the UN, the TCC 
and the host state; a “tri-hybrid tribunal”. I will assess critically the models that have been 
put forward by both the Group of Legal Experts’ reports and Burke.  
(3) CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION: THE THREE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING A NEW 
COURT FOR PEACEKEEPERS 
Before examining the various models that have been proposed, it is helpful to first consider 
why the three principles identified in Part One (justice being seen to be done, host state 
ownership, and UN leadership) should be reflected in a special court for peacekeepers.  
                                                          
11 Information on the Global Study is available online <http://wps.unwomen.org/en>; see also Security Council 
resolution 1325 SC Res S/Res/1325 (2000).  
12 Radhika Coomaraswamy Open Letter to Permanent Representatives of the Security Council dated 23 June 
2015 (2015) at 4; this was reiterated in the 2015 report Radhika Coomaraswamy Preventing Conflict, 
Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1325 (2015) at 149 and 156-157. 
13 R Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents: Moving Beyond the Current Status 
Quo and Responsibility under International Law (Leiden, Brill, 2014); R Burke “UN Military Peacekeeper 
Complicity in Sexual Abuse: The ICC or a Tri-Hybrid Court” in M Bergsmo (ed) Thematic Prosecution of 
International Sex Crimes (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Beijing, 2012) 317.  
14 A Cahillane “International Law, Sexual Violence and Peacekeepers” 17 Irish Student Law Review 1 at 14; 
T Innes “The Accountability of Peacekeeping Operations: A Focus on Allegations of Sexual Abuse” (2011) 1 
Warwick Student Law Review 19 at 31; M Odello “Tackling Criminal Acts in Peacekeeping Operations: The 
Accountability of Peacekeepers” (2010) 15 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 347 at 375; Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Maximising the 
Legacy of Hybrid Courts (United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2008) at 4. 
15 Above n 13. 
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Much like host state jurisdiction discussed in Chapter Six, a tribunal established on the 
ground, within the community in which the victim(s) live(s), will enable these communities 
to see “justice being done”.16 Having suffered exploitative conduct, victims and their 
communities deserve to have their stories told and their abuser to be held to account in a 
local and public arena.17 The visibility of victims themselves also supports serious 
recognition of the harm caused by sexual exploitation and abuse. Additionally, as discussed 
in Chapter Six, the Draft Convention on the Criminal Accountability of the United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission offers insight into how jurisdiction can be distributed via 
cooperation between the TCCs, UN and host states, although it does not go far enough in 
offering structural measures to achieve this. I argue that a hybrid tribunal may be an 
appropriate structural measure, particularly as it can serve the principle of host state 
ownership. 
It has been suggested by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights that 
hybrid tribunals for example contribute to the victim’s right to justice and an effective 
remedy; witnessing prosecution of the alleged abuser can be considered part of this right.18 
Moreover, the practice of hybrid tribunals suggests a trend of encouraging affected states to 
actively participate in the process of accountability with the consequence that victims have 
a more vital role in international criminal justice.19  
                                                          
16 Cahillane, above n 14, at 14.  
17 This has been held to be one of the primary reasons behind the hybrid tribunals, for example the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone A Smith “Sierra Leone: The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Practice” in C P R Romano, 
A Nollkaemper and J K Kleffner (eds) Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, 
and Cambodia (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 125 at 127.   
18 Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States, above n 14, at 4; Victims’ rights to an “effect remedy” will be 
discussed below in Chapter Nine. 
19 S Williams Hybrid and International Criminal Tribunals (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) at 59; T Becker 
“Address to the American International Law Association” (2004) 10 ILSA Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 477 at 479; P K Mendez “The New Wave of Hybrid Tribunals: A Sophisticated Approach 
to Enforcing International Humanitarian Law or an Idealistic Solution with Empty Promises?” (2009) 20 
Criminal Law Forum 53 at 72-73.  
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The status quo means that the troop-contributing state has exclusive criminal jurisdiction; 
therefore, prosecution (if any) is likely to occur in a foreign country. Currently, the victim 
of sexual exploitation or abuse is not directly involved in the trial process beyond being a 
witness. Under the current model-Memorandum of Understanding, between the UN and 
TCCs, the contributing state is required to report on outcomes of cases.20 These reports are 
inconsistent (and often non-existent);21 at the very least this needs to change in order to 
improve transparency for victims and their communities. Under the status quo “justice is not 
seen to be done” and this is one of the primary principles that should underlie an alternative 
model.  
Following on from the importance of victims (individual, community and host state) to see 
“justice being done”, the host state should have ownership in any alternative trial system. 
Host state “ownership” in this instance does not necessarily mean that the host state should 
have primary jurisdiction over offending peacekeepers, but it should have a role in the 
functioning of the court or tribunal itself. The level or scope of ownership in the process 
may depend on each particular host state (according to financial and human resources 
available) and may include participation in investigation, prosecution teams, judges or 
administration.22 Host state ownership in a judicial system of a hybrid kind would align with 
the UN’s policy of inclusivity in peacebuilding.23 Additionally, there are practical 
                                                          
20 Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned 
Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual) GA 
A/c.5/66/8 (2011) ch. 9 Memorandum of Understanding [2007 MOU] art 7 sexiens (1).  
21 Secretary-General Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse GA 
A/67/766 (2013) at [15].  
22 On the role of host ownership in transitional societies see M Saul “Local Ownership of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Restorative and Retributive Effects” (2012) 12 International Criminal Law 
Review 427. 
23 See for example, Report of the Secretary-General The Future of the United Nations Peace Operations: 
Implementation of the Recommendation of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations GA 
A/70/375-S/2015/628 (2015) at [64]; Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate 
Aftermath of Conflict GA A/63/881-S/2009/304 (2009) at [7]-[14]; Report of the Secretary-General on 
Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict GA A/64/866-S/2010/386 (2010) at [26]-[31]; Report 
of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict GA A/67/499-S/2012/746 
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advantages to having a tribunal on-site. The gathering and maintenance of evidence and the 
access to witnesses and the victim are made easier when the trial takes place in the same 
place as the sexual exploitation and abuse occurred. Justification for host state ownership in 
hybrid courts can also be based upon capacity-building and perceived legitimacy of the trial 
process.  
Generally, it has been argued that hybrid tribunals have the ancillary benefit of helping with 
a state’s capacity-building in situations of conflict or post-conflict.24 In such situations, the 
presence of international personnel in the host state’s legal system may assist with the 
reestablishment of the domestic justice system. Moreover, hybrid courts may also strengthen 
enforcement of human rights.25 Conflict can also mean the loss of legal expertise and skills 
in the host state, a hybrid tribunal with its mix of domestic and international personnel can 
help with training of staff and lawyers as well as temporarily filling the skills-gap.26 
However, the capacity-building argument for a hybrid court may not be especially strong in 
the peacekeeping context. The value of training in a specialised court may be diminished 
due to the fact that a hybrid court created especially for the prosecution of crimes committed 
by military contingent members (almost certainly international personnel) may not be 
considered comparable to the domestic legal system.27 Thus, the skills and expertise 
involved may not be relevant or particularly transferrable.  
                                                          
(2012); Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict GA 
A/69/399-S/2014/694 (2014) at [27]-[39]; inclusivity is discussed in Part One. 
24 See for example, Williams, above n 19, at 61-62.  
25 A Cassese “The Role of Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against International 
Criminality” in C P R Romano, A Nollkaemper and J K Kleffner (eds) Internationalized Criminal Courts: 
Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 1 at 6; Odello, 
above n 14, at 375. 
26 Cassese, above n 25, at 6; Mendez, above n 19, at 74. 
27 J Herman, “A Necessary Compromise or Compromised Justice? The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia” in H F Carey and S M Mitchell (eds) Trials and Tribulations of International Prosecutions 
(Lexington Books, Lanham, 2013) 209 at 216 where the author discusses the particular training given to 
nationals in the ECCC is not comparable or particularly relevant to the domestic legal system. See also Mendez, 
above n 19, at 88.  
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If the goal of a special tribunal is to improve accountability and thus have “justice being 
seen to be done” then the decisions of such a court should have legitimacy within the 
victim’s community.28 A stand-alone court that operates outside of the victim’s community 
or host state may lack such legitimacy. Practice of purely internationalised tribunals has 
shown that outcomes of cases rarely resonate with the communities of the affected state; 
such has been the case with the International Criminal Court, and the international ad-hoc 
tribunals.29 Without the judgments of cases reaching the affected community, the legitimacy 
of the tribunals themselves can be seriously questioned.30 This is similar to the current state 
of affairs within the peacekeeping context; unless there is notable media coverage over 
cases, the outcome of TCC sexual exploitation and abuse cases rarely make it back to the 
community/host state.31 A lack of transparency means a lack of legitimacy. Therefore, 
outreach programmes were established to raise awareness of the cases among victim 
communities to boost the image of the purely international tribunals.32 These issues can be 
avoided if proceedings are visible to the affected communities. Additionally, legitimacy and 
“moral authority” would be more likely to be fostered if host state communities are consulted 
in the creation of a hybrid court.33 
As the UN has the central role in any UN peacekeeping mission, it would follow that the 
organisation takes leadership in any new judicial system involving its peacekeepers. The 
                                                          
28 L A Dickinson “Notes and Comments: The Promise of Hybrid Courts” (2003) The American Journal of 
International Law 295, at 301; Mendez, above n 19, at 70; Saul, above n 22, at 43. 
29 Dickinson, above n 28, at 302; Y Shany “How can International Criminal Courts Have a Greater Impact on 
National Criminal Proceedings? Lessons from the First Decades of International Criminal Justice in Operation” 
(2013) 46 Israel Law Review 431 at 440. 
30 Dickinson, above n 28, at 302; see also R Zachlin “The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals” (2004) 
2 Journal of Criminal Justice 541 at 544.  
31 See for examples of high profile cases highlighted by the media D Gayle “French Solider charged with 
Burkina Faso Child Abuse” The Guardian (4 July 2015) www.theguardian.com; R O Graces “Uruguay: 
Peacekeepers Accused of Sexual Abuse in Haiti Jailed” Huffington Post (11 September 2011) 
www.huffingtonpost.com.  
32 E Evenson “ICC Success Depends on its Impact Locally” Human Rights Watch (26 August 2015) 
www.hrw.org. 
33 Saul, above n 22, at 433.  
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United Nations, as a human rights promoter and through its leadership role in the 
international community, is best placed to implement a responsive system for sexual 
exploitation and abuse committed by its peacekeepers. UN leadership in a hybrid tribunal 
can also be grounded in the concept of “expressive value” which is used as a justification 
for international criminal justice generally.34 Expressive value refers to the collective 
condemnation by the community of particular behaviour through prosecution of those 
expressing that behaviour.35 In the peacekeeping context, I would argue that the UN’s zero-
tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse is the particular behaviour that the UN 
expressly condemns.36 Therefore, UN leadership in the investigation and prosecution of 
peacekeepers who engage in prohibited sexual conduct will express the strength of the 
international community’s disapproval of this behaviour.37 Moreover, holding peacekeepers 
to account through a special court with UN leadership can contribute to ending impunity and 
strengthening the rule of law generally via the “demonstration effect”.38 The “demonstration 
effect” refers to the notion that hybrid courts in particular will leave a “legacy” or a lasting 
impact on the rule of law of the local territory and of the international community 
generally.39  
The three principles are about improving accountability from the perspective of victims, 
their communities, and host states; they are about legitimacy in responding to sexual 
exploitation and abuse, inclusivity of the host state, and great transparency to the 
                                                          
34 Shany, above n 29, at 445. 
35 At 445. 
36 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
Abuse, SG SGB ST/SGB/2003/13 (2003); UN Conduct and Discipline Unit We are United Nations 
Peacekeeping Personnel <http://cdu.unlb.org>; UN Conduct and Discipline Unit Ten Rules: Code of Personal 
Conduct for Blue Helmets <http://cdu.unlb.org>. 
37 Burke, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents, above n 13, at 239. 
38 Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States, above n 14, at 4, 6 and 17ff (specifically referring to the 
advantages to hybrid courts); see also Dickinson, above n 28, at 394.  
39 Dickinson, above n 28, at 394. 
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international community. I argue that these principles are best served through a hybrid court 
for peacekeepers. 
(4) A HYBRID COURT 
Hybrid courts have been used in different contexts around the world for similar purposes; to 
fill an accountability gap where the affected state is unable to do so. Since past and present 
practice of hybrid courts exist, there are different models to draw from in order to discuss 
their applicability to sexual exploitation and abuse by military contingent members. Hybrid 
models were also suggested and discussed by the Group of Legal Experts in their 2006 report 
and more recently by academic Roisin Burke.40 In this section I will briefly sketch out the 
historic contexts of hybrid courts in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Cambodia. I will 
then look at the commonalties between the examples of hybrid tribunals and how such 
models could apply in the context of peacekeeping. For the discussion below on “common 
factors” I will be partially structuring my critique using Sarah Williams’ book Hybrid and 
Internationalised Criminal Tribunals.41 Having closely examined previous and current 
practice of hybrid tribunals, Williams has suggested common features and attributes of such 
tribunals which are useful for discussing the possibility of a special hybrid court for 
peacekeepers. I will compare these attributes with the three principles underpinning this 
thesis (justice being seen to done, host state ownership, and UN leadership). 
(A) PAST AND PRESENT EXAMPLES OF HYBRID COURTS 
So-called “hybrid” tribunals are internationalised national courts.42 These courts have been 
utilised as a response to mass atrocities and typically have jurisdiction over both 
                                                          
40 Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents, above n 13; Burke “UN Military 
Peacekeeper Complicity in Sexual Abuse”, above n 13; Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 2.  
41 Above n 19.  
42 Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents, above n 13, at 385. 
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international and domestic crimes.43 They also tend to have mixed international and national 
personnel acting as registrars, judges, and lawyers. Hybrid tribunals have been established 
in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Cambodia with varying degrees of success.  
The Regulation 64 Panels were implemented as a response to the Serbian directed ethnic 
cleansing of local Albanians in Kosovo.44 In 1999 the UN Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK) was confronted with the mass investigation, detention and prosecution 
of alleged offenders.45 The physical infrastructure of Kosovo’s legal system was destroyed.46 
Only few local Albanians were legally trained.47 Applying local law and international human 
rights standards, the Panels held trials against accused war criminals using mixed 
international and national personnel to fill the gaps in expertise.48  
Arguably one of the more successful examples of hybrid tribunals in terms of creation and 
overall prosecution of international crimes is the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL).49 
After a civil war that spanned a decade, Sierra Leone’s fractured legal system faced the 
investigation and prosecution of mass atrocities, including the recruitment of child 
soldiers.50 The Government of Sierra Leone negotiated an agreement with the UN 
                                                          
43 At 385. 
44 Security Council Resolution 1244 SC Res S/Res/1244 (1999).  
45 Dickinson, above n 28, at 297. 
46 At 297.   
47 At 297. 
48 Regulation 1999/1 On The Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (1999) 
Regulation 1999/24 On the Law Applicable in Kosovo UNMIK/REG/1999/24 (1999); international criminal 
law was applied through pre-existing domestic legislation J Cerone and C Baldwin “Explaining and Evaluating 
the UNMIK Court System” in C R Romano, A Nollkaemper and J K Kleffner (eds) Internationalised Criminal 
Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 41 at 44-
47. 
49 Argued by D Cohen “Hybrid Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia: Lessons Learned and 
Prospects for the Future” (2007) 43 Stanford Journal of International Law 1, at 23; Mendez above n 19, at 81-
82.  
50 Cohen above n 49, at 11; E Nielsen “Hybrid International Criminal Tribunals: Political Interference and 
Judicial Independence” (2010) 15 UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 289 at 317.  
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establishing a hybrid tribunal to put war criminals on trial using a mix of international and 
national personnel.51  
In the wake of the vote to become independent from Indonesian rule, the Timorese were 
subjected to targeted killings by the Indonesian army and local militia groups.52 The Special 
Panel of the Dili District Court was created to prosecute those associated with these mass 
atrocities.53 The Special Panels were established as part of the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).54 In terms of structure, the Special Panels 
operated within the domestic legal system, with any appeals taken up by the national East 
Timorese Appeals Court (also with mixed international and domestic personnel).55  
The process of forming the Extraordinary Chambers (ECCC) was initiated by the 
Cambodian Government in order to investigate and prosecute those involved in the Khmer 
Rouge regime that resulted in the deaths of 1.5 million people from 1975-1979.56 An eight 
year delay between the request for a tribunal and the establishment of the ECCC was 
                                                          
51 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Letter dated March 6 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council S/2002/246 (2002).  
52 Cohen, above n 49, at 7; S Linton “Rising from the Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice System 
in East Timor” (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 122; Additionally, the Statue of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone has been the only constituent instrument of the hybrid tribunals to explicitly address criminal 
conduct by peacekeepers. Article 1(3) acknowledges that the TCC has primary jurisdiction over troops, 
however provides that where states are unwilling or unable to prosecute the SCSL may have jurisdiction. SCSL 
jurisdiction must be first authorised by the Security Council. This provision has never been utilised: UN 
Security Council, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2001) as established by Security Council 
Resolution 1315 SC Res S/Res/1315 (2000), arts 2-5; see generally, R Cryer “A special court for Sierra 
Leone?” (2001) 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 435 at 440-441; A McDonald “Sierra 
Leone’s Shoestring Special Court” (2002) 84 International Review of the Red Cross 121 at 132-133. 
53 Cohen, above n 49, at 7; Linton, above n 48, at 123ff; Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
East Timor S/2000/59 (2000).  
54 Situation of Human Rights in East Timor GA A/54/660 (1999) at [6]; Security Council Resolution 1272 SC 
Res S/Res/1272 (1999). 
55 Regulation 2000/15 On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal 
Offences UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000) at [Section 1]. 
56 See generally C Etcheson “The Politics of Genocide Justice in Cambodia” in C P R Romano, A Nollkaemper 
and J K Kleffner (eds) Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 181; H Horsington “The Cambodian Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The 
Promise of a Hybrid Tribunal” (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 462; B Kiernan “Historical 
and Political Background to the Conflict in Cambodia” in K Ambos and M Othman (eds) New Approaches in 




partially due to many disagreements between the government and the UN and concern about 
possible corruption on the part of the Cambodian government.57 The ECCC itself comprises 
of three Trial Chambers with mixed international and domestic personnel.58  
The hybrid model sought to combine the best elements of international and domestic courts 
in order to promote transitional accountability in the aftermath of mass atrocities.59 The 
hybrid model has particular conceptual benefits. Mixed international and national personnel 
can fill gaps in local expertise and ongoing training and professional development of local 
personnel promotes sustainable accountability once international experts leave.60 
International personnel can also negate perceptions of impartiality.61 The domestic location 
and host state ownership of the court supports legitimacy from the point of view of the local 
population.62  As noted above, the conceptual “promise” of hybrid courts potentially support 
the three principles of justice being seen to be done, host state ownership and UN leadership. 
However, the past and present examples of hybrid courts have in practice fallen short of 
such ideals. 
The purported “success” of the hybrid courts has been limited to the number of completed 
prosecutions of high-ranking officials complicit in mass atrocities.63  And while these courts 
                                                          
57 Agreement Between the United Nations And the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea GA 
Res A/Res/57/228 B (2003). See also See S Scully “Judging the Success and Failures of the Extraordinary 
Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia” (2011) 13 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 301 at 322-334; C 
Campbell “Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Trials are a Shocking Failure” TIME (13 February 2014) 
www.time.com. 
58 Agreement Between the United Nations And the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea,  
above n 53, art 2 (2)(a)-(b). 
59 P McAuliffe “Hybrid Courts in Retrospect: Of Lost Legacies and Modest Futures” in Y McDermott, W 
Schabas and N Hayes (eds) The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical 
Perspectives (Taylor and Francis, London, 2013) at 445.  
60 At 455; see also Mendez, above n 19.  
61 McAuliffe, above n 59, at 455.  
62 J D Ciorcian and A Heindel Law, Meaning and Violence: Hybrid Justice: The Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 2014) at 70.  
63 See for example A Cassese Report on the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Submitted by the Independent 
Expert, 2006); Summary of the Report to the Secretary-General of the Commission of Experts to Review the 
Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 S/2005/458.  
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“should be commended for establishing accountability as a standard of law and public policy 
where the alternative was systematic impunity”,64 they struggled with realising the more 
holistic goals. For example, many hybrid courts were unsuccessful at securing sufficient 
local ownership to foster legitimacy from the perspective of the community.65 Conversely, 
the ECCC has been criticised for allowing too much local ownership, resulting in significant 
delay and political interference, negatively impacting on the perception of impartiality.66 A 
focus on prosecution and conviction meant transferring a significant role to international 
judges and prosecutors and weakening the participation of domestic personnel.67  
Some scholars68 argue that the above issues with hybrid courts are related to implementation 
rather than their underlying ideals. Collectively, the hybrid courts lacked the required 
resources and training for outreach and local inclusivity.69 Therefore, in order to avoid or 
mitigate similar issues with a special court for peacekeepers there would need to be sufficient 
resources (both financial and human). The UN could take leadership in supporting the 
allocation of such resources. Additionally, it is fundamental that a positive and open 
dialogue between the host state and the UN be utilised in order to implement host state 
ownership appropriately.  
 
 
                                                          
64 McAuliffe, above n 59, at 458.  
65 For these criticisms see T Perriello and M Wierda Lessons from the Deployment of International Judges and 
Prosecutors in Kosovo (International Center for Transitional Justice, March 2006); C Reiger and M Wierda 
The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In Retrospect (International Center for Transitional Justice, March 
2006); P Rapoza “Hybrid Criminal Tribunals and Concept of Ownership: Who Owns the Process?” (2006) 21 
American University International Law Review 525.  
66 Ciorcian and Heindel, above n 62, at 71.  
67 McAuliffe, above n 59, at 460.  
68 For example Dickinson, above n 28, at 307; N Jain “Conceptualising Internationalisation in Hybrid Courts” 
(2009) Singapore Yearbook of International Law at 85.  
69 Cohen, above n 49, at 14; McAuliffe, above n 59, at 463. 
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(B) COMMON FACTORS: APPLICABLE TO MILITARY PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL 
In Sarah William’s book Hybrid and International Criminal Tribunals a number of factors 
were identified as the driving force behind the establishment of a hybrid court.70 These 
factors included the need to ensure accountability where crimes are of concern to the 
international community, to preserve state sovereignty to support the national legal system, 
to avoid immunities to domestic prosecution, and to “ensure that trials meet international 
fair trial standards”.71 Arguably, these factors can be applied in the context of sexual 
exploitation and abuse by military forces and can also align closely with the three conceptual 
principles of justice being seen to be done, host state ownership and UN leadership. 
(I) SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE BY PEACEKEEPERS IS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CONCERN 
One of the common aspects of hybrid tribunals to date is that they focus on international 
crimes.72 Hybrid tribunals have been established in the wake of armed conflict where mass 
atrocities have been committed and may be ongoing.73 This may be accompanied by a 
complete breakdown of the judicial system and infrastructure.74 Both the context and the 
crimes committed are generally of “international concern”; for example, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and war crimes. Sarah Williams has argued that the inclusion of at least 
one international crime is a necessary attribute of any hybrid court.75 Moreover, Williams 
                                                          
70 Williams, above n 19. 
71 At 196. 
72 For crimes within material jurisdiction of the various hybrid courts see regulation 1999/1, above n 48 and 
Regulation 1999/24, above n 48 [Kosovo Panels]; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, above n 52, 
arts 2-4 [Sierra Leone]; Regulation 2000/15, above n 55, at [1.3] [East Timor]; Agreement Between the United 
Nations And the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of 
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, above n 53, art 9 [ECCC]. 
73 Williams, above n 19, at 196; Cassese, above n 25, at 10. 
74 Such as was the case with East Timor: Mendez, above n 19, at 82. 
75 Williams, above n 19, at 248. 
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argues that in order to intervene in the affected state’s sovereignty via the establishment of 
a hybrid court, it needs to be justified by including crime/s of “international concern”.76  
As discussed previously in this thesis, although it may be possible that acts of sexual 
exploitation and abuse could fulfil the rigid requirements of these international crimes, they 
are unlikely to do so.77 However, sexual exploitation and abuse by military contingent 
members ought to be of international concern simply because UN peacekeepers represent 
the international community. The presence of a multi-national peacekeeping operation 
should be enough for the required international dimension. Moreover, as established in 
Chapter Two, sexual exploitation can be generally considered violence against women under 
international human rights law, which is also then a matter of “international concern”.78 
Peacekeepers deployed into post-conflict areas are there to protect the local people and not 
abuse them in the process. Such abuses should be of international concern. Therefore, the 
absence of an “international crime” strictly defined should not preclude a hybrid court for 
the special purpose of prosecuting military contingent members. Additionally, the Group of 
Legal Experts in 2006 noted specifically that a hybrid court need not include international 
crimes.79  
(II) A TRIBUNAL FOR PEACEKEEPERS WOULD SUPPORT (HOST) STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM.  
As argued previously, there is preference among scholars to keep accountability for crimes 
within the host state’s legal system; one of the reasons is that it would bolster the sovereignty 
of the host state.80 It is important for the victim and their community to see justice being 
                                                          
76 At 248.  
77 See Chapter Seven: The International Criminal Court.  
78 See Chapter Two: What is Sexual Abuse and Sexual Exploitation? 
79 Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 2, at [34].  
80 Williams, above n 19, at 59.  
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done and this is achieved better when prosecution takes place in the host state. This would 
also provide transparency of the accountability process for the international community. The 
advantage of a hybrid court in the host state is that the victim’s community would have some 
ownership over the process of justice against perpetrators.81 Justice is “seen to be done”. 
The addition of international personnel may also benefit the local community’s perception 
of the tribunal’s legitimacy, especially where the national legal system has suffered from 
corruption or partiality.82 However, there can be legitimate criticism where international 
personnel have more influence over the legal system as it can hark back to imperialism.83 
Consultation with the local community could be important here. Therefore, a balance must 
be struck between international and domestic personnel.  
In many host states, domestic capacity building is one of the key aspects of a peacekeeping 
mission.84 Implementation of institutions that bolster local capacity will therefore be an 
advantage to the national legal system of the host state. Moreover, a court for peacekeepers 
that takes on a mixed or hybrid model will likely avoid TCC fears that nationals will be 
subjected to unfair trials by a host state alone without civil rights safeguards.  
It should be noted that the more successful hybrid tribunals had clear mandates in terms of 
duration, structure and ownership. For instance, in Sierra Leone the Special Courts were 
administered by local personnel appointed by the UN.85 A strong registrar (mutually agreed 
                                                          
81 Dickinson, above n 28, at 306. 
82 At 306; Mendez, above n 19, at 70. 
83 Dickinson, above n 28, at 306; in Sierra Leone a common criticism of the Special Courts was that they were 
“western courts” removed from the domestic system and ruled by the international community, see Mendez, 
above n 19, at 79.  
84 See for example, Security Council Resolution 2149 SC Res S/Res/2149 (2014) [MINUSCA]; Security 
Council Resolution 1927 SC Res S/Res/1927 (2010) [MINUSTAH]; Letter Dated 5 June 2007 from the 
Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council S/2007/307/Rev.1 (2007) [UNAMID]; Statement 
by the President of the Security Council SC Prest S/Prest/2006/38 (2006) [UNMIL]; Security Council 
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85 Cohen, above n 49, at 12-13; Mendez, above n 19, at 81-82. 
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between the UN and the Government) meant few problems with day-to-day direction.86 This 
can be compared to East Timor where success of the Special Panels was hindered by 
arguments between the UN and the Government regarding ownership.87 This included long 
delays, for example, due to misunderstandings about who was to pay for electricity supplied 
to the court itself.88 There were also disagreements as to appointments of judges that delayed 
court processes for well over a year.89 These problems were partly attributed to the lack of 
negotiation between the East Timorese and the UN; as the Special Panels were created under 
UN regulations, the focus of decision-making concerned UN priorities rather than those of 
the affected community.90 Therefore, the creation of a hybrid tribunal for the special purpose 
of prosecuting military contingent members would likely benefit from negotiations between 
affected states.  
A dialogue between member states and the UN would be a necessary first step. However, in 
the case of the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia, the dialogue between the UN and the 
state government caused years of delay. On the one hand, the Cambodian government was 
reluctant to give up full ownership of the process (including a majority of local personnel); 
on the other, the Secretary-General had serious concerns about Cambodian partiality and 
fairness in the local legal system.91 The functioning of the ECCC has been hindered by 
continued political interference.92 In such cases where there is the likelihood of political 
corruption or undue political interference from the host state government, the principle of 
host state ownership would have to give way to the other two principles, particularly UN 
leadership. For example, the UN might implement a majority of international personnel or 
                                                          
86 Cohen, above n 49, at 12-13. 
87 At 9. 
88 At 9-10.  
89 At 10. 
90 Williams, above n 19, at 191.  
91 S Nouwen “‘Hybrid Courts’: The Hybrid Category of a New Type of International Crimes Court” Utrecht 
Law Review (research paper, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, 2011) 190 at 194.   
92 Scully, above n 57, at 322-334; Campbell, above n 57. 
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appoint an independent registrar. Nevertheless, in order to incorporate host state ownership 
(where plausible) such dialogue between states and the UN about a tribunal could be a 
lengthy process. 
(III) A TRIBUNAL FOR PEACEKEEPERS WOULD AVOID LEGAL IMMUNITIES AND 
FILL THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP 
A hybrid court for peacekeepers may mitigate the current gap in accountability where the 
troop-contributing country does not prosecute. Where hybrid tribunals have been suggested 
to solve the accountability problem in sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, it has 
been argued that troop-contributing countries should retain exclusive criminal jurisdiction 
over their troops.93 However, the Group of Legal Experts in 2006 argued that hybrid 
tribunals could be used to “facilitate host state jurisdiction”, suggesting that the host state 
would have primary jurisdiction.94 Nevertheless, the Group in that report were concerned 
only with jurisdiction over categories of personnel falling outside military contingent 
members, favouring exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the TCC.95 In the peacekeeping 
context there is an added layer of complexity that the pre-existing examples of hybrid 
tribunals do not need to consider. In Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia the 
issue of jurisdiction was less ambiguous as crimes were committed within the territory of 
that state, by nationals or members of the previous governing body. In the peacekeeping 
context, there are two states which can legitimately claim jurisdiction over conduct 
committed by military members; the host state and the troop-contributing country. The 
sovereignty of two states needs to be balanced. It is due to this added level of complexity 
that Roisin Burke has argued for an alternate version of the current hybrid tribunal model 
                                                          
93 Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents, above n 13, at 232; Zeid Report, above 
n 1, at [33].  
94 Group of Legal Experts, above n 2, at [33].  
95 At [7].  
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(discussed below), which differs from the Group of Legal Experts’ recommendation above 
as Burke favours retention of TCC exclusive criminal jurisdiction.96  
(IV) A TRIBUNAL FOR PEACEKEEPERS WOULD ENSURE FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS 
Past and present examples of hybrid tribunals have ensured fair trial standards and human 
rights protections.97 There is no reason to assume that the same could not be incorporated 
into a special court for peacekeepers. Such standards could be ensured and facilitated by the 
United Nations taking into account human rights norms related to criminal trials, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.98 
(5) TRI-HYBRID TRIBUNAL 
In this section I will explore the “tri-hybrid” tribunal system put forward by Roisin Burke.99 
Using similar justifications explored above for the establishment of hybrid courts (increasing 
legitimacy of decision in the host state, local capacity building, and expressive value of 
normative decisions), Burke expands on current models and puts forward a tribunal based 
on the cooperation of the troop-contributing state, host state, and the UN.  
Under general jurisdictional principles in international law the criminal conduct of 
peacekeepers can give rise to both territorial jurisdiction (host state) and jurisdiction based 
on active personality (TCC). According to Burke, this “dual jurisdiction” should be 
expressly acknowledged in the creation of a new tribunal.100 Therefore, jurisdiction should 
                                                          
96 Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents, above n 13, at 245. 
97 See for example Regulation 1999/1, above n 48 and Regulation 1999/24, above n 48 [Kosovo]; Statute of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, above n art 52 [Sierra Leone]; Agreement Between the United Nations And 
the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed 
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, above n 57, art 13 [ECCC]. 
98 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976). 
99 Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents, above n 13, at 245-251. 
100 Burke “UN Military Peacekeeper Complicity in Sexual Abuse”, above n 13, at 394. 
240 
 
be apportioned between the host state and the TCC.101 This follows a similar line of 
argument taken by the Group of Legal Experts in 2006, where it was suggested that host 
state jurisdiction should be favoured in any alternative system of prosecution.102 However, 
the Group were not considering military personnel, favouring the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the troop-contributing country. A tri-hybrid model may be a way to reconcile or balance the 
two perspectives (between host state jurisdiction and TCC exclusive jurisdiction) and 
potentially solve the conflicting jurisdiction problem presented by a hybrid model.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that at the heart of Burke’s alternative court structure is the 
retention of TCC exclusive criminal jurisdiction.103  Thus, a proposed new tribunal for 
peacekeepers would exercise secondary jurisdiction in the event that the TCC is unable and 
unwilling to take action (similar to the situation of complementarity under the International 
Criminal Court).104 Under Burke’s new hybrid system the TCC would also hold partial 
jurisdiction over their national members (although the author does not go on to explain what 
is meant by “partial jurisdiction”).105  
Burke explores a system where the split of jurisdictional components between the TCC and 
host state would need to be agreed between the UN and member states.106 Moreover, the 
precise split of jurisdiction may depend on each mission and particular host state. For 
example, while one host state may have the infrastructure in place to have jurisdiction over 
the investigation, prosecution and sentencing, another host state may not (due to conflict, 
natural disaster or diaspora).107 An agreement as to the split of jurisdiction would need to be 
                                                          
101 At 394.  
102 Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 2, at [27]. 
103 Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents, above n 13, at 232.  
104 At 232; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 17 July 1998, 
entered into force 1 July 2002) [Rome Statute] at art 17.  
105 Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents, above n 13, at 232.  
106 At 246. 
107 At 246. 
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negotiated between the parties, including the UN as the administrator of the particular 
peacekeeping mission’s mandate. Due to its binding nature, a treaty would be an applicable 
instrument in which to have such an agreement; perhaps through the pre-existing agreements 
such as the Status-of-Forces agreement (between the UN and the host state) and the 
Memorandum of Understating (between the UN and the TCC).108  However, this process 
could prove long and tedious if there are disagreements between the host states and TCCs 
demands in terms of jurisdiction over troops. Also, in separate agreements it may be difficult 
to reconcile the demands of the host state versus those of the TCC. To avoid this potential 
problem, it could be possible to negotiate a multilateral treaty or utilise a Security Council 
resolution and this would also avoid the need for consent of the host state or the TCC.  
As with existing hybrid courts, Burke’s tri-hybrid model envisions mixed international and 
domestic personnel where necessary, including administrators, lawyers and judges.109 
Moreover a “central feature” would include a roster of skilled personnel to draw from and 
be on standby in order to deploy when needed.110 Again, taking the Group of Legal Experts’ 
2006 report into consideration, the host state would be given priority under this model in 
terms of personnel.111 As host state personnel are likely to understand local laws and custom, 
language and the situation on the ground, this knowledge should be utilised, especially in 
the investigation stage.112   
 
 
                                                          
108 2007 MOU, above n 20; Model Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and Host Countries 
GA A/45/594 (1990) [Model-SOFA] art 47(b). 
109 Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents, above n 13, at 247.  
110 At 246-247. 
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(6) DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED MODELS: A HYBRID SOLUTION? 
Having explored the concepts of hybrid and tri-hybrid tribunals and how they might apply 
in the peacekeeping context, in this section I will further explore a special court for 
peacekeepers and what structure it might have. Moreover, I will discuss three potential 
hurdles in establishing such a tribunal; the material jurisdiction (criminalised conduct within 
sexual exploitation and abuse), the political will of states (and how states might sign up to 
such a tribunal), and resourcing the tribunal.  
As discussed above, under Burke’s tri-hybrid model the troop-contributing state still has a 
major role. Justification for the retention of exclusive criminal jurisdiction by the 
contributing states has been “sovereign prerogative.”113 This is the notion that the criminal 
investigation and prosecution of military members are a special part of a state’s exercise of 
sovereignty and an integral feature of the command and control structures of their particular 
forces.114 The fear associated with removing the exclusive jurisdiction of TCCs is the decline 
of contributed troops from states.115 The UN may fail to draw enough personnel from states 
if there was a possibility that another state or institution would investigate and prosecute 
their military members.  
The fear that states might not contribute their troops if their personnel would be subject to 
the jurisdiction of another judicial institution has never been tested.  Moreover, member 
states who contribute troops receive funding from the UN; for the top contributing states 
(many of which are developing states) peacekeeping can generate a substantial amount of 
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funding for their local economies.116 The question is whether such states would likely forgo 
monetary benefits if the exclusive jurisdiction were removed? Additionally, if the 
international community must accept that in order for troops to be contributed by states then 
it must also be accepted that some (predominately, if not exclusively, male)117 peacekeepers 
will commit sexual exploitation and abuse (against primarily female victims) with impunity, 
then I argue that the structure of peacekeeping operations that allows this behaviour 
unabated must be seriously reviewed.118 For the UN, to expect the international community 
to except such behaviour from peacekeepers would not only reinforce a culture of sexual 
exploitation and abuse, but would implicitly support the oppression of women. It has been 
established earlier in this thesis that sexual exploitation and abuse represent human rights 
abuses and, when committed by peacekeepers, this is of international concern. The 
international community should be able to expect that states will continue to contribute 
troops even if personnel are held accountable by an independent judicial institution.   
I argue that the exclusive jurisdiction to the TCC must be changed; I submit that an 
alternative tribunal or special court which envisions the retention of exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction to troop-contributing countries would be unlikely to materially change the 
current lack of accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse committed by military 
personnel. If the TCC needs to have been deemed “unwilling” or “unable” to exercise 
jurisdiction themselves in order for a hybrid court to have jurisdiction then this is similar to 
the requirements under the Rome Statute for the exercise of jurisdiction by the International 
                                                          
116 See for example, K Krishnasamy “Pakistan’s Peacekeeping Experiences” (2002) 9 International 
Peacekeeping 103 at 111-113; see also United Nations Peacekeeping “Financing Peacekeeping” (August 2015) 
<https://www.un.org>. 
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Criminal Court (ICC).119 In Chapter Seven I noted that this was a negative attribute of the 
ICC. Although it could be argued that the possibility of another tribunal having jurisdiction 
over their troops may encourage more states to take steps in investigating and prosecuting 
sexual exploitation and abuse cases, the time delay between the decision or failure to 
exercise jurisdiction and the conclusion that the state is indeed “unable or unwilling” may 
drastically hinder subsequent efforts to ensure accountability.120 In criminal cases involving 
sexual conduct the timeliness of the investigation component is essential to proving an 
offence in prosecution, particular in regard to collective medical evidence.121 Issues relating 
to undue delay have been recognised in the 2007 Model-Memorandum of Understanding 
which provides that where a TCC has not notified the UN of their intention to investigate 
within 10 working days, then the UN will initiate their own administrative investigation in 
order preserve evidence.122 Thus, for a court to have secondary jurisdiction or be of “last 
resort” may not solve the accountability problem.  
The exclusive jurisdiction of troop-contributing countries should be restricted to “functional 
immunity”. This would allow military contingent members to be immune from host state 
legal action (or the jurisdiction of another judicial institution) involving conduct performed 
within their official capacity and would align with immunity granted to other categories of 
peacekeeping personnel.123 Acts within “official capacity” could never include serious 
misconduct, such as sexual exploitation and abuse.  
                                                          
119 Rome Statute, art 17. 
120 For the point that exercise of jurisdiction by another court may encourage domestic prosecution see 
generally Shany, above n 29. 
121 See generally, J Morse “Documenting Mass Rape: Medical Evidence Collection Techniques as 
Humanitarian Technology” (2014) 8 Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 63. 
122 2007 MOU, art 7 quater 3(a); see also Secretary-General Special Measures for Protection from Sexual 
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Taking the above ideas and reimagining them as a court of first instance, I will discuss the 
possible structure and jurisdiction of an alternative court model for prosecuting military 
contingent members for sexual exploitation and abuse.   
(A) STRUCTURE  
One of the “lessons learned” from previous practice of hybrid tribunals is that an agreement 
between the affected state and the UN was a major advantage to their overall success.124 In 
the example of the hybrid tribunal in Kosovo, the local Albanian Kosovars viewed the Panels 
with scepticism and the lack of confidence in the domestic legal system is likely to have 
stemmed from the lack of consultation with the affected communities.125 This can be 
compared with the process in Sierra Leone, where the government initiated negotiation for 
a tribunal with the UN; there was also the added advantage of having an outreach program 
so that the local communities had a stronger connection to the Special Court itself.126  
The difficulty with peacekeeping missions is that each one is different in terms of its 
mandate and the context of the community in which they are deployed. Each host state may 
have different needs in terms of justice mechanisms and thus may have different levels of 
involvement in a court for peacekeepers. Depending on the mission, a bilateral treaty with 
the host state for the purpose of establishing a tribunal may not be possible; for example, it 
may not be clear whether there is a sovereign government with which to make such an 
agreement.127 For inclusivity, consultation with local communities is an appropriate first 
step.128 An outreach program to raise awareness of such a court and connect its work with 
                                                          
124 Cohen, above n 49, at 23;  
125 Mendez, above n 19, at 76-77. 
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the affected communities will be necessary to achieve an adequate level of host state 
ownership and “justice being seen to be done” for the victims and the communities. As stated 
above, such agreements may be made bilaterally between each host state, perhaps by 
amending the current model-Status-of-Forces Agreement; and specifics may then be tailored 
through negotiations.129 The structure agreed to must be reflected in the corresponding 
MOUs between the UN and TCCs involved. Alternatively, there could be a general 
multilateral treaty determining major aspects of such a tribunal, for example, stating that the 
court is one of first instance, on-site, and detailing the material jurisdiction (see below); thus, 
leaving details relating to host state ownership to be negotiated within the SOFAs and 
MOUs.  
Although Burke mentions in passing that the UN should have some role in a tri-hybrid 
tribunal, she does not elaborate.130 Taking the example of the more successful hybrid 
tribunals (in terms of day-to-day running of the court, and host state ownership), such as the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone, I would suggest that the UN should have a significant role in 
administration and facilitation, for instance through a centralised registrar. This would 
ensure the principle of UN leadership. A centralised UN administrative body could be 
partially influenced by the 2009 Stimson Center Report’s recommendation for a Judicial 
Support Division.131 In addition to providing central administration for the hybrid court(s), 
such a body could assess the host state’s judicial system and available expertise and provide 
logical support and assistance accordingly. To encourage inclusivity, the appointed 
                                                          
129 Model SOFA, art 100. 
130 Beyond that existing UN organs, such as the OIOS might be able to bolster the investigative process of a 
new court, see Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents, above n 13, at 245 and 247. 
131 See W J Durch, K N Andrews, M L England and M C Weed Improving Criminal Accountability in United 
Nations Peace Operations (STIMSON Center Report, Washington, 2009) at xiv-xv. 
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individual(s) may be mutually agreed between TCCs and host states or at least such 
interested parties should be consulted.  
Because the purpose of a special tribunal is to prosecute international personnel, it may be 
appropriate that the tribunal operates separately from the host state’s national courts.132  
Additionally, this may be even more appropriate where domestic legal institutions have 
suffered from conflict or natural disaster (for example, where physical infrastructure is 
destroyed or local personnel are missing).133  
Again, Sarah Williams’ work on Hybrid and Internationalised Criminal Tribunals is useful 
here in terms of the possible structure or features of such a court for peacekeepers.134 Based 
on the author’s examination of practice, Williams contends that there are six defining 
features of a hybrid tribunal; first, that the tribunal should have a criminal function. The 
purpose of a hybrid court for military contingent members would be to hold individuals to 
account for crimes of a sexual nature (presumably other crimes as well, such as homicide).135 
Williams suggests the second structural element of hybrid courts is that they are temporary 
or transitional in nature. As the purpose of the tribunal would be to prosecute military 
personnel, the temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal would last as long as the peacekeeping 
mission itself. Therefore, the tribunal would be temporary (although, it may be long-term 
depending on the length of the mission).  
Williams’ third defining feature is that tribunals should have a mix of international and 
domestic personnel. The element of mixed personnel aligns with a policy of inclusivity and 
supports legitimacy within the principle of host state ownership. Mixed personnel would 
                                                          
132 For example, the Special Court of Sierra Leone operated outside from the domestic court system Nouwen, 
above n 91, at 202.  
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see Mendez, above n 19, at 84.  
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need to have a certain level of expertise and sensitivity, particularly in cases involving sexual 
offences. Some TCCs may lack such expertise or sensitivity, and this gap may be filled by 
experts from other TCCs or by additional training, perhaps provided by the UN. A lack of 
expertise may lead to a prejudiced system and a subversion of the rule of law. A potential 
issue that may arise in the context of mixed personnel is a conflict between legal values for 
example, between a prosecutor from a civil law background and another from a common 
law background.136 Cooperation between domestic and international personnel will have to 
be reflected in the model of the trial system, which may mean striking a balance between 
adversarial and inquisitorial models. Where the balance is struck may depend on the 
particular host state involved.  
There are already mixed personnel structures in place within the UN for responding to sexual 
exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. The Office of Internal Oversight Service (OIOS) is 
the investigative arm of the UN and is often made up of mixed personnel.137 Moreover, for 
the investigation of crimes alleged to have been committed by military contingent members, 
investigative teams are led by the TCC national investigative officer.138 These structures 
could be utilised under Burke’s tri-hybrid model to include a host state personnel presence 
if necessary (discussed further below). 
For the fourth feature, Williams has suggested that there should be international assistance 
in resourcing the tribunal. As the United Nations receives financial contributions from its 
member states it follows that a tribunal led by the UN for the prosecution of peacekeeping 
troops would be resourced from international sources.139 I will explore resourcing a hybrid 
                                                          
136 Cassese, above n 25, at 7. 
137 See generally 2007 MOU, art 7 quater. The UN has indicated replacing the OIOS investigative teams with 
“Immediate Response Teams”, these are assumed to still be made up of international personnel see UN 
Conduct and Discipline Unit “Fact Sheet on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse” (3 September 2015) 
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138 2007 MOU, art 7 quater.  
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tribunal for peacekeeping below. The fifth structural feature is that listed crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal should be a mix of international and ordinary national crimes. As 
already noted above, I have argued that the inclusion of international crimes is not 
necessarily a requirement or a pre-requisite feature of a hybrid tribunal; nevertheless, sexual 
exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers can be regarded as of international concern.140 
Williams’ final purported attribute is that hybrid tribunals should involve the participation 
of more than the affected state. A court for peacekeepers would involve the host state, TCCs 
and the UN.   
The following discussion breaks down jurisdictional aspects of a possible tribunal for 
military contingent members, including the split of investigation/prosecution/sentencing.  
(B) JURISDICTION 
Burke has suggested that jurisdiction should be apportioned between the host state, the TCC 
and the UN.141 The precise split of components (investigation, prosecution, and sentencing) 
may be something to be worked out in negotiations in the bilateral agreements. However, it 
may be possible for the current system regarding investigation and prosecution to be 
modified to accommodate mixed personnel. Currently, where necessary, the UN through the 
Office of Internal Oversight Services, will cooperate with national investigation officers’ 
sent by the TCC on any investigations into serious misconduct (this includes acts of sexual 
exploitation and abuse).142  
Cooperation is currently in the form of administrative evidence gathering and sharing of 
information, obtaining consent from the host state’s authorities where appropriate, and other 
                                                          
140 A more detailed discussion on crimes that should be within jurisdiction follows below. 
141 Burke “UN Military Peacekeeper Complicity in Sexual Abuse”, above n 13, at 394.  
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logistical assistance.143 This method of joint investigation is a reflection of the Zeid report’s 
recommendation; “the participation of troop-contributing country at an expert level [in the 
United Nations investigation] would help to ensure that evidence was gathered in conformity 
with the laws of the troop-contributing country so it could be subsequently used by the 
country to take action against the contingent member.”144 However the procedure of 
cooperative investigation of serious misconduct committed by military contingents has 
come under some scrutiny.  
Under the Model-Memorandum of Understanding (between the TCC and the UN) there is a 
required procedure of the conduct of investigations of serious misconduct by military 
contingent members (includes sexual exploitation and abuse). This procedure includes a 
time limit on the troop-contributing countries to initiate an investigation of allegations (10 
days), and the ability of the UN (through the Office of Internal Oversight Services and 
mission Conduct and Discipline Teams) to conduct administrative fact-finding 
investigations if the time limit expires or the TCC is otherwise unresponsive.145 
Nevertheless, UN investigations must also attempt to include a representative from the 
national contingent investigation team (if available).146 Although a seemingly delineated 
process, examining OIOS reports reveal that this process is not always followed.147 
The Office of Internal Oversight Services has noted that in the majority of cases (of sexual 
exploitation and abuse) involving military contingents, TCCs have not complied with the 10 
                                                          
143 At art 7 quater 4(d).  
144 Revised draft Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and [Participating State] 
contributing resources to [the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation] GA A/61/494 (2006) at 9; Zeid 
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145 2007 MOU, art 7 quater 12. 
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day deadline of responding to an allegation.148 In fact, some TCCs were scrutinised in the 
OIOS 2015 report for causing long delays.149 Moreover, the OIOS has noted the varied 
standards of investigation between TCCs leading to disagreements about factual information 
regarding cases.150 However, the OIOS and mission Conduct and Discipline Teams do not 
have the capacity to undertake criminal investigations and so are open for criticism about 
standards of investigation (for example, administrative investigations do not involve 
obtaining medical evidence, whereas criminal investigations do).151 Therefore, standards are 
different across TCCs and the UN investigative organs. Overall, the OIOS noted a call to 
redraft the procedures in the MOU.152 
Taking into consideration the above issues with the current procedure of cooperation in 
investigation, it would be necessary for the UN to fill the gap in investigation standards and 
streamline the cooperative aspect more clearly under the MOU. Nevertheless, as the tribunal 
I am suggesting is a court of first instance led and (at least partially) administered by the 
UN, then it would be necessary for the UN to negotiate an agreed standard of investigation 
and prosecution with its member states. Moreover, the investigative arm of the UN should 
be trained and equipped with the capacity to undertake criminal investigation (according to 
such agreed standardised methods of investigation).  
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Although the procedure in the MOU for cooperative investigation has been criticised, in 
some cases cooperation has been successful. In 2012, an allegation of sexual abuse was 
made against the Pakistani Formed Police Unit in Haiti.153 In response the OIOS 
investigative team cooperated with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Police 
Division) and the Haitian National Police to conduct an investigation.154 The cooperative 
element of the investigation saved time and a preliminary report was made to the 
contributing country within two weeks.155 Therefore, a similar cooperative element could be 
used to incorporate mixed personnel international and national personnel for the purposes 
of investigation for a hybrid tribunal for peacekeepers. Such personnel may also be drawn 
from a roster of expertise, so as to avoid delay in initiating investigations. 
On other matters of jurisdiction; it would make sense that the tribunal would remain only as 
long as the particular mission, and therefore be temporary. However, this would mean that 
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse that are reported after the mission ends may not 
be investigated or adjudicated. Additionally, the crimes within its jurisdiction would have to 
be committed within the territory of the host state. Moreover, although military contingent 
members are the focus of this thesis, it would be appropriate that all peacekeeping personnel 
would be within the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
(C) THREE POTENTIAL HURDLES 
Having explored what a special court for peacekeepers might look like and the jurisdiction 
of such a court, I will now turn to three particular issues; material jurisdiction (sexual 
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exploitation and abuse as criminalised conduct), political will (how states may sign up to a 
court), and resourcing the court. 
(I) MATERIAL JURISDICTION – CRIMINALISED CONDUCT  
In 2006, the UN-appointed Group of Legal Experts noted that sexual exploitation and abuse 
by peacekeepers falls “between an ordinary criminal offence and an international crime”.156 
In a later report the Group reemphasised this point, adding that peacekeepers are in a position 
of trust and they represent the international community; how they interact with locals will 
contribute to the reputation of the United Nations.157 United Nations peacekeepers represent 
the international community and any serious misconduct committed by personnel is of 
international concern, particularly those involving the local population as alleged victims. 
As such, I argue that at least some forms of sexual exploitation and abuse should be included 
as “crimes” within jurisdiction of a special tribunal for peacekeepers.  
Forms of sexual exploitation and abuse are included in the Draft Convention on the Criminal 
Accountability of the United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission (still under 
consideration by member states).158 The Draft Convention was suggested by the Group of 
Legal Experts as a long term solution to the “accountability gap” but is aimed purely at 
categories of peacekeeping personnel falling outside military contingents.159 However, the 
crimes currently listed are useful for determining the forms of sexual exploitation and abuse 
that UN officials have deemed to be worthy of criminalising in a proposed multilateral 
treaty.  
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on Mission GA A/62/329 (2007) [Criminal Accountability Report] at [32]. 
158 Draft Convention on the Criminal Accountability of the United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission 
GA A/60/980 Annex III (2007): [Draft Convention].  
159 Criminal Accountability Report, above n 157, at [70].  
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There are currently two options proposed for the material jurisdiction of the Draft 
Convention. The first option is art 3(2) which provides: 
The serious crimes referred to in paragraph 1 of the present article are, for each 
state party establishing and exercising jurisdiction pursuant to this Convention 
those which, under the national law of that State party correspond to: 
… 
(c) Rape and acts of sexual violence; 
(d) Sexual offences involving children; 
It would seem that forms of sexual abuse have been included in the list of crimes, but not 
those relating to sexual exploitation. As argued in earlier in this thesis, “sexual abuse” under 
the current codes of conduct and the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Special Measures for 
Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (S-G Bulletin)160 covers the 
following conduct; rape, sexual violence and sex with minors. What is missing are forms 
relating to “sexual exploitation”; particularly survival sex. 
The alternative art 3(2) of the Draft Convention is potentially broader: 
The serious crimes referred to in paragraph 1 of the present article, for each 
State party establishing or exercising jurisdiction pursuant to this Convention, 
are: 
(a) Crimes of intentional violence against the person and sexual offences 
punishable under the national law of that State party by imprisonment or other 
                                                          
160 Above n 36. 
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deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least [one/two] year(s), or by 
a more severe penalty. 
The reference to “sexual offences” in this alternate article has the potential to encompass 
many forms of sexual exploitation and abuse.161 However, it is entirely reliant on the national 
laws of member states and does not seek to proscribe offences to be criminalised under 
domestic criminal law. It is less likely that forms of sexual exploitation would be included 
among member states’ criminal law, particularly survival sex (close to the notion of 
transactional sex). 
Both proposed articles of the Draft Convention seem to indicate that forms of sexual abuse 
committed by peacekeeping personnel are important enough to be described as “crimes” in 
a multilateral treaty. During the ongoing discussions between member states it seems that 
the inclusion of crimes of a “serious nature” has been generally supported.162 For the most 
part though, state representatives have not endeavoured to differentiate the “serious” crimes 
from “non-serious” crimes when talking about sexual exploitation and abuse.163 
Additionally, academic Roisin Burke argues that a tri-hybrid or hybrid tribunal should only 
have jurisdiction over “serious incidents of [sexual exploitation and abuse]”.164 However, 
Burke does not elaborate what forms of sexual exploitation and abuse she would consider 
“serious incidents”.  
                                                          
161 For critique see M O’Brien “Issues of the Draft Convention on the Criminal Accountability of United 
Nations Officials and Experts on Mission” in N Quenivet and S Shah-Davis (eds) International Law and Armed 
Conflict: Challenges in the 21st Century (YMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2010). 
162 General Assembly Summary record of the 5th Meeting GA A/C.6/63/SR.6 (2008) examples at [19], [35], 
and [36]; General Assembly Summary record of the 9th Meeting GA A/C.6/66/SR.9 (2011) examples at [10], 
[18], [24] and [43];  
163 Summary record of the 5th Meeting, above n 162, examples at [12] and [38]; Summary record of the 9th 
Meeting, above n 162, examples at [34], [44], and [50].  
164 Burke Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents, above n 13, at 243. 
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I argue that sexual exploitation (as survival sex) and sexual abuse committed by 
peacekeepers are international crimes. International crimes are more than just the narrowly 
defined “core crimes” included in the Rome Statute. Using Bassiouni’s criteria for 
international criminalisation supports sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers being 
interpreted as international crimes.165 This criteria includes the following;166 
(a) The prohibited conduct affects a significant international national interest; 
(b) The prohibited conduct constitutes egregious conduct deemed offensive to the 
commonly shared values of the world community, including what has been 
referred to as conduct shocking to the conscience of humanity; 
(c) The prohibited conduct has transnational implications in that it involved or effects 
more than one state in its planning, preparation, or commission, either through the 
diversity of nationality of its perpetrators or victims, or because the means 
employed transcend national boundaries 
(d) The conduct is harmful to an internationally protected person or interest; and 
(e) The conduct violates internationally protected interest but it does not rise to the 
level required by (a) or (b), however, because of its nature, it can best be prevented 
and suppressed by international criminalization. 
The relevant criteria are (c), (d) and (e). In relation to (e), I argue that forms of sexual abuse 
(rape, sexual violence and sexual activity with children) must be included in a list of 
applicable crimes within material jurisdiction of any alternative court for peacekeepers as 
                                                          
165 M Bassiouni International Criminal Law Series: Introduction to International Criminal Law (2nd ed, Brill 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2012) at 142. 
166 At 142. 
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that conduct has been accepted by member states and treaty bodies as “serious” in nature.167  
In regard to “sexual exploitation”, I argued in Chapter Two that the primary targeted conduct 
is survival sex; where sex is exchanged for assistance that peacekeepers have access to or 
which is already owed to the local population. The relationship is based on dependency and 
focusses on the peacekeeper’s position of power in relation to the beneficiary of assistance.  
Survival sex often occurs within a broader context of social and cultural inequalities 
(including extreme poverty) that marginalise women in post-conflict states. The presence of 
a (overwhelming masculine and militarised) peacekeeping force may exacerbate the 
inequalities that already exist. Peacekeepers will also have access to food, money, medicine, 
and other kinds of assistance that the local population does not and this creates the situation 
of differential power. They represent the international community, as well as their 
contributing state, and are in a position of trust within the community in which they are 
deployed. To abuse the unequal power dynamic by exchanging assistance for sex is 
exploitation and is of international concern (as argued above).  
Sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers has transnational implications. 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations are made up of multi-national forces, and sexual 
abuse is committed in a foreign state. As personnel represent the international community 
under the umbrella of the UN it is argued that the criteria for (c) is met in these 
circumstances. Furthermore, sexual exploitation and abuse is violence against women under 
international human rights law, as discussed in Chapter Three. Thus, victims should be 
protected from such harms. As a result, I argue that peacekeepers committing sexual 
exploitation and abuse should meet the criteria for (d).   
                                                          
167 These particular acts are considered “crimes” in the Draft Convention, art 3(2); see also discussion in 
Chapter Four: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse – State Obligations, particularly the following sections: “(1) 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment”, “(2) Sexual Activity with Children”, and “(3)(B) 
Criminalising Violence against Women”.  
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Overall, I would suggest that “sexual abuse” (defined as rape, sexual violence and sexual 
activity with children)168 and “sexual exploitation” (as survival sex) be included within the 
material jurisdiction of a hybrid court for peacekeepers as international crimes. The 
definition of “sexual exploitation” would therefore need to be drafted to reflect clearly 
survival sex. 
(II) POLITICAL WILL 
The second challenge I will discuss in relation to a special court for peacekeepers is the 
problem of political will. As previously noted, TCC exclusive criminal jurisdiction (for 
peacekeeping operations) exists as the default due to states’ continuing fears surrounding 
the jurisdiction of another judicial institution over their military forces.169 These fears 
include being subject to trials without appropriate human rights standards and the subversion 
of the sovereign prerogative to discipline or prosecute their own military forces.170 
Therefore, the point of this section is to discuss various options of signing up for a hybrid 
court for peacekeepers that may be offered in a situation of compromise to placate such 
fears. It also serves as an acknowledgement that a hybrid tribunal alternative for improving 
accountability (as with all options) is subject to the political will of states. 
The first option that may be available is a so-called “opt-in” measure whereby a multilateral 
agreement could be used to set up the major aspects of the court, but would only be 
                                                          
168 “Sexual activity with children” is included here notwithstanding the issues recognised in Chapter Two: 
What is Sexual Abuse and Sexual Exploitation? concerning the definition of “children” as being persons aged 
under18 years (for example, that the age of legal maturity will differ between states). 
169 Zeid Report, above n 1, at [80]; see also Dag Hammarskjold Summary Study of the Experience Derived 
from the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General GA A/3943 XIII (1958) 
at [136]; D Fleck “Introduction” in D Fleck (ed) The Handbook of The Law of Visiting States (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2001), at 5; Discussed in Part Two: Sanctions against the Troop-Contributing 
Countries.  
170 See generally D Fleck “Securing Status and Protection of Peacekeepers” in R Arnold and G A Knoops (eds) 
Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations under International Law (Transnational 
Publishers, New York, 2006) 141. 
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applicable to and applied by those states who have signed up. An advantage to such a 
mechanism is that it does not need consensus across all member states and may avoid delay 
caused by negotiations. An opt-in measure may also allow states which do not have the 
resources necessary to conduct investigations in a foreign state to share in the resources of 
an independent UN tribunal.171 However, peacekeeping personnel may be treated differently 
depending on whether states have chosen to “opt-in” and therefore an uneven application of 
justice may occur. Moreover, if applied through a multilateral treaty states may be able to 
make reservations, perhaps limiting criminalised conduct (to exclude survival sex, for 
example).172 Nevertheless, states cannot make specific reservations that target the object and 
purpose of the treaty;173 as improving accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse 
committed by peacekeepers would be within the object and purpose of an “opt-in” 
measure/treaty then such reservations seeking to limit its scope may not be valid. 
Another advantage of an opt-in measure may be that it could represent “best practice”; the 
idea that enough state interest and application would develop a model of behaviour and 
encourage improvement of accountability among states which were not a party. An example 
of best practice can be seen with the international criminal courts and their effect on non-
affected states’ prosecution of international crimes. It has been suggested by academics that 
the presence of international courts can increase the consciousness of the international 
community in relation to the seriousness of the conduct being prosecuted.174 Moreover, such 
tribunals may encourage prosecution by domestic courts, for example, local prosecutions in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo against military groups for international crimes have 
                                                          
171 Shany, above n 29, at 437 and 439.  
172 For general information about reservations to treaties see M Fitzmaurice “The Practical Working on the 
Law of Treaties” in M Evans (ed) International Law (4th  ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 166, at 
184-191. 
173 Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Advisory Opinion) Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1983) (Ser 
A) No. 3 at [61]. 
174 Shany, above n 29, at 436.  
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increased since the ICC began its trials over such crimes in the territory.175 Therefore, states 
that do not opt-in to a tribunal for peacekeepers may still be encouraged to exercise 
jurisdiction over their personnel by the practice of those states that do choose to opt-in.  
A second option is an “opt-out” measure; where peacekeeping personnel would be subject 
to the jurisdiction of a hybrid court outright, unless the troop-contributing country could 
establish that it was both willing and able to investigate and prosecute offenders. This is 
essentially the opposite of the International Criminal Court’s complementarity principle. An 
opt-out measure would encourage states to make the necessary changes to their domestic 
arrangements to investigate and prosecute their military contingent members if they wish to 
avoid the jurisdiction of an independent tribunal. In the interim, the jurisdiction of a hybrid 
court will ensure that sexual exploitation and abuse does not continue to be committed with 
impunity. In the early negotiations on the Rome Statute, there was some support for a similar 
“opt-out” measure, with support for the ICC having inherent jurisdiction, particularly over 
genocide.176 The opt-out measure was rejected in favour of complementarity to reflect the 
primacy of national jurisdiction and achieve consensus and widespread accession to the 
Rome Statute.177 Although these negotiations took place two decades ago, there is no 
indication that the position of states has changed in regard to complementarity. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
175 At 436.  
176 International Commission of Jurists The International Criminal Court: Third ICJ Position Paper (presented 
at the 1st Preparatory Committee of the ICC, August 1995) at 30-35. 
177 United Nations Information Centre in Sydney for Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific Preparatory 
Committee on International Criminal Court Discusses Complementarity Between National, International 
Jurisdictions (1st Session of the Preparatory Committee, 11th Meeting, April 1996);  United Nations 
Information Centre in Sydney for Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific Preparatory Committee on 
International Criminal Court Continues Considering Complementarity Between National, International 
Jurisdictions (1st Session of the Preparatory Committee, 13th Meeting, April 1996); United Nations 
Information Centre in Sydney for Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific International Criminal Court 
Should Not have Inherent Jurisdiction, Preparatory Committee Told  (1st Session of the Preparatory 
Committee, 15th Meeting, April 1996). 
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with the past and current UN reforms to improve the prevention and accountability for sexual 
exploitation and abuse seemingly not working,178 perhaps it is time to revisit this position. 
(III) RESOURCES 
It has long been recognised that hybrid court models are resource-intensive.179 A hybrid 
court for peacekeepers would likely be similarly expensive. Although it is acknowledged 
that a hybrid court is an expensive option and that the cost may be a barrier for states, I do 
not accept that a court cannot be budgeted for. United Nations’ gender or victim-related 
projects are often under-financed, as evidenced by the recent failure to adequately fund the 
United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse by UN Staff and Related Personnel (discussed below in Chapter 
Nine).180 To sufficiently resource a special court for peacekeepers would require a change 
in approach to funding priorities.  
In 2015 Malala Yousafzai (a Nobel Peace Prize recipient for her advocacy in education for 
girls) asked world leaders to consider diverting eight days of military spending into world-
wide free education for children.181 This figure is approximately $39 billion (USD). 
Additionally, a recent report regarding the UN mission in the Central African Republic and 
Chad revealed a surplus of unspent money (approximately $34 million USD).182 In this 
                                                          
178 As discussed in Chapter One: History of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping and UN 
Responses. 
179 Cohen, above n 49, at 13; Group of Legal Experts Report, above n 2, at [37]; Williams, above n 19, at 210.  
180 See for example, H Charlesworth “Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights 
in the United Nations” (2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1 at 11-13; H Charlesworth “Transforming 
the United Men’s Club: Feminist Futures for the United Nations” (1994) 4 Transnational Law & 
Contemporary Problems 421 at 432 and 447; see also, Secretary-General Special Measures for Protection 
from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse GA A/69/779 (2015) at [68]. 
181 M Khan “Malala Yousafzai: Cut 8 Days of Military Spending for 12 years of free education” IBTIMES (8 
July 2015) www.ibtimes.co.uk.  
182 Report of the Secretary-General Final Performance Report of the United Nations Mission in the Central 
African Republic and Chad GA A/70/559 (2015). Also noted by G Mathurin “Put Victims First: Time for UK 
Leadership at the UN” (media release by AIDS-Free World, 25 November 2015). 
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report the Secretary-General recommended this surplus be credited to member states.183 
Perhaps, such money could be redirected into other projects related to peacekeeping, such 
as a hybrid court for peacekeepers.  
Past examples of hybrid courts of a similar kind indicate the best method (so far) for 
resourcing is to set up a specific fund in which member states, and other interested parties, 
pay into on a regular basis.184 In his 2015 report, the Secretary-General stated the desire to 
set up a voluntary fund for victim assistance (related to sexual exploitation and abuse).185 
As a voluntary fund has already been proposed to respond to sexual exploitation and abuse, 
the financing of a special court for peacekeepers could also be attached to such a fund. 
Overall, the question of resourcing will inevitably be an issue when proposing any new 
mechanism at the international level. Currently, there appears to be enough money available 
to finance peacekeeping operations, as seen in the above example where there was a surplus 
of money for the mission in the Central African Republic. If there is enough money to send 
peacekeeping personnel to missions abroad, then there should be enough money available 
to ensure accountability for crimes committed by such personnel. Sexual exploitation and 
abuse is a human rights issue, and ultimately, if the international community (particularly 
the UN) is serious about human rights protection and accountability for violations, adequate 
resources will be found and allocated accordingly.  
 
                                                          
183 Final Performance Report of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, above 
n 152, at [7]. 
184 This was the case with the Special Court of Sierra Leone, although still underfunded the Special Court was 
far better resourced than the Special Panels in East Timor where funding was located within the UN mission 
budget: see Cohen, above n 49, at 13 and 25; Williams, above n 19, at 211. 




(D) HOW WOULD A HYBRID TRIBUNAL WORK? 
Having discussed why a hybrid tribunal could apply to the peacekeeping context in response 
to sexual exploitation and abuse committed by military contingent personnel it is useful to 
examine generally how such a hybrid tribunal might work.   
One of the most egregious early reports of sexual abuse included the media exposure of the 
story of “Elizabeth”, a 12 year old girl who was raped by 10 peacekeepers on her way home 
from school in Côte d’Ivoire.186 When her story was brought to public attention in 2007, 
none of her attackers were prosecuted.187 Left too traumatised to leave her village, Elizabeth 
and her community never saw justice being done. Under a hybrid tribunal for peacekeepers, 
cases like Elizabeth’s would certainly be dealt with differently. 
Upon an allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse, such as rape, an investigative team 
(perhaps drawn from a roster of related-expertise) made up of representatives of the host 
state (if appropriate), and the troop-contributing state concerned, and led by the investigative 
arm of the UN, would undertake a preliminary and formal investigation. This would avoid 
the current issues related with the MOU structure which can potentially involve many 
different entities investigating the same allegation (or none at all). Where appropriate, the 
cooperative element ensures some host state ownership and inclusivity, thus bringing some 
legitimacy to the process. With the UN taking the lead there should be an assurance of 
transparency.  The cooperative element, having been pre-agreed would mean the outcome 
of the investigation would be reached within a reasonable timeframe. This can be contrasted 
                                                          
186 M Pflanz “Six-year-olds Sexually Abused by UN Peacekeepers” The Daily Telegraph (26 May 2008) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news (“Elizabeth” is a pseudonym): Also mentioned briefly in Chapter One of this 
thesis. 
187 Above n 186. 
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with the current process under the MOU, where an inquiry into an allegation can take an 
average of 12 months.188 
Upon a positive investigation and decision to prosecute, the victim would see justice being 
done through the trial of their perpetrator taking place within the community via a hybrid 
court. The trial would be seen as legitimate and transparent because the host state would 
have some ownership in the process and running of the court itself. Unlike the status quo, 
where outcomes of cases are rarely reported back to the victim and their communities, the 
victim would have direct access to trial outcomes; so too would the international community. 
Upon conviction, any sentence could be served in the perpetrator’s home state (similar to 
the procedure under the International Criminal Court).189 
CONCLUSION  
In this chapter I argued that the three principles underlying this thesis would be best served 
by a hybrid court for peacekeepers. Justice is “seen to be done” by a hybrid model because 
it operates within the territory where the crime took place and where the victim’s community 
reside. Where appropriate, mixed personnel in investigation, prosecution, and day-to-day 
running of the court, including the host state community, would ensure some host state 
ownership of the mechanism. UN leadership should be facilitated by administration of such 
a tribunal and initiation of a treaty or negotiation process in which to legally base a tribunal 
of this kind. 
One of the major differences between my suggested model and those that have been argued 
in previous scholarship is the removal of the troop-contributing country’s exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction. Instead of a court of “last resort” I have argued for a court of first instance. A 
                                                          
188 See Evaluation Report, above n 147, at [30]. 
189 Rome Statute, art 103. 
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court with secondary jurisdiction will not materially change the accountability gap as TCCs 
would have to be deemed “unwilling and unable” to exercise jurisdiction. The evidence 
needed to prove a state was “unwilling” or “unable” to investigate or prosecute would cause 
lengthy delay and such delay would hinder the chances of successful prosecution. It would 
not improve accountability. 
In terms of structure, I have argued that the legal basis for a tribunal should be a combination 
of a multilateral treaty (for the primary attributes such as material jurisdiction) and amended 
versions of the Model-MOU and Model-SOFA (for the details to be negotiated, such as the 
mixed personnel and involvement of the host state).  
Forms of “sexual abuse” such as rape, sexual violence and sexual activity with children 
should be included within the jurisdiction of such a tribunal and are most likely 
unproblematic. I have argued further that sexual exploitation, as survival sex, and sexual 
abuse are international crimes.  
Overall, if the goal is to improve accountability of military contingent members who commit 
sexual exploitation and abuse, then the option must be visible and legitimate in the eyes of 
the victims and the international community. A hybrid court for peacekeepers will ensure 
the policy of host state inclusivity, transparency and fairness, and that the UN takes 
leadership in responding to sexual exploitation and abuse. In Chapter Nine I expand on the 









Victims of crime have not traditionally been at the centre of international (or domestic) 
criminal justice theories or institutions. However, within recent decades there has been a 
clear trend to increase the role of victims in criminal justice processes.1 This development 
parallels victims’ rights to effective remedies under international human rights law. As I 
have argued that a hybrid court best serves the three conceptual principles outlined in Part 
One and so improves accountability, I will attempt to link a special court for peacekeepers 
with the discussion on the appropriate response to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse 
in this chapter. Such responses should also align with the principles; justice seen to be done, 
host state ownership, and UN leadership. 
In section (1) I will examine victims’ rights to participation during criminal trials. This will 
firstly, include an overview of applicable participatory rights, the various restorative justice 
models (which centre the role of victims) and the involvement of victims in proceedings in 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). Secondly, I will explore victim reparations under 
international human rights, particularly those relating to violence against women. Thirdly, 
the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims will be considered as an example of an international 
criminal institution’s approach to implementing effective remedies.  
                                                          
1 See discussion below (1) The Role of Victims in International Criminal Justice. 
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Section (2) will look at that status quo in regard to the current response to victims of sexual 
exploitation and abuse committed by Peacekeepers. This will detail the United Nations 
Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by UN Staff and Related Personnel and its current implementation (or lack thereof). 
Arguably, the UN Strategy and response mechanism is inadequate, particularly in light of 
the responses expected by human rights bodies to contend with violence against women. 
I will conclude that a special court for peacekeepers should better incorporate the 
participation of victims. Such participatory rights should include the right to information, 
the right to be heard (before and during trial) and for victims to feel secure enough to 
participate safely. Participation itself supports the principle of justice being seen to be done 
and a policy of inclusivity. Moreover, reparations should be “transformative” in nature. This 
means assistance and support to victims should be beyond immediate or emergency care, 
but also forward-looking. Such reparations should also aim to dismantle societal and cultural 
structures that create and support gendered violence, both within peacekeeping and the local 
community in which the UN operates. Thus the UN should take leadership in the response 
to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse and also work with local networks to implement 
such responses (supporting host state ownership).  
(1) THE ROLE OF VICTIMS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
Traditionally, international (and domestic) criminal justice theory has marginalised the role 
of victims. Until relatively recently, the punishment of offenders was considered the sole 
purpose of criminal institutions. Under the criminal justice theory of “retribution” the role 
of victims has been understood as less integral to the criminal process.2 Victim participation 
                                                          
2 B Leyh Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings (Intersentia, 
Cambridge, 2011) at 37.  
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under such purely retributive models is restricted to victim-as-witness to provide 
information about the wrongdoing that took place.3 Not only are victim participatory rights 
largely ignored under retribution theory, but so are other victims’ rights generally, including 
the right to effective remedies.  
During the “victims’ rights movement” of the 1960s there was a push for more participatory 
rights and remedies for victims in the criminal justice process. This push primarily came 
from victims’ groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and paralleled the 
development of victim reparations in international human rights law. Early victimology 
academic reports from the United States illustrated mass underreporting of victimisation due 
to distrust in law enforcement and the criminal justice system.4 This corresponded with the 
women’s rights movement in the United States, which highlighted the issue of 
underreporting of violence against women (particularly domestic violence and rape) where 
victims felt unsafe and isolated from the criminal justice system.5 Criminal institutions 
which include greater victim participation and long-term remedies generally take on a 
“restorative justice model”.  Under restorative justice, greater emphasis is placed on victim 
participation and on repairing the harm caused to the victim and their community, whilst 
often including the offender in that process.6  
                                                          
3 Leyh, above n 2, at 41; R Henham and  M Findlay Exploring the Boundaries of International Criminal Justice 
(Ashgate, Furnham, 2011) at 86. 
4 This was also due to racial tensions surrounding the US civil rights movement see L W Sherman Trust and 
Confidence in Criminal Justice (2001) available online <www.ncjrs.org> at 4-5; A M Cellini “The Proposed 
Victims’ Rights Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Opening the Door of the Criminal Justice 
System to the Victim” (1997) 14 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 839 at 848-856; see 
also J T Davis “The Grassroots Beginnings of the Victims’ Rights Movement” (2005) National Crime Victim 
Law Institute News. 
5 Cellini, above n 4, at 853; Davis, above n 4. 
6 H Strange “Exploring the Effects of Restorative Justice on Crime Victims for Victims of Conflict in 
Transitional Societies” in S G Sholham, P Knepper and M Kett (eds) International Handbook of Victimology 
(Taylor and Francis, Hoboken, 2010) 537 at 538. 
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There are various modalities in which restorative justice is practiced; these include victim-
offender mediation, rehabilitation services, victim compensation schemes, and community 
service.7 At the international level, restorative justice is practiced through alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms, such as Truth Commissions, rehabilitative services and support for 
victims, and greater participatory rights in international tribunals. When it comes to 
international criminal tribunals there is still tension between traditional retributive models 
and more restorative models. However, some international institutions have been embracing 
restorative aspects of criminal justice and thus implementing a wider concept of victim 
participation.  
There are three parts to this section on the role of victims in international criminal justice. 
First I will explore victim participation in international criminal institutions. This will 
include examining examples of implementing victim participation, such as the International 
Criminal Court. Secondly, I will consider victims’ rights to an effective remedy under 
international human rights law, particularly those that would apply to sexual exploitation 
and abuse by peacekeepers. Thirdly, I will discuss the example of victim reparations under 
the International Criminal Court’s Trust Fund for Victims. In Chapter Eight I argued for a 
hybrid court for peacekeepers. My objective in this section is to consider what role victims 
of sexual exploitation and abuse might play in such a court for peacekeepers under current 
norms (or norms to be developed) and what reparations (if any) victims should expect.  
(A) VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INSTITUTIONS 
In order to determine suitable ways to include victims of sexual exploitation and abuse into 
a special court for peacekeepers, it is necessary to explore victim participatory rights under 
                                                          
7 See generally J P Vevan, G Hall, I Froyland, B Steels and D Goulding “Restoration or Renovation? 
Evaluating Restorative Justice Outcomes” (2005) 12 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 194. 
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current international norms. As restorative criminal justice theories tend to value the role of 
victims, I will also investigate the different restorative justice models. A current example of 
an international criminal institution which has mixed retributive-restorative goals is the 
International Criminal Court. Overall, the ICC’s mixed model has received mixed feedback 
from academics. However, various victim rights groups have praised the approach to victim 
participation; only practical improvements have been recommended.  
(I) VICTIM PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS 
Victims of sexual or gendered violence are likely to experience various obstacles to full 
participation in the criminal process. Such obstacles could include the need for immediate 
or emergency care in the case of sex crimes, gender discrimination, the lack of financial aid 
or information, social stigma, and issues relating to protection.8 Therefore, for victim 
participation to be meaningful such rights need to be made available and these perceived 
barriers mitigated. Victim participatory rights during criminal trials have developed 
relatively recently. Of the most important rights, the right to information, the right to be 
heard, and the securement of victim(s) safety are perhaps the most applicable to responding 
to sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Incorporation of victims in the criminal 
procedure also supports the principle of justice being seen to be done and a policy of 
inclusivity.  
The victims’ rights campaign during the 1960s, noted above, advocated for greater 
participatory rights before and during criminal proceedings.9 Additionally, campaigners 
                                                          
8 REDRESS Participation in transitional Justice Processes by Survivors of Sexual and Gender-based Violence 
(Submission to the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 2014) at 6. 
9 Leyh above n 2, at 45; M C Bassiouni “International Recognition of Victims’ Rights” (2006) 6 Human Rights 
Law Review 203 at 210; C Hoyle and L Ullrich “New Court, New Justice? The Evolution of “Justice for 
Victims” at Domestic Courts and at the International Criminal Court” (2014) International Criminal Justice 1 
at 2-3; C P Trumbull “The Victims of Victim participation in international Criminal Proceedings” (2008) 29 
Michigan Journal of International Law 777 at 781. 
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argued for improved services-related support for victims participating in the criminal justice 
system.10 These goals are supported by the few examples of empirical research available 
that investigate victims’ impression/experience of the criminal process.11 Research which 
looked at what victims perceive as “fairness” during the trial show that victims greatly 
appreciate receiving information about their rights, the procedure, and the outcome of their 
case.12 Victims’ “right to information” has also been increasingly acknowledged by human 
rights bodies as part of the right to an effective remedy.13  
Moreover, empirical research reveals that victims actively participating during trial value 
being “heard” and appreciated protection in which to do that.14 Victim participation can also 
offer victims the ability to take ownership over part of the process, which can have an 
empowering and rehabilitative effect.15 Such empowerment may be especially beneficial to 
vulnerable or marginalised groups, such as victims of sexual violence. Post-trial, victims 
want some form of reparation.16 For the most part, these expectations and demands have 
been incorporated into the collective body of victims’ rights in contemporary international 
criminal justice theory.17 Overall, the restorative justice direction of the victim rights’ 
                                                          
10 Leyh, above n 2, at 45. 
11 Leyh, above n 2, uses the following source (which ties together the few examples of empirical research in 
this area, which looks at victims participating in domestic criminal and civil courts) J Thibaut and L Walker 
Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (Lawrence Erlbaim, New Jersey, 1975).  
12 Leyh above n21, at 49; J Wemmers “The Meaning of Justice for Victims” in S G Sholham, P Knepper & M 
Kett (eds) International Handbook of Victimology (Taylor and Fancis, Hoboken, 2010) 27, at 34 and 38.  
13 Gulec v Turkey(Judgement) (1998) no 21593/93 (ECHR) at 82; Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to 
a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa DOC/05/(XXX)247 (2001) at Section C(b)(1-3); Fourth World 
Conference on Women Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and 
A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995) at [227]; Leyh, above n 2, at 108.  
14 Leyh, above n 2, at 49-50. 
15 S Kelly “The Role of Victims in the International Criminal Court: Challenges & Opportunities” (2012) 18 
New England Journal of International & Comparative Law 243 at 246.  
16 Leyh, above n 2, at 51; however, research into what victims want and expect out of criminal proceedings 
(particularly international criminal institutions) is still an underdeveloped area see Henham and Findlay above 
n 2, at 86. 
17 Leyh, above n 2, at 93. 
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movement and the few empirical studies that do exist have influenced the development of 
participatory rights for victims.   
A key international legal instrument that looks at victims’ participatory rights is The 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 1985 
(Basic Principles 1985).18 Based on art 8 (the right to an effective remedy) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Basic Principles 1985 provide guidance to states 
on implementing such a right to remedies, with a particular focus on participation during 
criminal proceedings.19 The document is not a source of law, rather its provisions must first 
be implemented by states (along with any human rights norms in which the right to an 
effective remedy is attached, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)).20  
Concerning victims of crime, the Basic Principles 1985 encourage judicial and 
administrative procedures to respond to the particular needs of victims.21 The Principles 
reiterate the importance of providing information to victims regarding their rights, the 
criminal procedure, outcomes, and when victims have specifically requested such 
information.22 Allowing the victim to express their views at “appropriate stages” of the 
proceedings is also encouraged.23 The Principles also dictate that victims should be provided 
assistance during the process and that their privacy and safety should be protected.24 The 
protection of victims and witnesses (particularly vulnerable groups such as women and 
children) who participate during the criminal process has been considered an “emerging 
                                                          
18 The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power GA Res A/Res/40/43 
(1985): [Basic Principles 1985].  
19 Bassiouni above n 9, at 216. 
20 At 217 and 246: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 
16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976): [ICCPR]. 
21 Basic Principles 1985, art 6. 
22 At art 6(a). 
23 At art 6(b). 
24 At art 6(c)-(d). 
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right” and highlighted under several international legal documents (and picked up by the 
International Criminal Court).25  
For victims of sexual offences, fulfilling the right to be heard during the criminal justice 
process can be both a healing and empowering act. However, depending on the 
circumstances, participation may also be re-victimising; the element of protection must take 
precedence in such circumstances. From the above discussion, it seems that the right to 
information is very important to victims and should also be implemented in the context of 
sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers. Moreover, for particularly 
vulnerable or marginalised groups of victims the need for protection must be met in order 
for participation to be safe and meaningful. As stated above, restorative justice theories have 
embraced the role of victims in criminal proceedings; below I will consider the various kinds 
of restorative models.  
(II) RESTORATIVE JUSTICE MODELS  
There is a clear movement in international criminal justice towards restorative models or at 
least mixed-models in order to implement victim participatory rights. There are different 
modalities of restorative justice that have been used in different contexts; some may be more 
suitable to responding to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse than others.  
As stated above, there is some tension between legal experts who suggest victims should 
participate during trial26 and those who argue that victim participation hinders the accused’s 
                                                          
25 Bassiouni, above n 9, at 258; see for example, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women Concluding Observations on the Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reports of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo CEDAW/C/COD/CO/6-7 (2013) at [10(d)]; Committee on the Rights of the Child 
Concluding Observations on the Combined third, fourth and fifth Periodic Reports of Hungary 
CRC/C/HUN/CO/3-5 (2014) at [59].  
26 S M Mitchell “Restorative Justice, RPF Rule, and the Success of Gacaca” in H F Carey and S M Mitchell 
(eds) Trials and Tribulations of International Prosecution (Lexington Books, Lanham, 2013) 255 at 258. 
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right to a fair trial.27 On the one hand, long procedural delays caused by incorporating victim 
participation interfere with the accused’s right to an expeditious trial.28 Moreover, there is a 
chance that crimes which emotionally impact and cause further suffering to victims may 
endanger the Court’s impartiality.29 On the other hand, it has also been argued that purely 
retributive criminal institutions, particularly in post-conflict settings, do not take the wider 
context of trust and reconciliation into consideration.30 For instance, the context of structural 
violence and discrimination against women may not be taken into account where the 
outcomes of the criminal court are solely driven by retributive justice.31  
Restorative justice models are still developing, and there are different approaches within 
restorative criminal justice theory. Some domestic models tend to focus on victim-offender 
interaction; where both the victim and the offender participate equally in the proceedings, 
the harm is acknowledged and the victim is in an empowered position to express their views 
directly to the offender.32 In the context of sexual offences however, this approach may not 
be appropriate. Direct victim-offender contact or interaction can be re-traumatising for the 
victim. Moreover, there may continue to be an uneven power dynamic operating between 
the UN peacekeeper (perpetrator) and beneficiary of assistance (victim) that may compound 
the harm already suffered by the victim.  
When it comes to responding to post-conflict, there has generally been a restorative objective 
to accountability.33 This has seen the introduction of Truth Commissions, participation in 
                                                          
27 Wemmers, above n  12, at 29. 
28B McGonigle Leyh “Victim-Orientated Measures at International Criminal Institutions: Participation and its 
Pitfalls” (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review 375 at 399; REDRESS The Participation of the 
Practice and Consideration of Options for the Future (London, 2012) at 6; S Zappala “The Rights of Victims 
v The Rights of the Accused” (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 137 at 145-146.  
29 McGinigle Leyh, above n 28, at 401; Zappala, above n 28, at 147-148.  
30 Mitchell, above n  26, at 258. 
31 At 258. 
32 At 258. 
33 Leyh, above n 2, at 59.  
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hybrid tribunals, and the notion of collective reparations. Truth Commissions have been 
utilised alongside hybrid courts, such as in Sierra Leone. Truth Commissions serve a 
complementary role to the prosecution of offenders, and include the active participation of 
both victims and perpetrators.34 These Commissions have multiple goals; to create a 
historical record of mass atrocities, to promote community-wide healing and reconciliation, 
and to help prevent future egregious violations of human rights.35 Additionally, such 
Commissions fulfil the right to truth and for victims to have their story “heard” after mass 
atrocities have been committed.36  
Truth Commissions have been implemented in specific contexts, involving mass crimes 
against humanity or war crimes. Moreover, the goals relating to transitional justice may not 
be at all applicable to the context of responding to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse 
by peacekeepers. Acts of sexual exploitation and abuse are typically opportunistic in nature, 
and not part of a wide-spread policy of peacekeepers or state officials. Truth Commissions 
help with recording events of mass atrocities such as genocide, rather than individual so-
called “ordinary” crimes.37 Moreover, at the end of a mission the peacekeepers leave the 
country – thus there is no need for “reconciliation” between peacekeepers and locals. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that Truth Commissions would be appropriate for responding to 
victims of sexual exploitation and abuse.  
Other models that have been taken up by certain international criminal institutions, such as 
the International Criminal Court, have more reparative or transformative goals. Such 
restorative criminal justice systems aim to incorporate victim participation and also award 
                                                          
34 At 158-159. 
35 W A Schabas “Internationalised Courts and Their Relationship with Alternative Accountability 
Mechanisms: The Case of Sierra Leone” in C P R Romano, A Nollkaemper and J K Kleffner (eds) 
International Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004) at 157. 
36 Bassiouni, above n 9, at 276. 
37 At 276. 
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reparations that address issues beyond those of the victim-offender but also the wider context 
of social-economic structural inequalities (the Trust Fund for Victims is an example of this 
I discuss further below).38 
 
(III) INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INSTITUTIONS AND VICTIM PARTICIPATION 
Current practice of international criminal institutions suggests a trend to incorporate victim 
participatory rights. Although the hybrid tribunals have (mostly) failed in putting rights into 
practice, the International Criminal Court has been praised for its work with victims and 
victim participation during trial. Arguably, the more appropriate restorative justice model 
(compared to those discussed above, such as Truth Commissions) is to incorporate 
participation during criminal trial, such as in the ICC; thus, a special court for peacekeepers 
with mixed retributive-restorative justice goals may be the most suitable mechanism for 
victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. 
Out of the international criminal tribunals of a hybrid model, the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has been the only example to successfully transfer 
participatory rights of victims into practice. The Special Panels of East Timor for example 
had extensive measures available for victim participation and reparations in its regulations. 
Under its regulations, participation in the Special Panels went beyond victim-as-witness and 
included the ability to request a specific investigation, the right to be heard at a review 
hearing, the right to be notified of hearings and progress of cases and the right to request a 
review of the Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate and/or prosecute.39Although such 
                                                          
38 Mitchell, above n 26, at 258. 
39 Regulation 2000/30 On Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure UNTAET/REG/2000/30 (2000); 
Regulation 2001/25 (amendment) On Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure UNTAET/REG/2000/25 
(2000) at 12.1-12.8; Leyh above n 2, at 153.  
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provisions reflected rights outlined in the Basic Principles 1985, they were never utilised in 
practice due to a lack of resources (both financial and human) and political will.40 Contrasted 
with the failed practice of the Special Panels, the ECCC could be considered (mostly) 
successful in implementing similar provisions in comparison. The ECCC Internal Rules 
noted three modes of victim participation, as “complainant”, as “civil party” or as witness. 
Victims participating as a “civil party” are granted the most rights under the Rules, allowing 
for participation during criminal procedure and reparation claims.41 Such rights include 
access to information, such as the case file itself, to make submissions, attend hearings and 
question accused (though legal representation), and request reparations.42 Although praised 
by commentators for its significant incorporation of victim participatory rights, the ECCC 
has also been heavily criticised by victims themselves for not meeting expectations and for 
lengthy delay in proceedings.43 Information regarding outcomes for victims needs to remain 
realistic in a post-conflict setting.44 Moreover, with the sheer number of victims requesting 
participation delays are unavoidable and may only be mitigated by simplifying the 
application process as much as possible. 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has been deemed a significant step 
forward for victim participatory rights and transformative justice.45 Non-governmental 
                                                          
40 Report to the Secretary General of the Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious 
Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (the East Timor) in 1999 S/2005/458(Annex II) (2005); Leyh, 
above n 2, at 154; E Evans The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) at 112. 
41 Civil parties are those victims who have suffered physical, mental or material harm directly from an 
international crime.  
42See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules (Rev. 9) ECCC (January 2015) at 
Rules 23, 23 quinquies, 83, 86, 90, 92, 94. 
43 Leyh, above n 2, at 179. 
44 Schabas, above n 35, at 541; the need for clear communication of expectations from proceedings was also 
important to victims in the experience of the Special Court for Sierra Leone see Special Court for Sierra Leone 
– Witness and Victims Section Best-Practice Recommendations for the Protection & Support of Witnesses: 
An Evaluation of The Witness & Victims Section of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2008) at 13. 
45 C McCarthy Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2012) at 46; Henham and Findlay, above n 3, at 86; Hoyle and Ullrich above n 9, at 4; Kelly, 
above n 15, at 244. 
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organisations and victims’ rights groups advocated for greater victim participation during 
the negotiation of the Rome Statute.46 Thus, the Rome Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence have created a sophisticated approach to victims’ rights and remedies.47 Victims 
may participate during legal proceedings, have a right to be protected and the right to 
reparations.48 Additionally, the Rome Statute established a Trust Fund for Victims which 
facilitates long-term reparations for victims and their communities.49 
Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute dictates that victims as participants may express their 
views at all levels of proceedings, if such participation does not impinge on the rights of the 
accused to a fair trial. This encapsulates a general right of victim participation in ICC 
proceedings.50 Victims may have their views considered at any time during proceedings, 
make opening and closing statements and may be called upon by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
when the Prosecutor is deciding on investigations.51 The ICC’s definition of “victims” also 
recognises that serious human rights crimes (such as torture and genocide) can have an effect 
beyond the individual, and victims may also be family members, dependants and the wider 
community.52 As participation is at the discretion of the court there has been little in the way 
of consistent application, thus potentially circumventing the principle of legal certainty.53 
However, applications for victim participation must be considered case-by-case in order to 
appropriately balance the rights of the accused against the victim’s right to participate 
                                                          
46 Although incorporated last minute due to a prolonged lack of consensus among state representatives Leyh 
above n 2, at 232-234; McCarthy, above n 45, at 50; Kelly, above n 15, at 247. 
47 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 17 July 1998, entered 
into force 1 July 2002): [Rome Statute]; The Rules of Procedure and Evidence Official Records of the Assembly 
of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr. 1 Part II.A 
(New York, 2002): [Rules of Procedure and Evidence].  
48 Rome Statute, arts 43, 57, 68, 68(3), 79 and 85; Bassiouni, above n 9, at 230. 
49 Rome Statute, art 75. 
50 Kelly above n 15, at 251.  
51 Rome Statute, arts 15(3), 19(3), 68(3).  
52 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, above n 47, at Rule 85; Kelly, above n 15, at 247. 
53 McGonigle Leyh, above n 28, at 404.  
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(taking into account the needs to all victims, particularly children or victims of sexual 
violence).54  
As victim participation is at the discretion of the particular Chamber, jurisprudence is very 
essential to its development; an important case in this regard is Prosecutor v Lubanga. The 
Trial Chamber has accepted the right of victims to lead evidence at trial and challenge the 
admissibility of evidence, without being a party to the proceedings.55 The right of 
participation in such a way is attached to victims’ role to assist the ICC in determination of 
truth.56 At pre-trial level, victims may also participate by providing their views and concerns 
regarding investigation.57 Victims may also have access to public material relating to cases, 
and in some circumstances, may request confidential materials.58 Additionally, victims may 
attend all public hearings and, in some circumstances, closed hearings.59 
Article 86 of the Rome Statute (which provides that the ICC shall take into account the needs 
of all victims and witnesses, particularly children and victims of sexual or gender violence)60 
is partially facilitated through the Victims and Witnesses Unit.61 The Court may order the 
protection of witnesses both before and during trial.62 Such protection includes physical and 
                                                          
54 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, above n 47, at Rule 86. 
55 Victims are framed as “participants” under the ICC rather than parties see H Friman “The International 
Criminal Court and Participation of Victims: A Third Party to the Proceedings?” (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 485 at 493; Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor and the 
Defence against trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008 ICC Appeals 
Chamber ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, 11 July 2008) at [94-105]. 
56 Rome Statute, arts 64(6)(d) and 69(3). 
57 Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo Decision on the Applications for Participation on the 
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPSRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber ICC-01/04-
101, 17 January 2006. 
58 Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo (Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) Decision on the 
Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06, and a/0003/06 at the Confirmation Hearing 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber ICC-01/04-01/06, 22 September 2006 at 7-8.   
59 Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo (Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) Decision on Victims’ 
Participation ICC Trial Chamber ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, 18 January 2008 at [113]. 
60 Child witnesses are also required special protection (physical and legal) under the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990): 
[CRC]; See also Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations on the combined third and 
fifth periodic report of Hungary CRC/C/HUN/CO/3-5 (2014) at [59]. 
61 Rome Statute, art 43(6). 
62 Rome Statute, arts 57(3)(c), 68; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, above n 47, at Rule 87.  
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psychological wellbeing, safety and privacy.63 In order for victims to participate (especially 
as witnesses) safeguards need to be put in place to ensure their security and confidence in 
the Court.64 This is particularly true of victims of sexual offences, for which the ICC ensures 
special protection measures.65 
The mixed retributive-restorative goals pursued by the ICC have come under criticism by 
some, claiming that it is unlikely that the Court will receive enough resources (human and 
financial) to realistically achieve both.66 Victim participation itself adds many hours and 
long delays for applications to be processed by the Registry’s Victim Participation and 
Reparations Section.67 For example, in 2011 there had been over nine thousand applications 
for participation in the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo with only 
approximately three thousand processed.68 However, the sheer number of applications point 
to the clear interest victims have in participation.69 Not only may the extensive participatory 
rights of victims compromise the rights of the accused, the wider transformative justice aims 
may undermine the so-called ultimate goal of the ICC – to punish offenders.70 Moreover, 
these “expansive” goals may conflict with the neutrality/non-political aspect of criminal 
institutions.71 However, the approach taken by the ICC and the Trust Fund for Victims 
                                                          
63 Rome Statute, art 68(1).  
64 S N Ngane “Witnesses before the International Criminal Court” (2009) 8 The Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 431 at 449.  
65 See Rome Statute, art 68.  
66 Hoyle and Ullrich above n 9, at 10 and 18; M Damaska “What is International Criminal Justice?” (2008) 83 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 329, at 330 and 343; Kelly, above n 15, at 260.  
67 REDRESS “Hundreds of Victims Prevented from Participating in Crucial Court Hearings due to Lack of 
Resources at the International Criminal Court” (press release, 15 July 2011); M Pena and G Carayon “Is the 
ICC Making the Most of Victim Participation?” (2013) The International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 at 
10. 
68 See C Van der Wyngaert “Victims Before International Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of an 
ICC Trial Judge” ( 2011) 44 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 475 at 482. 
69 The Participation of the Practice and Consideration of Options for the Future above n 27, at 10.  
70 Hoyle and Ullrich, above n 9, at 10; Damaska, above n 66, at 331. 
71 Hoyle and Ullrich, above n 9, at 16. 
281 
 
(discussed more below) has arguably broadened the definition of international criminal 
justice to include a more holistic perspective.72 
For all of the criticism, it appears the general impression of victim participation is that it 
plays a valuable part in the workings of the International Criminal Court.73 In fact, only 
logistical or practical recommendations have been made by victim groups in order to make 
participation more meaningful for participants and manageable for the Court.74 Moreover, 
an outreach programme to get more information into the wider community in which the ICC 
operates has been a priority.75 
In summary, the implementation of victim participatory rights, which include the right to 
information, the right to be heard and security/protection in which to participate must be 
balanced against the rights of the accused to a fair trial. Thus, the ICC embraces mixed 
restorative-retributive goals. It appears that this mixed model has been receiving positive 
feedback from victims’ rights groups with only practical or logistic improvements being 
formally recommended.  
However, the heavy participatory element of the International Criminal Court may not be 
appropriately transferrable into the context of a hybrid court for peacekeepers. Victims under 
the ICC system are seen as having valuable experience and insight regarding their 
community which has suffered massive human rights violations (such as genocide).76 These 
crimes harm more than individuals, but devastate entire communities.77 Thus, the ICC needs 
                                                          
72 At 11. 
73 The Participation of the Practice and Consideration of Options for the Future, above n 28, at 24; see also 
Victims’ Rights Working Group, “Making Victim Participation Effective and Meaningful” (June 2014). 
74 Such recommendations include strengthening outreach to victims and simplifying the application process 
see The Participation of the Practice and Consideration of Options for the Future, above n 28, at 24. 
75 See for example, International Criminal Court Integrated Strategy for External relations, Public Information 
and Outreach available online <www.icc-cpi.int>.  
76 Pena and Carayon, above n 67, at 7. 
77 At 7. 
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to consider the historical context of these crimes, from the point of view of the victims. 
Moreover, these crimes are committed by members of the same community, or their state 
officials. The context of peacekeeping may be compared, where sexual exploitation is 
committed by foreign personnel against individual locals, living (temporarily) in the same 
country. Insight into historical context may not be necessary. Nevertheless, the particular 
context in which sexual exploitation and abuse occurs may still be important. Victims of 
sexual exploitation may have insight and views that expose the structural inequalities that 
exist and shed light on the nature of the exploitation itself. Therefore, although the high level 
of victim participation that is warranted under the ICC may not be as necessary in a hybrid 
court, some level of inclusivity of victims and their views would be of some value.  
Under a hybrid court for peacekeepers, a victim of sexual exploitation and abuse may benefit 
from participation beyond acting as a witness. The three principles of justice being seen to 
be done, host state ownership, and UN leadership are about inclusivity, legitimacy, and 
transparency. Thus, a mixed retributive-restorative justice system may best serve these 
principles. The mixed model sees the goal of prosecuting the offender, whilst also 
incorporating the opportunity for victims to have their voices heard, to be included and see 
justice being done. A victim of sexual exploitation and abuse may have their voices heard 
by being consulted by the court or submit their views of the charges and reparations (see 
discussion on reparations below). For legitimacy and fairness, and fulfilment of the right to 
information, victims of sexual exploitation and abuse should be partial to material regarding 
their cases and have the ability to attend hearings. Victims of sexual violence may also need 
to feel safe and secure enough to participate fully, so there is a need for guaranteeing their 
safety as participants. A hybrid court for peacekeepers should therefore have a way to 
facilitate the security of victims who participate in proceedings.  
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(B) VICTIM REPARATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS  
When looking over the body of international human rights norms associated with victims 
and their rights to remedies there appear to be the following key elements; firstly, that 
victims have a right to an “effective” remedy and should be informed of that right and ways 
they can access related mechanisms; secondly, that states are expected to provide 
rehabilitation services; and thirdly, that reparations for victims of violence should also be 
forward-thinking with a focus on dismantling discriminatory structures and inequalities that 
foster gendered violence.  
It was acknowledged by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women in 2010 that 
“coherent theory and practice for remedies does not exist under international law”.78 
Nevertheless, international human rights instruments and associated monitoring bodies have 
confirmed a right of effective remedies for victims of serious violations of human rights.79 
Victims’ access to justice has been increasingly seen as forming part of the right to an 
effective remedy under international human rights norms.80 However, prosecution of the 
offender is not enough to discharge the obligation to provide a remedy.81 Therefore, victim 
participation during trial is not enough. There must also be steps taken to respond to the 
needs of victims in the form of reparations.82 
                                                          
78 Rashida Manjoo Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, it’s Causes and 
Consequences A/HRC/14/22 (2010) at [13]. 
79 At [13]. 
80 R Burke “Shaming the State: Sexual Offences by UN Military Peacekeepers and the Rhetoric of Zero 
Tolerance” in G Heathcore and D Otto (eds) Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender and Equality and Collective 
Security (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014) at 85; Bassiouni, above n 9, at 212, 263-266;  
81 Burke “Shaming the State ”, above n 80; see also Manjoo (2010), above n 78; Human Rights Committee 
General Comment No 31: The nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) [General Comment No 31] at [16]; Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women General Recommendation No 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties 
under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2 (2010) at [32]. 
82 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action GA Res A/RES/S-23/3 (2000) at [68(b)]. 
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Alongside the role of victims in international criminal justice, there have also been important 
developments for victim reparations under international human rights law. The two areas of 
law coincide; particularly when considering the role of victims under a hypothetical court 
for peacekeepers who commit sexual exploitation and abuse, which include human rights 
violations. It has been generally accepted that victims of crime have a right to reparations, 
particularly those crimes connected to gross human rights violations, and that reparations 
should be proportional to the crime/breach committed.83  
(I) WHAT ARE “REPARATIONS”? 
For information about what reparations mean in the context of human rights law, the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles 2006) offers detailed insight.84 The Basic Principles 
2006 are intended to reflect international norms regarding the implementation of the right to 
an effective remedy.85 Whereas the Basic Principles 1985 focus on victim participation 
(primarily) during criminal proceedings, the Basic Principles 2006 focus on the right to an 
effective remedy and reparations, specifically within the context of human rights and 
humanitarian norms. Although the document itself is not legally binding, the Principles 
(2006) are still relevant to legal obligations arising from international human rights and 
humanitarian norms.86 Overall, the Basic Principles 2006 aim to “identify mechanisms, 
modalities, procedures and methods” of the right to a remedy.87  
                                                          
83 Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ rights to a Remedy and Reparation (2007) available online: 
http://www.redress.org [Nairobi Declaration] at [3(E)]. 
84 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations 
of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law GA Res 
A/RES/60/147 (Annex) (2006) [Basic Principles 2006]. 
85 Leyh , above n 2, at 100.  
86 Basic Principles 2006, above n 84, at 2; Manjoo (2010), above n 78, at [15]. 
87 Basic Principles 2006 above n 84, at Preamble.  
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The Basic Principles 2006 note that the duty on states parties to “respect” and “ensure” 
include undertaking the following active steps; making available remedies which are 
adequate, prompt and effective;88 providing victims with “equal and effective” access to 
justice;89 and providing “effective remedies”.90 Additionally, victims should have the ability 
to freely access information regarding their rights relating to reparations and a way to access 
that information.91 The Basic Principles 2006 then go on to flesh out possible avenues for 
an “effective remedy”; these include reparations, rehabilitation and assistance.  
There are five accepted forms of “reparations” (that are described under the provisions of 
the Basic Principles 2006); first, restitution, where the victim is restored to the position they 
were in before the violation/crime took place.92 Methods of restitution include restoring 
human rights, identity or citizenship to the victim(s).93 For victims of sexual exploitation 
and abuse, restitution is perhaps not the most appropriate avenue for an effective remedy.94 
It is unlikely that the victim’s situation can be restored to a state previous to the harm caused 
(the sexual abuse) because it is their emotional and physical state that has suffered.  
The second form of reparation is financial compensation for the economically measurable 
harm.95 Such harm includes physical, moral and emotional.96 Compensation has been 
highlighted by several human rights monitoring bodies and will be discussed further below.  
A third mode of victim reparations is rehabilitation.97 This includes assistance such as 
medical or psychological care and legal and social services.98 Rehabilitation services and 
                                                          
88 At [2(c)]; see also Bassiouni, above n 9, at 260. 
89 Basic Principles 2006, above n 84, at [3(c)]; see also Bassiouni, above n 9, at 260. 
90 Basic Principles 2006, above n 84, at [3(d)]; see also Bassiouni, above n 9, at 260. 
91 Basic Principles 2006, above n 84, at [11], [12(a)] and [24].   
92 At [19]. 
93 At [19]. 
94 Manjoo (2010), above n 78, at [31]. 
95 Basic Principles 2006, above n 84, at [20]. 
96 At [20]. 
97 At [21]. 
98 At [21]. 
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related assistance to victims has been the direction taken by the International Criminal 
Court’s Trust Fund for Victims and the United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on 
Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Staff and Related 
Personnel.99 Moreover, such assistance-focussed remedies are favoured under international 
human rights norms regarding violence against women and will be discussed further below. 
The final two forms of reparations listed by the Basic Principles 2006 are satisfaction and 
guarantees of non-repetition.100 Satisfaction includes moral reparations, such as official 
declarations as to the victim(s) dignity, memorials and public apologies.101 Guarantees of 
non-repetition relate to preventative measures, such as endorsing the observance of codes 
and standards of conduct.102 In circumstances where restitution and compensation are not 
appropriate, or do not address the harm, these more moral reparations can often be more 
important to the victim(s).103 
(II) WHAT REPARATIONS ARE APPROPRIATE WHEN RESPONDING TO SEXUAL 
EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE? 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, “sexual abuse” includes rape, sexual violence and sexual 
activity with children. “Sexual exploitation” includes survival sex (where sex is exchanged 
for assistance to which peacekeepers have access to or which is already owed to the local 
population). These forms of sexual exploitation and abuse are also violations of human rights 
norms; acts of sexual abuse would, if the specific requirements are fulfilled, fall under the 
description of torture, and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (ICCPR, 
                                                          
99 Discussed more below; United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Staff and Related Personnel GA Res A/RES/62/214 (2008).  
100 Basic Principles 2006, above n 84, at [22] and [23].   
101 At [22(b),(d),(e)]. 
102 At [23(a),(b),(f)]. 
103 Bassiouni, above n 9, at 272.  
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Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT))104 and violence against children (Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC)).105 Both sexual abuse and sexual exploitation as survival sex would be interpreted 
as violence against women (ICCPR, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women’s General Recommendation 19).106  
Both the ICCPR and CAT have provisions pertaining to a right to an effective remedy for 
victims.107 The Human Rights Committee has noted that the right to an effective remedy 
requires states parties (ICCPR) not only to provide some form of reparations but also to 
make changes to law and cultural practices which support the occurrence of violations.108  
When developing response mechanisms, the Committee against Torture supports the total 
participation of victims.109  
When looking at sexual abuse under the ICCPR and CAT, the corresponding Concluding 
Observations for states parties reveal the type of reparations required. However, the 
Committee against Torture has suggested that compensation is not enough for an “effective” 
remedy, and that states parties should aim for full rehabilitation (or as far as possible).110 
“Rehabilitation” would include services to restore victims’ “independence, physical, mental 
social and vocational ability.”111 Such full rehabilitation is specifically mentioned in many 
                                                          
104 ICCPR, above n 20; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1465 UNTS 85 (opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987): [CAT]. 
105 Above n 60.  
106 ICCPR, above n 20; Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women General 
Recommendation 19 CEDAW/C/GC/19 (1992). 
107 ICCPR, art 2; CAT, art 14. 
108 General Comment No 31, above n 81, at [16]-[17]. 
109 Committee against Torture General Comment No 3: Implementation of Article 14 by States Parties 
CAT/C/GC/3 (2012) [General Comment No 3] at [4]. 
110 General Comment No 3, above n 109, at [5], [9] and [11]; see also Rashida Manjoo Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences A/HRC/23/49 (2013) at [75]. 
111 General Comment No 3, above n 109, at [11]; see also Committee against Torture Concluding Observations 
on the third periodic report of Belgium CAT/C/BEL/CO/3 (2014) at [23]; Committee against Torture 
Concluding Observations on the third initial report of Burkina Faso CAT/C/BFA/CO/1 (2014) at [18].  
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Concluding Observations.112 Accordingly, “full rehabilitation” translates into the following 
measures; firstly, the provision of medical and legal services (both emergency and long-
term), including counselling.113 Psychosocial services should also aim to reintegrate victims 
back into the community.114 Additionally, these services should be gender-sensitive 
providing for the specific needs of sexual abuse victims.115 Secondly, victims of sexual 
violence should have access to state protection, such as adequate and safe shelters which 
should be sufficiently resourced.116 Thirdly, the needs of vulnerable or marginalised 
women/girls should be prioritised when developing these rehabilitative services.117 Fourthly, 
states parties should work on sensitising societies to sexual abuse and take steps to raise 
awareness of the negative impacts of such violence on women/girls and their 
communities.118 Moreover, it is expected that adequate funding is put aside for these 
reparation measures.119  
                                                          
112 See for example Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on the combined fifth and sixth 
reports of Portugal CAT/C/PRT/CO/5-6 (2013) at [16]; Committee against Torture Concluding Observations 
on the combined third to fifth periodic reports of Latvia CAT/C/LVA/Co/3-5 (2013) at [22]; Human Rights 
Committee Concluding Observations on the fifth periodic report of Peru adopted at its 107th Session 
CCPR/C/PER/CO/5 (2013) at [12]; Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations on the Seventh 
periodic report of Ukraine CCPR/C/UKR/CO/7 (2013) at [6].  
113 See for example, Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on the third initial report of Burkina 
Faso, above n 111, at [18]; Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on the combined fifth and 
sixth periodic reports of Poland CAT/C/POL/CO/5-6 (2013) at [22(e)]; Human Rights Committee Concluding 
Observations on the initial report of Sierra Leone CCPR/C/SLE/CO/1 (2014) at [15].  
114 See for example, Concluding Observations on the third periodic report of Belgium, above n 111, at [23]. 
115 See for example, Committee against Torture Concluding Observations on the combined fifth and sixth 
periodic reports of Guatemala CAT/C/GTM/CO/5-6 (2013) at [12]. 
116 See for example, Concluding Observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Poland, 
above n 113, at [22(e)]; Concluding Observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of 
Guatemala, above n 115, at [13(c)]; Concluding Observations on the initial report of Sierra Leone, above n 
113, at [8]. 
117 See for example, Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations on the sixth periodic report of 
Germany CCPR/CDEU/Co/6 (2012) at [9]. 
118 See for example, Concluding Observations on the initial report of Sierra Leone, above n 113, at [15]; 
Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations on the initial report of Indonesia CCPR/C/IDN/CO/1 
(2013) at [13]; Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations adopted by the Human Rights Committee 
at its 105th session, 9-27 July 2012 Maldives CCPR/C/MDV/CO/1 (2012) at [11]. 
119 See for example, Concluding Observations on the fifth periodic report of Peru, above n 112, at [10]. 
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Similar measures are expected from states when responding to violence against children.120 
Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, states parties are required to provide an 
effective remedy.121 According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, an “effective” 
remedy will focus on compensation and rehabilitation.122 States parties are required to 
implement victim services, such as psycho-social and health, and provide protection such as 
shelters.123 In addition, the Committee has also noted that states should tackle the issue of 
sexual violence against children through a holistic strategy that takes into account the gender 
element.124  
International instruments and human rights norms surrounding violence against women also 
have similar expectation from states regarding the response to victims. The Platform for 
Action 1995 provides that states should implement preventative measures and provide 
access to effective remedies to victims, these include “compensation and indemnification 
and healing of victims”.125 Article 4(d) of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women (DEVAW)126 indicates a number of steps are expected from states when 
responding to violence against women; such as, providing victims with access to justice, 
effective remedies, and access to information about their rights and mechanisms available 
                                                          
120 See for example, Human Rights Committee concluding Observations on the fourth periodic report of 
Ireland CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4 (2014) at [10].  
121 CRC, art 14. 
122 See for example, Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations on the combined third to 
fifth reports of the periodic reports of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela CRC/C/VEN/CO/3-5 (2014) at 
[43(b)]; Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations on the combined fourth and fifth 
periodic reports of the Russian Federation CRC/C/RUS/CO/4-5 (2014) at [36].  
123 See for example, Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations on the combined third 
and fourth periodic report of Portugal CRC/C/PRT/CO/3-4 (2014) at [36(c)-(d)]; Committee on the Rights of 
the Child Concluding Observations on the combined second to fourth periodic report of the Congo 
CRC/C/COG/CO/2-4 (2014) at [43(b)]; Committee of the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations on the 
combined third and fourth periodic reports of Croatia CRC/C/HRV/CO/3-4 (2014) at [37(f)].  
124 See for example, Concluding Observations on the combined third to fifth periodic reports of the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, above n 122,  at [45(b)].  
125 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, above n 13, at [124(d)]. 
126 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women GA Res A/RES/48/104 (1994). 
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to address the harm caused.127 Although the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women128 does not mention victims in its provisions (or indeed 
violence against women) the monitoring body has illustrated corresponding rights and 
obligations relating to victims in its General Recommendations.129  
In addition to describing the various forms of reparations, the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women describes remedies as “affordable, accessible and 
timely”.130 Specifically, it has also been noted by the Committee that states parties should 
implement and resource victim support services.131 This includes rehabilitative programmes 
with specialised personnel to deal with the psychological needs of victims of gendered 
violence.132 Looking at the jurisprudence of the Committee and its Concluding Observations 
rehabilitative services are often favoured over compensation as a form of reparation, much 
like those preferred by the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture.133 
Rehabilitative services include those related to legal representation, psychosocial support, 
and medical treatment.134 Moreover, states parties are expected to implement protective 
                                                          
127 See also regional examples such as the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women [Convention of Belém do Pará,] (opened for signature 6 September 
1994, entered into force 3 May 1995) arts 7(f) and 7(g); Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women (opened for signature 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 November 
2005) arts 4 and 10.  
128Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1249 UNTS 13 (opened for 
signature 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981). 
129 Recommendation 19, above n 106.  
130 Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women General Recommendation 28 
CEDAW/C/GC/28 (2010) at [34]. 
131 General Recommendation 19, above n 106, at [24(k)]. 
132 At [24(k)]. 
133 Manjoo (2010), above n 78, at [14]. 
134 See for example, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Hakan Goekce, Handan 
Goekce and Guelue Goekce v Austria CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 Communication No 5/2005 (2007) at [12.1.1]; 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women S V P v Bulgaria CEDAW/C/53/D/31/2011 
Communication No 31/2011 (2012) at [9.11]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
Concluding Observations on the combined initial and second to fifth reports of the Central African Republic 
CEDAW/C/CAF/CO/1-5 (2014) at [28(b)]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
Concluding Observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of Cameroon 
CEDAW/C/CMR/CO/4-5 (2014) at [19(e)]; Committee on the Discrimination of Women, Concluding 
Observations on Cote d’Ivoire CEDAW/C/CIV/CO/1-3 (2011) at [29(c)-(e)]. 
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measures such as shelters for victims of gendered violence with particular reference to 
vulnerable or marginalised groups of women and girls.135   
Besides those remedies associated with prevention and immediate assistance and 
accountability, the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women has argued that 
reparations should serve additional societal goals.136 Moreover, remedies should link to both 
individual and structural “transformation”.137 Essentially, violence against women exists 
within a context of negative gender stereotypes and inequalities, and structural oppression 
over women and girls.138 Arguably, sexual exploitation and abuse is an example of this 
harmful structural gender hierarchy. Any gender inequalities and discrimination against 
women that exists is then compounded by any post-conflict or post-disaster context and the 
typical hyper-masculinity systemic within military forces.139 Therefore, reparations should 
not reinforce structural gender inequalities. In fact, the Special Rapporteur argued that 
remedies should aim to dismantle such negative structures and address the “root causes of 
violence … women experience before, during and after conflict.”140 Similarly, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has urged states parties to 
CEDAW to develop comprehensive strategies when responding to violence against women 
to tackle the wider societal context that fosters gendered violence.141 
                                                          
135 See for example, Hakan Goekce, Handan Goekce and Guelue Goekce v Austria, above n 134, at [12.1.2]; 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women V K v Bulgaria CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008 
Communication No 20/2008 (2011) at [9.13]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
Concluding Observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of Georgia 
CEDAW/C/GEO/CO/4-5 (2014) at [21(c)]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
Concluding Observations on the sixth periodic report of Sierra Leone CEDAW/C/SLE/CO/6 (2014) at [21(f)]; 
Concluding Observations on Cote d’Ivoire, above n 134, at [29(f)]; See also Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women A T v Hungary A/60/38 (Part 1) Communication No 2/2003 (2005) Annex III.  
136 Manjoo (2010), above n 78, at [12]. 
137 At [24]; see also Manjoo (2013), above n 110, at [ 71]. 
138 Manjoo (2013), above n 110, at [31]. 
139 See Chapter 2: Concepts of sexual exploitation and abuse for further discussion on the link between harmful 
masculinities within military culture and sexual exploitation. 
140 Manjoo (2013), above n 110, at [31]. 
141 See for example, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Banu Akbak, Gulen 
Khan, and Melissa Ozdemir v Austria CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 Commination No 5/2005 (2007) at [12.2] and 
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In responding to sexual exploitation and abuse by military personnel, it would seem that 
overall victims should be afforded effective remedies. For remedies to be “effective” they 
should include compensation (perhaps) and rehabilitation specifically.142 Rehabilitative 
services should be comprised of immediate or emergency support (such as medical, 
psychosocial, provision of shelters). Moreover, legal services would also need to be made 
available, particularly if there was going to be a hybrid court for peacekeepers. Additionally, 
reparations should have long-term societal or “transformative” goals. Thus, when 
responding to sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, states or the United Nations 
would need to take leadership and implement forward-thinking strategies aimed at 
dismantling harmful social structures or cultural practices that manifest gendered violence. 
In the context of peacekeeping, this may mean further sensitising personnel to sexual 
exploitation and abuse and breaking down harmful masculinities that can exist within 
military forces. Moreover, UN partnering with local (host state) networks that provide 
emergency and long-term support for victims should be prioritised (in order to link with the 
principle of host state ownership and a policy of inclusivity).  
A failure by a state to exercise criminal jurisdiction over their military contingent members 
for sexual exploitation and abuse not only breaches the obligation to prosecute but also to 
provide the victim with an effective remedy.143 The consequences of state responsibility 
                                                          
[12.3(b)-(c)]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Cecilia Kell v Canada 
CEDAW/C/51/D/19/2008 Communication No 19/2008 (2012) at [10.2] and [11(b)(i)]; Hakan Goekce, 
Handan Goekce and Guelue Goekce v Austria, above n 134, at [12.2]; Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women Isatou Jallow v Bulgaria CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011 Communication No 
32/2011 (2012) at [8.6]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Maria de Lourdes 
da Silva Pimentel v Brazil CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008 Communication No 17/2008 (2011) at [7.7]; S V P v 
Bulgaria, above n 134, at [9.10]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Concluding 
Observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of India CEDAW/C/IND/CO/4-5 (2014) at 
[11(b)]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Concluding Observations on the 
combined seventh and eighth periodic reports of Peru CEDAW/C/PER/CO/7-8 (2014) at [18]; Observations 
on the combined sixth and seventh periodic reports of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, above n 123, at 
[10ff].  
142 Compensation to be looked at more below. 
143 General Recommendation 19, above n 106, at art 24(i) and 24(iii); Bassiouni, above n 9, at 264.  
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were discussed in Chapter Five. However, it may be that the UN should have the 
responsibility to implement such comprehensive reparation schemes (particularly if coupled 
with a hybrid court for peacekeepers, as it follows the UN leadership principle). Moreover, 
the UN has already taken steps to implement victim support with the United Nations 
Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by UN Staff and Related Personnel.144  
There are parallels between the ideas of “transformative justice” underlying the ICC Trust 
Fund and principles advocated by the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women in 
regard to responding to victims of such gendered violence. As the ICC Trust Fund is one of 
the few examples of an organ of an international criminal institution, it is necessary to 
investigate how the Fund works and whether it is comparable to the UN Strategy. 
(C) REPARATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ICC TRUST FUND FOR 
VICTIMS 
The International Criminal Court has the power to order cost of reparations against a 
convicted person (in the form of restitution, compensation or rehabilitation).145 However, 
where the convicted person is unlikely to deliver on costs or it is deemed appropriate by the 
Court, the ICC may order reparations be made through the Trust Fund for Victims.146 The 
Trust Fund may be utilised in various ways; reparations may be awarded directly to the 
victim, collective reparations may be awarded, or general assistance may be made available 
to inter-governmental, international or national organisations previously approved by the 
Trust Fund.147 Additionally, the Trust Fund is an independent organ of the Court itself, and 
                                                          
144 Discussed more below.  
145 Rome Statute, art 75(2); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, above n 47, at Rule 98(3). 
146 Rome Statute, art 75(2); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, above n 47, at Rule 98(3). 
147 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, above n 47, at Rule 98(2), 98(3) and 98(4).  
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so may provide assistance to victims and their communities on its own accord (within an 
active situation of the Court and not inconsistent with the rights of any accused).148 The 
Fund may also consider the views of victims and their families when fulfilling its role.149 
In its first order for reparations to date (March 2015), the International Criminal Court 
fleshed out its general principles relating to reparations.150 The Appeals Chamber noted that 
reparations must be ordered and implemented with full consultation with victims and their 
communities.151 Reparations (whether restitution, compensatory, rehabilitative, or 
symbolic) must be prompt, appropriate, and proportional to the harm caused to the victim 
and their communities.152 Additionally, reparations aimed at community programmes should 
“reflect local cultural and customary practices unless these are discriminatory, exclusive or 
deny victims equal access to their rights”.153 In the particular case of Prosecutor v Lubanga 
Dyilo, all modalities of reparations were made against Lubanga (convicted for inter alia the 
recruitment of child soldiers).154 For example, the Court ordered reparation in the form of 
rehabilitation measures; to reintegrate former child soldiers back into their society, to 
address their shame and victimisation, and to include education programmes implemented 
                                                          
148 International Criminal Court Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims ICC-ASP/4/Res.3 (2005) at 
[50(a)(i)]; See also, Evans, above n 40, at 106.  
149 Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims above n 147, at [49].  
150 Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo (Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo) Annex A: Principles of 
Reparations ICC Appeals Chamber ICC-01/04-01/06-3129 3 March 2015: [ICC Reparation Principles]; 
Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo (Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo) Submission on reparations issue 
ICC Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/06-2879, 10 May 2012 at [4]. 
151 ICC Reparation Principles, above n 150, at [29]-[32]. 
152 At [44]-[45]. 
153 At [47]. 
154 Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo (Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo) Annex A: Order for 




within the victims’ community.155 The Trust Fund for Victims has been ordered to 
implement the reparation order.156  
Through its regulations, the Trust Fund has a mandate to partner with NGOs, international 
and national organisations to help provide assistance to victims and their communities in 
countries where the ICC investigates (situations).157 The Trust Fund for Victims takes a 
holistic view when providing assistance measures and projects. When deciding on such 
projects, the Trust Fund’s board of directors158 will consider the wider context (for example, 
conflict, post-conflict, post-disaster, human rights crimes) and take into consideration a 
number of factors when developing responses. Such factors include, transitional justice, 
gender mainstreaming, the physical, mental and social wellbeing of victims, economic 
security, material support (food and shelter), and wider peace and reconciliation of victim 
communities.159 Examples of current Trust Fund programmes (partnered with the 
appropriate international and national organisations) include employment skills training, 
financial literacy education and groups dedicated to assisting survivors of sexual violence 
with reintegration.160 Moreover, local outreach programmes to reduce stigmatisation of 
sexual violence has also been a key aspect of the Trust Fund’s work.161 The focus of such 
                                                          
155 Order for Reparations, above n 154, at [67(iii)]-[67(v)]. 
156 At [68]-[70] and [73]-[74]; a draft implementation plan of these reparations is currently being worked on 
by the Trust Fund for Victims see “TFV Board of Directors meets to discuss Lubanga reparations plan” (press 
release, 27 July 2015) available online <www.icc-cpi.int>. 
157 Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, above n 148, at [50].  
158 The Trust Fund’s board of directors are made up of five members, representing the five major world regions 
(currently, Asia, Africa, Americas and Caribbean states, Eastern European states, and Western European and 
“other” states) see J McCleary-Sills and S Mukasa External Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Victims 
Programmes in northern Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo: Towards a Perspective for 
Upcoming Interventions (International Center for Research on Women, The Hague, 2013) at 10. 
159 See generally The Trust Fund for Victims “A Road to Recovery: Healing Empowerment and 
Reconciliation” Programme Progress Report (Winter, 2014); The Trust Fund for Victims TFV Strategic Plan 
2014-2017 (The Hague, 2014).  
160 “A Road to Recovery: Healing Empowerment and Reconciliation” above n at 5; see for example, “The 
Trust Fund for Victims Launches New Assistance Projects in Northern Uganda” (press release, 3 July 2015) 
available online <www.icc-cpi.int>. 
161 Assembly of State Parties Resolution on Victims and affected Communities, Reparations and Trust Fund 
for Victims ICC-ASP/13/Res.4 (2014) at 8; TFV Strategic Plan 2014-2017, above n 159, at 20-21. 
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programmes is community leadership and participation, which has been highlighted as one 
of key aspects of the perceived success of the Trust Fund.162 
In terms of response to gendered violence, the Trust Fund’s measures have emphasised the 
empowerment of women and girls. Such measures include financial literacy for financial 
independence and community leadership.163 Therefore, the development of programmes and 
assistance seek to involve the full participation of local women and girls.164 This can help 
dismantle gendered stereotypes which foster violence against women, and provide a more 
complete perspective for implementation strategies.165 The ICC Trust Fund itself places its 
reparations programmes within the structure of “gender justice”; therefore, remedies that 
aim to acknowledge the context of unequal power dynamics based on gender and to avoid 
magnifying such inequalities.166 
The ICC Trust Fund’s approach has both expanded and challenged the traditional concept 
of reparations for victims with its focus on rehabilitation (which have often been limited to 
restitution and compensation).167 The Trust Fund’s notion of “transformative” justice has 
been drawn from several sources, particularly from human rights norms. As discussed 
above, the approach to victim reparations taken by the Special Rapporteur on Violence 
against Women has been with particular emphasis on long-term remedies and includes those 
aimed at changing negative social/economic/cultural structures that foster gendered 
violence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has also had some influence on the 
Trust Fund. In 2009, the Court held that to be effective remedies should be awarded in light 
                                                          
162 McCleary and Mukasa, above n 158, at 8.  
163 At 34. 
164 “A Road to Recovery: Healing Empowerment and Reconciliation” above n 160, at 4; TFV Strategic Plan 
2014-2017, above n 159, at 20-21; Resolution on Victims and affected Communities, Reparations and Trust 
Fund for Victims, above n 161, at 8; McCleary and Mukasa, above n 158, at 13. 
165 McCleary and Mukasa, above n 158, at 34. 
166 E Rehn “Speech: Achieving Gender Justice: The Case of Reparations” 57th Session of the Commission on 
the Status of Women (2013) at 3.  
167 Hoyle and Ullrich, above n 9, at 13. 
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of the context of “structural discrimination” and that reparations should be aimed at 
changing the situation.168 
Additionally, the ICC Trust Fund is influenced by the Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and 
Girls’ rights to a Remedy and Reparation.169 The Declaration arose out of a meeting between 
women’s rights organisations and survivors of war-time sexual violence from Asia, Europe, 
South and North America, and Africa.170 Primarily the instrument concerns implementation 
of the right to an effective remedy in the context of sexual violence during armed conflict. 
The Declaration is meant to reflect existing norms in relation to effective remedies, 
specifically within the context of armed conflict impacts on women and girls.  
The Nairobi Declaration acknowledges that states have an obligation to provide a remedy 
for victims, but goes further to suggest that this is a responsibility for the international 
community to share.171 The Declaration’s Preamble notes the wider context of negative 
gender stereotypes and the detrimental impacts of discrimination rooted in culture and 
religion on women and girls during and post conflict.172 Such negative impacts are magnified 
once sexual exploitation or abuse has been committed. The Declaration also supports 
transformative reparations:173 
… reparation must drive post-conflict transformation of socio-cultural injustices, and 
political and structural inequalities that shape the lives of women and girls that 
reintegration and restitution by themselves are not sufficient goals of reparation, since 
                                                          
168 Case of Gonzales et al (“Cotton Field”) v Mexico (2009) Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Ser C) 
No 205at [450].  
169 Nairobi Declaration, above n 83; Noted by Chambers in Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo (Decision Establishing 
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at [185], [192] and [209]. 
170 Nairobi Declaration above n 83.  
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172 At Preamble; see also generally V Couillard “The Nairobi Declaration: Redefining Reparations for Women 
Victims of Sexual Violence” (2007) 1 The International Journal of transitional Justice 444. 
173 Nairobi Declaration, above n 83, at Declaration 3.  
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the origins of violations of women’s and girls’ human rights predate the conflict 
resolution. 
Moreover, the Declaration notes that “political and structural inequalities” that harm 
women and girls should also be incorporated in reparations.174 Not only should the context 
be taken into account when deciding reparations, but also the harmful long-term 
consequences of gender-based crimes on victims and their communities.175 Victims 
themselves should be involved in every stage of the reparations process, both in its 
development and implementation.176 This not only supports the principle of host state 
ownership but also supports women and girls’ empowerment and participation during a 
rebuilding stage post-conflict generally.177 
Overall, the ICC Trust Fund for Victims focuses on transformative and forward-looking 
reparations. This goes further than just immediate or emergency care for victims. The 
Trust Fund takes a holistic view of human rights violations, victims and their communities 
to tackle the wider context that fosters such violations. In relation to sexual violence, this 
view is similar to that under international human rights norms which support reparations 
that have transformative goals. Remedies that are rehabilitative and forward-thinking can 
help dismantle cultural or societal structures that foster gendered violence. Moreover, this 
trend places host state ownership and victim empowerment at its core. These policies and 
strategies align with the principle of host state ownership and are inclusive of victims and 
their communities. The Trust favours working with local organisations and communities 
which legitimises its reparations and its transformative goals.  
                                                          
174 At [3(h)]. 
175 At [3(e)]. 
176 At [2(A),(B)]. 
177 At [1(D)]. 
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(D) VICTIMS OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE: STATUS QUO 
Certain parallels can be made between the ICC Trust Fund and the UN Strategy on victims 
of sexual exploitation and abuse. However, the current direction of the UN Strategy and its 
lack of full implementation mean that the UN response has fallen short of the kind of 
reparations and assistance expected under international human rights norms as described 
above. Arguably, more needs to be done to adequately address victims’ needs. 
The 2005 Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Zeid Report) highlighted the need for the UN to 
look at providing victim assistance.178 However, the report also noted that (at that stage) the 
organisation did not have the mandate to provide full victim support, and instead favoured 
emergency medical assistance and referrals to local networks to provide comprehensive 
care.179 Nevertheless, since 2005 the approach from the UN has been to look at 
implementing a wide-ranging approach to provide victim assistance.  
Building on the Zeid Report, the United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and 
Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Staff and Related Personnel 
purports to introduce “bold measures” to respond to victims.180 When the draft UN Strategy 
was submitted for discussion in 2006, Kofi Annan asserted that a “truly comprehensive 
approach will leave no uncertainty for the victims and will restore the reputation of the 
Organization [UN] as one that acts responsibly towards the communities it serves.”181   
                                                          
178 Secretary-General A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations GA A/59/710 (2005) [Zeid Report] at [52]. 
179 At [53]-[56].  
180 Kofi Annan Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their Aspects 
Letter dated 25 May 2006 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly GA A/60/877 
(2006) at 2. 
181 At 2.  
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The 2006 draft policy noted that there has been no previous coherent system for victim 
support, and the UN Strategy is an attempt to fill that gap with a “system-wide 
comprehensive approach to victim assistance”.182 The individual responsibility of 
perpetrators is not however circumvented by the UN Strategy.183 Instead, the UN’s role is to 
coordinate response to the individual needs of victims, working with local organisations 
which provide such support.184 
The UN Strategy highlights the importance of working within local (host state) organisations 
and networks which already provide emergency or immediate medical/psychological/legal 
support.185 The response to sexual exploitation and abuse may be different depending on the 
particular host state and the cultural/social context.186 Local community ownership over 
assistance and support of victims also helps with legitimacy.187 Working with local networks 
is important not only for host state ownership, but also to avoid alienating or discriminating 
against victims of gendered violence generally.188 Therefore, the UN’s position under the 
Strategy is to facilitate victim support through such networks, and to offer help in the 
creation of assistance mechanisms if gaps exist.189 It has since been confirmed that this does 
not mean the UN will fully fund the establishment of new victim support networks, but will 
provide proportionate funding whilst working with local organisations.190 It was envisioned 
                                                          
182 Kofi Annan Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their Aspects 
Letter dated 25 May 2006 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly GA A/60/877 
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that the UN will facilitate referrals between service providers using “Victim Support 
Facilitators” (individual roles).191  
Services for assistance should be implemented through a “victim-orientated” approach.192 
There are three categories for recipients of assistance under the UN Strategy; 
“complainants”, “victims” and “children born as a result of sexual exploitation and 
abuse”.193 The different categories reflect different stages of inquiry and corresponding 
forms of support. Complainants represent individuals who have alleged they have been 
sexually exploited or abused, whose complaint has not yet been verified by an administrative 
process (either UN or Troop-Contributing Country).194 Under the UN Strategy, 
complainants are entitled to emergency or immediate care, including medical, 
psychological, social, and legal assistance and protection, such as shelter.195  
“Victims” under the UN Strategy are individuals whose claim has been verified (or the 
category seems appropriate) by an administrative, civil or criminal process.196 Victims are 
entitled to additional support, depending on individual needs.197 However, the 2006 draft 
Strategy had referred to forward-looking support for victims; such as continued education, 
vocational skills training and assistance with the goal of reintegration back into the 
community.198 This reference was excluded in the final version of the UN Strategy adopted 
in 2008. The final Strategy fails to acknowledge the reparative type of support which would 
                                                          
191 2008 UN Strategy, above n 183, at [12]. 
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align with reparations under international human rights norms associated with violence 
against women.  
Children born from sexual exploitation and abuse are also entitled to basic assistance 
(medical, psychological, social, and shelter) under the 2008 UN Stratgey.199 Moreover, the 
UN is committed to working with member states to facilitate the pursuit of child support and 
paternity claims.200 In the 2006 draft, there was an explicit link made between UN support 
and international human rights law involving the rights of children. Articles 7 and 27 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child are specifically referenced in the draft, where states 
parties are required to take all measures to ensure children know and are cared for by their 
parents, and that maintenance for the child are recovered.201 The 2008 Strategy thus builds 
on these rights and obligations by facilitating paternity and child support claims.202 
In terms of implementation of the UN Strategy, progress has been slow. According to the 
Secretary-General, implementation should begin in two “phases”; the first is to map local 
networks in countries in which the UN operates; the second is to develop these services 
further, establish firm partnerships and take note of “lessons learned”.203 Currently, 
implementation is in its first phase. Information regarding the mapping of services has been 
sporadic; in 2009, there appeared to be a disparity between implementation progressions 
across host states. In the Democratic Republic of Congo for instance, a number of steps have 
been taken including the identification of pre-existing legal, medical and psychosocial care 
services, the hiring of an individual with the role of “network coordinator” and the 
                                                          
199 2008 UN Strategy, above n 183, at [8]. 
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202 At [25]-[27]. 
203 Report of the Secretary-General Implementation of the United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on 
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designation of focal points for implementation of the UN Strategy.204 However, in Timor-
Leste there was a complete lack of a formal network identified or established for responding 
to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse (with no explanation as to this absence).205 
Notably, the Secretary-General’s report indicated that the concept of sexual exploitation and 
abuse was not understood in many host state communities, which would make it difficult 
for victims to come forward for assistance and support in the first instance.206  
In 2012, some implementation progress was noted by the Conduct and Discipline Unit. Out 
of only five missions which conducted mapping of basic services for victims, three had some 
form of assistance described under the UN Strategy for the three categories of complainants, 
victims and children born from sexual exploitation and abuse. Those three missions were 
the UN Mission in Liberia, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the UN Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.207 Overall, more 
information is needed to develop a clear understanding of the services available and further 
develop. The information currently available appears to suggest that more needs to be done 
to establish consistency across host states in terms of what kinds of support services are 
available (and are proportionate to the need of victims). Currently, there is no system-wide 
implementation of the UN Strategy as intended. This was made clear in the Secretary-
General’s 2015 annual report, which notes that the failure of implementation has been due 
to a lack of resources.208  
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Currently, the response to victims depends on the level of support offered by organisations 
in the host state. Although the Memorandum of Understanding (agreement between the 
troop-contributing country and the UN) has detailed provisions relating to the criminal 
accountability of military personnel for sexual exploitation and abuse, it makes limited 
mention of accountability to victims. Article 7 sexiens notes that the TCC and the UN should 
cooperate in matters regarding paternity claims involving military contingent members 
(involving sexual exploitation and abuse or otherwise).209 Until the UN Strategy is fully 
implemented, basic material care is required from the UN and its partners.210 Such care 
includes referrals to local safe houses, medical care, counselling services, and legal support 
organisations.211 Such referral systems are the likely recourse that victims have outside of 
the current complaint mechanism which initiates investigation and (hopefully) prosecution.  
In the 2015 annual report on sexual exploitation and abuse, the Secretary-General, noting 
the lack of implementation of the UN Strategy, highlighted the need for a common funding 
mechanism.212 The Secretary-General reiterated that it is not the intention of the funding 
mechanism to provide compensation to victims, rather to help fund awareness raising, 
community outreach campaigns, and provide support and assistance to complainants, 
victims and children born from sexual exploitation and abuse generally.213 Although it is 
noted that best practice supports implementation of the UN Strategy through local 
organisations and networks, the lack of funding (from the UN) has meant that this has not 
been the case.214 Therefore, it is unclear whether the establishment of a new funding 
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mechanism will allow the UN to have more of a direct role in providing services to victims 
or whether it will likely fund permanent positions in the field as “focal points” for the 
prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse.215 The proposed trust fund for victims has since 
been preliminarily adopted by the UN and is to be implemented sometime in 2016.216 It 
remains to be seen whether the funding system will help or hinder the implementation of the 
UN Strategy. 
(I) CHILDREN BORN AS A RESULT OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE 
Children fathered through acts of sexual exploitation and abuse is a relatively under-
researched issue.217 Also known as “peacekeeper babies”, children born from sexual liaisons 
between local women and peacekeepers can also be a result of consensual relationships, 
however fathers may have been redeployed or otherwise disappeared.218 The consequences 
for women and girls left with children from such relationships (and sexual exploitation and 
abuse) can be harmful; for example, in communities where unmarried women with children 
are ostracised or stigmatised it is more difficult to seek out opportunities for employment or 
assistance.219 Before the UN Strategy, the abandonment of such mothers and their children 
by peacekeepers (from consensual relationships or otherwise) was seen by UN officials as 
“exploitative” conduct.220 Although the Strategy now makes the distinction with the specific 
category “children born as a result of sexual exploitation and abuse” (thus, ruling out explicit 
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assistance for those children born out of consensual relationships), the annual reports from 
the Secretary-General suggest that the UN will facilitate paternity and child support claims 
regardless.221  
The distortion of the two seemingly distinct contexts of “peacekeeping babies” (those born 
as a result of sexual exploitation and those born as a result of a consensual sexual 
relationship) can be a reflection of the “women-as-victims” rhetoric that the UN has taken 
up when conceptualising sexual exploitation and abuse.222 The perception that all local 
women and girls are “inherently vulnerable” has the potential to fuel further discrimination 
against women, rather than help dismantle such structural inequalities.223 Arguably, the 
ambiguity in such conceptualisation makes it difficult to adequately provide effective 
remedies to mothers. The position of children born out of sexual exploitation and abuse in 
regards to receiving remedies is even less coherent. 
Arguably, “peacekeeping babies” are a unique category of “victims” under human rights 
legal theory. A comparison could be made with “war babies”; where children are born out 
of sexual abuse committed during armed conflict. While such children are often in need of 
specific assistance as they can suffer stigmatisation of being born out of rape, there is relative 
silence regarding response to their needs.224 As such, reparations for children born of 
wartime rape are ambiguous and therefore cannot be compared to those expected in response 
to children fathered by peacekeepers by acts of sexual exploitation and abuse. Moreover, 
due to the lack of a wider context in human rights law in which to draw from, apart from 
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very general rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the UN cannot be 
expected to respond in a particular way.225  
Regardless of the lack of guidance from human rights norms, the UN has in the past 
suggested assistance to children born from sexual exploitation and abuse beyond just 
facilitating paternity and child support claims. For example, the draft Strategy included 
provisions on basic assistance for such children (medical, psychosocial, and legal) and in 
“exceptional cases” financial assistance.226 However, these provisions were dropped in the 
adopted version and there appears to be little interest by the UN to implement such assistance 
mechanisms in the future. 
(II) SUMMARY OF THE STATUS QUO 
The current arrangements find certain parallels with the ICC Trust Fund, particularly with 
the UN Strategy’s focus on working with existing local organisations in providing assistance 
and support to victims. However, transformative or forward-thinking support mechanisms 
are missing from the current Strategy. Mechanisms such as skills training or further 
education would support full rehabilitation or reintegration of victims back into the 
community. Although compensation has been mentioned as appropriate reparations by some 
international human right bodies, the ICC Trust Fund has been successful in 
“transformative” reparations and so perhaps it would be more suitable for the UN to channel 
funds into forward-thinking rehabilitative assistance mechanisms. Moreover, victims of 
sexual exploitation and abuse may want more than financial compensation.227 As such, 
                                                          
225 Although, sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers may be distinguished from “war babies” as sexual 
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reparations should go towards “re-humanising” victims.228 For example, although the UN 
has established in-house training and awareness raising among their personnel about sexual 
exploitation and abuse,229 nothing suggests that this has been linked to transforming 
communities or dismantling harmful masculinities that foster violence against women.  
Working with local community organisations will help foster host state ownership over 
response systems. Moreover, it allows for flexible responses depending on the unique 
circumstances of each host state. However, for the UN to take leadership in implementing 
responses to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by their peacekeepers there needs to 
be a fully comprehensive scheme in place. At the moment, the support in place for victims 
is highly dependent on the host state’s established networks. 
More research needs to be done in the area of “peacekeeping babies”. Children born out of 
sexual exploitation and abuse may need specific kinds of support and should be included in 
any forward-thinking reparations.  
(E) REPARATIONS AND ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND 
ABUSE 
In addition to victim participation under a hybrid court for peacekeepers, I argue that the UN 
should also implement a reparation scheme in response to sexual exploitation and abuse. 
Moreover, the UN should also expand on the Strategy for assistance to provide adequate 
support for victims and their communities.  
Whereas under the status quo a victim of sexual exploitation and abuse may not receive any 
support (as such assistance is inconsistent across host states), a UN body existing alongside 
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a hybrid court for peacekeepers might be able to fill that gap and apply reparations and 
assistance more evenly across host states. As sexual exploitation and abuse involves human 
rights violations it would be prudent to follow the trend for reparations as part of an effective 
remedy. This would mean reparations that are transformative in nature and focus on 
dismantling structural inequalities (both within peacekeeping operations and the host state) 
that foster violence against women.  
Within the host state, in order to achieve inclusivity and to follow international best practice, 
the UN can facilitate transformative reparations through local networks and organisations. 
In response to sexual exploitation and abuse, these reparations might be the provision of safe 
houses for victims of sexual violence or the implementation of vocational training for 
women, in order to foster more economic opportunities that are not transactional sex. Within 
peacekeeping itself, the UN might focus on addressing harmful masculinities within military 
forces that support a culture of discrimination against women and a reluctance to enforce 
standards. This may include further sensitising personnel to sexual exploitation and cultural 
and social factors that lead to abuse. It may be appropriate that individual victims under a 
hybrid court for peacekeepers also be awarded reparations, such as compensation.  Under 
the status quo, victims of sexual exploitation and abuse receive nothing.  
 
 
CONCLUSION: RESPONDING TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE 
The response to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse should be closely aligned with the 
principles I identified in Part One: justice being seen to be done, host state ownership and 
UN leadership. In order to improve accountability for victims, their communities, and host 
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states, these guiding principles should ensure a response centred on inclusivity, legitimacy 
and transparency. Below I have outlined the summaries of the two broad categories of 
responses to victims; participation during the criminal process and effective remedies.  
(A) PARTICIPATION 
For a special court for peacekeepers I argue it is necessary to incorporate victims of sexual 
exploitation and abuse into the process where appropriate. There appears to be an overall 
trend in international criminal justice towards giving victims a greater role. Moreover, 
incorporation of victims into the process supports the principle that justice should be seen 
to be done. Arguably, the mixed reparative-retributive model of the International Criminal 
Court is an appropriate guide to implementing victim participatory rights. Such rights 
include the right to information, the right to be heard, and the protection in which to fully 
participate. These rights closely align with the principles of host state ownership and justice 
being seen to be done, as well as being inclusive and transparent.  
The right to information can be addressed in two ways; awareness raising of sexual 
exploitation and abuse generally in order to sensitise communities to such conduct and to 
inform victims of their rights, the criminal process, and possible outcomes. The UN can take 
leadership here in the countries in which the organisation operates. The right to be heard can 
be incorporated by allowing for victims’ views to be expressed or considered before and 
during trial. Allowing victims to be heard can have both an empowering and rehabilitative 
effect, especially for vulnerable or marginalised groups (aligning with international human 
rights norms relating to effective remedies). The rights of victims must be however balanced 
with the rights of the accused to a fair trial. 
Safety is also an important aspect to victim participation. Victims of sexual crimes may be 
especially reluctant to face their perpetrators directly. This can be compounded if these 
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victims are subject to marginalisation or discrimination based on gender or wider structural 
oppression. Participation should be voluntary as some victims might be re-traumatised 
through engaging with the criminal justice system. A special court for peacekeepers would 
need to ensure the protection (physically, mentally, and emotionally) of both victims and 
witnesses.  
(B) REPARATIONS  
Under various human rights norms, victims of sexual exploitation and abuse have a right to 
effective remedies. For remedies to be “effective” they need to be made available and be 
enforceable. In responding to violence against women (which covers all forms of sexual 
exploitation and abuse) human rights bodies have focussed on rehabilitative and 
transformative reparations. Not only should victims have access to immediate and 
emergency material care (medical, legal and psychological) but also long-term or forward-
thinking reparations (such as education and vocational skills). Moreover, responses should 
take into consideration the wider context; reparations should not enforce pre-existing 
societal or cultural structures that foster gendered violence but instead aim to dismantle 
them. This includes negative stereotypes associated with hyper-masculinity in military 
forces (within peacekeeping) and also within the local community in which the UN operates.  
The UN should take leadership in responding to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. 
Arguably, the current UN Strategy for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse is not an 
adequate response. The Strategy itself has yet to be fully implemented and focusses on 
immediate or emergency care rather than long-term or forward-looking support.  However, 
the Strategy’s preference for working with local organisations in order to provide support 
and assistance to victims represents international best practice. Moreover, working with 
312 
 
networks within the host state, and involving victims and communities themselves in 
development, supports the principle of host state ownership and bolsters legitimacy.  
Finally, the definition of victims under the UN Strategy is narrowly linked to individual 
harm.230 Under the International Criminal Court and its Trust Fund for Victims, the 
definition recognises that the harm associated with human rights crimes can extend beyond 
the individual victim.231 Although sexual exploitation and abuse will directly harm the 
individual victim, such crimes can affect their family and the host state community. This is 
compounded by the fact that sexual abuse is committed by UN peacekeepers who are there 
to provide assistance and help prevent harm to the local population. By extending the 
definition of victims under the Strategy, the UN may be able to encapsulate the reality of the 
harm caused by sexual exploitation and abuse. Moreover, provision of transformative 
reparations can be more easily supported and legitimised.  
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CONCLUSION TO PART FOUR 
The three conceptual principles underling this thesis (justice being seen to be done, host state 
ownership, and UN leadership) are about inclusivity, legitimacy, and transparency. From 
the viewpoint of victims, their communities, and the host state, I have argued that a hybrid 
tribunal for peacekeepers best serves these principles.  
Unlike the status quo where victims and the host state (and the international community 
generally) are often ignorant regarding the outcome of sexual exploitation and abuse 
allegations, a hybrid tribunal operating within the host state itself will ensure justice is seen 
to be done. Embracing a structure that facilitates cooperation between the UN, TCCs and 
the host state will ensure both UN leadership and host state ownership. The jurisdiction of a 
hybrid court will also address the obligations under human rights law to criminalise, 
investigate and prosecute violence against women.  
A primary difference between my argued model of a hybrid tribunal and models argued in 
previous scholarship is the removal of TCC exclusive criminal jurisdiction. Instead of a court 
of “last resort” I have argued for a court of first instance with jurisdiction over sexual 
exploitation and abuse. A court with secondary jurisdiction will not materially change the 
accountability gap as TCCs would have to be deemed “unwilling and unable” to exercise 
jurisdiction. The evidence needed to prove a state was “unwilling” or “unable” to investigate 
or prosecute would cause lengthy delay and such delay would hinder the chances of 
successful prosecution. It would not improve accountability. 
Moreover, to align with human rights standards involving violence against women, it is 
necessary for the UN (or a hybrid court) to provide transformative reparations to victims. 
Unlike the current system where a victim of sexual exploitation and abuse may receive no 
314 
 
support or assistance, the UN should also implement standardised measures of assistance 
and reparations. Transformative reparations should target structural inequalities that support 
gendered violence within the host state (through local networks) and within peacekeeping 
itself. These measures will bolster the integrity of the UN as a human rights promoter, and 




PART FIVE: CONCLUSION AND FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
CONCLUSION  
The aim of this thesis was to explore various ways in which the United Nations can improve 
accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse committed by military contingent members 
within its peacekeeping personnel. Under the status quo, the troop-contributing country has 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over its military forces, currently preventing the UN from 
doing more than repatriating individual offenders. Ultimately, criminal investigation and 
prosecution is up to the whim of the particular TCC, and successful (or thorough) 
investigations and prosecutions have been few and far between. Instead, there is a culture of 
silence and a reluctance to enforce standards. The result is impunity and a lack of justice for 
victims and their communities. In this thesis I am seeking options for greater accountability 
to victims, their communities, and the host state. Moreover, I am focussing on the United 
Nations’ role in improving accountability. 
Past UN reforms aimed at increasing accountability have made some progress, but have not 
gone far enough to address the accountability gap. Drawing on previous scholarship and UN 
official reports, there are three broad categories of avenues for improvement; firstly that the 
UN should sanction states which do not investigate and prosecute their national personnel 
for sexual exploitation and abuse; secondly, alternative mechanisms to investigate and 
prosecute military contingent members should be pursued; and thirdly, victims should 
receive reparations and better assistance and support from the UN. 
Applying a feminist lens, I assessed these broad categories guided by three underlying 
principles. These principles are justice being seen to be done, host state ownership, and UN 
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leadership. These principles are about legitimacy and transparency in response to sexual 
exploitation and abuse, and inclusivity of the host state. Part Five summarises the key 
findings of this assessment.  
KEY CONCLUSIONS OF THE THESIS 
Having unpacked the UN’s definition of “sexual abuse” and “sexual exploitation”, Chapter 
Two illustrated that the definition of “sexual exploitation” is conceptually flawed and 
ambiguous. Taking a blanket prohibition on all transactional sex shuts down any 
engagement with the many reasons why local women engage in such transactions and diverts 
the focus away from the very relevant contextual issues (such as extreme poverty and 
harmful masculinities associated with militaries). Taking an anti-essentialist and 
intersectional feminist lens in Part One, I argued that not all transactional sex is necessarily 
“exploitative”; however the context of differential power that exists between peacekeepers 
and the local population cannot be ignored. Where sex is exchanged for assistance that 
peacekeepers have access to or which is otherwise owed to the local people, the abuse of 
trust and power in such a situation is exploitation. Therefore, in this thesis I took “sexual 
exploitation” to mean “survival sex”.  
In Part Two, I investigated whether the UN could or should sanction troop-contributing 
countries which fail to investigate and prosecute their nationals and made the following 
arguments; firstly, that there are obligations on states to exercise criminal jurisdiction when 
their military contingent members commit sexual exploitation and abuse. These obligations 
may be identified in the Memorandum of Understanding (between the UN and the troop-
contributing countries) and under international human rights law. Secondly, although these 
obligations exist, the coercive measures suggested by academics and UN officials 
(withdrawing troops and blacklisting states) fall outside legally endorsed responses (within 
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countermeasures). Thus, the laws of state responsibility and the responsibility of 
international organisations are not helpful in trying to achieve greater accountability. 
Coercive measures may still be employed as part of the “political strategies” of the UN, and 
may be the likely direction taken, in addition to naming and shaming states. However, it 
would seem that this “top-down” approach is not sufficient and only delivers a partial 
response.  The three conceptual principles are not reflected in these measures; although they 
involve UN leadership, they do not achieve justice being seen to be done and do not involve 
host state ownership.  
Part Three demonstrated that the conceptual principles may be better served by host state 
jurisdiction.  Trials performed within the victim’s community will assure that justice is seen 
to be done, and the host state would have at least some ownership over that process. 
However, host state jurisdiction may not always be possible, for example the host state may 
be in a post-conflict situation and be without a fully functioning criminal justice system. 
Instead, host state jurisdiction may need to be facilitated by an internationally-mandated 
structure. Part Three also considered the International Criminal Court. Although the ICC 
offers an existing formal structure for investigation and prosecution, it has too many 
limitations in the context of sexual exploitation and abuse by Peacekeepers. It is unlikely 
that this conduct would fulfil the tightly defined crimes listed under the Rome Statute or be 
included as a separate crime. The complementarity principle means that the ICC may have 
secondary jurisdiction, however the required evidence to prove that a state is “unable” or 
“unwilling” to prosecute their nationals would mean long delays. Finally, the discretion of 
the ICC Prosecutor favours prosecution of high-ranking officials in cases with a large 
number of victims. Overall, Part Three illustrated that while alternative mechanisms are 
desirable, sole host state ownership and the ICC are ultimately unsatisfactory and unlikely 
to improve accountability.  
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Part Four argued for a special court for peacekeepers. To improve accountability and provide 
a structure for facilitating aspects of host state jurisdiction (if applicable), it may be 
necessary to consider a hybrid tribunal for peacekeepers.  
A hybrid tribunal fulfils all three of my guiding conceptual principles. Justice is “seen to be 
done” because the tribunal would operate within the territory where the crime took place 
and would be witnessed by the victim and their community. Where appropriate, mixed 
personnel in investigation, prosecution, and day-to-day running of the court, including the 
host state community, would ensure host state ownership. UN leadership should be 
facilitated by administration of such a tribunal and initiation of a treaty or negotiation 
process in which to legally base a tribunal of this kind. A hybrid tribunal would offer a 
solution in which accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse is seen to be legitimate, 
is inclusive of victims, and is transparent to the international community.  
However, I also argued that a hybrid tribunal should have jurisdiction over military 
contingent members i.e. a court in the first instance. A court with secondary jurisdiction will 
not materially change the accountability gap as TCCs would have to be deemed “unwilling 
and unable” to exercise jurisdiction. The evidence needed to prove a state was “unwilling” 
or “unable” to investigate and/or prosecute would cause lengthy delay and such delay would 
hinder the chances of successful prosecution. Where past UN reforms have seemingly failed 
to improve accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse, it is perhaps time for member 
states to reconsider TCC exclusive criminal jurisdiction over their troops.  
In addition, Part Four considered the role of victims and argued for the participation of 
victims in a hybrid court for peacekeepers and the provision of transformative reparations. 
In an effort to achieve inclusivity of victims and bring further legitimacy to the criminal 
justice system, a hybrid court should also include restorative elements. This may mean the 
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realisation of victim participatory rights, such as the right to be heard, the right to 
information, and the right to be protected.  
Under the status quo, victims rarely receive any support. Therefore, Part Four argued that 
the United Nations should implement transformative reparations; ie forward-looking 
reparations aimed at dismantling structural inequalities that manifest gendered and sexual 
violence. In the context of peacekeeping, this may mean sensitising personnel to sexual 
exploitation and abuse and breaking down harmful masculinities that can exist within 
military forces. Moreover, UN partnering with local (host state) networks that provide 
emergency and long-term support for victims should be prioritised (in order to link with the 
principle of host state ownership). 






(1) RECOMMENDATION: THE DEFINITION OF “SEXUAL EXPLOITATION” NEEDS TO BE RE-
DRAFTED TO REFLECT THE PRIMARY TARGETED CONDUCT – SURVIVAL SEX 
 As a general comment, there is a notable gap in current international human rights 
law regarding survival sex. 
 The official definition of “sexual exploitation” under the Secretary-General’s 
Bulletin Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse 
needs to be redrafted or reconceptualised in order to reflect survival sex. 
 In an effort to re-draft the definition, the United Nations should engage in 
conversations about women’s agency in transactional sex involving their 
peacekeeping personnel. Thus, additional relevant empirical research should be 
conducted. 
 A new definition of “sexual exploitation” could be drawn from the reconceptualised 
definition used throughout this thesis; ie “sexual exploitation” as survival sex – 
specifically where sex is exchanged for assistance to which peacekeepers have 
access or which is already owed to the local population. 
(2) RECOMMENDATION: UN MEMBER STATES SHOULD CONSIDER A HYBRID TRIBUNAL 
FOR PEACEKEEPERS IN ORDER TO PROSECUTE CASES OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND 
ABUSE 
 This hybrid tribunal should be a court in the first instance rather than a court of “last 
resort”. 
 A hybrid tribunal could be legally based on an international instrument, embracing 
an “opt-in” or “opt-out” measure. 
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 The structure of the hybrid court should aim to support host state ownership and 
inclusivity (where appropriate). 
 An agreed procedure for investigation should be standardised and streamlined (ie 
one formal body to investigate). 
 A roster of relevant experts should be made available from which to draw 
international personnel. 
 A centralised registrar within the UN should be appointed, and such individual(s) 
should be mutually agreed by troop-contributing countries and host states. 
 The above re-drafted definition of sexual exploitation (and sexual abuse) should be 
included within the material jurisdiction of a hybrid court.  
 Victims should be consulted about charges, and have participatory rights realised. In 
addition, victims’ safety before and during trial should be prioritised.  
(3) RECOMMENDATION: THE UN SHOULD IMPLEMENT A REPARATION SCHEME AND 
INCREASED ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT FOR VICTIMS 
 A hybrid court should have the ability to award individual reparations. 
 In addition, the United Nations should implement rehabilitative reparations through 
local networks, such as safe houses for women who have suffered sexual violence. 
 Transformative reparations can also be used to address the context in which sexual 
exploitation and abuse occur, notably the socio-economic environment of the local 
population and the harmful masculinities that may be present within peacekeeping 
operations themselves.  
 
It has been over a decade since the reports of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by 
UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo prompted the UN to take action in 
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terms of institutional reforms. Reforms so far have failed to adequately improve 
accountability. A number of official reports indicate that there continues to be a culture of 
sexual exploitation within peacekeeping and reluctance to enforce standards. The time has 
come for serious consideration of a “hybrid” solution to improve accountability of offenders 




During the final stages of this thesis, the UN-requested Independent Review Panel report 
was released (17 December 2015) which directly relates to sexual exploitation and abuse by 
peacekeepers. As I am unable to offer extensive comment on this report due to time 
constraints, the following is an initial discussion regarding the report’s key 
recommendations relating to improving accountability of peacekeepers who commit sexual 
exploitation and abuse. This postscript is written within the same conceptual framework as 
the rest of the thesis; ie I apply a feminist lens, and am guided by the three underlying 
principles of justice being seen to be done, host state ownership, and UN leadership. 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL REPORT (2015) 
In April 2015, a report leaked by an NGO1 revealed year-old allegations against French 
peacekeepers in the Central African Republic (CAR) for the sexual abuse of local children.2 
The report further indicated that no investigation had been conducted by France. Moreover, 
the whistleblower of the allegations was promptly disciplined by the UN.3 After this report 
was caught by world media, French authorities launched an official investigation.4 As a 
result of the apparent lack of interest in following up these allegations when first reported, 
the UN requested an independent review of these sexual abuse allegations and the current 
response mechanism.5 The Independent Review Panel released its report in December 
                                                          
1 AIDS-Free World. 
2 Dr T Awori, Dr C Lutz and General P J Thapa Final Report: Expert Mission to Evaluate Risks to SEA 
Prevention Efforts in MINUSTAH, UNMIL, MONUSCO, and UNMISS (2013) leaked by AIDS-Free World 
March 2015 see AIDS-Free World Open Letter to Ambassadors of All United Nations Member States (16 
March 2015) <www.aidsfreeworld.org>.  
3 The whistleblower was vindicated months later see Colum Lynch “The UN Official Who Blew the Lid off 
Central African Republic Sex Scandal Vindicated” (17 December 2015) Foreign Policy 
<www.foreignpolicy.com>. 
4 K Willsher and S Laville “France Launches Criminal Inquiry into Alleged Sex Abuse by Peacekeepers” The 
Guardian (7 May 2015) http://www.theguardian.com/world.  




2015.6 The UN is currently considering this report and an initial response is expected 
sometime in February 2016.  
The Independent Review Panel indicated serious flaws in the response to these particular 
allegations and implicated failings across many UN agencies, including UNICEF, the head 
of the UN mission in the Central African Republic, and the UN human rights staff operating 
in CAR.7 With these apparent failings in mind, the Panel made recommendations aimed to 
improve the response to sexual exploitation and abuse committed by all categories of UN 
peacekeeping personnel. In particular, the Panel was interested in centralising the role of the 
UN in its response to allegations.  
The relevant recommendations are:8 
 Acknowledge that sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, whether or not the 
alleged perpetrator is under UN command, is a form of conflict related sexual 
violence to be addressed under the UN’s human rights policies. 
 Create a Coordination Unit in OHCHR reporting directly to the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights to oversee and coordinate responses to conflict related sexual 
violence, including: 
o Monitoring, reporting and follow up on allegations of sexual abuse; 
o Analysing data with a view to tracking trends and practices for the purpose 
of improving prevention and accountability; and 
o Following up on the implementation of the Panel’s recommendations. 
                                                          
6 M Deschamps, H B Jallow and Y Sooka Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: 
Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in 
the Central African Republic (December, 2015). 
7 At i. 
8 At xv-xvi. 
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 Create a working group to support the Coordination Unit made up of experts 
(including specialists skilled in addressing sexual violence by international forces), 
and representatives of TCCs. The working group should: 
o Develop a single policy harmonising the sexual exploitation and abuse and 
human rights policies; and 
o Develop processes promoting criminal accountability for sexual violence. 
 Establish, under the authority of the Coordination Unit, a professional investigative 
team available for immediate deployment when conflict related sexual violence by 
peacekeepers is reported. 
 Establish a Trust Fund to provide specialised services to victims of conflict related 
sexual violence. 
 Negotiate with TCCs provisions ensuring prosecution, including by granting host 
state countries subsidiary jurisdiction to prosecute crimes of sexual violence by 
peacekeepers. 
THE RECONCEPTUALISATION OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE AS CONFLICT 
RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
The Panel’s first recommendation calls for a reconceptualisation of sexual exploitation and 
abuse as “conflict related sexual violence”. The Panel argued that with this change sexual 
abuse by peacekeepers would need to be directly addressed under the UN’s human rights 
policies and that the UN would have obligations to “protect victims, report, and follow up 
on allegations” as a result.9 Currently there are two parallel policies that may apply when 
peacekeepers commit serious misconduct involving human rights violations. The first is the 
                                                          
9 At x. 
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zero-tolerance policy represented by the S-G Bulletin (if sexual exploitation and abuse)10 
and the second is the human rights policy framework flowing from multiple sources, 
including Security Council Resolutions on conflict related sexual violence.11 According to 
the Panel, the isolation of sexual exploitation and abuse from general UN human rights 
policies denies the seriousness of such conduct and removes the UN’s obligations to follow-
up accountability.12 The Panel has recommended that these two policies should be 
harmonised so the UN will be obligated to respond to sexual exploitation and abuse 
allegations in a “robust and meaningful way.”13 Such obligations include prompt 
investigation of allegations, reporting (internally and publically), and follow-up 
“irrespective of the affiliation of the perpetrator.”14 The discharge of these obligations would 
be within the mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR).15 
Conflict-related sexual violence has been defined by the UN as the following:16 
Conflict-related sexual violence refers to incidents or patterns … of sexual 
violence, that is rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity 
against women, men or children. Such incidents or patters occur in conflict or 
post-conflict settings or other situation of concern (e.g. political strife). They also 
have a geographical and/or causal link. In addition to the international character 
                                                          
10 At 22-27; United Nations Secretary-General’s Bulletin Special Measures for Protection from Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse SG B ST/SGB/2003/13 (2003). 
11 For example, Security Council Resolution 1820 SC S/Res/1820 (2008); Security Resolution 1888 SC 
S/Res/1888 (2009); Security Council Resolution 1889 SC S/Res/1889 (2009); Security Council Resolution 
2106 SC S/Res/2106 (2013); Security Council Resolution 2122 SC S/Res/2122 (2013). 
12 Deschamps, Jallow and Sooka, above n 6, at iii and x. 
13 At 27. 
14 At 27. 
15 At 27. 
16 Report of the Secretary-General Conflict-Related Sexual Violence GA A/66/657-S/2012/33 (2012) at [3]. 
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of the suspected crimes (which can, depending on the circumstances, constitute 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, acts of genocide or other gross violations of 
human rights), the link with conflict may be evident in the profile and motivations 
of the perpetrator(s), the profile of the victim(s), the climate of impunity/State 
collapse, cross-border dimensional and/or the fact that they violate the terms of a 
ceasefire agreement. 
This is the definition also adopted by the Independent Review Panel. The Panel argued that 
sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers (mostly international personnel) 
in a post-conflict setting such as the Central African Republic is conflict related sexual 
violence.17 Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers has been commented on by the 
Global Study on Security Council Resolution 1325 and briefly included in some of the 
Security Council Resolutions on conflict related sexual violence.18 This further supports the 
Panel’s view that sexual exploitation and abuse should be reconceptualised as such.  
Interestingly, the Panel does not offer or request that the definition of sexual exploitation 
and abuse itself be modified, but presumably intend that it be subsumed into the above 
definition of conflict related sexual violence. If the latter is the case, and the UN removed 
the current definition of sexual exploitation and abuse altogether and replaced it with its 
current policies regarding conflict related sexual violence, then many of the criticisms 
regarding “sexual exploitation” would be partially remedied. In particular, “sexual 
exploitation” under the S-G Bulletin has been criticised for being broad enough to 
potentially include consensual adult sexual relationships between peacekeepers and the local 
                                                          
17 See Deschamps, Jallow and Sooka, above n 6, at 4-5. 
18 A Global Study on the Implementation of United nations Security Council Resolution 1325 Preventing 
Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace (UN Women, 2015) at 132-157; see also Security Council 
Resolution 1888, above n 11. 
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population.19 The definition of conflict related sexual violence does not include ambiguous 
phrasing about exchanging sex for assistance, nor does it include an emphasis on the equally 
ambiguous “exploitative relationships” as the S-G Bulletin does. Moreover, sexual slavery 
and enforced prostitution may possibly be interpreted to include survival-sex-type 
relationships (a key element of “sexual exploitation” in the S-G Bulletin).  
In international criminal law, sexual slavery and enforced prostitution refer to situations 
where a woman or girl is forced to exchange sex for their own safety or survival.20 In reality, 
these women may not be regarded as prostitutes; however, due to the context, where men 
might have the “dominant position of power” and access to the safety that victims are 
dependent on, the victim may be deemed a sexual slave.21 Such a description can easily be 
compared with survival sex in peacekeeping missions. Peacekeepers are in a position of trust 
and have access to assistance and material goods that the local population does not. 
Moreover, survival sex creates a cycle of dependency.22 However, as will be discussed 
below, sexual slavery and enforced prostitution are tied to a particular context and may in 
fact exclude young women who engage in survival sex with peacekeepers. Moreover, the 
Independent Review Panel was responding to allegations of sexual abuse of children, 
although the conduct under review resembled survival sex scenarios, the Panel’s focus was 
clearly on the age of the victims in question.23 The Panel did not consider survival sex in 
general or the question of young women engaging in survival sex.  
                                                          
19 See discussion in Chapter Two: Concepts. 
20 N Quenivet “The Dissonance between the United Nations Zero Tolerance Policy and the Criminalisation of 
Sexual Offences on the International Level” (2007) 7 International Criminal Law Review 657 at 671.  
21 See Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice in the International Criminal Court Recommendations and 
Commentary Preparatory Committee (December, 1997) PART III at WC.5.6. 
22 Secretary-General A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations GA A/59/710 (2005), prepared by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein [Zeid 
Report] at [6]. 
23 Deschamps, Jallow and Sooka, above n 6, at 4-8. 
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As noted above, the Security Council has in its Resolutions on conflict related sexual 
violence included sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, urging troop-contributing 
countries “to take appropriate action, including pre-deployment and in-theater awareness 
training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving 
their personnel.”24 Although seemingly acknowledging the link between sexual exploitation 
by peacekeepers and conflict related sexual violence, the Security Council places 
responsibility for criminal accountability solely on member states. This is in contrast to 
conflict related sexual violence more generally, in which the UN regularly investigates, 
monitors and reports on. Investigations are not criminal investigations as criminal 
accountability for conflict related sexual violence is still the responsibility of states. The UN 
monitors progress and outcomes of cases, and publicly reports its findings. 
The definition of conflict related sexual violence is a working definition used by the UN in 
its effort to monitor and report on such conduct. Obligations on states to investigate and 
prosecute such conduct in domestic criminal law come from international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law (not the Security Council Resolutions on conflict related 
sexual violence). The UN’s definition of conflict related sexual violence is much broader 
than the human rights and humanitarian treaties which provide obligations on states in 
relation to the conduct described. For example, forced prostitution and sexual slavery form 
part of the international crimes of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes.25 
These crimes have additional requirements, such as the conduct must form part of a 
systematic attack or a widespread policy to cause harm.26 Although survival sex involving 
                                                          
24 Security Council Resolution 1820, above n 11, at [7]. See also Security Resolution 1888, above n 11; Security 
Council Resolution 1889, above n 11; Security Council Resolution, above n 11; Security Council Resolution 
2122, above n 11. 
25 Quenivet, above n 20, at 671. 
26 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 17 July 1998, 
entered into force 1 July 2002) art 7. 
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peacekeepers in a post-conflict setting may sit with the UN’s definition of conflict related 
sexual violence as forced prostitution (therefore placing obligations on the UN to respond 
in a particular way), the same conduct may not fulfil the high threshold of crimes against 
humanity (therefore states will not have obligations to respond in a particular way). The 
same conduct, of course, would be considered violence against women under international 
human rights law, so obligations on states to act in due diligence to investigate and prosecute 
may arise there. However, such obligations rely on the particular conduct (such as survival 
sex) being incorporated into domestic criminal law.  
In sum, although the Panel’s recommendation to reframe sexual exploitation and abuse as 
conflict related sexual violence centralises the role of the UN and places obligations on the 
UN to investigate, report and follow up with TCCs, it does not place additional obligations 
on states to exercise their criminal jurisdiction in regards to such conduct committed by their 
military personnel. The principle of UN leadership is clearly strengthened by this 
recommendation. This reconceptualisation would enable the UN to name and shame non-
compliant TCCs in its public reports concerning conflict related sexual violence and thus 
add more political pressure on TCCs to hold their peacekeepers to account. Additionally, 
the transparency achieved by public reporting of allegations would further support 
accountability in the view of victims, the host state and the international community. 
However, criminal accountability is still up to the particular TCC and this recommendation 
does not, on its own, guarantee improving individual accountability; justice would not be 
seen to be done.  
As a final note on this recommendation, it is not clear whether survival sex involving young 
women and peacekeepers would fall within the definition of conflict related sexual violence. 
Without further comment from the Panel on survival sex involving adults, the 
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reconceptualisation of sexual exploitation and abuse as conflict related sexual violence may 
leave adult victims of survival sex without justice. Such a conclusion is unacceptable. If this 
was the eventual result of the Panel’s recommendation, then that would need to be remedied 
by redrafting the relevant definitions in order to explicitly include survival sex involving 
adults.  
A COORDINATION UNIT 
A second recommendation closely linked to the reconceptualisation of sexual exploitation 
and abuse is the creation of a Coordination Unit (within the OHCHR) “to direct and 
coordinate the UN’s response to all allegations” of conflict related sexual violence by 
peacekeepers.27 The Coordination Unit would presumably take the place of the current 
Conduct and Discipline Teams (operating in the field) in informing the relevant TCCs and 
kick-starting the investigation process. Moreover, the Unit would be supported by a working 
group tasked with harmonising the UN’s human rights policies with policies on sexual 
exploitation and abuse. The Unit would not only facilitate the response from TCCs and the 
UN but also be tasked with follow-up on cases and the communication of outcomes to 
victims and their communities.28  
Upon receiving an allegation, investigations would be conducted by a team of experts 
specialised in conflict related sexual violence.29 These teams would be promptly deployed 
in order to gather and preserve evidence, and be able to assist in criminal investigations.30 
Not only would these teams replace the Office of Internal Oversight Services’ response to 
sexual exploitation and abuse, but be specialised enough to conduct criminal investigations. 
                                                          
27 Deschamps, Jallow and Sooka, above n 6, at x. 
28 At 80. 
29 At 83. 
30 At 83. 
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The Panel does not indicate whether these teams would replace TCC investigation teams in 
allegations regarding military contingent members or whether they would be available only 
to assist.  
Placing a central response framework within the OHCHR clearly supports this thesis’ view 
that sexual exploitation and abuse is a human rights issue and requires a human rights 
approach. A central investigative team with expertise in crimes of a sexual nature would be 
beneficial as the current investigative structure is confusing and not specialised. It would 
also give a UN agency the capacity to conduct criminal investigations, further centralising 
the UN’s role in responding to sexual exploitation and abuse. The Panel does not comment 
on the host state’s possible role in these investigations, but does encourage direct and 
transparent communication and information sharing with victims and their communities, 
further supporting the participation of victims.  
A TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS 
The Panel confirms a victim’s right to a remedy, and although the Panel also acknowledges 
that victims are entitled to individual reparations it instead recommends a Trust Fund 
specifically for the provision of rehabilitative services for victims.31 The Panel does not 
comment further on the possible provision of other kinds of reparations, individual or 
otherwise. Nevertheless, this recommendation supports the argument that the UN should be 
doing more to protect victims and respond to victims’ needs and that the UN is best placed 
to provide some form of remedies.  
HOST STATE JURISDICTION 
                                                          
31 At 84-85. 
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Among its recommendations on individual accountability, the Panel suggests an alternative 
mechanism: granting host states secondary jurisdiction to prosecute.32 The Panel based its 
suggestion on the practice of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), where its 
Status-of-Forces Agreements (SOFAs) are negotiated so as to grant secondary jurisdiction 
to host states where a troop-contributing country fails to exercise its primary jurisdiction.33 
This thesis considered such a proposal in Chapter Six, and although this option will provide 
host state ownership and victims could see justice being done, such a proposal does not offer 
a clear enough structure to facilitate UN, host state and TCC cooperation. Nevertheless, this 
recommendation further supports the impetus for an alternative mechanism to prosecute 
individual peacekeepers.  
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
In terms of its terms of reference, the Independent Review Panel draws on the specific 
context of the UN mission in the Central African Republic, a post-conflict state. The 
allegations under scrutiny exclusively involve the sexual abuse of children. The Panel does 
not discuss sexual exploitation, or survival sex involving adults. I suggest that this absence 
impacts on the recommendations of the Panel, as they seemingly do not consider both 
“sexual exploitation” and “sexual abuse” when reconceptualising this conduct as conflict 
related sexual violence (which underlies the rest of the Panel’s recommendations). 
The Panel makes several recommendations that attempt to centralise the role of the UN when 
responding to sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers, thus further 
strengthening UN leadership. Host state ownership is also supported by the Panel’s 
recommendation that host states should have secondary jurisdiction over crimes committed 
                                                          
32 At 87-88. 
33 At 87. 
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by UN personnel on mission. Moreover, the report reinforces that victims are entitled to 
remedies and that the UN is best placed to provide them. However, the Panel’s 
recommendations do not go far enough to fill the accountability gap and may leave adult 
victims of sexual exploitation without justice. Additionally, the Panel does not seem to 
explicitly challenge TCCs exclusive (or primary) criminal jurisdiction over their military 
contingent members or consider an alternative structure for individual criminal 
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